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Peirce on the Passions: 
The Role of Instinct, Emotion, and Sentiment in Inquiry and Action 
Robert J. Beeson 
ABSTRACT 
 One of the least explored areas of C.S. Peirce’s wide range of work is his 
contributions to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This dissertation examines the 
corpus of this work, especially as it relates to the subjects of mind, habit, instinct, 
sentiment, emotion, perception, consciousness, cognition, and community. The argument 
is that Peirce’s contributions to these areas of investigations were both highly original 
and heavily influenced by the main intellectual currents of his time.  
      An effort has been made to present Peirce’s philosophy without apology, within 
the conceptual framework and idiom of its time, and without appeal to a comprehensive 
view that Peirce, whose notorious lack of perseverance resulted in many unfinished 
projects, never articulated. Nevertheless, as several noted interpreters have argued, much 
of this work can be viewed through the lens of Peirce’s innovative theory of signs and the 
notion of the semiotic triad as its central unifying feature, despite the fact that the general 
theory was itself under continuous refinement and remained incomplete at the time of his 
death. Another hermeneutical device employed is William James’ better known and more 
accessible work which, when juxtaposed with Peirce’s ideas, serves to bring them into 
sharper relief. 
 
v 
      While general and historical in the presentation of material, this study seeks, at 
the same time, to engage the criticism of contemporary Peirce scholars in an attempt to 
account for several of the conundrums inherent in Peirce’s work. Among the problems 
with implications for his philosophy of mind and theory of inquiry are the limitations of 
his theory of continuity, his negative view of the self, his somewhat ambiguous position 
on the relation of psychology to logic, and the metaethical puzzle arising from application 
of his theory of probable inference to truly fateful decisions. These problems provide an 
interesting perspective and lend balance to the truly insightful contributions Peirce made 
to the discovery of the mind.   
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Chapter One 
The Scope of the Project and an Introduction to Peirce’s Work 
     “He finished almost nothing, but he began almost everything.” 
--Hacking, Representing and Intervening 
 
A. The Scope and Structure of the Project  
 One of the many disciplines to which Charles Sanders Peirce lent insight and 
originality was psychology. “His interest in human nature was wide and varied, and, in 
his fragmentary way, he contributed notably to the study of various psychological 
problems – in particular, to problems relating to the threshold of sensation, and to various 
other problems of the psychology of perception.”1  Yet this is perhaps the least explored 
area of Peirce’s contributions. There has not been to my knowledge any book-length 
treatment of Peirce’s psychology despite his having written extensively on the philosophy 
of mind. It is the purpose of this dissertation to explore this largely neglected body of 
work especially as it relates to his theory of signs, his views on habit and instinct, his 
theory of abduction and his understanding of sensation, emotion, sentiment, self, and 
community.  
 A context for this dissertation will be Peirce’s doctrine of signs as an essential 
hermeneutical tool for understanding Peirce’s views of emotion and sentiment, 
                                            
 Epigraph. Ian Hacking,  Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983). 
 1. Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan, “Peirce as a Philosopher,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods 13 (1916): 702. 
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notwithstanding the incompleteness of his general theory of signs. The reason for using 
this theory as a backdrop for discussion of these matters is my agreement with David 
Savan that “the concept of the semiotic triad2 is the central unity in Peirce’s philosophy, 
from beginning to end,” and the closest thing we have to a constant in Peirce’s own 
methodology despite his constant refinement of the details.3  This is not to argue that 
there is an essential Peircean viewpoint. On the contrary, I tend to side with those  
interpreters of Peirce who for many of the reasons cited below, fail to find in his writings 
an indication of single-mindedness and instead see a great deal of disparity and 
occasional contradiction. This feature of Peirce’s work is, however, less marked in the 
semiotic which, while it evolved over the span of his career, remained the unifying 
feature of his work. “Peirce’s basic philosophical hypothesis is that everything is an 
actual sign.”4 Moreover: 
Peirce uniformly holds (1) that there is no such thing as a sign in 
isolation, every sign being a constituent of a sequential set of signs, so 
that apart from membership in this set, a thing has no meaning; and (2) 
that in the sequential movement of signs thus ordered, the meaning of 
the earlier ones in the series is provided by or constituted by the later 
ones as their interpretants, until a conclusion (logical as a matter of 
course) is reached. Indeed, Peirce adheres so consistently to this view 
that he says, more than once, that signs, as such, form an infinite series, 
so that no conclusion of reasoning is forever final, being inherently open 
to having its meaning modified by further signs.5 
 
 
 2. Following from Peirce’s assertion that all thinking is in signs and that everything is a sign, the 
triad is the structure and action of semiosis that is established from the relations that stand among the 
representamen (the sign), its object (the thing represented by the representamen), and an interpretant (the 
meaning of the sign). 
 3. David Savan, “The Unity of Peirce’s Thought,” in L.W. Sumner, John G. Slater, and Fred 
Wilson, eds., Pragmatism and Purpose (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 10. 
 4. Ibid., 11. 
 5. John Dewey, “Peirce’s Theory of Signs, Thought, and Meaning,” The Journal of Philosophy 43 
(1946), 88. 
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 I will endeavor to treat the subject matter in a critical manner, without attempting 
to provide a comprehensive position that Peirce himself never fully articulated. Instead, 
my intention will be to show how Peirce’s work addressed problems within the 
philosophy of mind of his own time and provided penetrating insight into some of these 
issues. I will thus seek to avoid what Thomas Dixon terms “presentism” or the imposing 
of “the assumptions, theories and terminologies of contemporary academic psychology” 
upon theories of emotion of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.6  This becomes 
extremely important in the matter of psychological language and categories where the 
equivocation of terms such as ‘sentiments,’ ‘feeling,’ ‘passions,’ ‘sensation,’ 
‘sentiments,’ and ‘emotion’ is unwarranted. The philosophical method herein employed 
will, therefore, be in part historical in nature and will begin in chapter two with a brief 
overview of the development of nineteenth century psychology. 
 Notwithstanding Peirce’s well documented debt to Kant and his comprehensive 
knowledge of the laboratory researches of Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann von Helmholtz, and 
Gustav Fechner (Wundt granted Peirce the translation rights to Vorlesungen über die 
Menschen- und Thierseele in 1869, Peirce translated a portion of Helmholtz’s Handbuch 
der physiologischen Optik in 1871, and made a study of Fechner’s Elemente der 
Psychophysik in 1869),7 I will argue that his views owe more to and are for the most part 
better understood in the context of nineteenth century British and American psychology.  
 
 6. Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13. 
See also his rationale for using the term ‘psychology’ to refer to pre-scientific uses of the term. 
 7. Max Fisch, “A Chronicle of Pragmaticism,” in Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. 
Kloesel, eds. Peirce, Semiotic and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), 119-120. 
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His writings on the topics covered in this dissertation were often in response to the claims 
of James and John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, William Hamilton and, 
of course, Charles Darwin. Chapter two will be a brief study of this history.  
 The case of Bain is of special interest in that his theory of belief was a cornerstone 
in the development of pragmatism by the Metaphysical Club of Cambridge in the early 
1870s. This Club, which counted among its members not only Peirce but Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., William James, Chauncey Wright, and attorney Nicholas Green, was well 
read in the writings of Bain.8  “[Green] eloquently urged the importance of Bain’s 
definition of belief as that upon which a man is prepared to act, from which pragmatism 
is scarce more than a corollary.”9  On the other hand, as we shall see, Peirce’s cognitivist 
psychology was strongly opposed to Bain’s physicalist associationism and when in 
critical retrospect, Peirce detected traces of psychologism in his early and best known 
papers on pragmatism he may have been thinking of Bain’s influence.  
 The brief history of psychology in the nineteenth century English speaking world 
presented in chapter two will be an attempt to trace its evolution from the moral 
sentimentalists of the late eighteenth century, through the 1820 Lectures on the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind by the physician Thomas Brown10  to its apex in the 1890 
 
 8. Fisch, “Alexander Bain and the Genealogy of Pragmatism” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and 
Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, 93. 
 9. Ibid., 81, and is drawn from CP 2.267, 4.233, 4.613. 
 10. Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: W. and 
C. Tait, 1820).  
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publication of William James’ Principles of Psychology.11  Here, I will rely heavily on 
two recent works: Thomas Dixon’s From Passions to Emotions12 and Rick Rylance’s  
Victorian Psychology and British Culture.  Dixon’s chief argument is that of a growing 
secularization within psychology that culminated in the creation of the category of the 
‘emotions.’  Rylance’s contention is that there were only two schools of psychology in 
Victorian England: the A priori School and Associationism.13  In this context, the drama 
of nineteenth century psychology is played out on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 The focus of this history will be on the development of the category of ‘emotion’ 
which appeared for the first time in the English language in Hume’s Treatise on Human 
Nature but was only refined in Brown’s Lectures “in which ‘emotions’ was the term 
adopted for all those feelings that were neither sensations nor intellectual states.”14  This 
development was important for a variety of reasons that will be explored in some depth. 
Essentially, experimental psychology was in its infancy and beginning to assert itself as a 
science and as such, developing a terminology apart from that of both philosophy and 
theology. The language of ‘passions,’ ‘affections,’ and ‘sentiments’ was giving way to a 
non-theistic, non-moral and non-cognitive understanding of ‘emotion,’ reflecting a 
growing secularism and the influence of Darwinism in intellectual circles. 
 Chapter three will examine Peirce’s general theory of signs, in particular his 
semiotic theory of emotion. This will entail an overview of Peirce’s three categories as 
 
 11. William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 
1890).  All references will be to Dover Publications edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1950). 
 12. Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 13. Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 41-43. 
 14. Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 23. 
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essential to understanding the semiotic –Quality or Firstness, Relation or Secondness, and 
Representation or Thirdness. Within the context of Representation are two of Peirce’s 
axioms asserted continually throughout his career. First, “all thought is in signs. We have 
no power of thinking without signs.”15  Peirce defined a sign in a number of ways.16   At 
one time he wrote, “a sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine 
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, 
called its Interpretant.17  But perhaps the most oft-quoted definition is that “[a] sign, or 
representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity.”18  
 Secondly, so pervasive is thought, so general is the theory of signs “… that, 
whatever else anything may be, it is also a sign.”19 Or as he put it on another occasion, 
“…this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.”20  So 
broad is Peirce’s understanding of sign as “to encompass the notion of self as a sign,”21 
an idea that will be explored in some detail in chapter four. From there it can be expanded 
further to embrace the concept of community as a social principle of logic and as product 
 
 15. CP 5.253, 2.265.  Note that “It was at the age of twenty-eight, in 1868, in the second number 
of the second volume of the first philosophical journal in the English language, that Peirce committed 
himself to this … doctrine that all thought is in signs; and in the remaining forty-six years of his life he 
found no reason to abandon it.”  Max H. Fisch, “Just How General Is Peirce’s General Theory of Signs?” in 
Ketner and Kloesel, eds., Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, 358. 
 16. “76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce,” collected and analyzed by Robert Marty; see 
Arisbe website, http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/resources/76defs/76defs/htm (accessed August 
2008). 
 17. CP 2.274. 
 18. CP 2.228. 
 19. Fisch, “Just How General Is Peirce’s General Theory of Signs?” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and 
Pragmatism, 357. 
 20. CP 5.448, endnote. 
 21. CP 5.313. 
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of the social instinct,22 and as the final arbiter of truth, a topic we will take up chapter 
seven. It can also be narrowed to incorporate pets, plants, pronouns and possibilities: 
All thinking is by signs; and the brutes use signs. But they perhaps rarely 
think of them as signs.23 
 
Even plants make their living … by uttering signs …24  
 
Pronouns are words whose whole object is to indicate what kind of 
collateral observation must be made in order to determine the 
significance of some other part of sentence. Which directs us to seek the 
quaesitum in the previous context; the personal pronouns to observe who 
is the speaker, who is the hearer, etc.25  
 
But other signs, such as the word “the,” in the sense in which “the” is a 
single word, consist, each of them, in something being possible. I call 
such things … “May-be’s,” perhaps better “Can-be’s”26  
 
As Peirce summarized so effectively: 
 
I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant in reference to the 
object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the 
object through the mediation of this “sign.” The object and the 
interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being 
antecedent, the other consequent of the sign.27 
 
It is clear from these quotations that for Peirce, semiosis is dual faceted. “Peirce was 
prepared to understand semeiosis in either of two ways: (1) from the side of the sign, as 
sign-action, the functioning of a sign, or (2) from the side of the interpretant, as sign-
 
 22. CP 5.311, 5.534; see Brent, Peirce: A Life, 73. 
 23. CP 5.534. 
 24. MS, 318, 205; quoted in Brent, Peirce: A Life, 311. 
 25. MS, 318; quoted in EP 2:406. 
 26. Letter to William James, 25 December 1909, quoted in EP 2:500. 
 27. MS, 318, quoted in EP 2:410. 
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interpreting or inferring from signs.”28  As Vincent Colapietro stated it: “Any interpretant 
can itself function as a sign; that is, represent an object and generate an interpretant.”29 
 It is the role of the interpretant that is the key to unlocking Peirce’s understanding 
of emotion as a sign of feelings rather than immediately intuited feelings, a view that 
Peirce firmly denied. As some critics have noted, Peirce suffered from triadomania, a fact 
that will become abundantly clear as we progress in our study. He saw three irreducible 
phenomenological categories where Aristotle had seen ten and Kant twelve. He saw three 
kinds of representations: icons, indices, and symbols or interpretants, and, predictably, he 
saw trichotomies of interpretants. One such trichotomy was (1) emotional  
interpretants, (2) energetic interpretants, and (3) logical interpretants. The emotional 
interpretant is a feeling or a quality, the energetic is an effort or activity, and the logical is 
a deliberately formed habit, a general. All three are closely connected to Peirce’s view of 
the emotions as signs.  
 Our examination of the interpretant will lead us into the study of Peirce’s 
classification of the sciences as another necessary component for understanding his 
psychology and his view of emotions as signs. This will be the subject of chapter five. 
Semiotic, which Peirce came to see as subsuming logic, is one of three normative 
sciences.  The others are aesthetics and ethics. As we will see, Peirce viewed logic, which 
is concerned with truth and whose good end is to represent something, as relying upon 
ethics for principles of self-control in performing correct reasoning. Ethics, which is 
 
 28. Fisch, “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs,” in Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism, 329 (italics 
mine).  
 29. Vincent Colapeitro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human 
Subjectivity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 57 
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concerned with the right and whose good end is self-regulated action, in turn relies upon 
aesthetics for the notion of the summum bonum. It is aesthetics, which is concerned with 
the beautiful and whose good end is feelings. The relation between logic and ethics is of 
particular interest as it provides a backdrop for the study of the essential role of sentiment 
and emotion in rational inquiry.  
 Collectively, the normative sciences are grounded in phenomenology and “its    
ubiquitous elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.”30  Metaphysics, as that 
which attempts to discern the reality of phenomena, represents the third grand division of 
philosophy, follows from the normative sciences. Psychology, upon which Peirce voiced 
disparate views, was usually placed with the special or observational sciences and seen as  
descriptive in nature. “Certainly it was no disparagement of psychology to place it lower 
than semeiotic in the classification of the sciences….”31  It was only being viewed as less 
general than semiotic. In its later development, Peirce’s interpretant was not necessarily 
an individual mind, an interpreter. To view it as such would be a violation of Peirce’s 
consistent opposition to psychologism, the view, so prevalent in his time, that logic is 
based on psychology. Yet Peirce’s supposed unequivocal opposition to psychologism is 
not above question. The doubt/belief dichotomy – the irritation of doubt that we seek to 
escape for the satisfaction of belief – which formed the basis of his 1878 iteration of 
pragmatism, and which was subject to his own later critical analysis, is just one example 
of how Peirce’s work was left open to lingering charges of psychologism, charges that  
 
 30. CP 5.121. 
 31. Fisch, “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs,” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, 343. 
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became more widespread as the more subjective forms of pragmatism gained in 
popularity. “The consistency and force of Peirce’s critique of psychologism, hence, 
depends in the last analysis on the cogency and legitimacy of his understanding of 
logic.”32  Pragmatism was, after all, developed by Peirce as merely a maxim of logic.  
… I make pragmatism to be a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime 
principle of speculative philosophy. In order to be admitted to better 
philosophical standing I have endeavored to put pragmatism as I 
understand it into the same form of a philosophical theorem.33  
 
Pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render 
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as 
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful 
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism 
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not 
understood as a proposition in psychology.34  
 
The question of Peirce’s psychologism will be raised in a variety of contexts throughout 
this work. 
 Our study of Peirce’s understanding of the interpretant will be expanded into the 
discussion of the place of sentiment and emotion in Peirce’s philosophy as indispensable 
to reason and, moreover, to basic decision making and action. This will be the subject of 
chapter six. This discussion will be set in a more general treatment of Peirce’s 
understanding of sensation which, in turn, will entail a study of Peirce’s belief that a  
capacity for feeling and a propensity for habit-taking are common to all protoplasm 
within the context of instinct, which Peirce sometimes referred to as “half-conscious 
 
 32. Vincent Colapietro, “C.S. Peirce’s Critique of Psychologism,” in Dale Jacquette, ed., 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 173. 
 33. CP 5.18. 
 34. CP 5.196. 
 
11 
                                           
inference.”35  The respective roles of instinct and habit and the theory of abduction as 
instinct will also be examined as will two notions Peirce borrowed from medieval 
philosophy and made extensive use of: logica utens and logica docens. As we will see, 
logica utens is closely tied to the notions of instinct and il lume naturale as the instinct 
for correctly guessing the laws of nature.  
 This will lead naturally into Peirce’s notion of the social instinct for community 
and his view of the scientific community of inquirers engaged in investigation and pursuit 
of the ideal of truth, the subject of chapter seven. Peirce was in this sense a 
communitarian. As early as 1868, he had galvanized this ideal community in his mind so 
that he proclaimed “[t]he individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only 
by ignorance and error … is only a negation.”36  The individual in isolation could not 
fruitfully or genuinely undertake the pursuit of knowledge, which was obtainable only as 
the individual identified his or her interests with those of the community of inquirers 
working through the ages: 
This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races 
of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate 
intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this 
geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his 
own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all 
his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle.37  
 
  Conversely, nine years earlier, Peirce had written, “He who would not sacrifice 
his own soul to save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the 
 
 35. CP 6.238-271, 6.570. 
 36. CP 5.317 
 37. CP 2.654. 
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social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.”38  In regard to the social principle, Peirce 
spoke of three logical sentiments presupposed in reasoning “namely (1) interest in an 
indefinite community (2) recognition of the possibility of this interest being made 
supreme, and (3) hope of the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity as 
indispensable requirements of logic.”39 He explained elsewhere that the notion of an 
indefinite community is the source of his understanding of reality and idealized truth.  
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning 
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the 
vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of 
reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a 
COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite 
increase of knowledge.40  
 
As he was quick to acknowledge, it may seem strange that a man of science would put 
forward three sentiments as requirements of logic. But, “when we consider that logic 
depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in action, must begin 
in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is 
that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse, why should 
we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasoning?”41   Chapter seven will 
further explore the foundational connection between emotion and correct reasoning, 
begun in chapter five, in the context of the indefinite community.  
  Far from presenting a unified, systematic theory of emotion, sentiment, passions, 
feelings, and instincts and their relation to reason, Peirce’s writings on these subjects are  
 
 38. CP 5.354. 
 39. CP 2.655. 
 40. CP 5.311. 
 41. CP 2.655. 
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fragmentary and merely suggestive. Indeed, we may occasionally find ourselves 
resonating with William James’ words to Henry Bowditch, the grandson of the famous 
mathematician and astronomer, Nathaniel Bowditch: 
I have just been quit by Charles S. Peirce, with whom I have been 
talking about a couple of articles in the St. Louis Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy by him which I have just read. They are exceedingly bold, 
subtle and incomprehensible and I can’t say that his vocal elucidations 
help me a great deal to their understanding, but they nevertheless interest 
me strangely.42 
 
These same essays, which contain much of Peirce’s most important thinking on these 
matters, and which will be examined in some detail are, to some degree, as James 
describes them. Yet, I will argue, they are insightful, like so much of Peirce’s work 
anticipatory of twentieth century themes, and thus important. For examples, we need only 
point to his cognitive view of emotion, the evidence of what some have taken as an early 
articulation of behaviorism, and his views on community that foresaw some of the basic 
tenets of sociobiology. We should bear in mind that “[s]ince Peirce was himself an 
experimental psychologist, perhaps the first on the American continent, and once thought 
of giving up logic for psychology,” his views on these matters, while never central to his 
philosophical pursuits, are nevertheless noteworthy.43 
 
 
 42. Henry James, ed., The Letters of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1920), 1:149 (letter dated 1/24/1869). 
 43. Fisch, “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs,” in Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism, 343. 
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B. Flashes against a Cimmerian Darkness:  
Coming to Terms with Peirce 
 The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce is, at turns, one of the most enigmatic 
and fecund bodies of work produced in the Anglophone world during the past two 
centuries. Peirce was an eccentric, “a strange and unruly being,”44  who, working almost 
continuously from early adulthood, produced over 80,000 pages of manuscript and 
12,000 pages of published papers on a wide range of subjects but managed to bring only 
one book into print, an 1878 collection of astronomical calculations and suggestions 
entitled Photometric Researches.45   Morris R. Cohen assayed the value of his labor and  
his place in American thought when he wrote, “If philosophic eminence were measured 
not by the number of finished treatises of dignified length but by the extent to which a 
man brought forth new and fruitful ideas of radical importance, then Peirce would easily 
be the greatest figure in American Philosophy.”46  His work, largely carried out in a 
penurious and eremitic existence as a result of his ostracism by the academy, is mostly in 
the form of essays and reviews. Josiah Royce, perhaps the only contemporary to possess 
a comprehensive grasp of Peirce’s thought,47 stated the obvious when he wrote: 
                                            
 44. William James quoted by Joseph Brent, in Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 16. 
 45. Nathan Houser estimates that Peirce’s extant writings would fill a hundred octavo volumes. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, The Essential Peirce, ed. Peirce Edition Project (1998), 2:xii. 
 46. William P. Trent, John Erksine, Stuart P. Sherman, and Carl Van Doren, eds., Cambridge 
History of English and American Literature: An Encyclopedia in 18 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press and New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1907-21), vol. 17, “Later National Literature,” Part II, 
“Later Philosophy,” §18, “Charles S. Peirce.” 26; see Bartleby.com, http://www.bartleby.com/227/ 
1018.html (accessed August 2008). The citation: Ward & Trent et al. The Cambridge History of English 
and American Literature (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907-21), New York: Bartleby.com, 2000, 
http//www.bartleby.com/cambridge (accessed July 2008).  
 47. In the first of his 1914 Berkeley Conferences, Royce made the following reference to a missive 
from Peirce after sending him his recently published The Problem of Christianity: “Peirce received the 
volumes in May, 1913. He was then slowly dying of an incurable malady. He wrote me a very kind letter of 
acknowledgment which I deeply prize, and which showed that my so belated effort to understand and to 
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It is not always easy to understand Peirce … Upon occasion he could be 
brilliantly clear in his expressions of highly complex and recondite 
problems, although this clearness was a capricious fact in his life and 
writings.  One finds this tendency toward what might be called 
“impenetrability” especially evident in his manuscripts. Too often the 
reader meets with a thought of surpassing brilliancy and follows it 
eagerly, only to have it disappear like the cuttlefish in an inky blackness 
of its own secretion.48  
 
 The problem stemmed from several factors. For one thing, Peirce seemed to 
delight in opacity. “He deliberately chose that most of his researches should be concerned 
with highly technical topics and should be secure from the intrusion of the uncalled.”49  
Peirce’s most original work was in logic, and it was as a logician that he wished always 
to be identified. Given the place of logic in nineteenth century American philosophy, this 
was enough to keep his readership small. After a lecture series on Pragmatism, which had 
been arranged for Peirce by Royce and William James at Harvard University so that he 
might advance himself professionally and procure some badly needed funds, James 
discouraged Peirce’s suggestion that the seven poorly attended lectures be published. 
Counting himself among those in the audience who had found the lectures abstruse, 
James wrote to Peirce “As things stand it is only highly skilled technicians and 
professionals who will sniff the rare perfume of your thought and, after you are dead, 
 
expound the side of his opinions which was in question in this book, had received, despite his feebleness 
and his age, a reasonable and an unexpectedly careful, although necessarily a very summary attention, and 
that my interpretation of him gained on the whole his approval.” Josiah Royce’s Late Writings: A 
Collection of Unpublished and Scattered Works, ed. Frank M. Oppenheim, (Bristol, England: Thoemmes 
Press, 2001), 2:4. 
 48. Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan, “Peirce as a Philosopher,” The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods 13 (1916): 707. 
 49. Ibid. 
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trace things back to your genius.”50  Peirce stubbornly resisted the repeated suggestion of 
James that he seek to gain notice through the popularization of his ideas. Ironically, it 
was James, from 1898 on, who was to gain notoriety from popularizing a few of Peirce’s 
leading ideas first presented in the lively discussions of the Metaphysical Club of the 
1870s to which both had belonged. For the most part, however, Peirce’s thought 
remained bewildering to James, who by his own admission had no head for mathematics 
and little interest in logic, and was experienced by him as “flashes of brilliant light 
relieved against Cimmerian darkness”51  Without James’ gracious attribution to Peirce as 
the source of Pragmatism, Peirce might well have become a footnote in the history of 
American thought.52  
 Another factor was Peirce’s “’incapacity for linguistic expression’ and the 
difficulty he had in putting his thoughts into words,” reflecting what he saw in himself as 
a peculiar bent of mind organically rooted in his left-handedness, a fact causing him to 
think diagrammatically rather than verbally.53  Though his prose could occasionally be 
elegant, Peirce was somewhat confounded by English and found it as challenging as any 
foreign language54 again believing it to be a reflection of his disposition. Peirce, in 
comparing himself to James, who was by contrast a splendid stylist, remarked, “Who 
…could be of a nature so different from his as I? He is so concrete, so living; I a mere 
 
 50. Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed., Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997), 16. 
 51. William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 5. 
 52. Ibid., 6. 
 53. Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 15.  
 54. See Beverly Kent, Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences, (Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), Appendix 2:207. 
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table of contents, so abstract, a very snarl of twine.”55  In a constant attempt at greater 
precision, Peirce was given to making up new terms to suit the purpose of the moment, 
stipulating the technical sense in which each term was to be understood only to later alter 
its meaning without notice, thus serving only the purpose of further obfuscation. In a 
1908 letter to the British semiotician, Lady Victoria Welby, Peirce recalled a chance 
encounter with the writer and critic W.D. Howells that serves to illustrate the problem. 
I remember one day, when I was in the twenties, on my way to the post-
office, I fell in with the novelist William D. Howells, who began by 
criticizing one of my articles from the point of view of rhetorical elegance. 
I said to him, ‘Mr. Howells, it is no part of the purpose of my writings to 
give readers pleasure.’ Such an idea was quite out of his horizon; and I 
heard of his repeating it as very amusing. People do not consult an 
encyclopaedia to be amused, but to receive definite instruction as 
condensed as clearness permits.56 
 
 Maryann Ayim observed that “one of the most characteristic features of Peirce’s 
writing is its organic nature. His ideas are so closely interwoven with one another that 
they can be fully grasped only within their total context, in their relationships with one 
another.57  Peirce was, as Richard Rorty has charged, a most traditional philosopher who 
was forever seeking a “first philosophy,” an epistemological ground for science in his 
reduction of the Kantian categories.58  His writings reflect a commitment to constant 
rearrangement of his arguments relative to his thinking about those categories. The result 
is less than a systematic presentation as Peter Skagestad summarizes very well: 
 
 55. CP 6.184. 
 56. CP 8.378. 
 57. Maryann Ayim, “Retroduction: The Rational Instinct,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 10 (1974): 39. 
 58. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota 
Press, 1982), 160-1. 
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Peirce was, or aspired to be, a systematic thinker. Consequently, his 
various fragmentary writings abound with cross-references, as well as 
references to an overarching ‘architectonic’ system, which is nowhere 
set fully set forth … [I]n the course of his long and productive career 
Peirce repeatedly changed his mind; these changes are sometimes 
acknowledged, sometimes not. At times even the acknowledgements are 
retracted, so Peirce changed his mind over whether or not he had 
changed his mind.59  
 
Hence, it is impossible to determine which of several versions Peirce consigned to paper 
is the one intended for interpretation. As Umberto Eco points out, “Peirce was compelled 
continuously to re-discuss and revise his ideas.  He felt a sort of psychological pleasure in 
challenging and re-defining his own formulas; it is rather difficult to find two separate 
passages on a same topic in which he does not contradict and re-propose what he has 
previously said.”60  The result is, at the very least, confusing. As Rulon Wells bluntly 
stated, “every student of Peirce has found inconsistencies in him; respects in which he 
‘talks out of both sides of his mouth,’ or tries ‘to have it both ways,’ or moves in different 
directions.”61  As we will see below, the hermeneutical problem is further compounded 
by the state of his literary remains and the fact that Peirce dated less than one fourth of 
his extant manuscripts.62  
 His linguistic disability which he believed stemmed from his left-handedness, is 
coupled with what Peirce referred to as his pedestrianism, his deliberate, tortoise-paced 
method of thinking which, late in life, he described in a letter to the mathematician 
Cassius J. Keyser: 
 
 59. Peter Skagestad, Road of Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 1-2. 
 60. Umberto Eco, “Peirce’s Notion of Interpretant, Modern Language Notes 91 (1976): 1457.  
 61. Rulon Wells, “Peirce’s Notion of the Symbol,” Semiotica 19 (1977): 198. 
 62. Thomas L. Short, Review article in Synthese 3 (March 1996) 106:409. 
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But I am left-handed; and I often think that means that I do not use my 
brain in the way that the mass of men do, and that peculiarity betrays 
itself also in my ways of thinking. Hence, I have always labored under 
the misfortune of being thought “original.” Upon a set subject, I am 
likely to write worse than any man of equal practice …I am not naturally 
a writer, but as far from being so as any man. If I have ever written 
anything well, it was because the ideas were exerting a tremendous 
tension, almost to the bursting point. Moreover, I write much better 
when I have a definite proposition to prove. It should also not be 
intricate; for otherwise my mental left-handedness makes me express 
myself in a way that to a normal mind seems almost inconceivably 
awkward.63  
 
In an unpublished manuscript, Peirce elaborated, revealing that he knew the brain’s left 
hemisphere is the normal center of speech: 
I will remark, by the way that I am led to surmise that this awkwardness 
is connected with the fact that I am left-handed.  For that my left- 
handedness is not a mere accidental habit, but has some organic cause 
seems to be evidenced by the fact that when I left the last school where it 
had attracted attention, I wrote with facility with my right hand, but 
could not write legibly with my left; and yet when I ceased to make the 
effort to continue this habit of three years standing, I soon fell back to 
using my left hand, though I have always used knife, fork, and spoon, at 
table, just as others do … [(crossed out) Now supposing that my cerebral 
organ of speech is on the left side as in other people …] Now, since my 
heart is placed as usual, it would seem that the connections between 
different parts of my brain must be different from the usual and 
presumably best arrangement; and if so, it would necessarily follow that 
my thinking should be gauche.64  
 
 The result was his propensity to approach work in a very deliberate, methodical, 
and self-critical fashion that required going over and over his results and repeatedly 
making modifications. In a letter to the British pragmatist, F.S.C. Schiller, Peirce 
described his philosophical approach in the following terms: 
I must tell you that my practice has always been when I had said my say 
on any subject, to turn round upon myself and say, “Oh, pooh! I don’t 
 
 63. Brent, Peirce: A Life, 43. 
 64. Peirce, MS, 632, quoted in Kent (1980), Appendix 2: 208. 
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believe a word of it,” and to devote myself seriously to trying to 
appreciate the other side of the question; after which I let my mind lie 
fallow about it for several years and then reexamine it. And this I do 
repeatedly.65  
 
 This fact of Peirce’s methodology can be maddening to those attempting to weave 
the dangling and incongruent threads of so many drafts into a unified thesis as evidenced 
by the many different results. His interpreters have not agreed on the essential nature of 
Peirce’s contributions or his identity as a systematic philosopher. Overall evaluation of 
Peirce’s work has ranged widely. Some interpreters claim to have discovered a 
continuous, unified theme in his work, while others have seen only the fragmented, 
unfinished, ambivalent and, ultimately self-refuting elements.66 By way of example, in 
Charles Peirce’s Empiricism67 Justus Buchler believed he had seen in Peirce an inchoate 
form of Logical Positivism. Conversely, Joseph Esposito in Evolutionary Metaphysics68 
believed that the unity was to be uncovered in his cosmology. Indeed, in the end “it is 
difficult to produce a unified treatment of a philosopher who seems to incorporate the 
anti-metaphysical prejudices of a critical philosopher of language with a predisposition to 
speculative metaphysics derived from Hegel and the German idealists.”69  
 Others, Thomas Goudge and Murray Murphey among them have emphasized the 
disunity in Peirce’s philosophy. Goudge saw only a tough-minded naturalism joined to a  
 
 65. MS, Max H. Fisch Collection, Peirce Edition Project, quoted in Douglas R. Anderson, Strands 
of System (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1995), 28. 
 66. See Carl R. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) for an excellent assessment of the various treatments of Peirce’s interpreters. 
 67. Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce’s Empiricism (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
1939). 
 68. Joseph Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980). 
 69. Christopher Hookway, Peirce (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 2. 
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tender-minded and incongruent transcendentalism while Murphey chose to deal with the 
disparate elements by postulating four separate “systems” each in turn abandoned by 
Peirce and all of them remaining unfinished products.  
 To make matters worse, the interpreters of Peirce lack clarity in what they 
perceive in one another’s interpretations. For instance, in the case of Peter Skagestad’s 
The Road of Inquiry,70 Carl R. Hausman believes he has a kindred spirit whose treatment 
comes close to his own in discerning an essential unity71 while Christopher Hookway 
finds the worst kind of interpretation, one that “[recommends] that interpretation should 
focus on Peirce’s contributions to relatively small concrete issues, with attempts to grasp 
the systematic importance of his thought being postponed.”72  
  Then there is the example of Richard Rorty, the renowned and in some sense most 
derisive of Peirce’s critics. Rorty saw Peirce as antithetical to the “great” (i.e. James and 
Dewey) pragmatists’ most important and radical contribution as opposing “standard, 
academic, neo-Kantian, epistemologically-centered philosophy.” 73   For Rorty, Peirce 
embodies traditional western philosophical attempts to construct “theories of truth” or 
“theories of knowledge” or “theories of morality” that have, over the course of twenty-
five hundred years, failed to adequately resolve even one of its own problems.74 Peirce’s 
program of making philosophy more naturalistic and “desire to rescue the good ship 
Philosophy for the service of Science from the hands of lawless rovers of the sea of 
 
 70. Peter Skagestad, Road of Inquiry: Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Realism  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981). 
 71. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy, xvi.  
 72. Hookway, Peirce, 2. 
 73. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1982), 160 
 74. Ibid.  
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literature” was anathema to the late Rorty’s views concerning the real business of 
philosophy and the true contribution of pragmatism, as can be seen in the following 
quotations.75  
As soon as a program to put philosophy on the secure path of science 
succeeds, it simply converts philosophy into a boring academic 
specialty.76  
 
Pragmatism has gradually broken the historical links that once connected 
it to empiricism.77 
 
Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any 
literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a family romance 
involving, e.g. Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and, bad 
brother Derrida.78 
 
All Rorty could bring himself to say in Peirce’s favor was that despite his “undeserved 
apotheosis,” his “contribution to pragmatism was merely to have given it a name, and to 
have stimulated James.”79  
This dismissive assessment followed almost twenty years Rorty’s complimentary 
remarks that he wanted “to suggest that Peirce’s thought envisaged and repudiated in 
advance, the stages in the development of empiricism which logical empiricism 
represented, and that it came to rest in a group of insights and a philosophical mood much 
like those we find in the Philosophical Investigations and in the writings of philosophers 
 
 75. CP 5.449. In CP 1.33 Peirce wrote: “As for that phrase ’studying in a literary spirit,’ there is 
nothing more nauseating to a scientific man.” 
 76. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 384-5 
 77. Richard Rorty, introduction to John P. Murphy, Pragmatism From Peirce to Davidson 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 4 
 78. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 92. 
 79. Ibid., 161. 
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influenced by the later Wittgenstein.”80 These remarks from an intellect no less 
praiseworthy than Rorty further serve to demonstrate just how resistant to facile 
classification and summarization Peirce remains. In a typical understatement, Van Quine 
said, “Peirce does not lend himself to single-minded interpretation.”81  
 One further factor abetting Peirce’s “impenetrability” is the unfortunate fate of his 
manuscripts.  
In reconstructing Peirce’s position, the expositor cannot avoid 
considering texts from quite different phases in Peirce’s intellectual 
career. Accordingly, apparent inconsistencies might be resolved by a 
consideration of the chronological development of Peirce’s sustained 
reflections on logical topics. But this difficulty itself points to yet 
another one: the somewhat chaotic state of Peirce’s manuscripts often 
makes it difficult to reconstruct with the requisite accuracy the actual 
chronology of Peirce’s philosophical development.82  
 
In reference to the disarray of his papers just on logic, Peirce himself remarked: 
I must tell you that all that you can find in print of my work on logic are 
simply scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which 
remains unpublished. Most of it, I suppose has been written down; but 
no human being could ever put together the fragments. I could not 
myself do so.83  
 
 
 80. Rorty goes on to say that “In particular, Peirce and Wittgenstein complement each other 
especially well; one presents you with a bewildering and wonderfully abstract apparatus of categories; the 
other shoves you into very particular puzzles.  Peirce’s odd numerological categories, just because they are 
so abstract and so far from the cliches of the history of philosophy, are perhaps the best handles for 
grasping what one learns from Wittgenstein. Conversely, Wittgenstein’s riddles and aphorisms, just 
because they are so fresh and fragmentary, let one see the point of some of Peirce’s darker writings.” 
Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language,” Philosophical Review 70, 199. 
 81. W.V.O. Quine, “The Pragmatist’s Place in Empiricism,” in Robert J. Mulvaney and Philip M. 
Zeltner, eds, Pragmatism: Its Sources and Prospects (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981), 
32. 
 82. Colapietro, “Peirce’s Critique of Psychologism,” in Jacquette, ed., Philosophy, Psychology, 
and Psychologism, 165. 
 83. Nathan Houser, “The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers,” published in Signs of 
Humanity, vol. 3, Michel Balat and Janice Delledalle–Rhodes, eds, (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), 
1259-1268; see http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/houser/fortunes.htm (accessed July 2008). 
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When Peirce died in 1914, Royce arranged with his widow for the sale of his library and 
literary remains to Harvard University. Royce, who in 1912 had had a “Peircean Insight” 
after re-reading Peirce’s early writings on logic,84 was eager to pore over the papers. 
Royce and his graduate assistant, W. Fergus Kernan, went to work sorting and cataloging 
the pages but were soon daunted by the task of arranging the body of manuscript: 
A first lecture (of the Lowell Lectures on Pragmatism, [1903]) would be 
found … at the top of one group of manuscripts prominently located on 
the right edge of Royce’s long study table. Then three piles further on 
(and two days later) one would discover Lecture No. 2 firmly wedged 
between a lengthy dissertation on “The Doctrine of Chances” [1878] 
with pages unnumbered and a small, intensely interesting, treatise “On 
the Prospect of Air-Sailing” [MS 1014 and part of 1013, circa 1901].85  
 
 Royce died suddenly in 1916 before managing to bring any semblance of order to 
the papers. Kernan left Harvard for the Army and the papers lay fallow for much of the 
next ten years. Morris Cohen did manage to prepare a volume of Peirce’s previously 
published essays under the intriguing title, Chance, Love and Logic86 in 1923.  It was not, 
however, until the late twenties when Charles Hartshorne, a newly minted Ph.D. and a 
family friend of the department chairman, James Houghton Woods, was retained by 
Harvard solely for the purpose, that a full edition of the manuscripts was undertaken.  It is 
 
 84. Royce wrote, in part: “Although I long knew Peirce personally, and have been for many years 
interested in his theories, there were some aspects of Peirce’s theory of knowledge which I never 
understood until, in connection with my own efforts to work out the relations of my philosophy of loyalty 
to other branches of philosophy, and, in particular, in connection with my review of the problem of the 
essence of Christianity, I was lead [sic] to reread some of Peirce’s early logical contributions, and to 
reconsider the way in which these his earlier theories had worked themselves out in the form which some 
of his later studies indicate. Then I came to see, with increasing clearness, that Peirce’s whole career as a 
student of logic and of scientific method was devoted to a few fairly simple and obvious ideas, which have 
nevertheless been very imperfectly understood, just as great and obvious ideas usually are neglected and 
misunderstood.”  Oppenheim, ed., Josiah Royce’s Late Writings, vol. 1e:19.   
 85. Fergus Kernan, “The Peirce Manuscripts and Josiah Royce – A Memoir,” Transactions of the 
Charles Peirce Society 1 (1965): 93. 
 86. Charles S. Peirce, Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays, ed., Morris R. Cohen, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc. 1923). 
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clear from the evidence that the papers were in a state of neglect and disarray when C.I. 
Lewis escorted Hartshorne to the workroom in or around 1925.87  Harvard graduate Paul 
Weiss soon joined himself to the project, and after three years, a six-volume edition of 
the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce was complete though not published until 
1931-35.  
 Despite rekindling an interest in Peirce, the Collected Papers were for the 
purposes of critical research anything but ideal. Hartshorne and Weiss made some fateful 
choices that compromised the value of their work:  
It was decided that Peirce’s writings (except for his scientific and 
mathematical writings, which, though voluminous and important, were 
hardly considered at all) would be organized thematically according to 
Peirce’s classification of the sciences, and to further that end 
chronological and textual considerations were given low priority. 
Lecture series were broken apart and published in separate volumes, 
single papers were cut in two, and under a single title might appear 
excerpts from writings composed more than thirty years apart.88  
 
Ever since, Peircean scholarship has been hampered by the topical arrangement of the 
Collected Papers and the constraints that Harvard placed upon Hartshorne and Weiss to 
select only what could be fitted into a few volumes. The late Arthur W. Burks edited 
material for two more volumes that appeared in 1958.89  In the interim, the collection 
suffered more neglect and abuse. There were rumors in the early 1940s of a “give-away” 
of important papers, some referenced in the Collected Papers but no longer to be found in  
 
 87. An interview by Irwin C. Lieb, “Charles Hartshorne’s Recollections of Editing the Peirce 
Papers, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 6 (1970): 149-159. 
 88. Houser, “The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers,” 2. 
 89. Two additional collected editions that have since appeared are: Charles Sanders Peirce, 
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the Harvard collection. A sizeable portion of the 1,250 volume library that was sold to 
Harvard with the papers, many of the tomes bearing Peirce’s marginalia, was shelved in 
the general circulation of the Robbins and Widener Libraries. The papers, contained in 
some sixty-one boxes, were moved to Widener Library and subsequently transferred to 
Houghton Library in 1960 and underwent several more sortings by cataloguers and 
researchers with no heed paid to earlier classifications.  
 Only with commencement of work in 1976 on a definitive, critical, and 
chronological edition of the papers by the Peirce Edition Project, a group of Peirce 
scholars housed at Indiana University and working from photocopied and, later, 
digitalized microfilmed images of the Harvard collection, was renewed hope of a useful 
classification warranted. However, the effort has progressed slowly with only six 
volumes of a projected forty appearing so far. Working with over eighty thousand pages 
from the Harvard collection, only one fourth of which were dated by Peirce, and several 
other collections, including the nearly ten thousand pages in the National Archives,90 the 
task of compiling a comprehensive chronological edition is a monumental undertaking.  
 Despite the obstacles to a clear understanding of Peirce – the idiosyncrasies of the 
man, the vagaries of his thought, and the disarrangement of his manuscripts, there was 
something compelling and suggestive to his contemporaries. Royce called him, “our most 
brilliant and original American logician.”91  As already noted, James acknowledged his 
debt to Peirce for the inspiration of pragmatism and dedicated his The Will to Believe:  
 
 90. Houser, “The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers,” 7. 
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To My Old Friend, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, to whose 
philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more 
recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or 
repay.92  
 
 In his second year at Hopkins, John Dewey took two courses with the part-time 
lecturer Peirce which Dewey confessed made little sense to him at the time. “Twenty 
years later Dewey began to see the value of Peirce’s work, but it was only after another 
twenty years, when Morris Cohen republished some of Peirce’s Papers, that Dewey 
learned what Peirce had tried to teach him.”93 Though he was less effusive in his praise 
of Peirce than either James or Royce, Dewey’s later work in logic and his own brand o
pragmatism bear the mark of Peirce’s influence and are pocked with references to his 
teacher’s work. While Dewey wrote relatively little on Peirce, one of his essays, “Peirce’s 
Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought and Meaning,” is a succinct and powerfully written 
summary of the general theory of signs. Another essay, “Peirce’s Theory of Quality,” 
delivered as a corrective to Thomas Goudge’s misconceptions of Peirce’s category of 
“Firstness,” is a probing examination of Peirce’s phenomenology.94  
 In his groundbreaking Survey of Symbolic Logic, Royce’s student, Clarence Irving 
Lewis, wrote in 1918 that “[t]he contributions of C.S. Peirce to symbolic logic are more 
numerous and varied than those of any other writer –at least in the nineteenth century.”95  
In the twenty-eight page section on Peirce, Lewis drew attention to the 1883 collection of 
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essays by some of Peirce’s Johns Hopkins students, Studies in Logic,96 that were inspired 
and edited by Peirce, though he fittingly gave editorial credit to the authors collectively. 
Lewis’ “most Peircean work” and his magnum opus, Mind and the World Order,97 “was 
somewhere between Peirce’s pragmatism and Royce’s absolute pragmatism.”98  
 Closer to our time, the list of those who have acknowledged taking inspiration 
from Peirce includes Alfred North Whitehead, Frank Ramsey, Karl Popper, Noam 
Chomsky, Umberto Eco, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, Helmut Pape, Hilary 
Putnam, Richard Bernstein, and to a lesser extent, W.V.O. Quine.99  Ramsey was so 
enamored of Peirce’s correspondence with Victoria Lady Welby on semiotics that “in his 
review of the Tractatus [he] remarked that Wittgenstein would have profited from 
Peirce’s type-token distinction.”100  In an intriguing essay, Charles S. Hardwick surmised 
that the origin of what some have interpreted as a pragmatic strain evident in 
Wittgenstein’s later work, speculating that inasmuch as Wittgenstein credited Ramsey 
with “waking him from his dogmatic slumber,” that their lengthy conversations might 
have covered notions inspired in Ramsey by his reading of Peirce.101 Hardwick 
concluded that “What is needed is a careful study of themes common to Peirce and 
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Wittgenstein.”102 Ironically, it is Rorty who provided something of that study in 
observing that “When Peirce says that ‘vagueness is real’ and when Wittgenstein points 
to the difference between causal and logical determination, the only differences between 
what they are saying are verbal,” that “[t]he similarity of their insights about language 
reflects that fact that the slogans ‘Don’t look for the meaning, look for the use’ and ‘The 
meaning of a concept is the sum of its possible effects upon conduct’ reciprocally support 
each other.”103  
 At a 1976 conference on the philosophy of language, “Chomsky was asked which 
philosopher he believed to be most kindred to his own ideas. He answered, ‘In relation to 
the questions we have been discussing, the philosopher to whom I feel closest and whom 
I’m almost paraphrasing is Charles Sanders Peirce.’”104  For his part, Quine believed that 
“Peirce scored a major point for naturalism … in envisioning a behavioristic semantics. 
Naturalism in psychology and semantics is behaviorism; and Peirce declared for such a 
semantics when he declared that beliefs consist in dispositions to action.”105  
 Of the many and widely varied ideas pioneered by Peirce, we need only highlight 
a few to gain an appreciation of the fruitfulness of his labors. In addition to being the 
progenitor of pragmatism, Peirce is credited with developing the logic of relatives. At 
about the same time as Frege, he obtained the insight of quantification, and as Putnam put 
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it, “effectively introduced quantifiers as we know them today.”106  He worked out a 
single connective logic that anticipated the Sheffer stroke by some thirty years. He 
developed a triadic or many-valued logic well in advance of Jan Lukasiewicz and Emil 
Post.107  He is responsible for the Law that bears his name: {[(P⊃Q) ⊃ P] ⊃ P} or ‘P 
must be true if you can show that P implying Q forces P to be true,’ a tautology that 
Peirce employed as a substitute for the Principle of the Excluded Middle.108  Peirce also 
developed a system of iconic first-order logical graphs, and was the progenitor of modern 
semiotics. He made a lasting mark in probability theory and developed a third order o
reasoning that he alternately termed abduction, retroduction
  As a true polymath, Peirce made original contributions to chemistry, geodesy, 
metrology (the science of measurement), literary criticism, sociology, lexicography, 
astronomy, and cartography in addition to philosophy, mathematics and logic. He 
invented the quincuncial map in 1876, an extraordinarily accurate projection that was 
used extensively during the Second World War. He was, Ian Hacking notes, “perhaps the 
only philosopher of modern times who was quite a good experimenter.”109 He spent most 
of his professional life as a working scientist, employed by the United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, where he pioneered new methods in pendulum-swinging and was the 
first to suggest the use of the light wave to more accurately measure the length of a meter. 
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As we will see, his laboratory work extended to the then new field of psychology and the 
measurement of human perceptions. Though he was responsible for ground-breaking 
work in many fields, his wide-ranging interests often conflicted and caused distractions 
that kept him from completing much of what he started and thus, he is not widely known 
today outside of small circles within academe. As a result, “he [has] suffered from 
readers of narrow vision, so he is praised for having had this precise thought in logic, or 
that inscrutable idea about signs.”110 However, as Hacking concludes one of the fairest, 
most admirable, and certainly most colorful assessments of Peirce:  
We should instead see him as a wild man, one of the handful who 
understood the philosophical events of his century and set out to cast his 
stamp upon them. He did not succeed. He finished almost nothing, but 
he began almost everything.111 
 
This is the portrait of Peirce that I hope has been the guiding principle of this study.  
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Chapter Two  
 
The Modern English History of the Emotions 
 
The old sensationalists, Hartley, Brown, and the Mills, never wrung  
many admissions from the advocates of a-priority. 
--Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce 
 
Hamilton’s own lectures were the first philosophic writings I ever forced myself to study,  
and after that I was immersed in Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown. 
--James, Varieties of Religious Experience 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 The development of psychology in the English-speaking world as “mental 
science,” apart from the concerns that it shared with philosophy and theology, began to 
take shape in the late eighteenth century. It is rooted in the emergence of new 
terminology, in particular, the term ‘emotion’ to signify that which for generations had 
been referred to varyingly as passions, affections, sentiments, feelings, and sensibilities. 
“By about 1850 the category of ‘emotions’ had subsumed ‘passions,’ ‘affections,’ and 
‘sentiments’ in the vocabularies of the majority of the English-language psychological 
theorists. It had become the most popular standard theoretical term for phenomena such 
as hope, fear, love, anger, jealousy and a wide variety of others.”1  This was in large part 
due to the posthumously published four volume work entitled, Lectures on the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Thomas Brown, Doctor of Medicine and Professor of 
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Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh that appeared in 1820.2  “Brown’s 
Lectures was the single most important work in introducing the term ‘emotions’ as a 
major psychological category to the academic and literary worlds during the first half of 
the nineteenth century.”3  This work ran to twenty editions by 1860 and as we will see, 
exerted widespread influence on most of the better known proponents of the emerging 
new psychology.  
 A full western history of affective psychology might commence with a study of 
the emergence of such terms as the Greek pathē and the Latin passiones, affectiones, or 
affectus.4  Or it might begin with a study of Plato’s Protagorus and the discussion of the 
proper relation between reason and the emotions. For the purposes of this dissertation, it 
is sufficient to chronicle developments in Anglo-American psychology from the late 
eighteenth century. 
 
B. Roots of the ‘Emotions’ 
 Thomas Dixon picks up the modern history of the emotions with what he sees as 
the crux of Christian affective psychology, “psychological, moral, and theological 
distinctions that were made neither in the classical [Greek] discourse of the passions 
(pathē) nor in the subsequent discourse of the ‘emotions.’”5 These distinctions were 
between appetites, lusts, desires, and passions that were insubordinate to the rational will, 
on the one hand, and virtuous and godly affections that issued in acts of the higher will, 
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on the other hand. “This was the result of the Christian desire to say both – against the 
Stoics – that some human feeling or affection is proper and necessary to this life, but also 
that God, the angels, and perfected humans are free from the turmoil and perturbations of 
sin and the passions.”6  
 These distinctions, adapted from the Greeks by the Scholastics, were still very 
much in vogue during the Enlightenment. 
In 1755, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of the English language was first 
published. The entries for ‘affection,’ ‘appetite,’ ‘emotion,’ ‘feeling,’ 
‘passion,’ ‘sensibility,’ and ‘sentiment’ provide a rough and ready guide 
to usage in the middle of the eighteenth century. They reveal that the 
predominant terms for describing states such as love, fear, joy and 
sorrow were still ‘passions’ and ‘affections,’ each of which was given an 
extensive entry … ‘Passions,’ as well as being a very general term, 
referred to the more violent commotions of the mind …’Affections’ was 
defined (as well as also being a very general term) as encompassing, 
amongst other things, goodwill, love, or kindness towards other people. 
‘Appetite’ was given the next longest entry of these affective terms, 
which defined it as a word for physical appetites, sensual desires, and 
violent longings. Next came entries for ‘feeling,’ ‘sensibility,’ and 
‘sentiment.’ ‘Feeling’ when used as an adjective, meant ‘expressive of 
great sensibility’; ‘sensibility’ in turn was defined as ‘quickness of 
sensation’ or ‘quickness of perception.’ ‘Sentiment’ had a very short 
entry – only two meanings were suggested: thought, notion, or opinion 
on the one hand; and sense or meaning on the other. ‘Emotion’ too was 
given only a very brief definition: ‘Disturbance of mind; vehemence of 
passion, pleasing or painful.’ The term ‘emotion’ and its plural 
‘emotions,’ were not in common use at this time other than as words 
denoting any kind of agitation or disturbance (of the mind, of the body, 
of a mass of people, or even in the weather).7 
 
Embedded in this long quotation is the message that ‘emotion’ is a relative newcomer to 
the lexicon of affective psychology. Gradually, but in a most interesting way, the new 
category of ‘emotion’ displaced an older terminology. This displacement reflected a 
 
 6. Ibid., 61. 
 7. Ibid., 62-3. 
 
35 
                                           
corresponding shift in mental ontology, a shift from mental powers or faculties of the 
soul to mental states or feelings.  
 Dixon’s study of the invention of the ‘emotions’ in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries traces a movement away from reference to the categories of the 
‘appetites,’ ‘passions,’ ‘sensibilities,’ ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments,’ all rooted in 
traditional Christian thought, and toward a more secular view of psychology as ‘mental 
science’ entailed in the more general category of ‘emotion.’  Nowhere is this 
development more clearly evident than in the writings of the so-called British moralists.  
This eclectic group of thinkers that included Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas 
Reid, Lord Shaftesbury and Adam Smith, who were for the most part latitudinarian 
Anglicans, is compared with the Christian evangelicals Jonathan Edwards and Isaac 
Watts. “While the revivalists considered the relationship between nature and grace, the 
natural and the supernatural, and compared the affections and passions of the natural and 
the saved man, the moralists contemplated the relationship between nature and art, the 
natural and the social, the individual and the state.”8  
 The progressive outlook of the moralists favored the view of human nature as 
essentially virtuous and human beings as possessing a reliable moral sense or propensity 
for the good. By contrast, the evangelicals and, ironically enough, Hobbesians such as 
Bernard Mandeville, with whom the moralists were polemically engaged, viewed human 
nature as self-seeking and brutish. “A critical difference was that the classical Christian 
view of man in a state of nature was that he was selfish and sensual because prolapsarian,  
 
 8. Ibid., 70. 
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while the Hobbesian view of human nature was that it was selfish and sensual because 
pre-social.”9  By championing an innate moral sense, the moralists are credited with 
causing the soteriological view of classical Christian psychology to fade into the 
background and with it the focus on will as the means of turning away from sin and 
toward God. “On the classical Christian model, passions and affections were movements 
of the soul –specifically passions were movements of the lower part of the will (the sense 
appetite) and affections were movements or acts of the higher or rational will (the 
intellectual appetite).”10 
     Another factor leading to the invention of the emotions was rise in popularity, 
particularly in France and England, of the metaphor of the machine to describe the 
functioning of the human animal. “The introduction in Germany in the eighteenth century 
of a third faculty of the soul in addition to understanding and will – the faculty of feeling 
– was part of a parallel trend away from classical Christian psychology towards a new 
psychology in which passions, affections, feelings or, ultimately, emotions were not 
movements of the will but constituted an independent faculty with their own causal 
power. Psychological thinkers such as Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann 
Tetens were important contributors to a new tradition of mental philosophy in which a 
third faculty of feeling (Gefühl or Empfindung) was joined to the traditional two faculties 
of Christian psychology – knowing and willing.”11  Dixon’s claim is that it was 
endorsement by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment of 1790 and  
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Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht in 1798 and, to a lesser extent, by 
Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation in 1819 that lent authority to the 
tripartite view: 
The faculty of feeling (Gefühl) for Kant was composed of Affekte and 
Leidenschaft. These terms did not map straightforwardly on to 
corresponding English terms such as ‘passions’, ‘affections’, or 
‘emotions.’ This separation of the third faculty from the existing 
faculties of intellect (or understanding) and will was one of the crucial 
factors in laying the groundwork for various theories of passions and 
emotions that saw them as both irrational and involuntary.12 
 
While English language models did not explicitly copy the Kantian model, increasingly 
they adopted something similar and eventually the “feelings” entered into common 
parlance as a separate faculty of the mind.  
     Another factor leading to the invention of the emotions was the widely adopted 
metaphor of the machine to describe the human animal. In an age of growing 
mechanization, the metaphor resonated with those seeking a more scientific explanation 
of human nature and behavior. Hobbes made an early use of it in the first paragraph of 
the Leviathan. 
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in 
principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines 
that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an 
artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves but so 
many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the 
whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?13  
 
As a religious skeptic and materialist, Hobbes believed neither in the reality of sin nor the 
moral agency of human beings. “Human beings, like machines, were designed, had no 
 
 12. Ibid., 71. 
 13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston (New York and 
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real agency and no free will.”14  Descartes also made use of the trope as did Shaftesbury, 
Butler, Reid and de la Mettrie, who attempted to show that Descartes’ view of animals as 
mechanical automata was easily extended to the human animal without compromise: 
In the famous L’Homme Machine of 1747, de la Mettrie simply set aside the 
Cartesian soul to reduce man to the same status as animals. The mechanical 
physiology of the autonomous Cartesian body did not need, he claimed, to be 
supplemented with the mysterious Cartesian soul, any more than Newton’s 
mechanical universe had needed to be supplemented by a mysterious and 
unpredictable God. De la Mettrie did for Cartesian anthropology what Pierre 
Laplace would later do for Newtonian cosmology – neither needed those 
theological hypotheses.15  
 So compelling was this metaphor of the human machine, driven by passion and 
the appetites, that it went largely unchallenged. Even a writer as orthodox as Butler did 
not take issue with the suggestion of man as machine arguing only that man was a virtue 
producing machine, not a selfish machine. The end result, however, was that the 
individual will came to be viewed as a slave of the passions, an unreflective conjunction 
of conditioned responses to external forces. Highly reductionist versions of this analogy 
would appear in the influential works of Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer in the 
nineteenth century.  
 Two other analogies were influential in leading the way to the invention of the 
emotions, according to Dixon. One was the analogy between inner and outer sensations. 
Passions and affections (including the moral sense and moral 
sentiments) were described as a sort of inner sensation or perception, by 
analogy with the external senses of taste, touch, sight and so on. Reid’s 
opposition to the reduction of complex acts of the mind, of which 
sensation or feeling was only one element, to sensation or feeling alone, 
displayed awareness of the reductionist tendency of the analogy. 
Sensationalist and associationist thinkers such as Hartley, Condillac and 
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James Mill would later replace the view that they just were modes or 
combinations of sensations – Spencer and Bain also tended towards this 
latter view in their works on emotions.16  
As we have stated, the case of Bain is of special interest in respect to the fact that Peirce 
was very familiar with Bain’s work and allowed that Bain’s definition of belief had been 
foundational to the development of pragmatism.   
 The third analogy that was important to the evolution of the emotions as a 
category of affective psychology and the philosophy of mind was that which held 
between sciences of mind and sciences of matter: 
The ‘moral arithmetic’ and ‘inward anatomy’ of the moralists were 
attempts to apply Baconian inductivism to the mind by methodological 
analogies. It was again Reid, in his critique of Hume’s attempt to 
construct a causal and law-like science of human nature, who showed 
most caution about pursuing the analogy between the necessary laws of 
Newtonian physics and the operations of an active human mind: ‘There 
are many important branches of human knowledge, to which Sir Isaac 
Newton’s rules of Philosophizing have no relation, and to which they 
can with no propriety be applied. Such are Morals, Jurisprudence, 
Natural Theology, and the abstract Sciences of Mathematics and 
Metaphysicks; because in none of those sciences do we investigate the 
physical laws of Nature.’  Reid went on to say that it was normally the 
belief or judgment that caused the feeling rather than the other way 
around.17 
 
Thus it is that Reid can be viewed as anticipating some of the themes of twentieth century 
cognitivists, “notably [Robert] Solomon, [William] Lyons, [Irving] Thalberg, [Joel] 
Marks and [John] Searle, all of whom ascribe a critical role to cognitive beliefs and 
desires in the production (or constitution) of emotions.”18  More closely tied to our  
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interests, distinctly Reidian threads are discernable in the fabric of Peirce’s theory of 
emotion, which is distinctly cognitivistic. What emerged by the closing decade of the 
eighteenth century, however, was a view in which “the passions and affections were 
conceived as a faculty in their own right … (and) that they (thus) came to be seen as alien 
powers rather than as movements integral to the self.”19  
C. The Emergence of the Emotions  
     The category ‘emotion’ is, as we have noted, a relative latecomer to the lexicon of 
affective psychology. The English word apparently is apparently derived from the Latin 
ēmovēre, to move out, remove or take out (ē – out + movēre to move), or sometimes 
movement of the soul (emotus animae), indicating the radiation outward of some of its 
movements.20 Ēmovēre was employed by both Augustine and Aquinas to indicate 
movement in relation to some object.  “It is tempting to see in such uses by Augustine 
and Aquinas an etymological precursor of the term ‘emotions,’ which is clearly a cognate 
term.”21  Yet the various connotations of the English word that began to appear only in 
the eighteenth century seem to have far less to do with movement toward or away from a 
given object than an inward bodily or mental movement.  
      By the mid-eighteenth century, the term was well enough known for Johnson to 
take notice and give it a brief entry in his dictionary. Interestingly, the modern term was 
in large measure a Scottish product. “Some Scottish writers on aesthetics, especially Lord  
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Kames, in his Elements of Criticism (1752), and Archibald Alison, in his Essays on the 
Nature and Principles of Taste (1790), were early users of the category of ‘emotions’ as a 
general psychological term referring to vivid feelings, perceptions, and sensations.”22 It 
was, however, the proponents of the emerging school of associationism who were to 
adopt the term as a synonym for the passions, affections, and sentiments and adapt its use 
to the view that all mental life is the product of sensory and perceptual stimulation.  
     Associationism was one of two main schools of mental philosophy in the 
eighteenth century, the other being, A priorism, which was heir to the older faculty 
psychology. Associationists drew their inspiration from Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding and his belief that the contents of the mind and all of its powers 
are derived from individual sense experience.   
Associationism assumes that mental life is derived from sensory and 
perceptual stimulation. In childhood, these stimuli establish the 
fundamental structures of mind, which is empty without them. In later 
life, these structures regulate the flow of sensory data and prevent the 
mind from becoming an inferno of chaotic and random stimuli. For 
associationists, the mind is thus self-organizing around the initiatory 
clusters … So how do the mind’s contents organize themselves in 
associationist theory? The simplest explanation was that the structures of 
the mind replicate the structures of the experienced environment …The 
mind’s dominant ideas are therefore a self-electing reflection of the way 
the world is.23 
 
     The associationists had, in addition to pure sensation, a second source of ideas in 
the mind’s capacity to reflect on its own activities. It was this capacity for reflection, 
however, that proved associationism’s undoing. 
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 In most accounts, the links between ideas occur in one of two ways: 
either by contiguity (that is, by direct adjacency in time or space) or by 
the perception of resemblance … However, the perception of 
resemblance – the association of similar ideas –is a tricky issue. It is 
sometimes ascribed to the frequency with which ideas are associated in 
the environment, in which case, for strict theorists, the perception of 
resemblance is only a special case of heavily repeated contiguity. But if 
ideas are associated by means other than contiguous occurrence, then the 
theory is in difficulties, because this line of thought suggests that the 
mind might be able to recognize resemblance by a faculty that is not 
itself a product of association. This is a classic difficulty in Locke’s 
development of associationist doctrine in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, and it dogged the theory for nearly two hundred years 
thereafter. If a relatively independent faculty to adjudicate comparisons 
and detect similarities is conceded – Locke’s general name for it is 
‘reflection’ – the purist rigour of associationism  falls, and important 
ground is given up to jeering faculty psychologists. If it is not conceded, 
however, a serious gap appears in the theory … The mind was to be 
understood as an entity constituted within its own history and not under 
any terms of reference outside this process.24  
 
     So wedded to the Lockean point of view was associationism that it was often 
referred to as the School of Locke and its adherents as Locke’s descendants.25 The 
earliest statement of the associationist psychology appears to have been David Hartley’s 
1749, Observations on Man.26 Those who found a muse in Hartley included Thomas 
Brown, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer and George 
Henry Lewes. Hartley, in turn, had been stirred by Hume and the principle of the 
association of ideas in the Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40),27 the work in which the 
 
 24. Ibid., 58-9. 
 25. Ibid., 56. 
 26. David Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and his Expectations, 2nd ed. 
(London: J. Johnson, 1791). 
 27. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge with text revised 
and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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term ‘emotions’ made its first sustained appearance in a manner proximate to modern 
usage.28 Even so, Hume did not appear certain what he wanted the term to do. 
There are [in the Treatise] many cases of apparent equivocation … 
between ‘passions and ‘emotions,’ although ‘passions’ was the central 
and most frequently used category. In most instances Hume seemed to 
intend ‘emotions’ to be read as a rather vague and general term to mean 
something like ‘feelings’ or ‘movements’ or ‘agitations’ of the mind. In 
this sense an emotion could be said to be something ‘which attends a 
passion.’ In other places, however, Hume seemed to use ‘emotions’ as a 
synonym or stylistic variant for ‘passions,’ as well as for ‘affections’; he 
also used emotion to mean a movement of the bodily ‘spirits,’ as well as 
an ‘immediate feeling’ or sensation.29 
 
     A variant form of associationism was dubbed ‘sensationalism’, a generally 
pejorative term used to describe the reductionism that held that ideas were one of two 
classes of feeling, one being ideas, the other being sensations from which all 
understanding of the world was directly and solely derived.30 The former is merely a 
copy of the latter in a manner similar to Hume’s ideas being simply fainter copies of 
sense impressions. James Mill put it this way: “We have two classes of feelings; one, 
which exists when the object of sense is present; another, which exists after the object of 
sense has ceased to be present. The one class of feelings I call sensations; the other class 
of feelings I call ideas.”31 “The difference between ‘sensationalism’ and ‘associationism’ 
– aside from the often derogatory overtones of the former – was that the former was more 
crudely reductionist, and explained complex phenomena as mere aggregates of basic 
bodily sensations, whereas the latter explained them as proprieties of complex learned 
 
 28. Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 104. 
 29. Ibid., 105. 
 30. Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 59. 
 31. James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols. (London: Baldwin and 
Cradock, 1829; repr., Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 2001), 1:41. 
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associations, and gave a greater role, as Locke had, to the mind’s power of reflection.”32 
The sensationalists thus dismissed the distinction of body and mind and “this opened the 
way to a physiologically based study of mind by placing cognition, perception, sensation, 
the functioning of the organs of sense, and general physiology all in one line of 
development.”33  
      The Associationists of the early nineteenth century were opposed by the A 
priorists, who adhered to principles of faculty psychology and its discourse of the soul. 
Residing in its core values were two major premises. 
[F]irst, that human beings occupy a special place at the pinnacle of 
Creation, and, secondly, that, by virtue of this, humans, for the most 
part, are exempt from the messy determinations of nature. Humans are 
not only higher in the scheme of things, they are different …[Faculty 
psychology] discriminated higher minds from lower (for instance, men 
from women and ‘civilized’ minds from ‘primitive’) and saw itself as 
defending the special dignity of human nature… As a result, 
psychologically, human beings were thought to possess relatively 
autonomous, distinctly human, mental faculties.34  
 
These were arranged in a variety of taxonomies that distinguished between “higher” 
faculties (reason, faith, love, will) and “lower” faculties (sensation, feeling, appetite, 
desire).35  
      The A priorists believed that they had discovered a formidable reaffirmation of 
their essential convictions in an appropriation of Kant’s critical philosophy. “Faculty 
psychologists obstructed new enquiries as often as possible (especially in psycho-
physiology), and promoted the view that the development of any kind of substantive 
 
 32. Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 100. 
 33. Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 60. 
 34. Ibid., 26-27. 
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psychological theory on empirical lines was misplaced effort.”36 Revolted by the 
materialistic implications of the associationists’ growing infatuation with physiology, 
they were heartened by what they gleaned from the transcendental psychology of Kant. 
“Faculty psychologists, building on the discourse of the soul, take from Kant two 
supportive affirmations: first, that the mind possesses innate ideas (time, space, and so  
on); and, secondly, that as an intellectual discipline the scope open to psychology is very 
limited, and its methods remain restricted to the increasingly old-fashioned looking ones 
of introspection.”37  
     As to the second of these two affirmations, faculty psychologists were heartened 
by Kant’s claim that empirical psychology should be wholly banished from metaphysics 
because it cannot add to a priori knowledge, that it is not yet refined enough to count as a 
legitimate field of study and is “therefore, merely a stranger whom one puts up with for a 
while and grants residence for some time, until he can move into his own lodging in a 
comprehensive anthropology (the pendant to empirical natural science).”38  Having 
asserted “that in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science 
as there is mathematics therein,” Kant weighs empirical psychology in this balance and 
 
 36. Ibid., 47. 
 37. Ibid., 48. 
 38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Unified Ed., trans. Werner S. Pluhar, intro. Patricia 
Kitcher (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996), A:849 / B:877. I have 
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Reason, followed by the page number from the standard edition of Kant’s works, Kants gesammelte 
Schriften, issued by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & 
Company and Predecessors, 1902- ). 
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finds it wanting as a science “because mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of 
inner sense and their laws …”39 
     Having savaged the pretensions of psychology posing as natural science, Rylance 
explains that Kant set out to narrow its proper scope.  
Psychology’s strength, according to Kant, is that it can dismantle 
‘speculative’ propositions; its limitation is that it cannot provide 
substantive knowledge, ‘neither enlightenment nor determinant 
judgment,’ as Kant puts it. At best, Kant states, substantive or empirical 
psychology consists of routine introspective observation, a ‘mere 
anthropology of the internal sense.’ Its authentic task is self-reflection 
upon the processes of intellection themselves, in particular the 
fundamental category structures inherent in thought: ‘the universal laws 
apart from which nature in general (as an object of sense) cannot be 
thought.’ These are the ‘a priori laws’ that ‘understanding prescribes… 
for nature.’ Examples would be our sense of Time, Space, and 
Extension, or Unity, Difference, and Limitation, a sense of which Kant 
believed, was innately embedded in human minds.40  
 
The faculty psychologists, as we have seen, delighted in the view of Kant that 
underscored the operations of the mind and the limitations of psychology for getting 
behind the three faculties of cognition, volition, and judgment by any other means than 
introspection. “[Psychology] certainly cannot enquire into their origin (especially their 
physiological origin), nor analyze very deeply their mode of operation.”41  This portrayal 
of Kant as a highly sophisticated faculty psychologist was quite popular with the  
 
 39. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, eds. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. 
Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 185-6; standard German edition of Kant’s works, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal 
Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900- ), indicated by 
means of marginal numbers, 4:470-471. 
 40. Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 48. Quotes of Kant are from Critique of Judgement, trans. 
James C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), Part II: Critique of Teleological Judgement, 
131-132. 
 41. Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 49. 
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philosophers of the Scottish common-sense school, who sought to wed Kant and Reid. 
There are, as Rylance notes, contemporary proponents of similar positions such as Wayne 
Waxman, Patricia Kitcher, and Karl Ameriks.42  
     There was, however, another interpretation of Kant that placed emphasis not on 
faculties of the mind but instead viewed the critical philosophy as essentially skeptical. 
This view was espoused in the nineteenth century by T.H. Huxley (1825-1895), who saw 
Kant not so clearly akin to Reid as to Hume.  
In short, nothing can be proved or disproved, respecting either the 
distinct existence, the substance, or the durability of the soul. So far, 
Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the 
immortality of the soul, and as the belief herein is very useful for moral 
purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a century 
later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no better 
foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much strain; and, 
if it have a better foundation, the assumption rather weakens than 
strengthens it.43  
Those who followed this line of interpretation included positivists such as William 
Kingdom Clifford (1845-1879) and John Tyndall (1820-1893), who found in Kant what 
they reckoned as the scientific grounds for skepticism that thus issued a liberating 
warrant for scientific inquiry as producing findings that were permanently open to 
revision.44 “In his own work, Kant conceals the epistemological abyss his critical 
reasoning might open by insisting that innate categories of thought happily agree with the 
order of nature. The normal mind does not freewheel towards mysticism or madness 
 
 42. Ibid., note 29 on Wayne Waxman, Patricia Kitcher, and Karl Ameriks. 
 43. Thomas Huxley, Hume, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd. 1901), 210; quoted 
from Huxley, Hume, (1879), 181, by Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 50. 
 44. Rylance, Victorian Psychology, 50. 
 
48 
because the fundamental categories are coincident with sensory intuition.”45  Among 
those who championed this notion was Benjamin Peirce (1809-1880), the father of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, and once considered this country’s leading mathematician. In his 
final published work, Ideality in the Physical Sciences, Benjamin Peirce articulated the 
view Charles Peirce affirmed as “ideal-realism” and which he summarized as “consisting 
in ‘the opinion that nature and the mind have such a community as to impart to our 
guesses a tendency toward the truth, while at the same they require the confirmation of 
empirical evidence.’”46  The mind’s innate affinity with the order of nature, or il lume 
naturale – a phrase borrowed from but seldom used by Galileo47 – would later be 
developed, as we will see, in Charles Peirce’s views on instinct and probability.  
 
D.  Thomas Brown and the Development of the Emotions 
     Thomas Brown (1778-1820) is credited by Dixon with playing a key role in 
developing the psychological category of ‘emotions’ to identify love, hate, anger, joy, 
sadness, jealousy, and so forth.48  Within one generation this all-purpose psychological 
category supplanted the older language of the ‘passions,’ ‘affections,’ and ‘sentiments.’  
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Brown’s four volume Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind appeared in 1820.49  
By 1850 the ‘emotions’ were the standard currency of affective language.  
      Placing Brown in the landscape of nineteenth century philosophy of mind is 
difficult. The psychology of Brown may be summarily described as a combination of the 
Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and the analyses by Condillac, Destutte de 
Tracy, and the higher philosophers of the sensational school of France, together with 
view of the association of ideas derived from a prevailing British school.50 
      Brown, however, was clearly no sensationalist. “(He) complained that materialism 
eliminates ‘heroic virtue’, leaving ‘but a certain aggregation of particles, which … must 
rot in the grave, with the other parts of the withered and ulcerated body.’”51 What his 
position seems to have combined was essential features of both Reid’s common sense 
and Hume’s skepticism. Evidence that Brown believed it quite possible to coherently 
combine the two is indicated in the gloss of his Lectures. 
The doctrine of both is composed only of two propositions; one is that, 
That no argument can be offered to shew by mere reasoning the 
existence of external causes of our feelings, --The other, that it is 
absolutely impossible for us, in the various states of mind which we term 
Perception, not to believe in external causes of our feelings. The whole 
seeming difference is merely this, -that each philosopher, though 
affirming  both propositions, dwells a long time on one of them, and a 
short time on the other; and that the particular proposition on which they 
dwell the longer, is not, in both cases, the same.52 
 
 49. Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: W.C. 
Tait; London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820); all references will be to the two volume 
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      Brown, however, had his share of critics and the consensus among them seems to 
indicate that they sensed in his writings a sensationalism of the Condillacian stripe. Three 
contemporary historians of philosophy, Robert Blakey, James McCosh, and J.D. Morrell, 
each accused Brown of harboring ideas that were congruent to sensationalism.53 Brown 
defended himself by rejecting Condillac’s reductionism as vigorously as he did Reid’s 
unbridled proliferation of faculties.  
The phenomena of mind are … in the general technical language of the 
science [of the mind], referred by us to many powers which, I cannot but 
think, are not so different as to furnish ground of ultimate distinction, 
but are truly varieties of a few more simple powers or susceptibilities. 
While I am far from conceiving, therefore, with Condillac and his 
followers that all our states of mind are mere sensations modified or 
transformed, since this belief appears to me to be a mere assumption 
without even the slightest evidence in our consciousness, I am equally 
unwilling to admit the variety of powers, of which Dr. Reid speaks.54 
 
     On one hand, Brown sided with Reid and Stewart in the belief that there are in the 
mind, intuitive first principles, such as the uniformity of nature, the identity of self, and 
the moral sense. On the other hand, he took issue with their unwarranted multiplication of 
faculties.55  Analysis must precede intuition, and one may appeal to the latter only when 
 
compared the two positions thusly: “The sceptic, and the orthodox philosopher of Dr. Reid’s school, thus 
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and dwells on the second, with a tone of confidence. The negation in the one case, and the affirmation in 
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all efforts of the former have failed and analysis, first and foremost, is the business of 
classification. No science of the mind, no analysis, indeed, no taxonomy is possible 
without accounting for similitude in observed phenomena. 
But still, when we arrange these different phenomena in certain classes, 
it is an error in classification to give a new name to varieties that can be 
referred to other parts of the division already made; and it is on this 
account that I object to the unnecessary amplification of our intellectual 
systems, in arranging the phenomena of mind under so many powers as 
those of which we are accustomed to speak.56  
 
     What Brown brought to the discourse on mental science was a view that greatly 
reduced the number of active faculties and powers of the mind and held that there were 
generally only sequences of passive mental phenomena, i.e. mental states or affections.57  
These states of the mind were divided between external and internal affections. The 
external affections included all sensations including smell, taste, hearing, touch, vision, 
and muscular sense. The internal affections of the mind were, in turn, subdivided between 
intellectual states or thoughts, on the one hand, and emotions on the other hand.58  “The 
latter of these classes comprehends all, or nearly all, the mental states, which have been 
classed by others, under the head of active powers.”59  Of the emotions we will say more 
momentarily.  
     Brown’s portrait of the mind is heavily laced with analogies from the natural 
sciences, especially chemistry. In his Lectures he wrote of the ‘Classification of the 
Phenomena of the Mind’: 
 
 56 Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1846), Lecture 33, 1:336. 
 57. Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 120-1. 
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The science of mind, as it is a science of analysis, I have more than once 
compared to chemistry, and pointed out to you and illustrated its various 
circumstances of resemblance. In this, too, we may hope the analogy 
will hold, that, as the innumerable aggregates, in the one science, have 
been reduced and simplified, and the innumerable complex feelings in 
the other will admit of a corresponding reduction and simplification.60 
 
Directed at more than merely the end of simplification, Brown employed the analogy in 
the hope of developing mental science along the same lines as natural science, and with 
an eye to more than mere resemblance. Brown borrowed the methods and language of 
chemistry as a means of lending status and authority to his observations. It was a tactic 
effectively adopted in turn by George Payne, James and John Stuart Mill, George 
Ramsay, Thomas Laycock, and G.H. Lewes.61 
     At the same time, Brown’s adoption of analogies from chemistry and physics was 
a retreat from realism. Sanctioning an analysis of cause and effect as mere uniformity, 
Brown’s view appears to have been more austere than Hume’s. When applied to mental 
phenomena, the result was the effective denial of a priori faculties or powers of the mind. 
Brown wrote: 
The view of the mental phenomena which I have taken … a view which 
it appears to me of the utmost importance for simplicity and accuracy of 
investigation to have constantly before us while we are endeavoring to 
philosophize on them, is that which considers all our feelings of 
whatever order, Sensations, Thoughts, Emotions, simply as states of the 
mind, that bear to each other, or to corresponding affections of our 
bodily frame, certain relations, either of reciprocal antecedence and 
consequence, by which we distinguish them as Causes and Effects, or of 
virtual comprehensiveness, by which it is impossible for us not to regard 
some of them as complex and involving, virtually at least, certain 
simpler feelings as their elements. From the beginning of life to its close 
the mind has existed, and is known to us only as thus existing, in various 
states of changeful feeling; the feeling at each moment being its state at 
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each moment, that continued till the new state of some other feeling was 
more or less rapidly induced.  The whole series of these feelings, 
therefore, has been the whole series of its states: and it is in our power to 
philosophize on these changes of mental state, as we philosophize on 
any of the changeful phenomena of the material world which they 
indirectly indicate to us.62 
 
      Having already declared “that there is nothing general but the mere names, or 
other symbols which we employ,”63 and thus, that there are no real faculties or powers of 
the mind, only mental states, it is clear from this passage that Brown’s analogy between 
“mental chemistry” and physical chemistry could hold just so far. Dixon explains its 
limitations and liabilities.  
Brown termed his mental philosophy variously ‘physiology of the 
mind,’ ‘mental chemistry,’ ‘mental science,’ intellectual physics,’ and 
even ‘the physical investigation of the mind.’ However, Brown’s 
‘mental science,’ like that of moderates such as Reid and Stewart as well 
as that of the Associationists Hume, Hartley and James Mill, was a 
purely mentalistic and introspective discipline. It was a science, like 
chemistry or physiology, in that it analyzed the whole into parts, 
classified those parts and described the dynamics of their interaction. 
But it was not a physical science – it had nothing to say about chemistry 
or physiology tout court, it simply analysed and classified mental 
phenomena qua mental phenomena.64 
 
So long as he clung to substance dualism and a methodology that was largely 
introspective in nature, Brown struggled to make “mental chemistry” do what he needed 
it to accomplish. 
     Apart from the application of a quasi-empirical methodology to the philosophy of 
mind, the real significance of Brown’s work is that it introduced a number of new 
psychological categories and terms. As we have noted, Brown reduced mental 
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phenomena to what he alternately termed mental states, feelings or affections of the 
mind. These mental phenomena, in turn, were classified as according to whether the 
immediate antecedent or cause was material or mental.65 The causes of external 
affections of the mind or sensations were material objects whereas the causes of internal 
affections of the mind, whether intellectual states or emotions, were mental feelings.66  
As we have seen, one of Brown’s innovations was the division of internal affections into 
intellectual states of mind and emotions. It was the first attempt in the English language 
to codify the term ‘emotions’ as a replacement for what the faculty psychologists had  
termed the ‘active powers’ of the human mind and it was the first attempt to create of the 
‘emotions’ a psychological category that was more than a mere synonym for the feelings.  
      “Brown himself gave three main reasons for his change of terminology from 
‘active powers’ to ‘emotions’: first, that he found the term ‘active powers’ awkward and 
ambiguous; secondly, that intellectual states were the really active states of mind; and 
thirdly that he wished to include in his category of emotions many states that were not 
active – such as grief or astonishment – and some also that had traditionally but wrongly 
been considered intellectual powers, such as the feelings of beauty and sublimity.”67 The 
result, however, was far less than the achievement of clarity. For one thing, the attempt to 
include many dissimilar mental states under the ‘emotions’ risked equivocation. This is 
indicated in Brown’s failure to provide a clear definition for the term. He admitted, that, 
‘The exact meaning of the term emotion … is difficult to state in any form of words.’68 
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He appealed to general understanding and enumeration. “Every person understands what 
is meant by an emotion, at least as well as he understands what is meant by any 
intellectual power; or if he does not, it can be explained to him only, by stating the 
number of feelings to which we give the name, or the circumstances which induce the 
feelings to which we give the name, or the circumstances which induce them.”69  
Brown’s lack of an adequate précising definition for the ‘emotions’ had a residual effect 
on the development of nineteenth century psychology.  
It was certainly true that the category of ‘emotions’ could be filled out 
ostensively by listing love, hate, joy, sorrow, fear, anger, surprise and so 
on (although not without controversy). The problem with such a practice 
was that in the absence of a definition of ‘emotion’ it was not at all clear 
what was being claimed about a certain mental state when it was 
included in the category of ‘emotions’. The problem of the non-
explanatory nature of the label ‘emotions’ has been a perennial problem 
ever since Brown … Later writers also echoed Brown’s statements that 
‘emotions’ could not be given a precise definition but were distinguished 
by a peculiar vividness of feeling, and that they were not to be confused 
with ‘sensations,’ which were feelings with external bodily causes rather 
than internal mental ones … It is no surprise that in 1884 William James 
was still asking the question ‘What is an emotion?’ (and failing to find 
an answer that persuaded most of his peers).70 
 
     As we have noted, within two decades of Brown’s untimely death in 1820 the 
term ‘emotions’ replaced the language of the ‘passions,’ ‘sentiments’ and ‘affections.’ As 
Brown himself prophetically observed, this change was more than merely verbal in 
nature. “A difference of words is, in this case, more than a mere verbal difference. 
Though it be not the expression of a difference of doctrine, it very speedily becomes 
so.”71  Brown’s bequest to the next generation of philosophers of mind was more than a 
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glossary of new terms for old categories. Though Brown contended that much of his 
thinking was merely the reclassification of time honored truths, he consistently disputed 
the division of mental phenomena into those which belonged to the understanding and 
those belonging to the will –“a division which is very ancient, but though sanctioned by 
the approbation of many ages, very illogical.”72  He held that there were many emotions 
that did not fit into either division. “To take, on a few instances out of many, to what 
class are we to reduce grief, joy, admiration, astonishment, which perhaps are not 
phenomena of the mere understanding, and which, though they may lead indirectly to 
desires or volitions, have nothing, in themselves, that is voluntary, or that can be 
considered as in any peculiar degree connected with the will?”73  
     Thus detached from the will, the emotions were rendered “’mere feelings’ –
passive states akin to Hume’s ‘secondary impressions’ and Descartes’ ‘perceptions’ – to 
be contrasted with active intellectual judgments.”74 The implications for morality, no less 
than psychology, were clear: “We do what we do because of whichever appetite, passion, 
or emotion prevails (which might or might not be a benevolent or moral emotion) not 
because we judge it to be right.”75  Brown summed up the new teaching. 
In the picture which I have now given of our emotions, however, I have 
presented them to you in their fairest aspects; there are aspects, which 
they assume, as terrible as these are attractive; but even, terrible as they 
are, they are not the less interesting objects of our contemplation. They 
are the enemies with which our moral combat, in the warfare of life, is to 
be carried on; and if there be enemies that are to assail us, it is good for 
us to know all the arms and all the arts with which we are to be assailed; 
as it is good for us to know all the misery which would await our defeat, 
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as much as all the happiness which would crown our success, that our 
conflict may be the stronger, and our victory, therefore, the more sure.76  
 
Clearly, the new teaching had a foot firmly planted in the past, owing what it did to both 
Hobbes and Hume. “Brown’s category of ‘emotions’ was, by definition, a category of 
passive (rather than active), non-intellectual feelings or states (rather than actions of a 
power or faculty).”77  The debate that had been joined by Plato with Protagorus over the 
relation of reason and the emotions had in Brown come full circle: 
What is your attitude toward knowledge? … Most people think, in 
general terms, that it is nothing strong, no leading or ruling element … 
They hold that it is not the knowledge that a man possesses which 
governs him, but something else – now passion, now pleasure, now pain, 
sometimes love, and frequently fear. They just think of knowledge as a 
slave, pushed around by all the other affections.78  
 
     Notwithstanding the plethora of texts one might cite to demonstrate Brown’s 
indebtedness to Reid and Stewart, his psychology of the emotions seems, in the end, to 
tilt slightly more toward sensationalism, though, again, Brown’s emotions were internal 
mental states rather than external sensations. John Stuart Mill wrote, “The doctrine and 
spirit of Brown’s philosophy are entirely Positivist, and no better introduction to 
Positivism than the early parts of his Lectures has yet been produced.”79  As we noted at 
the outset, finding Brown’s proper place in the landscape of nineteenth century 
philosophy of mind is difficult. Some of the trouble results from Brown’s rhetoric and his  
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lack of a proficient knowledge of the history of philosophy. “[Dugald] Stewart’s verdict 
on his successor [at Edinburgh] is that Brown was ‘remarkably deficient’ in ‘that capacity 
of patient thinking, to which Newton had the modesty to ascribe all the merit of his 
greatest discoveries.”80  William Hamilton’s assessment was more brutal yet. The 
Lectures, he said, are riddled with ‘radical inconsistencies,’ ‘unacknowledged 
appropriations,’ ‘endless mistakes in the history of philosophy’ and ‘frequent 
misrepresentations of other philosophers.’”81  
     Questions of internal consistency aside, what is of far greater significance is 
Brown’s influence on the subsequent generation of philosophers of mind.  
“His introspective ‘mental science’ methodology and his new 
classification of mental states were both widely adopted. Brown had 
divided mental-scientific methodology into two tasks: first, analyzing 
mental states into their components (‘mental chemistry’) … and, 
secondly, discovering the laws of succession of mental states (‘mental 
physics’). These were what Brown called his ‘laws of succession’ [or 
Association]. The division of mental phenomena into ‘Sensations,’ 
‘Thoughts’ and ‘Emotions’ was another characteristic feature of 
Brown’s system that was adopted by several later psychologists.82  
 
Brown cast a long shadow on the work of James and John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, 
and, especially, Alexander Bain, each of whom adopted some or all of these features of 
Brown’s system. “Later writers also echoed Brown’s statements that ‘emotions’ could not 
be given a precise definition but were distinguished by a peculiar vividness of feeling, 
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and that they were not to be confused with ‘sensations.’83  In addition to Mills, Spencer 
and Bain, those who acknowledged a debt to Brown included his biographer, Thomas 
Welsh; Thomas Chalmers, who authored of one of the Bridgewater Treatises, and wrote a 
Preface to an 1846 edition of the Lectures; James McCosh, historian of Scottish 
philosophy and later president of Princeton University; Charles Bell, George Ramsay, 
William Lyall, and G.H. Lewes, all important figures in the development of nineteenth 
century psychology.84  What is of special interest here is the appropriation of Brown’s 
ideas by the physicalist theorists of emotion during the second half of the century.  
 
E.  Alexander Bain and the New Psychology 
     The lineage of thought from Brown to Bain meanders through the work of 
Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847), who took a harder line than Brown in defining the 
emotions as mental states that are, “passive, non-cognitive, and ‘altogether unmodified by 
the will.’”85  The influence of Chalmers’ work was immense and codified much of what 
else Brown had originated. “The huge popularity of Thomas Brown’s Lectures and the 
(unacknowledged) adoption of his views on emotions by Thomas Chalmers … must 
together take a large measure of the credit for [the] terminological revolution [from the 
vocabulary of passions, affections, and sentiments to talk of emotions].”86 
 Alexander Bain (1818-1903) is the next leading figure in the modern history of 
the emotions to be considered. The treatises of Bain and Herbert Spencer in psychology 
were considered authoritative in the English speaking world of the second half of the 
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nineteenth century.87  Bain’s work was momentous for two reasons. First, there was his 
intention toward synthesis. “He entered the psychological debates of the 1850s and 1860s 
as the voice of a modernized associationism alert to the possibilities of the new 
physiology, and with a determined instinct to marry the two while making the latter 
subordinate to the former.”88  Secondly, his work had a profound effect on the epoch-
forging work of Charles Darwin and William James. Moreover, Peirce was to 
acknowledge that Bain’s theory of belief played a defining role in the development of 
pragmatism through the influence of Nicholas St. John Green, an original member of the 
Metaphysical Club.  
     Bain, the autodidactic son of a weaver, founded the journal Mind in 1876, 
subtitled, interestingly enough: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. “The 
conjunction expresses both, an identity and a difference, a necessary relationship and a 
desired independence, as the science and the philosophy pulled in contrary directions, as 
they did in various ways throughout the period.”89  Mind was, nevertheless, established 
as the first exclusively, “specialist psychological journal,” touting psychology’s scientifi
credentials, though it continued to take notice of related trends in philosophy on both 
sides of the Atlantic.90  
     The profound effect of Bain’s theory of belief on the Cambridge circle of the 
early 1870s has already been mentioned. The attorney, Nicholas St. John Green, was 
credited by Peirce, in a 1907 letter to the Editor of The Nation, with introducing Bain’s 
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work to the Metaphysical Club around 1873, work which served as a catalyst for Peirce’s 
establishment of pragmatism in the “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” series that 
appeared in Popular Science Monthly a few years later. Green’s son, Frederick who 
edited his legal briefs for private publication, was in possession of his father’s library, 
which contained copies of Bain’s two major works in psychology: The Senses and the 
Intellect (1855) and The Emotions and the Will (1859) as well as a copy of the 1869 
edition of James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, bearing 
marginalia in Green’s hand, an edition edited, in part, and heavily annotated by Bain.91  
These volumes indicate that Green was quite familiar with Bain’s work and serve to 
corroborate Peirce’s three decade old memories.  
      Bain was the protégé of John Stuart Mill. They met in 1841 and formed an 
immediate bond. Mill introduced Bain to Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive in 
1842.92  Bain was the only person acknowledged by Mill to have contributed to the text 
of the two volume landmark, A System of Logic, which appeared in 1843.93  Bain 
reviewed the System of Logic in a most sympathetic manner the following May, in the 
Westminster Review.94  Mill returned the favor by reviewing The Senses and the Intellect 
for the October 1859 issue of The Edinburgh Review, approving in the strongest terms, its 
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author and, fresh from the press, The Emotions and the Will.95  Mill’s praise was not the 
empty accolade heaped on one friend by another or in reciprocity for favorable print.  
Robert Wozniak places the two works by Bain in an historical perspective. 
The publication of Bain’s The Senses and the Intellect in 1855 and The 
Emotions and the Will in 1859 is widely considered to make the advent 
of modern psychology. Through four heavily revised editions, these 
texts served for more than thirty years as the leading English-language 
compendium of the discipline. Until superseded at the end of the 
nineteenth century by William James’s Principles of Psychology, they 
were widely read by students and heavily cited by psychologists. Much 
that is taken for granted in modern psychology had its point of origin in 
these two great treatises.96  
 
     The names of the two works indicate something of the purpose behind Bain’s 
project. “The relational aspect of Bain’s work is clear from the simple titles of his books: 
both The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will relate one of the higher 
faculties – intellect and will – to what would at the time have been regarded as subaltern 
mental phenomena, sensations, and emotions.”97  In the earlier work, Bain argues that 
classical taxonomies that placed sense in a subordinate role to the ‘higher’ faculty of the 
intellect have produced bad habits of misperception.98  Whereas, Reid, Stewart, Brown, 
and James Mill had considered appetite and instinct among the phenomena of sensation, 
Bain wanted us to see them as spontaneous properties of the mind. 
[W]here James Mill’s orthodox Utilitarian associationism had portrayed 
the mind as fundamentally passive, Bain insists that it is capable of 
initiatory action in its dealings with the world. Meanwhile, at the other 
pole of the argument, he maintained against the orthodox faculty 
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psychologists that mind and body form a continuum. Sensation, appetite, 
and instinct were no longer to be classed apart, beyond the pale of the 
special human capacities. This quiet, but far-reaching disruption of the 
standard classificatory systems is very deliberate and sustained in 
Bain.99 
 
      The deliberation stemmed from a single-minded purpose that Bain had embarked 
upon as early as 1851 and which he set had forth in the Preface to the first edition of The 
Senses and the Intellect. Bain declared, “Conceiving that the time has now come when 
many of the striking discoveries of Physiologists relative to the nervous system should 
find a recognized place in the Science of Mind, I have devoted a separate chapter to the 
Physiology of the Brain and Nerves.100  It was precisely upon this innovation that J.S. 
Mill focused his tribute. 
Mr. Bain possesses, indeed, a union of qualifications peculiarly fitting 
him for what, in the language of Dr. Brown, may be called the physical 
investigations of mind. With analytic powers comparable to those of his 
most  distinguished predecessors, he combines a range of appropriate 
knowledge still wider than theirs; having made a more accurate study 
than perhaps any previous psychologist, of the whole round of physical 
sciences, on which the mental depend both for their methods, and for the 
necessary material substratum of their theories … This is especially true 
of the science most nearly allied, both in subject and method, with 
psychological investigations, the science of Physiology: which Hartley, 
Brown, and [James] Mill had unquestionably studied, and knew perhaps 
as well as it was known by anyone at the time when they studied it, but 
in a superficial manner compared with Mr. Bain; the science in the 
meanwhile assumed almost a new aspect, from the important discoveries 
which had been made in all its branches, and especially in the functions 
of the nervous system, since even the latest of those authors wrote.101 
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     Bain’s focus on motion was an attempt to generate a shift in the associationist 
view of mind from the passive sensationalism it had received from Locke. Attempts by 
Thomas Brown, James Mill, and David Hartley to infuse it with one species or another of  
motion, notwithstanding, associationism remained wedded to the empiricist notion of 
passive mental states and sensation as the primary, if not only, source of 
understanding.102  “Bain’s analysis of motor phenomena was the first union of the new 
physiology with a detailed association psychology in the English tradition and he thereby 
laid the psychological foundations of a thoroughgoing sensory-motor 
psychophysiology.”103  It was, however, sometime before physiology was refined enough 
to provide both the experimental evidence and an adequate theoretical explanation for the 
association of the mind with the cerebral hemispheres and for the association of the 
hemispheres and the ganglia.104  Bain continually edited his work to take account of 
advances in physiology, though his understanding of physical structures rendered his 
work sketchy and incomplete. Nevertheless, “Bain provided a discussion of motor 
phenomena which gave association psychology a balanced sensory-motor view.”105  
     Bain’s separate chapter on the brain and the nerves, comprised mostly of 
quotations from two highly recognized treatises of the day, moved John Stuart Mill to 
remark that “…no rational person can doubt the closeness of the connection between the 
functions of the nervous system and the phenomena of mind, nor can think any 
exposition of the mind satisfactory, into which that connection does not enter as a 
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prominent feature.”106  This feature of Bain’s work, as Mill declared, was formative. “No 
matter how little relevance it had to the rest of the work or how little it actually explained 
the psychological processes under discussion, future writers almost invariably included a 
chapter on the structure and physiology of the nervous system.107  As for the emotions, 
Bain’s development led him to declare the emotions as separate and distinct from 
sensations under the very broad heading of ‘feelings.’ “Feelings are divided into 
Sensations (including Muscular Feelings) and Emotions. Sensations, as such are primary 
and simple; Emotions, as such, are secondary and compound.”108  
     Having dispatched the ‘Sensations’ in the prior opus, Bain set out to sift through 
the more nebulous ‘Emotions’ in 1859. As was the case with the former work, the latter, 
The Emotions and the Will, underwent regular revision. From the beginning, however, 
Bain insisted that the emotions, unlike sensations, are derivative and do not depend on the 
impact of the outer world on the sensory organs: 
Mind is distinguished by the three attributes … Feeling, Volition, and 
Intellect. In the previous volume [The Senses and the Intellect], attention 
was called to the dependence of all mental workings whatever on Bodily 
Organs; and, in treating the sensations, there was given, in each instance, 
not merely the mental side, but the physical also … In the Sensations, the 
physical side includes both the mode of action on a sensitive surface, and 
the outward manifestations or diffused wave of effects. In the Emotions, 
the first is wanting. Our attention is thereby limited to the second, which 
consequently rises into greater importance.109 
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In this view, Bain found himself in essential agreement with Spencer and Darwin. “The 
innovation here was that the Brownian distinction between sensation and emotion, like 
the category of emotion itself, was now physicalized with reference to the nervous system  
by these mid-century psychologists: emotions, they said, had a central nervous origin and 
were in some sense ‘secondary’ and sensations had a peripheral nervous origin and were 
primary.”110  Thus was established a continuum between mind and body that would place 
psychological theory on a sounder scientific footing.  
     This innovation, however, was not without a price. “Along with the Brownian 
categorization of mental states into thoughts, sensations and emotions, the evolutionary-
physiological school inherited the problematic inclusivity of the category of ‘emotions’ 
that had been another feature of Brown’s scheme.”111 There is, as Dixon points out, a 
veritable ‘hodge-podge’ of feeling evident in the table of contents. 
After discussing feeling and emotion in general he considered thirteen 
topics: emotions of harmony and conflict, emotions of relativity, 
emotion of terror, tender emotions, emotions of self, emotion of power, 
irascible emotion, emotions of action/pursuit, emotions of intellect, 
emotions of sympathy and imitation, ideal emotion, the aesthetic 
emotions, the ethical emotions.112  
 
Thus it was that critics were dismissive of Bain’s work on the emotions. “His list of the 
‘special emotions’ is a pot-pourri of the psychological, philosophical, and physiological 
issues of the day, and any attempts to make a coherent position from it disparate parts 
consistently fail.”113 
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     Bain’s union of physiology and associationist psychology produced an uneasy 
marriage. “As long as the association psychology continued to rely on individual 
experience and the subtleties of philosophical arguments it failed in its investigations of 
emotional phenomena.”114  It could offer no apparent account for the content of mental 
life beyond sensory and perceptual stimulation of the individual, notwithstanding Bain’s 
intricate theory of motor-development along the lines of the Laws of Association. 
Moreover, it could not account for any phenomena that might be described as trans-
generational imparting of knowledge, instinct, or predisposition. Developments in 
biology and evolutionary theory, meanwhile, were giving rise to a whole new set of 
questions:  
With what does the individual organism begin as a result of the 
biological history of its species? What power does it have to change or 
effect its inheritance? Is the means of transmission of this inheritance 
organic or cultural? To what extent is the mind only a phenomenon of 
consciousness and habit? What relative weight is to be given to the 
various descriptive languages and conceptual frameworks available to 
the informed psycho-physiologist? Is he to write in the registers of 
science or philosophy, of specialization or the wider culture?115  
 
Spencer had been critical of Bain for altogether ignoring evolutionary theory and Bain 
responded, if only half-heartedly, by adding a lengthy chapter on the evolution of the 
mind to the third edition of the Emotions in which he entertained such topics as instinct, 
habit, the inheritance of emotions and various associated behaviors.116  However, Bain 
remained quite reserved in his acceptance of evolution. “As late as 1881, in a review of 
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the third edition of Spencer’s Principles [of Psychology], he was pointing, rather sniffily, 
to the fact that Evolution was not yet a validated theory.”117  
     Notwithstanding Bain’s reticence when it came to the question of Darwinian 
evolution, his contribution to the history of the emotions was, as we have seen, two-fold. 
First, he brought Brown’s distinction between sensation and emotion into currency and, 
in accounting for both, introduced contemporary physiological theory into the analysis of 
psychological phenomena. Secondly, he infused associationism with a theory of activity 
that rescued the understanding of mind from its tendency toward flaccid, reactive 
sensationalism. In both instances, Bain left his mark on emerging psychological theory 
but both contributions proved more suggestive than normative and thus merely signal a 
pending transition in the history of the emotions.  
 
F. From Spencer and Darwin to William James 
     Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) were the two, 
though by no means only, leading theorists to attempt an evolutionary account of the 
origin of the emotions. Darwin’s The Origin of Species118 exploded upon the scientific 
community in 1859, four years after Spencer’s groundbreaking; The Principles of 
Psychology119 had appeared. It is today generally acknowledged that Darwin’s was the 
more accurate view of evolution in general and the heritability of mental faculties in 
particular. “However, this twentieth-century verdict should not blind us to the historical 
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situation in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, for these two versions of ‘the development 
hypothesis’ existed side by side for at least a quarter of a century and their differences 
were frequently blurred even by informed commentators.”120  
     Herbert Spencer was, like Bain, a self-taught scholar of humble origin and one of 
two leading lights of psychology in English-speaking countries during the second half of 
the nineteenth century. It was Spencer’s legacy to have commingled associationism and 
evolutionary theory. “His evolutionary associationism freed him from the usual 
procedure of starting at birth with a tabula rasa and explaining the development of the 
complex phenomena of instinct, emotion, and intellectual functions on the basis of 
individual experience alone.”121  Influenced by Bain, Spencer adapted associationism to 
evolutionary theory, in part due to the limited ability of associationism to account for 
either instinct or emotion. This weakness had been identified by Mill in his review of 
Bain. Observation was, for Spencer, sufficient to identify the weakness. 
The doctrine maintained by some philosophers, that all the desires, all 
the sentiments, are generated by the experiences of the individual is so 
glaringly at variance with hosts of facts, that I cannot but wonder how 
any one should ever have entertained it. Not to dwell on the multiform 
passions displayed by the infant, before yet there has been such an 
amount of experience as could by any possibility suffice for the 
elaboration of all passions; I will simply point to the most powerful of 
all passions – the amatory passion – as one which, when it first occurs, is 
absolutely antecedent to all relative experience whatever.122 
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     It was abundantly clear to Spencer that attempts to locate the genesis of emotion 
solely in the experience of the individual were in opposition to the facts and thus 
unjustified. Evolutionary theory provided a feasible explanation. 
By the accumulation of small increments, arising from the constant 
experiences of successive generations, the tendency of all the component 
psychical states to make each other nascent, will become gradually 
stronger. And when ultimately it becomes organic, it will constitute what 
we call a sentiment, or propensity, or feeling, having this set of 
circumstances for its object.123  
 
This process for the trans-generational acquirement of experience, and the attending 
emergence of new emotions and instincts, was rooted solely in the constancy of 
environmental factors. “Acquired habits are passed from generation to generation until 
they become fixed in the nervous system.”124  Emotions, like all psychological 
phenomena, are instances of the inheritance of acquired characteristics through repetition 
and association. “What the individual feels as homogeneous emotions, undecomposable 
into specific experiences, are in fact ‘the organized results of certain daily-repeated 
combinations of mental states.”125  The process is mechanistic and the results are 
deterministic, inspired by the model of Lamarckian theory. Spencer’s rejection of natural 
selection and his lack of appreciation for Bain’s theory of activity gave his developmental 
theory of adaptation to the environment a tendency toward passivity that could not 
account for deviation or spontaneity.126  
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     At about the time his The Descent of Man127 was going to print in 1871, Darwin 
was starting a new book, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals,128 a work 
grounded in observations of his infant son, those of other people and animals he had  
solicited from missionaries, zookeepers, and asylum directors over a span of thirty 
years.129  He was motivated, in part, by the writings of John Abercrombie and James 
Mackintosh, both of whom had been deeply influenced by Thomas Brown and had 
adopted Brown’s terminology and his tripartite division of mental states. Darwin 
compiled the extensive notes and observations of thirty years in the attempt to account for 
the formation of instincts as inherited habits of volition that became, over time, 
unconscious and, thus, involuntary.130  “Darwin’s primary concern in the Expression was 
not to develop a theory of the emotions but rather to explain how particular emotions and 
the behaviors we have come to think of as their ‘expressions’ might initially have become 
connected.”131 The emotions, for Darwin, were closely tied to their expression. 
“Emotions, having been formed by actions, will always lead to them.”132  
     Interestingly, Darwin’s Expressions is relatively free of references to natural 
selection as an explanatory hypothesis. Natural selection is mentioned only four times in 
nearly four hundred pages compared with over one hundred references in the Descent of 
Man.133  The reason is readily clear to the casual reader. 
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Emotional display, to be sure, had an evolutionary history. Darwin’s 
many comparisons of facial movements in children, adults, the insane, as 
well as in apes, dogs, and cats – done with the aid of photography and 
sketches – showed similarities across sexes and mental capacities. This 
kind of comparative evidence bespoke a common origin for emotional 
expression. But since he could discover no social or communicative 
function in these emotional reactions – unlike neo-Darwinians today – 
his theory of natural selection did not readily apply.134 
 
Yet, it was the doctrine of natural selection that served as the hallmark of Darwin’s grand 
theory and had such a telling influence on the next generation of psychologists, most 
notably, William James. Within the narrower scope of affective theory, however, it was 
Spencer and Darwin, together, who infused psychology with a sense of history –“not just 
the history of individuals appealed to by associationist psychologists, but the deeper 
history of the human race that their evolutionary hypotheses invoked.”135  
     William James (1842-1910) was very much a product of his time and the 
vicissitudes of nineteenth century psychological theory. Reared in one of the most gifted 
and original families America has yet produced, during a period of tremendous ferment in 
American intellectual history, at the epicenter of its flowering, James came to personify 
much of the creative richness and intellectual crosscurrents that marked Cambridge in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Slow to mature, depressive and ambivalent by 
nature, James responded to fifteen years of cacophonic vocational callings, studying, in  
turn, painting, chemistry, anatomy, natural history, and medicine before settling on first, 
psychology and later, philosophy. These sundry pursuits and an extraordinary gift for 
prose distinctly qualified him for the tremendous contribution he was about to make to 
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the understanding of the mind and the nascent field of physiological psychology. His 
formative years were marked, incidentally, by immersion in the writings of William 
Hamilton, Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Brown.136 
     It was, however, exposure to the research of the German schools that whet his 
appetite for psychology and served to steer him in a more or less permanent quest to 
attain its status as a science. During one eighteen month period in Berlin, in the late 
1860s, having attended lectures in physiology at the University and having been awed by 
the appearance of its well appointed physiology laboratory, James wrote presciently to 
his friend, Thomas Ward. 
It seems to me that perhaps the time has come for psychology to begin to 
be a science – some measurements have already been made in the region 
lying between the physical changes in the nerves and the appearance of 
consciousness-at (in the shape of sense perceptions), and more may 
come of it. I am going on to study what is already known, and perhaps 
may do some work at it. Helmholtz and a man named Wundt at 
Heidelberg are working at it, and I hope … to go to them in the 
summer.137  
 
Experimentalism had already become the hallmark of serious science and James was to 
play a key role in its introduction into psychology on the American continent, and in 
particular, in its employment in theorizing about the emotions.  
The Jamesian era saw shifts in the geography of academic psychology as 
well as its disciplinary boundaries. While Scottish philosophy, and 
English biology and neurophysiology, had led the way in the psychology 
of emotions earlier in the nineteenth century, the drive to 
experimentalism in psychology found the centre of gravity shifting first 
to Germany, during the 1880s, especially to Wilhelm Wundt’s 
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laboratory of ‘psychophysics’ in Leipzig – the first of its kind, founded 
in the late 1870s – and thence to America.138 
 
During a leave of absence in 1892, James raised funds for a new psychology laboratory at 
Harvard and assisted in filling his vacant position by retaining the services of Hugo 
Münsterberg (1863-1916), who had taken his Ph.D. under Wundt at Leipzig and 
established himself at Freiburg after receiving his M.D. from Heidelberg.139   
     The study of James’s thought on the emotions usually begins with the paper, 
‘What is an emotion?’ which appeared in Bain’s journal, Mind, in 1884 and appeared 
with very little change as chapter XXV in The Principles of Psychology, the massive, two 
tome work that made him world famous.140  The gist of the theory of emotion, developed 
independently of James in Denmark by Carl Lange (1834-1900), is the claim that 
emotion originates as a bodily rather than mental state. 
Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the 
mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the 
emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression. My thesis, on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow 
directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of 
the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common sense says, we 
lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and 
run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here 
to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one 
mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily 
manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more 
rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, 
because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the 
bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely 
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cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We 
might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and 
deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry.141   
 
A few pages later we find James making an even more reductionistic claim that he 
believed emotion to be constituted wholly by the associated bodily reflexes.  
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this. 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, 
we find we have nothing left behind, no “mindstuff” out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception is all that remains.142 
 
The cold and neutral intellectual perception could not possibly refer to any emotion. 
A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. I do not say that it 
is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits are 
condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I say that for us, emotion 
dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. The more closely I 
scrutinize my states, the more persuaded I become, that whatever moods, 
affections, and passions I have, are in very truth constituted by, and 
made up of, those bodily changes we ordinarily call their expression or 
consequence; and the more it seems to me that if I were to become 
corporally anaesthetic, I should be excluded from the life of the 
affections, harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence of merely 
cognitive or intellectual form.143  
 
     As Dixon notes, with no clear definitions or delineation, plainly, in James’s 
theory, there is a conflation of ‘mood,’ ‘affection,’ and ‘passion’ which together are 
subsumed under the category of ‘emotion,’ a confusion of concepts traceable to 
Brown.144  Among the other striking features of the theory is the emphasis on an assumed 
chasm between the emotions and reason, again, possibly a residue of James’s early 
reading of Brown and a clear indication that James did not consider the possibility that 
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reason or cognition might be an instinct or other faculty resulting from adaptation.145  
“While the new science of psychology had some success in moving away from mind-
body dualism, there was little development in the deconstruction of the reason-emotion 
dichotomy.”146  As we will see, however, James developed a nativistic theory of instinct 
during the three years following the appearance of the famous 1884 essay, a model that 
subsumed his theory of emotion and tended to blur the boundary between reason and 
emotion.  
     When it appeared in 1884, James’s counter-intuitive theory of emotion stirred up 
a storm of controversy and was assailed on several other accounts by his contemporaries, 
beginning with William Gurney in the same issue of Mind.  Writing in 1896, H.N. 
Gardiner reviewed the salient issues in ensuing dozen years of dispute.147  First, there 
was the absence of uniformity in the relations of emotions to their expression. “If the 
theory were true, and emotions were really nothing but awarenesses of bodily changes, 
then, at least in the same subject, one set of bodily changes should uniformly give rise
the same emotion, and by the same token, any one emotion could be associated only with 
one set of bodily changes.”148  However, such is not the case as when we observe t
phenomenon of weeping as an expression of both joy and sorrow. Furthermore, as 
Gardiner reminded his readers, some bodily symptoms – for example laughing, sobbing, 
 
 145. Ibid., 227. 
 146. Ibid., 228. 
 147. H.N. Gardiner, “Notes” in The Philosophical Review 5 (January, 1896): 102-112. 
 148. Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 214. 
 
77 
                                           
shivering, and sneezing – can and do occur without any associated emotion.149  Hence, 
the  
theory fails to adequately distinguish between emotion and non-emotion. Aesthetic 
emotion, which is generally unaccompanied by bodily reflex, cannot be qualified as 
emotion. Lastly, the theory assumes, perhaps wrongly, that in emotion there must be a 
cause and effect relationship between the mental and the physical aspects and overlooks, 
as David Irons (1870-1907) suggested, the possibility that emotion is independent of 
bodily changes.150  The mental and physical aspects of emotion could be simply 
concomitant without one necessarily producing the other.  
     In fact, however, James had conceived a strong case against parallelism, a form of 
automaton-theory then being advanced by William Kingdom Clifford (1845-79). James 
incorporated it into chapter five of his Principles of Psychology, generally a revision of 
his 1879 essay, ‘Are We Automata?’151  The heart of his argument, from common sense, 
was that the evidence for interaction between body and mind, or more precisely, between 
brain and mind, was too compelling to believe there was no interference of one with the 
other. In terms of emotions, the inference was simply too paradoxical to be credible. 
That inference is that feelings, not causing nerve-actions, cannot even 
cause each other. To ordinary common sense, felt pain is, as such not 
only the cause of outward tears and cries, but also the cause of such 
inward events as sorrow, compunction, desire, or inventive thought. So 
the consciousness of good news is the direct producer of the feeling of 
joy, the awareness of premises that of the belief in conclusions. But 
according to the automaton-theory, each of the feelings mentioned is 
only the correlate of some nerve-movement whose cause lay wholly in a 
previous nerve-movement. The first nerve-movement called up the 
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second; whatever feeling was attached to the second consequently found 
itself following upon the feeling that was attached to the first. If, for 
example, good news was the consciousness correlated with the first 
movement, then joy turned out to be the correlate in consciousness of the 
second. But all the while the items of the nerve series were the only ones 
in causal continuity; the items of the conscious series, however inwardly 
rational their sequence, were simply juxtaposed.152  
 
That said, James maintained a kind of agnosticism about causality in general and often 
pointed to Hume as providing in the end, a fallibalistic mysticism and surrogate for a 
scientific account of the agency of the immaterial mind.  James concluded, “The only 
trouble that remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort of 
world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all. This trouble, however, since 
it also exists inside of both worlds, and involves neither physical improbability nor 
logical contradiction, is relatively small. I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul 
influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by 
conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as 
we yet have attained.”153  Nevertheless, giving priority to bodily reflex over the mental 
element in causing emotion seems a highly subjective choice on the part of James when, 
at the end of the day, all he can scientifically demonstrate is concomitant variation 
between the two phenomena.  
     Dixon’s own criticism is focused on the ‘reductionist’ William James whose 1884 
theory of emotion, he believed, was akin to the epiphenomenal views of Thomas 
Huxley.154  
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The brain, [Huxley] claimed, received stimulation from the environment 
and issued motor acts as a result; the engine of the central nervous 
system simply transformed one kind of energy into another, without 
consciousness playing any mediating role at all. Rather, conscious mind 
hovered over brain activity like mists of steam coughed up from the 
dynamo actually doing the work.155 
 
Dixon’s assertion is that James’s theory is an unambiguous reduction of emotions to 
products of physical processes that, in turn, qualified it as epiphenomenalism.156  
“[James] saw the ‘spiritual fact’ of emotional experience as purely a product of bodily 
changes, and such a view might reasonably be called epiphenomenalist if not a 
materialistic account of the spiritual aspect of human life.”157  The charge of 
epiphenomenalism, however, cannot account for the importance James placed on will and 
independence of the mind. In order to bring these disparate elements of James’ views into 
some measure of harmony, the theory of emotion must be understood in relation to his 
evolutionary theories of instinct and will.  
      Like many of his generation, James had become enamored of Spencer’s 
evolutionism, despite being pained by the inference that mind was forged solely and 
passively by response to the external environment158  In some measure through the  
influence of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce, James gradually shifted from 
Spencer’s mechanistic theory to Darwinism through which he began to perceive an 
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argument for the independence of the mind.159  In a series of essays published during the 
1880s, sandwiched around his famous paper on emotion, James presented theories of will  
and instinct. The theory of will supported the theory of emotion, which, in turn, supported 
the theory of instinct.  
 The first of these essays appeared in 1880 under the title, ‘The Feeling of Effort,’ 
which was expanded into a prodigious 106-page chapter on will in the Principles.160  For 
James, reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements were all viewed as primary 
performances – automatic and involuntary responses.161 Richard M. Gale traces the rise 
of voluntary will in James’ account.  
For James, all actions initially are involuntary. In some cases a sensory 
idea of the motion or its immediate effects is formed. This creates a 
neural pathway from the brain to the concerned motor organ so that now 
mere consciousness of this idea causes the action. In the simplest cases, 
that of the “ideo-motor” will, there is no fiat or effort.  But human 
beings quickly become more complex so that for many ideas they might 
entertain there is a competing idea which blocks its motor discharge. 
Such a case of conflict sets the stage for an occurrence of an effort to 
attend to one of these competing ideas so that it alone will fill 
consciousness for a sufficient time with sufficient intensity and thereby 
lead to its motor discharge. This effort to attend is the voluntary will. 
“The essential achievement of the will … when it is most ‘voluntary,’ is 
to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-
doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the 
object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should ensue” 
(Principles of Psychology 2.1166).162  
 
This notion of will buttressed the view of emotion found in the famous essay of 1884, 
where bodily sensation holds priority.  
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     As we have seen, in that essay James described emotions as mere feelings of 
bodily response. In an 1887 paper, ‘What is an Instinct?’ James advanced a 
comprehensive and nativistic theory of instinct that encompassed the theory of 
emotion.163  In this essay James joined others in defining an instinct as “the faculty of 
acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends and without 
previous education in the performance.”164  Having earlier asserted that cognition does 
not cause emotion, James went on to iterate his position “that emotion is a direct response 
to the instinctive wisdom of the body … a stage in the release of innate instinctive 
reactions.”165  Surprisingly, instinct and emotion became, in James’ view, difficult to 
distinguish.  
In speaking of the instincts it has been impossible to keep them separate 
from the emotional excitements which go with them. Objects of rage, 
love, fear, etc., not only prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke 
characteristic alterations in his attitude and visage, and affect his 
breathing, circulation, and other organic functions in specific ways. 
When the outward deeds are inhibited, these latter emotional expressions 
still remain, and we read the anger in the face, though the blow may not 
be struck, and the fear betrays itself in voice and color, though one may 
suppress all other sign. Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions 
thus shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an 
instinct excites an emotion as well. Emotions, however, fall short of 
instincts, in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the 
subject’s own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther 
and enter into practical relations with the exciting body.166  
 
Working in tandem, instincts and the concurrent emotions drive behavior in patterns or 
habits altered only by slight variations in experience, the mind playing only a secondary  
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role of differentiation. “Wherever the mind is elevated enough to discriminate; wherever 
several distinct sensory elements must combine to discharge the reflex-arc; wherever, 
instead of plumping into action instantly at the first rough intimation of what sort of a 
thing is there, the agent waits to see which one of its kind it is and what the 
circumstances are of its appearance; wherever different individuals and different 
circumstances can impel him in different ways; wherever these are the conditions – we 
have a masking of the elementary constitution of the instinctive one.”167  The repertoire 
of possible responses points, once again, not only to the blurring of any distinction 
between reason and emotion, but between reason and instinct. 
Thus, then, without troubling ourselves about the words instinct and 
reason, we may confidently say that however uncertain man’s reactions 
upon his environment may sometimes seem in comparison with those of 
lower creatures, the uncertainty is probably not due to their possession 
of any principles of action which he lacks, but to his possessing all the 
impulses that they have, and a great many more besides. In other words, 
there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason. Reason, per 
se, can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse 
is an impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference 
which will set loose the impulse the other way; and thus, though the 
animal richest in reason might be the animal richest in instinctive 
impulses too, he would never seem the fatal automaton which a merely 
instinctive animal would be.168  
 
      In a second essay on instinct in the same year, James underscored his core belief 
that the fundamental difference between animals and humans is not, as conventional 
wisdom has it, that animals possess more instincts and that by developing increased 
powers of reason, humans are less reliant on instinct.169  
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It is generally considered that a cardinal differentia of the human race is 
its poor endowment in the way of instincts … I believe this doctrine to 
be a great mistake. Instead of having fewer, man has more instincts than 
any other mammal. He has so many that they bar one another’s path, and 
produce an indeterminateness of action in him, supposed to be 
incompatible with that automatic uniformity which, according to popular 
belief, characterizes all instinctive performances.170  
 
This theme was prevalent in the two volumes of the Principles that finally came to press 
in 1890, ten years behind schedule. This groundbreaking work, largely a compilation of 
essay material spanning those ten years, was reviewed somewhat critically by Peirce for 
the Nation, who began by stating the obvious.  
 Upon this vast work no definitive judgment can be passed for a 
long time; yet it is probably safe to say that it is the most important 
contribution that has been made to the subject for many years. Certainly 
it is one of the most weighty productions of American thought. The 
directness and sharpness with which we shall state some objections to it 
must be understood as a tribute of respect.  
 Beginning with the most external and insignificant characters, we 
cannot much admire it as a piece of bookmaking; for it misses the unity 
of an essay, and almost that of a connected series of essays, while not 
attaining the completeness of a thorough treatise. It is a large assortment 
of somewhat heterogeneous articles loosely tied up in one bag, with 
tendencies toward sprawling.171  
  
Despite its meandering and, at times, disjointed style, James’ work marked the apex of 
the development of emotion theory in the nineteenth century English-speaking world and 
directed the discourse of nearly a generation of researchers and writers.  
     Beginning with an 1868 series of essays for the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy, Charles Sanders Peirce developed his own theory of emotion that, while 
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Chapter Three 
 
Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion 
 
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not 
describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ 
are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream 
of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. 
--James, Principles of Psychology 
 
As for the mind’s watching its own operations, no such thing is possible. It is pure delusion.  
Take, for example, a train of ideas. A man may recall some of the ideas of the train.  
But what are they? They are objects, imaginary objects, products of 
the mind’s operation, but not the movement of mind itself.  
--Peirce, Collected Papers 
 
A.  Streams and Trains: Peirce, James and Consciousness 
 
 General access to Peirce’s theory of emotion is more readily achieved through 
juxtaposition of his views on matters of the mind with those of James. James and Peirce 
represent a special instance of what Royce was saying when he wrote that, “contrast is 
the mother of clearness.”1 Despite their unflagging friendship and deep mutual respect, 
Peirce and James were often philosophically at odds. Peirce’s letters to James and 
occasional reviews of his work were frequently polemical, reflecting not only the deep 
differences between them in perspective but in philosophical attitude and temperament.2  
As we have noted, James was characteristically generous in his praise of Peirce’s work 
and acknowledged the intellectual debt he owed by dedicating The Will to Believe to his 
                                            
Epigraph.  James, Principles of Psychology 1, Chap. 9. 
Epigraph.  CP 7.376. 
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old friend in 1897. What is sometimes overlooked, because of the remonstrant attitude 
Peirce adopted toward James, is the stimulation and suggestion that James’ work often 
provided him.3  This was particularly true in the case of the Will to Believe. Despite his 
misgivings about the title phrase and its implications, a book which James always 
regretted not having called, the ‘Right to Believe,’ Peirce was moved to reassess his 
views on, among other things, individual will.4  Also, as Nathan Houser notes,  “from at 
least that time [1897] on, the role of instinct, or sentiment, as a co-participant with reason 
in the acquisition of knowledge became a key concern for Peirce, and it would not be 
long until he came to regard ethics and esthetics as epistemically more fundamental than 
logic.”5  This influence will be further explored in the subsequent chapters.  
     We might begin by contrasting three types of theory of mental activity. 
Anglophone philosophy has been most fond of what James Crombie calls the first-person 
type, an approach well represented by James.6  This type is adhered to by those who, like 
James, maintain that we possess a privileged access to the contents of our own minds, 
and that nothing can be as incorrigible as knowledge of our own mental states.  These 
contents of our introspection, these “inner” mental phenomena, such as thoughts, dreams, 
pains, and desires, are readily contrasted with the physical phenomena or objects of the 
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“outer” world. This approach to the knowledge of mind treats consciousness as 
completely insular and the hallmark of this subjectivism is inescapable privacy.  
The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in 
personal consciousness, minds, selves, concrete particular I’s and you’s. 
Each of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving 
or bartering between them … Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, 
is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or 
this thought or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned. 
Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of 
quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered 
by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches 
between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature.7   
 
Within the thinking subject thoughts are experienced as a continuous whole, a stream, 
unobstructed by gaps in time or altered states of consciousness. The awaking subject 
understands the sleeping, dreaming subject as belonging to self.  
     This approach to the knowledge of mind can be contrasted with Crombie’s third- 
person type or what C.F. Delaney calls the “externalist” tradition.8  It is represented both 
by behaviorism and identity-theory analysis, which “analyze mental terms as referring to 
some overt, publicly identifiable feature of intelligent beings, such as their actual conduct 
or the current state of their brains and nervous systems.”9  It is probably fair to mention 
that Quine believed that “Peirce made a general and explicit declaration for behaviorism, 
indeed, in the following terms: ‘We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of 
the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external 
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facts.”10  The view expressed below is that while Peirce’s account of belief in the 
pragmatic maxim is certainly behavioristic in spirit – Quine asserted that beliefs 
construed as dispositions to action constitute behavioristic semantics – there is still much 
that separates him from vulgar behaviorism.  
     Both the first-person and the third-person approaches are fraught with well 
known difficulties. Wittgenstein’s allegory of the “beetle in a box” illustrates the problem 
of private language inherent in first-person accounts.11  The third-person accounts of 
behaviorism and mental/physical identity theses are no less troublesome. Intuitively, the 
report of a mental state, an acute pain for instance, seems more or other than that which is 
conveyed by pain behavior or by accounts of brain processes, especially to the one 
reporting the pain experience. The experience of pain and the mental process language 
used to report it, i.e., references to pain behavior and the brain process language of 
neurons and C-fibers, may all have the same referent but have different meanings.12    
     Peirce is credited by Vincent Colapietro, James Crombie, and C.F. Delaney with 
providing a third type, an approach I will call inferentialist, in contrasting it with the 
intuitionist and externalist types.13  Peirce’s denial of any power of introspection, a 
faculty he identified as a salient feature of Cartesianism, is a constant theme in his 
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I§293. 
 12. J.J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, ed. 
David M. Rosenthal, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2000), 53-66. 
 13. Vincent Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1989); Crombie in Caws, “Peirce and our Knowledge of Mind”; Delany, “Peirce’s Account of 
Mental Activity.” 
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writings beginning with the series of three essays published in the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy in 1868-9.14  In the first of these essays Peirce clarified his understanding of 
the term.  
By introspection, I mean a direct perception of the internal world, but 
not necessarily a perception of it as internal. Nor do I mean to limit the 
signification of the word to intuition, but would extend it to any 
knowledge of the internal world not derived from external observation.15  
 
Thirty years later, Peirce’s zealous denial of this faculty was unabated. In his review of 
Karl Pearson’s, Grammar of Science for The Popular Science Monthly, he wrote:  
[Pearson] tells us that that each of us is like the operator at a central 
telephone office, shut out from the external world, of which he is 
informed only by sense-impressions. Not at all! Few things are more 
completely hidden from my observation than those hypothetical 
elements of thought which the psychologist finds reason to pronounce 
‘immediate,’ in his sense. But the starting point of all our reasoning is 
not in those sense-impressions, but in our percepts. When we first wake 
up to the fact that we are thinking beings and can exercise some control 
over our reasonings, we have to set out upon our intellectual travels from 
the home where we already find ourselves. Now, this home is the parish 
of percepts. It is not inside our skulls, either, but out in the open 
[emphasis mine]. It is the external world that we directly observe. What 
passes within we only know as it is mirrored in external objects. In a 
certain sense, there is such a thing as introspection; but it consists in an 
interpretation of phenomena presenting themselves as external percepts. 
We first see blue and red things. It is quite a discovery when we find the 
eye has anything to do with them, and a discovery still more recondite 
when we learn that there is an ego behind the eye, to which these 
qualities properly belong.16   
 
And in a series of articles for The Monist in 1905, Peirce reiterated his position.  
 
 14. This series is comprised of “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868): 103-14; “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868): 140-57; and “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic,” Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 2 (1869): 193-208 and appears in CP 5.213-263; it is commonly referred to as the 
“Cognition Series” and represents Peirce’s critique of Cartesianism. 
 15. CP 5.244, 249. 
 16. CP 8.144 [1901]; review first appeared in Popular Science Monthly 58 (Jan. 1901): 296-306. 
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Introspection is wholly a matter of inference. One is immediately 
conscious of his Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of an 
ego. The self is only inferred. There is no time in the Present for any 
inference at all, least of all for inference concerning that very instant. 
Consequently the present object must be an external object, if there be 
any objective reference in it.17  
 
Peirce criticized James’ conflation of feeling-qualities with thoughts as evidence for 
James’ wrong-headed and misdirected internalism.18  “Our cognitive gaze is first directed 
outward and only by reflection turned inward, so that our knowledge of ourselves, our 
mental acts, and the data of consciousness is not immediate but logically parasitic on our 
more ordinary awareness of the objects around us.”19  Peirce did not so much deny a 
power of introspection as he affirmed that such a faculty provided only a mediated, 
indirect and derivative access to our thoughts, and thus, no more secure than any other 
inference.  
Now the truth is that the data of introspection are … altogether 
analogous to those of external observation. Introspection does not 
directly reveal what is immediately present to consciousness, at all; but 
only what seems to have been present from the standpoint of subsequent 
reflection. It does not even tell what the normal appearance from this 
subsequent standpoint is, without its testimony being falsified at all 
times with serious accidental errors.20  
 
Colapietro notes that “According to [Peirce], we are unable to catch our own thought in 
flight; we cannot know what we are presently thinking, only what we have just now 
thought.”21  Peirce tells us why.  
 
 17. CP 5.462. The series in The Monist was comprised of “What Pragmatism Is,” 15 (April 1905): 
161-181; “Issues of Pragmaticism,” 15 (Oct. 1905): 481-499; and “Prolegomena to an Apology for 
Pragmaticism,” 16 (Oct. 1906): 492-546 with minor corrections listed in 17:160. 
 18. CP 8.81. 
 19. C.F. Delaney, Science, Knowledge and Mind (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1993), 102. 
 20. CP 7.420. 
 21. Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self, 116 
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We have already seen that an idea cannot be instantaneously present, 
that consciousness occupies time, and that we have no consciousness in 
an instant. So that at no time have we a thought. But now it further 
appears that in reference to a belief not only can we not have it in an 
instant, but it can not be present to the mind in any period of time. It 
does not consist in anything which is present to the mind, but in an 
habitual connection among the things which are successively present.22  
 
The data of introspection are thus conditioned by prior percepts.  
Our logically initial data are percepts. Those percepts are undoubtedly 
purely psychical, altogether of the nature of thought. They involve three 
kinds of psychical elements, their qualities of feelings, their reaction 
against my will, and their generalizing or associating element. But all 
these I find out afterward. I see an inkstand on the table: that is a 
percept. Moving my head I get a different percept of the inkstand. It 
coalesces with the other. What I call the inkstand is a generalized 
percept, a quasi-inference from percepts, perhaps I might say a 
composite-photograph of percepts. In this psychical product is involved 
an element of resistance to me, which I am obscurely conscious of from 
the first. Subsequently, when I accept the hypothesis of an inward 
subject for my thoughts, I yield to that consciousness of resistance and 
admit the inkstand to the standing of an external object. Still later, I may 
call this in question. But as soon as I do that, I find that the inkstand 
appears there in spite of me. If I turn away my eyes, other witnesses will 
tell me that it still remains. If we all leave the room and dismiss the 
matter from our thoughts, still a photographic camera would show the 
inkstand still there, with the same roundness, polish, and transparency 
and with the same opaque liquid within. Thus, or otherwise, I confirm 
myself in the opinion that its characters are what they are, and persist at 
every opportunity in revealing themselves, regardless of what you, or I, 
or any man, or generation of men, may think they are. That conclusion 
to which I find myself driven, struggle against as I may, I briefly express 
by saying that the inkstand is a real thing. Of course, in being real and 
external, it does not in the least cease to be a purely psychical product, a 
generalized precept, like everything of which I can take any sort of 
cognizance.23  
 
 
 22. CP 7.355. 
 23. CP 8.144. 
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This is one way Peirce had of asserting his realism and at the same time rejecting the 
first-person subjectivism of James and, in turn, its view of mind as private and insular 
with every thought melding into the continuous stream of consciousness.  
     James had written in The Principles of Psychology: 
No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal 
consciousness than its own … My thoughts belong with my other 
thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts … Each of these 
minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering 
between them … Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law.24  
 
In unpublished notes, presumably prepared for his review of James’ Principles in The 
Nation, Peirce responded: 
Is not the direct contrary nearer observed facts? Is not this pure meta-
physical speculation? You think there must be such insulation, because 
you confound thoughts with feeling-qualities; but all observation is 
against you. There are some small particulars that a man can keep to 
himself. He exaggerates them and his personality sadly.25  
 
     Herein lays, perhaps, philosophically the biggest difference between the two 
friends. “One way to state this difference between James and Peirce is to note that, for the 
former, the most fundamental feature of personal consciousness is the irreducible fact of 
privacy whereas, for the latter, its most basic characteristic is the ubiquitous possibility of 
communication.”26  For Peirce, consciousness was a train of thought, each thought 
conditioned by those before it and conditioning those that follow. It is a product of sign-
action and, as he never tired of heralding, all thought is in signs,27 and, as such, is 
communicable.  
 
 24. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:226 
25. CP 8.81 
 26. Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self, 78. 
 27. For example, CP 1.191, 4.551, 5.251, 5.553, 7.356. 
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every state of consciousness [is] an inference; so that life is but a 
sequence of inferences of a train of thought. At any instant then man is a 
thought, and as thought is a species of symbol, the general answer to the 
question what is man? is that he is a symbol.”28  
 
This last sentence is one of Peirce’s most intriguing ideas and one that we will return to 
in subsequent chapters.  
     One further feature of Peirce’s theory of mind should be noted. Besides his denial 
of both the privileged status of introspective data and the insularity of an individual’s 
mental states and his affirmation of both the communicability of thought and the 
representative nature of thought, Peirce asserted the externality of the mind. Again, he 
reminded his readers that the “parish of precepts” is not located, “inside our skulls … but 
[rather] out in the open.”29  In an intriguing passage in which his prop is once again an 
inkstand, Peirce wrote the following in 1902 (a year after his review of Pearson’s 
Grammar of Science). 
The psychologists say that consciousness is the essential attribute of 
mind; and that purpose is only a special modification. I hold that 
purpose, or rather, final causation, of which purpose is the conscious 
modification, is the essential subject of psychologists’ own studies; and 
that consciousness is a special, and not a universal, accompaniment of 
mind … A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale me 
alienum puto), and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, 
“you see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt 
it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able 
to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts 
would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized 
in my inkstand. It is localization in the sense in which a thing can be in 
two places at once.30 
 
 28. CP 7.583. 
 29. CP 8.144. 
30. CP 7.366; see Peter Skagestad, “Peirce’s Inkstand as an External Embodiment of Mind,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35:551-561. 
 
94 
                                           
This passage underscores Peirce’s conviction that mind is much broader than personal 
consciousness and, as such, is not confined to the protoplasmal content of brain cells any 
more than an electric current resides inside the copper wires of a circuit, an analogy he 
draws later in the same passage.31  Consciousness, as an unbroken train of thought, 
extends infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future. Peter Skagestad suggests that 
Peirce is saying, “thoughts come to him through the act of writing, so that having writing 
implements is a condition for having certain thoughts – e.g., those thoughts that issue 
from trains of thoughts too long to be entertained in [his individual] human 
consciousness.”32  In the notes he prepared for his review in The Nation, Peirce quoted 
from James’ Principles: “The cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man,”33 and 
responded by observing, “The reasoning seems pretty loose for settling all the important 
positions implied in this statement. What is consciousness anyway?”34   
     Peirce argued that consciousness was both an exceptionally ambiguous (CP 
7.585) and vague (CP 5.313) term, noting that it could be used to express the emotion 
that accompanies the reflection that we have animal life, or it can refer to the 
introspective knowledge we have of our mental states, or it can denote the Kantian 
concept of “I think,” i.e., the apperception of being or the unity in thought.35  In a 1904 
letter to James, in response to James’ essay “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” that appeared 
in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,36 Peirce further noted 
 
 31. CP 7.366. 
 32. Skagestad, “Peirce’s Inkstand as an External Embodiment of Mind,” 35:551. 
 33. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:66. 
 34. CP 8.72. 
 35. CP 7.585. 
 36. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (September 1, 1904): 477-491. 
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three usages of the term ‘consciousness’ by a variety of contemporary schools. It was 
used by sensationalists, including James, to indicate mere feeling. It was used by others, 
such as Bain and Mary Whiton Calkins, to signify knowledge of both “inner” and “outer” 
worlds, i.e., of subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. Thirdly, Peirce joined his 
own use the of the term with that of Thomists, Hegelians and other “Intellectualists” who 
denote three modes of consciousness: “that of feeling, that of experience (experience 
meaning precisely that which the history of my life has forced me to think; so that the 
idea of a struggle, of not mere twoness but active oppugnancy is in it), and [that of] the 
consciousness of the future (whether veridical or not is aside from the question) in 
expectation, which enters into all general ideas according to my variety of 
prag tism.”37   
     In a largely unpublished manuscript, Peirce had differentiated three states of mind
as feeling, acting/reacting, and thinking.38  Each will be examined in some detail below.
Asserting the vagueness of the term ‘consciousness’ and, once again, the externality of 
mind, Peirce wrote, “Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories. But if it 
to mean Thought it is more without us than within.”39  This vagueness as to the precise 
meaning of the term was, for Peirce, a product of its generality. As Robert Innis point
out, “Peirce refuses to identify consciousness with any one of its forms or to make it 
some mysterious inner realm or ‘space.’ Consciousness is exemplified in each category;
                                            
 37. CP 8.291. 
 38. MS 404, §1; Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, eds., The Essential Peirce (Bloomington 
nd India anapolis: Indiana University Pess, 1992), 2:4-5. 
 39. CP 8.256. 
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We will return to this criticism in our treatment of the general 
ss 
e 
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e dual nature of experience produces a 
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there are, in fact, different kinds – as well as elements – of consciousness.”40  Thought, 
too, is so general (and thus vague) that “[it] is not necessarily connected with a brain. I
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world.”41  
Rulon Wells saw this tendency to overly generalize, especially in regard to the concept 
mind, to be a fatal flaw, vitiating Peirce’s semiotic. As a practicing scientist, and more 
specifically a logician of scientific method, Peirce acquired the tendency honestly. “Often
this attempt [to generalize] is inspired by the notion that generalizing is one of the thing
one does in science.”42  
theory of signs below.  
     Peirce’s inferentialism rests on the conviction that “every state of consciousne
[is] an inference; so that life is but a sequence of inferences or a train of thought.”43  
Objecting to James’ classification of mental states as either feelings or thoughts, Peirc
suggested that a more useful, and clearly more scientific and logical, division would 
attempt to account not for “mental states” but rather for “mental elements” as “feeling-
qualities, reactions (volition and experience), and habit-taking.”44  The mental elements 
of consciousness, including the notion of an experiencing self, are themselves prod
inference. James Crombie describes how th
usness of self.  
Peirce’s suggestion, which is to construe the existence and propert
an empirical self as inferable from anomalies and contradictions in the 
                                  
 40. Robert E. Innis, Consciousness and the Play of Signs (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 17. 
 41. CP 4.551. 
 42. Rulon S. Wells, “Criteria for Semiosis,” A Perfusion of Signs, ed. Thomas Sebeok 
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1977), 1. 
 43. CP 7.583. 
 44. CP 8.80. 
 
97 
o 
ng, 
 
 
h I had at first thought to observe in 
xternal facts. This, then, is the general line which Peirce proposes as an 
direct, intuitive introspection.    
In describing the nature of the category of Secondness or experience in his Lowell 
Lecture
t 
oming 
fect on 
r 
fe that we conceive others things also to exist by virtue of their 
pivot of thought. To this element I give the name of Secondness.   
Quoting this passage in one of his few papers on Peirce, John Dewey, who had taken 
Peirce’s courses on logic as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins during the early 1880s, 
observe
                                           
world as it presents itself to us, from how our observations of the 
external world seem to be “affected” by something not belonging to that 
world: The landscape appears to me today to be somehow not so 
cheerless and hard as it did yesterday. But when I mention this “fact” t
family and friends, it is universally maintained that today is, if anythi
even more wretched and miserable than yesterday and the landscape is
certainly not more inviting. Upon reflection, then, I find that I cannot 
identify any precise feature in which today’s landscape differs from 
yesterday’s, either in the color of the dead leaves against the sky or in 
the cold and the intensity of the wind. I therefore attribute to a change in
my own inner state a change whic
e
alternative to the suggestion that the contents of our minds are open to 
45
 
s of 1903, Peirce had said: 
You have a sense of resistance and at the same time a sense of effort. 
There can be no resistance without effort; there can be no effort withou
resistance. There are only two ways of describing the same experience. 
It is a double-consciousness. We become aware of ourself in bec
aware of the not-self. The waking state is a consciousness of reaction; 
and as the consciousness itself is two-sided, so it has also two varieties; 
namely, action, where our modification of other things is more 
prominent that their reaction on us, and perception, where their ef
us is overwhelmingly greater than our effect on them. And this notion, 
of being such as other things make us, is such a prominent part of ou
li
reactions against each other. The idea of other, of not, becomes a very 
46
 
d that Peircean  
[consciousness’s] ‘two-sidedness’ anticipates what James later, but 
probably independently, called the doublebarreledness of experience. 
Implicitly, but not explicitly, it anticipates the principle of 
 
 45. Crombie, “Peirce on our Knowledge of Mind,” 80. 
 46. CP 1.324. 
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is two-sided affair, it is equally true that the organism’s side is 
transaction. It all depends, so to say, on whose side we are on.   
     In the next chapter we will examine Peirce’s inferential theory of mind in more 
detail, in particular the argument for the self from the 1868 Cognition Series.  It is here 
that “[Peirce] goes so far as to maintain that the whole notion that there is an empirical 
self which is the subject of my judgments and emotions is likewise reached by a species 
of inference from ‘external facts’ and is in fact reached at about the time that we learn to 
distinguish between judgment and emotion, between fact and mere appearance.”   For 
now it is enough to note that Peirce’s theory is distinct from either traditional first-person 
or the third-person approaches. Whether one sides with C.F. Delaney in the claim that 
Peirce is “the philosopher who carried through [the] externalist program most self-
consciously and most completely,”  or views Peirce’s position as a unique third type, it 
is clear that “it differs from a third-person approach in that it involves inference from the 
nature of one’s own experience, but differs from the first-person approach in that the 
experiences in question concern the outer and not the inner world.”51   
 
                                           
“indeterminancy,” according to which, when a cat looks at a king, there
is a bumping in which the king as well as the cat is moved – though not 
of course to anything like the same extent. Perception of “internal” and 
“external” worlds is a matter of one and the same event – the even
which, in recent psychology, the same “sensori-motor” is applied. And
while Peirce uses the word “internal” to express the organism’s p
th
“external” to that of the part of environing conditions in the common 
47
 
48
49
50
 
 47. John Dewey, “Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought and Meaning,” Journal of 
Philosophy 43 (Feb. 14, 1946): 90.  
 48. See footnote 14 for a description of the “Cognition Series.”  
 49. Crombie, “Peirce on our Knowledge of Mind,” 81. 
 50. C.F. Delaney, “Peirce’s Account of Mental Activity,” Synthese 41 (1979): 27. 
 51. Crombie, in Caws, “Peirce and our Knowledge of Mind,” 83. 
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B. Categories and Semiotic 
     In endeavoring to describe Peirce’s theory of emotion, it is necessary to come to 
some understanding of his semiotic. In order to accomplish that, it is required that we 
account for his metaphysical categories, the basic universal conceptions upon which his 
semiotic and, thus, much of the rest of his philosophy rests. Charles Hartshorne, who, 
with Paul Weiss, edited the first six volumes of Peirce’s Collected Papers, did not 
overstate the case when he wrote that “Although it receives but a bare mention in the 
writings published during his lifetime, Peirce’s theory of the categories is really his entire 
philosophy in its most technical and original aspects.”52  Moreover, as Richard Bernstein 
adds, “We can … draw together the various strands in [Peirce’s] thought by reference to 
his theory of categories which pervades all his thinking.”53  In order to avoid getting 
bogged down in the more technical aspects, it will be necessary to keep our treatment 
somewhat general and cursory and focused upon the psychological purpose and 
application of the categories.  
      Throughout his life, Peirce acknowledged an early debt to Kant and, for a time, 
counted himself among his most ardent disciples.  
I came to the study of philosophy not for its teaching about God, 
Freedom, and Immortality, but intensely curious about Cosmology and 
Psychology. In the early sixties I was a passionate devotee of Kant, at 
least as regarded the Transcendental Analytic in the Critic of the Pure 
Reason.54 I believed more implicitly in the two tables of the Functions 
                                            
 52. Hartshorne, Charles, “Foreword” to Categories of Charles Peirce, ed. Eugene Freeman 
(Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1934). 
 53. Richard J. Bernstein, “Charles Sanders Peirce and The Nation,” in Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Contributions to The Nation, Part 1, 1869-1893, compiled and annotated by Kenneth Laine Ketner 
(Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1975), 21. 
 54. Critic of the Pure Reason, see Charles Sanders Peirce, Contributions to the Nation, Part 3, 
1901-1908, compiled and annotated by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook (Lubbock: Texas 
Tech University Press, 1979), 95. Peirce consistently and deliberately used ‘Critic’ rather than the more 
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of Judgment and the Categories than if they had been brought down 
from Sina 55
 
For much of the 1860s, Peirce was consumed with the study of Kant, a passion tempered 
by the critical eye of his father, Benjamin Peirce. In preparing his 1867 essay, “On a New 
List of Categories,” Peirce recalled that, “Before I came to man’s estate, being greatly 
impressed with Kant’s Critic of Pure Reason, my father, who was an eminent 
mathematician, pointed out to me lacunae in Kant’s reasoning which I should probably 
not otherwise have discovered.56  Charles soon became immersed in these, committing 
three hours a day for two years to problems he perceived in Kant’s formal logic.57  
“Peirce’s further investigations undermined his confidence in all of the details of Kant’s 
table [of the Functions of Judgment], but left him convinced that Kant’s project of 
deriving a system of categories from a logical investigation of the structure of judgment 
and argument was of fundamental importance.”58  Questions concerning Kant’s logic and 
his ultimate rejection of the unknowable ding an sich, notwithstanding, Peirce salvaged 
enough from Kant’s approach for a deduction of three a priori categories: Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness.59  Peirce presented his new list by reminding his readers of 
the groundwork Kant had laid in showing that “the function of conceptions is to reduce 
 
common English translation of ‘Critique’ because “Kant, not being insane, did not propose to criticize the 
Reasoning Power, unless to approve it in one paragraph. But what he chiefly criticized and had reference to 
in his title was the faculty of knowing first principles, The Reason. Consequently, his book, the ‘Critik der 
reinen Vernunft,’ is a work concerning ‘Critic of the Pure Reason.’” 
 55. CP 4.2 
 56. CP 1.560. 
 57. CP 4.2. 
 58. Christopher Hookway, Peirce (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 83. 
 59. Both Christopher Hookway and Gayle Ormiston acknowledge that while Peirce did not, 
strictly speaking, provide a Kantian metaphysical deduction of his three categories, a non-Kantian 
deduction, traceable from his writings, clearly shows how the categories were conceived in experience and 
logically deduced. See Hookway, Peirce, 81-88, and Gayle L. Ormiston, “Peirce’s Categories: Structure of 
Semiotic,” Semiotica 19 (1977): 209-231. 
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the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception 
consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the 
introduction of it.”60  That groundwork was at the very core of one of Peirce’s most  
mature expressions of Pragmatism, the seven Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism.61  There, 
in conclusion to the seventh and last lecture, he stated, “The elements of every concept 
enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of 
purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be 
arrested as unauthorized by reason.”62   
     In an undated manuscript, Peirce introduced the categories in the following way: 
“Three ideas are basic: those of something, other and third … In this mathematical 
proposition (for such it is shown to be), you have all logic and all metaphysics in a 
 
 60. CP 1.545. 
 61. Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997). Of these lectures, Peirce wrote to his former student, Christine Ladd-Franklin: “In the Spring of 
1903 I was invited, by the influence of James, Royce, and [Harvard psychologist Hugo] Münsterberg, to 
give a course of lectures in Harvard University on Pragmatism. I had intended to print them; but James said 
he could not understand them himself and could not recommend their being printed. I do not myself think 
there is any difficulty in understanding them, but all modern psychologists are so soaked with 
sensationalism that they can not understand anything that does not mean that, and mistranslate into the 
ideas of Wundt whatever one says about logic.” Christine Ladd Franklin, “Charles S. Peirce at the Johns 
Hopkins,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 13 (Dec. 21, 1916): 719-20. 
Given James’ lack of understanding, it is perhaps not insignificant that James was not in attendance for the 
second and either the sixth or seventh lectures and read manuscripts of both, sent by Peirce, some time after 
they had been delivered. These were returned to Peirce on June 5th. James wrote to his brother, the novelist 
Henry James, Jr., on May 3rd, “Charles Peirce is lecturing here – queer being …Boott (sic) is in good 
spirits, and a sociable as ever.” George Santayana was present for the third lecture, and recalled the 
experience many years later: “I heard one of [Peirce’s] Harvard lectures. He had been dining at the James’s 
and his evening shirt kept coming out of his evening waistcoat. He looked red-nosed and disheveled, and a 
part of his lecture seemed ex-tempore and whimsical. But I remember and have often used in my own 
thought, if not in actual writing, a classification he made that evening of signs into indexes and symbols 
and images: possibly there was still another distinct category which I don’t remember.” Brent, Charles 
Sanders Peirce: A Life, 289-292. See also William James, The Letters of William James, 2 vols., ed. Henry 
James (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 2:191. 
 62. CP 5.212. 
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nutshell.”63  As Peirce sees it, these three a priori categories are “ideas so broad that they 
may be looked upon rather as moods or tones of thought, than as definite notions …[and] 
viewed as numerals, to be applied to what objects we like, they are indeed thin skeletons 
of thought, if not mere words.”64  Still, as he expressed it to the Victorian semiotician, 
Lady Victoria Welby, once the categories occurred to him, they formed the organizing 
idea behind his subsequent work.  
I was long ago [1867] led, after only three or four years of study, to 
throw all ideas into the three classes of Firstness, of Secondness, and of 
Thirdness. This sort of notion is as distasteful to me as to anybody; and 
for years, I endeavored to pooh-pooh and refute it; but it long ago 
conquered me completely. Disagreeable as it is to attribute such meaning 
to numbers, and to a triad above all, it is as true as it is disagreeable.65  
  
And in a “Prolegomena for an Apology to Pragmatism” he wrote: 
I cannot tell you with what earnest and long continued toil I have 
repeatedly endeavored to convince myself that my notion that these 
three ideas [categories] are of fundamental importance in philosophy 
was a mere deformity of my individual mind. It is impossible; the truth 
of the principle has ever reappeared clearer and clearer.66  
 
Until the end of his career, and not without warrant, Peirce fretted about the 
pervasiveness of triads in his work as possible evidence of a disease he termed triadamy 
but not without irony was once prepared to call trichimania.67  A growing obsession with 
triads is clearly indicated in the latter third of his life when his philosophical interests 
shifted to evolutionary cosmology. In an incomplete manuscript of 1910, he took the time 
 
 63. MS 915, “The Three Categories and the Reduction of Fourthness,” quoted from Hans G. 
Herzberger, “Peirce’s Remarkable Theorem,” in Pragmatism and Purpose, eds. L.W. Sumner, John G. 
Slater, and Fred Wilson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 41. 
 64. CP 1.355. 
 65. CP 8.328. 
 66. Charles S. Peirce, The New Elements of Mathematics, 4 vols. in 5, ed. Carolyn Eisele (The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1976), 4:331. 
 67. CP 1.568. See also C.W. Spinks, Peirce and Triadomania (Berlin and New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter, 1991), 9n1. 
 
103 
                                           
to outline “The author’s response to the anticipated suspicion that he attaches a 
superstitious or fanciful importance to the number three, and forces divisions to a 
Procrustean bed of trichotomy.”68  For three pages his readers are cautioned against 
rushing to the conclusion that the author is a triadomaniac, notwithstanding the large 
number of trichotomies in the corpus of his work and at once are asked to consider two 
arguments for why he is not a victim of idée fixe. After all, “Kant, the King of modern 
thought, it was who first remarked the frequency in logical analytics of trichotomics or 
threefold distinctions.”69  For all of that, Peirce had to admit that while different numbers 
have been championed by others – two by Peter Ramus, four by the Pythagoreans, five 
by Sir Thomas Browne – his own leaning was to the number three in philosophy. At one 
point he said “In fact, I make so much use of threefold divisions in my speculations that it 
seems best to commence by making a slightly preliminary study of the conceptions upon 
which all such divisions must rest.”70  However, his explanation failed to dispel the 
suspicion that a commitment to psychological realism and an essentialist belief in the 
esoteric nature of triads allowed Peirce to find exactly what he was looking for in 
hairsplitting distinctions. Or, more frankly, in the words of Richard Rorty, there is 
nothing here to indicate Peirce was not “just one more whacked-out triadomaniac.”71  
     To my knowledge, Peirce never comprehensively addressed how he came to think 
of his three categories. He did, however, give a hint at how Kant was a catalyst. In 1905, 
Peirce radically revised his 1867 paper “On a New List of Categories” for inclusion in a 
 
 68. CP 1.568. 
 69. CP 1.369. 
 70. CP 1.355. 
71. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: The Penguin Group, 1999), 134. 
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larger work that was never finished. In this paper he remembered “As early as 1860, 
when I knew nothing of any German philosopher except Kant, who had been my revered 
master for three or four years, I was much struck with a certain indication that Kant’s list 
of categories might be a part of a larger system of conceptions.”72   
In my studies of Kant’s great Critic, which I almost knew by heart, I was 
very much struck by the fact that, although, according to his own 
account of the matter, his whole philosophy rests upon his “functions of 
judgment,” or logical divisions of propositions, and upon the relation of 
his “categories” to them, yet his examination of them is most hasty, 
superficial, trivial, and even trifling, while throughout his works, replete 
as they are with evidences of logical genius, there is manifest a most 
astounding ignorance of the traditional logic, even of the very Summulœ 
Logicales, the elementary schoolbook of the Plantagenet era.73  
 
In this essay Peirce shared how he came to think the relationship between the two tables 
of Kant’s Transcendental Analytic in the First Critique – the Function of Judgments and 
the Categories (A/70-B/95 and A/80-B/106 respectively) – comprised, as they are, of four 
sets of triads, might be flawed. 
For instance, the categories of relation – reaction, causality, and 
subsistence – are so many different modes of necessity, which is a 
category of modality; and in like manner, the categories of quality – 
negation, qualification, degree, and intrinsic attribution – are so many 
relations of inherence, which is a category of relation. Thus, as the 
categories of the third group are to those of the fourth, so are those of 
second to those of the third; and I fancied, at least, that the categories of 
quantity, unity, plurality, totality, were, in like manner, different intrinsic 
attributions of quality. Moreover, if I asked myself what was the 
difference between the three categories of quality, the answer I gave was 
that negation was a merely possible inherence, and intrinsic attribution a 
necessary inherence; so that the categories of the second group are 
 
 72. CP 1.563. The 1867 paper had also been rewritten in 1893. This earlier revision is MS 403 in 
Richard Robin’s catalog of Peirce’s papers presently housed in the Houghton Library at Harvard 
University. See Richard Robin, Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1967). The 1893 version has been presented along side the 1867 original by Joseph 
Ransdell and is located at the Arisbe website: http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ 
ms403/ms403.pdf (accessed August 2008). 
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distinguished by means of those of the fourth; and in like manner, it 
seemed to me that to the question how the categories of quantity – unity, 
plurality, totality – differ, the answer should be that totality, or system, is 
the intrinsic attribution which results from reactions, plurality that which 
results from causality, and unity that which results from inherence. This 
led me to ask, what are the conceptions which are distinguished by 
negative unity, qualitative unity, and intrinsic unity? I also asked, what 
are the different kinds of necessity by which reaction, causality, and 
inherence are distinguished? I will not trouble the reader with my 
answers to these and similar questions. Suffice it to say that I seemed to 
myself to be blinding groping among a deranged system of conceptions; 
and after trying to solve the puzzle in a direct speculative, a physical, a 
historical, and a psychological manner, I finally concluded the only way 
was to attack it as Kant had done from the side of formal logic.74  
 
 The logical process through which Peirce was able to reduce Kant’s twelve 
categories to three, and through which he came to “the demonstrative certitude that there 
was something wrong about Kant’s formal logic,”75 is outside the scope of the present 
work. Besides, as Murray Murphey points out, Peirce neglected to tell us precisely how 
the “demonstrative certitude” was reached.76  However, Peirce allowed:  
Even without Kant’s categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was 
quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental 
conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. 
This search resulted in what I call my categories. I then [1867] named 
them Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware 
that undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects 
than two; for this reason Reaction is a better term [than Relation]. 
Moreover, I did not then know enough about language to see that to 
attempt to make the word representation serve for an idea so much more 
general than it habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation 
would be better. Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for 
scientific terms, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, are to be 
preferred as being entirely new words without any false associations 
whatever.77 
 
 74. CP 1.563. 
 75. CP 4.2. 
 76. Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
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     While Peirce employed a variety of methods for iterating the categories, he 
primarily made use of two. The first was phenomenological, by which he engaged the 
psychologist-phenomenologist James in a thought experiment.78  The second method was 
what he termed “ideoscopic,” which he used in correspondence with the semiotician, 
Lady Victoria Welby.79   
     Having read the second of the seven 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism from 
the manuscript Peirce had provided him, James returned it, with a copy of one of the 
other lectures, on June 5th, enclosing the following note. 
I have read the Second one [on the Categories] twice – but so original, 
and your categories are so unusual to other minds, that although I 
recognize the region of thought and the profundity and reality of the 
level on which you move, I do not yet assimilate the various theses in 
the sense of being able to make use of them for my own purposes. I may 
get it later; but at present event 1st, 2nd & 3rdness are outside my own 
sphere of practically applying things, and I am not sure even whether I 
apprehend them as you mean them to be apprehended. I get, throughout 
your whole business, only the sense of something dazzling and imminent 
in the way of truth. This is very likely partly due to my mind being so 
non-mathematical and to my slight interest in logic; but I am probably 
typical of a great many of your auditors – of the majority, so my 
complaint will be theirs … You cannot start with too low an idea of their 
intelligence. Look at me as one!80  
 
Peirce found James’ incapacity most vexing and he responded on June 8th in an attempt at 
elucidation. 
It rather annoys me to be told that there is anything novel in my three 
categories; for if they have not, however confusedly, been recognized by 
men since men began to think, that condemns them at once. To make 
them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is, however, no small task … 
 
 78. CP 8.266-269. 
 79. CP 8.328. 
 80. The Correspondence of William James, eds. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley 
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But I am going to try to make here a brief statement that, I think, will do 
something for them. By the phenomenon I mean whatever is before our 
minds in any sense. The three categories are supposed to be the three 
kinds of elements that attentive perception can make out in the 
phenomenon.81  
 
As Nathan Houser explains “Here the categories appear as fundamental categories of 
experience (or consciousness): firstness is the monadic element of experience usually 
identified with feeling, secondness is the dyadic element identified with the sense of 
action and reaction, and thirdness is the triadic element identified with the sense of 
learning or mediation as in thought or semiosis.”82   
     To illustrate, Peirce asked James to imagine the breakers on the seashore as 
indicating the character of secondness as involving effort. All effort involves resistance 
and is hence, dyadic. “All the actual character of consciousness is merely the sense of the 
shock of the non-ego upon us. Just as a calm sea sleeps except where its rollers dash upon 
the land.”83  Secondness is a dyadic relation, indicated in a two place predicate, e.g., X 
kills Y. It indicates the element of struggle, resistance, or irritation. It is brute fact or 
existence, the sense of otherness, actuality.  
If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you will tell me 
that it consists in its happening then and there. The specifications then 
and there involve all its relations to other existents. The actuality of the 
event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of existents. A court 
may issue injunctions and judgments against me and I care not a snap of 
my finger for them. I may think them idle vapor. But when I feel the 
sheriff’s hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to have a sense of actuality. 
Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting 
your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an 
unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided 
consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come 
 
 81. CP 8.265. 
 82. Houser, introduction to The Essential Peirce, 1: xxxi. 
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tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have 
here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object 
is. I call that secondness.84  
  
      Next, Peirce beckons James to “imagine that feeling retains its positive character 
but loses all relation, (and thereby all vividness, which is only the sense of shock).”85  
What remains is the mere sense of quality. Here Peirce employs a mental image he had 
used many times before. He points to a patch of red and to that “element that makes red 
to be such as it is, whatever anything else may be.”86  It is unmediated, neither individual 
nor general. Quality: 
is not anything which is dependent, in its being, upon mind, whether in 
the form of sense or in that of thought. Nor is it dependent, in its being, 
upon the fact that some material thing possesses it. That quality is 
dependent upon sense is the great error of the conceptualists. A quality is 
a mere abstract potentiality, and the error of these schools lies in holding 
that the potential, or possible, is nothing but what the actual makes it to 
be … First that the quality of red depends on anybody actually seeing it, 
so that red things are no longer red in the dark, is a denial of common 
sense … The sensation is requisite for its apprehension; but no sensation 
nor sense-faculty is requisite for the possibility which is the being of the 
quality.87  
 
Feeling, including sensation, is a monadic relation represented by a one place predicate, 
e.g., X is red. It is represented in quality, in the immediate, in the presentness of the 
present. 
Go out under the blue dome of heaven and look at what is present as it 
appears to the artist’s eye. The poetic mood approaches the state in 
which the present appears as it is present. Is poetry so abstract and 
colorless? The present is just what it is regardless of the absent, 
 
 84. CP 1.24. 
 85. CP 8.267. 
 86. Ibid. 
 87. CP 1.422. 
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regardless of past and future. It is such as it is, utterly ignoring anything 
else.88  
 
What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before 
he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own 
existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, 
original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, 
remember that every description of it must be false to it.89  
 
Imagine me to make and in a slumberous condition to have a vague, 
unobjectified, still less subjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or 
of an ache, or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note. That would 
be, as nearly as possible, a purely monadic state of feeling.90  
 
      Thirdness, or the third element of the phenomenon, is that we perceive it to be a 
thing capable of being represented. “We perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject 
to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol … [and] whatever is 
capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature.91  As such, Thirdness is a 
triadic relation, mediating between a first and a second, indicated by a three place 
predicate, e.g., A gives B to C.  Whereas, firsts, being unreferred, are neither individual 
nor general, seconds are individual and thirds are general. Thus it is, as Peirce proclaimed 
in his 1903 Harvard lectures that “Thirdness pours in upon us through every avenue of 
sense, in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on 
necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of 
generality and continuity at every step.”92  Thirdness, for Peirce, has many aspects 
including “generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence.”93  It is 
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 89. CP 1.357. 
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 91. CP 8.268. 
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also intelligibility, universality, regularity, lawfulness, mediation, vagueness, 
representation, destiny, reasonableness and life.94  In an especially fertile passage on 
examples of Thirdness, Peirce claims that: 
Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection. Every process 
comes under that head. Moderation is a kind of Thirdness. The positive 
degree of an adjective is first, the superlative second, the comparative 
third. All exaggerated language, “supreme,” “utter,” “matchless,” “root 
and branch,” is the furniture of minds which think of seconds and forget 
thirds. Action is second, but conduct is third. Law as an active force is 
second, but order and legislation are third. Sympathy, flesh and blood, 
that by which I feel my neighbor’s feelings, is third.95   
 
The suggestion that sympathy – as he defines it, what might today be called the empathic 
response, though the term ‘empathy’ has a short history, never appearing in the Oxford 
English Dictionary prior to 1930 – is a third is especially rich. As we delve into Peirce’s 
theory of emotion we will begin to see that as primarily a cognitivist, Peirce views 
particular emotions as judgments about something that is, as intentional in nature. Thus 
emotions, like thoughts, are thirds.  
      Toward the end of a 1935 article “Peirce’s Theory of Quality,”96 Dewey shifted to 
the psychological identifications and descriptions of the three categories. 
In this psychological universe of discourse, Quality (including 
sensations as barely had and not referred) represents feeling; Secondness 
represents existence as conative (since involving effort-resistance); and 
Thirdness, as cognitive thought, represents rationality.97   
 
As such, these psychological descriptions could, according to Dewey, be interpreted in 
two ways. One interpretation, certainly harmonious with Peirce’s “panpsychic 
 
 94. Rulon S. Wells, “Thirdness and Linguistics,” The Signifying Animal, eds. Irmegard Rauch and 
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predilections,” would be to construe them as constituents in a grand cosmological 
scheme, comprised of hypostasized mathematical relations “isomorphic with three 
elements active in the universe – chance, law, and habit-taking.”98  That is the view, says 
Dewey, that “apart from experience and phenomenology, the universe is constituted of 
something very like feelings and acts of effort-resistance, while natural continuity is 
inherently assimilable to what presents itself in experience as reflective thought.”99   
     The second, far more modest, interpretation of the psychological descriptions of 
the three categories stands apart from metaphysics.  
Whether “feelings,” for example, are or are not constituents of the 
natural world, it can be affirmed that, psychologically it is through 
feeling (including sensation as such) that qualities present themselves in 
experience; that it is through volitional experiences that existence, as a 
matter of action-reaction, is actualized in experience, and it is through 
thought that continuities are experienced … This idea that feeling is the 
true psychical representative [see CP 5.44] of that immediacy of being 
which characterizes, according to Peirce, everything in the natural 
world, is all that is essential to his theory. The rest is supernumery; as he 
repeatedly says, with unusual frankness for a philosopher, it is a guess. If 
what is suggested …is followed out, we do not define or identify quality 
in terms of feeling. The reverse is the case. Anything that can be called a 
feeling is objectively defined by reference to immediate quality: 
anything that is a feeling, whether of red or of a noble character, or of 
King Lear, is of some immediate quality when that is present as 
experience.100  
 
In what follows we will trace elements of both interpretations as they are presented in 
Peirce’s notions of instinct, emotion, and sentiment and the roles these play in inquiry 
and action. I will take the position that for Peirce these two interpretations do not in any 
way bifurcate reality, that he felt, as he attempted to show in his 1887-88 essay, “A Guess 
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at the Riddle,” essentially an outline for a book he never finished, the categories were the 
foundation of an architectonic that revealed the universe in both its vastness and 
intricacy.  
     The second method Peirce frequently used for iterating the categories was what he 
called ideoscopic. Its clearest articulation is found in a letter to Lady Victoria Welby 
dated October 12, 1904.101  The term, like another he used in this letter, “cenoscopic,” 
was borrowed from Jeremy Bentham.102  Its meaning is clear from the following passage. 
 Ideoscopy consists in describing and classifying the ideas that 
belong to ordinary experience or that naturally arise in connection with 
ordinary life, without regard to their being valid or invalid or to their 
psychology … The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are 
simple enough. Giving to being the broadest possible sense, to include 
ideas as well as things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as 
ideas we do have, I should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness 
thus:  
 Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else. 
 Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
with respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
 Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in 
bringing a second and a third into relation to each other. 
 I call these ideas the cenopythagorean categories.103   
 
     Here Peirce returned to thought experiment to illustrate his ideoscopic 
conclusions regarding firstness and secondness.   
Imagine yourself to be seated alone at night in the basket of a balloon, 
far above the earth, calmly enjoying the absolute calm and stillness. 
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Suddenly the piercing shriek of a steam-whistle breaks upon you, and 
continues for a good while. The impression of stillness was an idea of 
Firstness, a quality of feeling. The piercing whistle does not allow you to 
think or do anything but suffer. So that too is absolutely simple. Another 
Firstness. But the breaking of the silence by the noise was an experience. 
The person in his inertness identifies himself with the precedent state of 
feeling, and the new feeling which comes in spite of him is the non-ego. 
That consciousness of the action of a new feeling in destroying the old 
feeling is what I call an experience. Experience generally is what the 
course of life has compelled me to think. Secondness is either genuine or 
degenerate. There are many degrees of genuineness. Generally speaking 
genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon another, brute 
action. I say brute, because so far as the idea of any law or reason comes 
in, Thirdness comes in.104 
 
      Revisiting his illustration of the shrieking steam-whistle, now from the standpoint 
of a person in a room startled from a dreamy, half-awake state in which he was thinking 
of nothing but a pleasing color, Peirce turned to thirdness. 
[L]et us imagine that our now-awakened dreamer, unable to shut out the 
piercing sound, jumps up and seeks to make his escape by the door, 
which we will suppose had been blown to with a bang just as the whistle 
commenced. But the instant our man opens the door, let us say the 
whistle ceases. Much relieved, he thinks he will return to his seat, and so 
shuts the door again. No sooner, however, has he done so than the 
whistle recommences. He asks himself whether the shutting of the door 
had anything to do with it; and once more opens the mysterious portal. 
As he opens it, the sound ceases. He is now in a third state of mind: he is 
Thinking. That is, he is aware of learning, or going through a process by 
which a phenomenon is found to be governed by a rule, or has a general 
knowable way of behaving … This third state of mind is entirely 
different from the other two. In the second there was only a sense of 
brute force; now there is a sense of government by a general rule. In 
Reaction only two things are involved; but in government there is a third 
thing which is a means to an end.105  
 
The conception of Thirdness, i.e. the element in phenomena that allows us to see it as a 
thing capable of being represented, leads us to Peirce’s general theory of signs. The 
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theory of signs arises from an analysis of conscious experience from the viewpoint of his 
three universal categories. Later in MS 404, in §2, Peirce observed that: 
There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First, we may 
have a primary interest in it for itself. Second, we may have a secondary 
interest in it, on account of its reactions with other things. Third, we may 
have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it conveys to a mind an idea 
about a thing. In so far as it does this, it is a sign, or representation.106  
 
As David Savan points out, it is in the 1867 essay, “On a New List of Categories,” that 
Peirce presents his triadic analysis of the sign as dependent upon his categories.107   
 
C. Peirce’s General Theory of Signs 
     In his article, “Questions Concerning Certain Classifications Claimed for Signs,” 
a play on Peirce’s leading essay in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy series of 1868, 
“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” David Savan asks “What is 
the relation of categories to signs?” He begins by raising the question “What is a sign?” 
Peirce had many answers to that question, no fewer than seventy-six, in fact, as 
catalogued by Robert Marty and Alfred Lang.108  In the 1902 Baldwin Dictionary entry 
for “Sign,” contributed by Peirce, a sign is:  
Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to 
an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the 
interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.109 
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 It is clear that in Peirce’s mind, a sign has three references: “A REPRESENTAMEN is a 
subject of a triadic relation TO a Second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its 
INTERPRETANT.110   His most common and generic way of stating it was to say that 
“A sign, or representamen [sometimes representation], is something which stands 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity,”111 or, as a very early formulation 
had it, “A representation is something that stands for something to someone who so 
interprets it – more precisely, to the ‘interpretant,’ which that person forms in response to 
the sign and which is a second representation of the same thing.”112  What each of these 
slightly different takes on the sign makes clear it that for Peirce a sign is any “one of 
three relata – sign, object, interpretant – of a single, triadic relation.”113   
      Those familiar with Peirce know that he was continuously revising his thoughts 
on signs. “As he did that in several stages over many years – often in letters or unfinished 
manuscripts – what we now possess is little more than a sequence of contradictions, a 
series of ambitious yet unfinished sketches of elaborate but mutually incompatible 
structures.”114  In 1907, after the investment of thirty years, Peirce could only describe 
himself as “a pioneer; or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up 
what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties 
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quote of Peirce on p. 98, on why an interpretant is not an interpreter: “Instead, it is the particular thought, 
action, or feeling which interprets a sign. The formation of interpretants constitutes an interpreter, which in 
some cases is a person.” In MS 318 Peirce wrote: “A sign without an interpreter has as an interpretant, a 
‘would-be’, i.e., what would determine in the interpreter if there were one.” 
 113. Short, “The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Signs,” in Misak, 214. 
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of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great for a first comer.”115  
Yet, his writings on signs cannot be ignored, because “the semeiotic is the center from 
which most of Peirce’s thought radiates,” and “[t]he conception of the semeiotic triad is 
the central unity in Peirce’s philosophy, from beginning to end.”116  Peirce himself put it 
this way: “It has never been in my power to study anything – mathematics, metaphysics, 
gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, psychology, 
phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology – 
except as a study of semiotic.”117  Moreover, “his pragmatic theory of inquiry and his 
synechistic account of the mind are incomplete without it.”118    
     The fragmentary state of his semiotic writings has, however, given Peirce’s critics 
a looming target and presented his interpreters with a rather thorny hermeneutical 
problem. Rorty’s claim is that the recent tendency to overly praise Peirce is largely due to 
the unfinished but suggestive character of his sign theory.  
[T]he main reason for Peirce’s undeserved apotheosis is that his talk 
about a general theory of signs looks like an early discovery of the 
importance of language. For all his genius, however, Peirce never made 
up his mind what he wanted a general theory of signs for, nor what it 
might look like, nor what its relation to either logic or epistemology was 
supposed to be.119  
 
 
 115. CP 5.488. 
116. David Savan, “Peirce and Idealism,” in Peirce and Contemporary Thought, ed. Kenneth 
Laine Ketner (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 315; and David Savan, “The Unity of Peirce’s 
Thought,” in Pragmatism and Purpose, eds. L.W. Sumner, John G. Slater, and Fred Wilson (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981), 10-11, respectively. 
 117. Charles S. Hardwick, ed., Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence Between Charles S. 
Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 85-6. 
 118. Short, “The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Signs” in Misak, 214. 
 119. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
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While Rorty is correct in claiming that Peirce never made up his mind about what the 
general theory of signs might finally look like, he did know exactly what he wanted it for, 
how logic as a species of semiotic related to it,120 and how it related to the ultimate goal 
of outlining a “theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of 
human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in 
physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there might 
be, shall appear as the filling up of its details.”121  It was this vision that consumed his 
last years. His biographer, Joseph Brent noted th
Despite his steadily declining health and increasingly undependable 
mind, Peirce continued until the last few weeks of his life to work 
doggedly and surprisingly fruitfully on his great undertaking, now called 
a ‘system of logic defined as formal semeiotic.’ This dry description 
meant far more than a change in name. Between about 1900 and 1912, 
Peirce transfigured his entire architectonic on the basis of a 
transcendental doctrine of signs that had been in kernel in 1867.122   
 
Our interest here is, of course, much narrower in scope, specifically the relation of sign 
theory to instinct, sentiments, and the emotions. However, even here, at the level of the 
affective, in the unity of thought and feeling, in the relation between science and 
sentiment, in the understanding of instinct and abduction, the development of the theory 
of signs is salient.  
     The hermeneutical problem arises in the philological task of reconstructing what 
the general theory of signs might have looked like had Peirce settled on its final form. 
The natural tendency of interpreters is to work backward from what is often rendered as 
 
 120. CP 1.444, 4.9, 8.377. 
 121. CP 1.1. 
 122. Joseph Brent, Charles Peirce: A Life (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1991). 
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the “mature” work that occurred after 1906. Short says that “To speak of this mature 
theory at all [however] is to speak hypothetically: It has to be construed from the 
surviving manuscripts of Peirce’s last years plus all that is consistent with them from his 
earlier writings.”123  The work is highly speculative. As Umberto Eco notes, lacking a 
final iteration upon which to account for the stages of a supposed development, the 
interpreter must extrapolate what represents the “authentic” theory and what is “a mere 
abortive deviation.”124  Efforts to impose coherence by extraction of an essential kernel 
from the extraneous chaff tend, for Eco, to result more in “Peircist” interpretations than a 
“Peircean” reconstruction. At just such a risk and for the sake of brevity, we turn now to 
a thumbnail sketch of the theory. 
     We should begin with a note on spelling. “For σημειωσιζ – sign-action, the 
operation or function of a sign, sign-interpretation, or the act of inferring from signs – he 
uses two English forms, semiosis and semeiosy … For σημειωτικη – the art or science or 
doctrine or general theory of semioses [Peirce] uses semeiotic; much less often, 
semeiotics or semiotic, very rarely, semeotic; never semiotics.125  For the balance of this 
work, in quoting, I shall adopt whatever spelling is used in the original and outside of 
quotations I shall use the more common ‘semiotic.’  
     We began this discussion by raising David Savan’s question, “What is the relation 
of categories to signs?” As fundamental to all being, potential or actual, the three 
 
 123. Short, “The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Signs,” in Misak, 214 
 124. Umberto Eco, “Peirce’s Notion of Interpretant,” Modern Language Notes 91, Comparative 
Literature (Dec. 1976): 1457-1472. 
 125. Max H. Fisch, “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs,” in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: 
Essays by Max H. Fisch, eds. Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana 
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irreducible categories impose a triadic structure upon all signs.126  “The sign relation is 
fundamentally triadic: eliminate either the object or the interpretant and you annihilate the 
sign.”127  Thus it can be said that: 
[T]he ‘cenopythagorean categories’ are the structure on which Peirce 
built his theory of signs. Following his inquiry from the Kantian 
categories into his own deduction one can see how each category is 
dependent on and determined by the preceding categories. And, in so 
doing, Peirce shows how the categories function in their limited 
capacities, that of drawing attention to certain general characteristics 
within phenomena. The categories are the ‘skeletons of thought’ (1.355) 
and, as the skeleton of thought they offer or suggest a way of thinking, a 
perspective to look at the picture.128 
 
More importantly, beyond merely imposing a structure on the theory of signs, Savan 
responds to his own question by arguing that Peirce’s categories are themselves signs. 
“When Peirce writes … that being and cognizable are synonymous he is saying that being 
and representable are synonymous.”129  For our immediate purposes, the general theory 
of signs can be roughly summarized as follows. 
     From three fundamental kinds of relations – monadic, dyadic, and triadic – there 
are three mathematical relations – first, second and third or, via hypostatic abstraction, 
Firstness (a monad or quality), Secondness (a dyad or relation), and Thirdness (a triad or 
representation or mediation).  A sign, as that which stands for something (its object) to 
something (its interpretant), has two objects: a dynamic object, “the object in itself,” and 
 
 126. For a thorough discussion and formal demonstration of Peirce’s reduction thesis, whereby all 
quadruple or higher relations are reducible to triads and no further reduction is possible, see Hans G. 
Herzberger, “Peirce’s Remarkable Theorem,” in eds. Sumner, Slater and Wilson, Pragmatism and Purpose 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 41-59; and CP 3.144, 3.317, 1.345-7; MS 482, 439. 
 127. Houser, Introduction to the Essential Peirce, 1:xxxvi. 
 128. Gayle L. Ormiston, “Peirce’s Categories: Structure of Semiotic,” 224. 
 129. David Savan, “Questions Concerning Certain Classifications Claimed for Signs,” Semiotica 
19 (1977): 183; the reference in Peirce’s writing is to CP 5.257 from the second essay of the 1868 
Cognition Series. 
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an immediate object, “the object as the sign represents it.”130   Helmut Pape explains that 
“The immediate object is internal to the sign – just the idea of an object to which the sign 
gives rise to. The dynamical object is the external object of the sign, an intersubjective 
item that different people at different times locate in their experience as the same object 
that these people have experienced before.”131   To illustrate Peirce says:  
‘It is a stormy day.’ Here is [a] sign. Its Immediate Object is the the 
notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and 
mine – not the character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical 
Object is the identity of the actual or Real Meteorological conditions at 
the moment.132  
 
Additionally, every sign has three interpretants: a final interpretant, the “effect that would 
be produced on the mind by the sign after sufficient development of thought,” a dynamic 
interpretant, the “effect actually produced on the mind,” and an immediate interpretant, 
the “interpretant represented or signified in the sign.”133  Returning to the example of the 
stormy day, Peirce says: 
The Immediate Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the 
vague Image or what there is in common to the different Images of a 
stormy day. The Dynamical Interpretant is the disappointment or 
whatever actual effect it at once has upon her. The final interpretant is 
the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc.134   
   
Using Peirce’s own words, Jay Zeman very effectively summarizes the distinction 
between the immediate and dynamical in the following way: 
…the Immediate Object … is the object as the Sign itself represents it, 
[making its] Being … dependent on the Representation of it in the Sign 
 
 130. CP 4.536 and 8.343. 
 131. Helmut Pape, “Charles S. Peirce on Objects of Thought and Representation,” Noûs 24 (June, 
1990): 382. 
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 133. CP 8.343. 
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…; the Immediate Interpretant … is the interpretant as it is revealed in 
the right understanding of the sign itself.135  
 
 Immediate is contrasted to dynamical: 
 
…the Dynamical Object … is the Reality which by some means 
contrives to determine the sign to its Representation. … the Dynamical 
Interpretant … is the actual effect which the sign as sign really 
determines.136  
 
So far as interpretants are concerned, Peirce speaks of a final interpretant 
as well as an immediate and a dynamical:  
 
“…the Final Interpretant … refers to the manner in which a Sign tends 
to represent itself to be related to its object.”  
 
He goes on, “I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant 
is not yet quite free from mist.” Thanks.137 
 
 Elsewhere, as if to turn the mist to fog, Peirce uses another trichotomy of 
interpretants, that of the emotional interpretant (a feeling), the energetic interpretant (an 
action), and the logical interpretant (a thought).138  This second trichotomy has been the 
source of considerable controversy over whether it is to be understood as synonymous 
with the first division or as representative of a new departure. Among the Peirce scholars 
who believed the trichotomies are synonymous are Paul Weiss and Arthur Burks, 
Thomas Goudge, James Feibleman, Justus Buchler, Manley Thompson, and Douglas 
Greenlee.139  A second group of interpreters, represented by Thomas L. Short and Jay 
 
 135. CP 4.536. 
 136. Ibid. 
 137. J. Jay Zeman, “The Esthetic Sign in Peirce’s Semiotic,” Semiotica 19 (1977): 246. 
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Zeman, believe that the two trichotomies are very different but do not compete or conflict 
with one another.140  James Jakób Liszka holds that the the two trichotomies of 
intepretants co-exist not merely synonymously but have a complementary relationship.141  
Finally, John J. Fitzgerald and Brandon Lalor are two scholars who contend that the 
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy is merely a special case of either the dynamical 
(Fitzgerald) or the immediate/dynamic/final trichotomy.142   
      I will follow Lalor’s lead in holding that the emotional/energetic and logical 
classification of 1906 is a special case of the immediate/dynamical/final trichotomy of 
1909 as it reflects the concrete human experience of semiosis while the latter 
characterizes semiosis more generally. In spite of Thomas L. Short’s contention that the 
two trichotomies, defined on different principles, thus intersect without being identical, 
he is forced to admit that Peirce continued revision of his work on interpretants until the 
end of his career and that as late as 1907, in MS 318, the two trichotomies are identified 
with one another.143  While Lalor is left to explain how the trichotomy of 1906 could be a 
special case of one not fully developed for three more years, he points out that Peirce’s 
work on the subject was in a more or less constant state of flux, that there were several 
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other terminologies employed between 1893 and 1904, that as late as 1909 Peirce was 
writing to Welby of his “gropings after the three kinds of interpretant,” that even in MS 
318 when both trichotomies are mentioned together, it is ostensibly to identify rather  
than distinguish them, and that nowhere does Peirce claim they are distinct.144  Lalor’s 
interpretation gains us two things.  
     First, the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy, as a special case of the more 
abstract immediate/dynamic/final classification, provides a vehicle for the examination of 
feeling as manifested in psychological identifications, in human experiences of emotion, 
instinct and sentiment and, at the same time, as reflected in the grand scheme of Peirce’s 
panpsychical metaphysics. In this we are able to account for Peirce’s synechism, i.e. his 
theory of continuity and account of evolution, and his view of instinct as instrumental in 
accounting for both the success of scientific hypothesis and the source of the summum 
bonum.145 From this we are able to trace what Peirce referred to as his Ideal-Realism, a 
view containing elements of both idealism and realism, attributed to his father as “the 
opinion that nature and the mind have such a community as to impart to our guesses a 
tendency toward the truth, while at the same time they require the confirmation of 
empirical science.”146  Klaus Oehler argues that because he retained language common to 
the controversy between idealism and realism that marked much of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, it is easy to miss the fact that the theory of thought-signs, that 
Peirce advanced in 1868-9, is a first step in the attempt at overcoming the false 
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infinitum.   
It was a flaw that was not resolved until 1907 when Peirce conceded that every 
interpretant of a thought-sign need not be another thought-sign in an infinite series. “In 
1907, Peirce reversed himself by drawing a distinction within the category of logical 
interpretants between those that are signs and those that are not. The latter he named 
                                           
alternatives of that protracted and unproductive debate over the question of reality – 
whether, on the one hand, the object of experience stands outside of consciousness or, on 
the other hand, is a product of consciousness.147 The essence of Peirce’s argument is that 
thought can only be cognized by external facts.  
If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we 
can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be 
evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external facts 
can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possibly 
be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized 
does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs.148  
 
Because all thought is in signs, by nature all signs refer to each other. “Since meaning 
cannot be located in any thought-sign, it must be found in the very process by which one 
thought interprets another.”149 This very premise, however, revealed a fatal flaw in the 
early theory of signs. Short notes that: 
[Peirce] supposed that significance depends on interpretation, but then 
explained interpretation as consisting in signs. Thus, the problem of 
accounting for significance is not solved but merely handed on, from 
one sign to the next. Nor does it matter that the process of interpretation 
continues ad infinitum. That merely postpones an answer ad 
150
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‘ultimate logical interpretants.’”151  The ultimate logical interpretant of a sign is a habit of 
conduct.  
To say that I hold that the import, or adequate ultimate interpretation, of 
a concept is contained, not in any deed or deeds that will ever be done, 
but in a habit of conduct, or general moral determination of whatever 
procedure there may come to be, is no more than to say that I am a 
pragmaticist. Now every animal must have habits. Consequently, it must 
have innate habits. Insofar as it has cognitive powers, it must have in 
posse innate cognitive habits, which is all that anybody but John Locke 
ever meant by innate ideas.152   
 
The notion of such habits of conduct, covering all cases of the subjunctive as general, is 
at the core of Peirce’s later pragmatism, what he came to call pragmaticism, and extends 
to qualities of feeling. 
Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the the 
color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the 
taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a fine 
mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love, etc. I do not 
mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, whether 
primarily or in any memory or imagination … But I mean the qualities 
themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily 
realized.153   
 
The existence of ultimate interpretants gives rise to the question of just how general 
Peirce’s theory of signs truly is. The quick answer to the question is to present the 
distinction between token and type, sometimes termed the distinction between replica and 
legisign,154 first introduced by Peirce in The Monist in1906 and later adopted by, among 
others, Davidson.155  In his 1923 review of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for Mind, 
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Frank Ramsey suggested that a fuller understanding of certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
work could be gained from the introduction of Peirce’s type-token distinction.156  To 
illustrate, Peirce noted that there is but one definite article in the English language but 
that any printed page will contain a dozen instances. The one is the type to which the 
twelve are the tokens. “[T]he types are signs in a prior and preeminent sense; they confer 
signhood on their tokens.”157  Thus the ultimate interpretant as a habit is also, as a type, a 
sign, not merely as a constituent part of a compound as any interpretant would be a sign, 
but as any other type, bestowing signhood upon its tokens.  
     The second thing gained by accepting the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy 
as a special instance of the immediate/dynamic/final classification of interpretants, 
viewing the former as standing in relation to the latter as species to genus, is the hedge it 
affords Peirce against the danger of psychologism that he feared was lurking behind all 
attempts to relate semiosis to human experience. 
Peirce hoped to be able to generalize the conclusions reached from our 
human point of view, to characterize semiosis universally. He 
recognized that to do so unprovisionally would be to base a proposition 
of logic on a proposition of psychology. Thus, he stressed that the 
soundness of the generalization is conditional on the truth of the 
assumed analogy between modifications of human consciousness and 
interpretants in general. In this light, it should be no surprise that his 
1906 classification of the interpretants as emotional, energetic, and 
logical, reflects an anthropomorphic way of looking at semiosis. The 
1909 trichotomy lays down a general structural pattern which Peirce 
believed can be found in all kinds of semiosis.158 
 
Peirce was keenly sensitive to the hints of psychologism that were evidenced in his early 
work, in particular his use of the sensations of belief and doubt in the first founding of 
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 157. Fisch, “Just How General Is Peirce’s General Theory of Signs?” in Ketner and Kloesel, 357. 
 158. Lalor, “The Classification of Peirce’s Interpretants,” 7-8. 
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pragmatism in the “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” series of articles and did his 
utmost to expunge any such suggestions from subsequent formulations.159 One strategy 
for overcoming any tendency toward psychologism was, as Max Fisch points out, 
Peirce’s insistence on the difference between thinking and thought.   
Early and late, Peirce made frequent and wide-ranging use of the 
distinction between thinking and thought. Thinking is a matter for 
psychology, thought for logic. Thought is type; thinking is token.160 
 
We will return to the issue of psychologism in subsequent chapters.  
 
      With respect to the subject of this dissertation, a final remark on the special 
relationship of meaning to the emotional interpretant is in order before we turn to other 
aspects of the general theory of signs. Peirce’s clearest statement on this relationship was 
published in 1907 in the Popular Science Monthly. 
Now the problem of what the “meaning” of an intellectual concept is can 
only be solved by the study of the interpretants, or proper significate 
effects, of signs. These we find to be of three general classes with some 
important subdivisions. The first proper significate effect of a sign is a 
feeling produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come 
to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, 
although the foundation of truth in this is very slight. This “emotional 
interpretant,” as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of 
recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect 
that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted 
music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer’s 
musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings.161  
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By his own admission, Peirce had “terribly neglected” the study of aesthetics, which he 
nevertheless believed to be a science foundational to logic. 
…it is generally said that the three normative sciences are logic, ethics, 
and esthetics, being the three doctrines that distinguish good and bad; 
Logic in regard to representations of truth, Ethics in regard to efforts of 
will, and Esthetics in objects considered simply in their presentation. 
Now that third normative science [i.e. esthetics] can, I think, be no other 
than that which I have described. It is evidently the basic normative 
science upon which as a foundation, the doctrine of ethics must be 
reared to be surmounted in its turn by the doctrine of logic.162 
 
For Peirce, the normative sciences, representing the second grand division of philosophy 
after phenomenology, examine the relation of phenomena to ends. Logic, as self-
controlled thought, directed at the good end of representing something, depends upon 
ethics for the principle of self-control. Ethics, as self-regulated action directed at the good 
end of action, depends upon aesthetics for its notion of the summum bonum. Aesthetics, 
concerned with beauty and directed at the good end of feelings, is foundational. In this 
way, aesthetics is a first, ethics a second, and logic a third.163  The esthetic sign, while 
largely undeveloped by Peirce, represents the category of feeling as experience, i.e., at its 
most immediate contact with the object. Peirce draws his example of the emotional 
interpretant from the esthetic experience of music. Jay Zeman explains: 
An anecdote told of Schubert (whether apocryphal or not) illustrates the 
key role of the immediate, and so of the emotional interpretant, in 
esthetic experience. The composer had played one of his pieces on the 
piano, and afterwards was asked by a lady who had been listening, “Oh, 
Maestro, what does it mean?” Whereupon he sat back down at the 
pianoforte and played the composition again. Any answer to her 
question other than the providing of the immediate experience of the 
music would have missed the point, for the point was found precisely in 
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the ineffable immediacy of the experience – in the Peircean emotional 
interpretant which was its effect. Esthetic experience may be the locus 
where the emotional interpretant is most easily recognized, but this 
interpretant is by no means restricted to experience in the arts. Rather, it 
is an element of experience in general; in fact, “If a sign produces any 
further proper significate effect [beyond the emotional interpretant], it 
will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant.”164 
 
    We turn now to further divisions in the theory of signs that are necessary for 
understanding Peirce’s treatment of instinct, emotion, and sentiment. First, Peirce 
sometimes spoke of the ground of a sign. For instance: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it 
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. That which it creates I call the interpretant of the first 
sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, 
not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the representation.165   
 
Hartshorne and Weiss date this unidentified fragment from around 1897. Peirce’s use of 
‘ground’ was rare and, according to Thomas L. Short, the cited passage is the only 
instance in which it was employed after 1867 and thereby only to refer to earlier 
views.166  As such, the ‘ground’ is not a feature of the sign in the same way as the three
relata of sign (or representamen), object and interpretant but rather a device for 
identifying the nature of the particular sign or explaining how the sign picks out its 
objects.167  In 1867, Peirce explained the ground as being “the common characters of [th
sign’s] objects, or its connotation.”168  As D
 
 164. J. Jay Zeman, “Peirce’s Theory of Signs,” in A Perfusion of Signs, ed. Thomas Sebeok 
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[J]ust as a predicate may be said to refer to some character, say ‘being 
white,’ through which it refers to some correlated object, say the thing 
that is white, so Peirce says that every sign is a reference to a ground. A 
ground is an abstraction, like redness or squareness, color or shape. That 
which is concrete, is limited in its spatio-temporal existence, and is 
referred to such an abstract ground, Peirce calls a quale.169 
 
    From this standpoint, a sign will be either a quality (a “qualisign” – CP 2.244), an 
existent thing or event (a “sinsign” – CP 2.245) or a law or habit (a “legisign” – CP 
2.246).170  This first of three further trichotomic divisions, comprised of the qualisign, 
sinsign, and legisign, views the sign “as it is in itself,” i.e., the relatum in the triadic sign 
relationship designated as the sign or the representamen. In a return to one of his favorite 
illustrations, Peirce explains the trichotomy. 
A sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when I call it a qualisign 
or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when Icall it a sinsign 
(the syllable sin being the first syllable of semel, simul, singular, etc.); or 
thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a legisign 
[from the Latin Lex]. As we use the term ‘word’ in most cases, saying 
that ‘the’ is one ‘word’ and ‘an’ is a second ‘word,’ a ‘word’ is a 
legisign. But when we say of a page that it has 250 ‘words’ upon it, of 
which twenty are ‘the’s,’ the word is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying 
a legisign, I term a ‘replica’ of the legisign … The qualisign, on the 
other hand, has no identity. It is the mere quality of an appearance and is 
not exactly the same throughout a second. Instead of identity, it has great 
similarity, and cannot differ much without being called quite another 
qualisign.171   
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Qualisigns, as firsts, are the most abstract of the three. Qualisigns do not operate as signs 
until incarnate in an object but the actualization has nothing to do with their identity as 
signs.172  Until embodied, they are mere possibilities.  
    Another division of signs involves the sign considered in relation to its dynamical 
object. This division, by far the most developed by Peirce, is the division of signs into 
icons, indices, and symbols. Icons, or likenesses, represent by bearing a resemblance to 
the object. They represent simply through imitation. Examples of icons include 
photographs, especially instant photos, a design an artist draws of a statue, architectural 
elevations, imitative gestures and sounds, hieroglyphics, a painted portrait, an historical 
novel, or a theatrical performance.173  “An icon has no dynamical connection with the 
object it represents; it simply happens that its qualities resemble those of that object, and 
excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness.”174  
     Indices, on the other hand, represent by being physically or causally connected to 
the object, representing and making an organic pair. Or, in another way Peirce stated it 
around 1903, “an index is a sign which refers to the Object it denotes by virtue of being 
really affected by that Object.”175  Examples of indices include a weather vane, a plumb 
line, measles spots, temperature readings, billowing smoke, exclamations of pain, a bullet 
hole, lightning, the pole star, a scream for help, cartoons, footprints, a pointing index 
finger. As we will see, Peirce believed indices, like icons, are natural signs, and thus 
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signify regardless of whether an interpreter is present. “[Indices] brutely direct the 
eyeballs of the interpreter to the object in question.”176 “The index … forces the attention 
to the particular object intended without describing it.”177 “The index …like a pointing 
finger exercises a real physiological force over the attention, like the power of a 
mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense.”178 However, as Wittgenstein 
effectively demonstrated, one could imagine “a person [who] naturally reacted to the 
gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to 
wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.”179  Swelling, pain, redness and heat are indices of 
inflammation in a body. “Indices … furnish positive assurance of the reality and the 
nearness of their objects.”180 Thus, a map of a particular place, a guidepost, or a fence 
may be an index. A sundial or a clock is an index of the time of day. A man with a rolling 
gait may be a probable indication that he is a sailor just as a bowlegged man in gaiters 
and a jacket may be the probable indication that he is a jockey. Moreover, letters of a 
geometrician on parts of a diagram indicate that part. A rap on the door, a thunderbolt, 
“anything which startles us is an indication, in so far as it marks the junction between two 
portions of experience.”181  
     Icons and indices, as distinguished from instituted or conventional signs or 
symbols, are natural signs. As such, Max Fisch points out, they 
need not be thought of as having an utterer. We may therefore drop the 
utterer from the general model in terms of which we construct our 
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definition of a sign. And a sign does not cease to be a sign when no 
interpreter is present. So we may drop the interpreter also from our 
definition.182  
 
Thus we are able to refer to the interpretant rather than an interpreter because a natural 
sign is a sign regardless of its being interpreted as a sign.183 Icons rest on likeness and 
indices rest on association by contiguity.184 Neither hinge upon a rational animal for their 
signification.   
     Symbols, apart from being marked by the social or conventional, are 
distinguished from icons and indices negatively, that is, conceived as signs that are 
neither icons nor indices.185   
There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the thing 
signified; in that case, the sign is an icon. Or, there may be a direct 
physical connection; in that case, the sign is an index. Or there may be a 
relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates the sign with 
its object; in that case the sign is a name [or symbol].186 
  
As such, symbols, unlike icons and indices, possess generality. “A symbol is a 
representamen whose special significance or fitness to represent just what it does 
represent lies in nothing but the very fact of there being a habit, disposition, or other 
effective general rule that it will be so interpreted.”187  Symbols, or general signs, are 
associated with their meanings by custom or usage and, as such, most words, phrases, 
speeches, books, and libraries would be symbols. After tracing symbol as etymologically 
derived from εμΒολον (embolum) as a thing thrown into something or, in the case of the 
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symbol, thrown together (σνμΒολον) as in a contract or convention, Peirce lists other 
examples as a watch fire, a badge, a church creed, a ticket or a check, and, intriguingly, 
any expression of sentiment. Finally, almost any common word such as “give,” “bird,” or 
“marriage” is a symbol to the extent that the idea of each is connected with the word that 
in no case shows us an actual bird, or a marriage or a giving.188  
     Yet another division of signs involves the relation of the interpretant to the sign 
and how it “represents” a sign as a rhema (‘word’ in Greek), dici (alluding to judgment or 
proposition) or, as a chain of propositions, an argument. Peirce’s fullest expression of his 
general theory of signs contains a total of ten classifications or trichotomies, which, if 
they proved to be independent of one another – by his own reckoning, highly improbable 
– would result in 59,049 different kinds of signs.189  The ones we have covered will 
suffice in our attempt at accounting for Peirce’s treatment of emotion and sentiment.  
     Before moving on to the semiotic theory of emotion, a couple of points are in 
order. On the whole, Peirce’s work in semiotics has been lauded as pioneering and 
suggestive while at the same time much of it remains not only incomplete but 
unintelligible, contradictory and fruitless. The theory has its critics but none as incisive as 
Yale University’s Rulon S. Wells, who in five essays raises several issues often 
overlooked by those who enthusiastically endorse Peirce’s groundbreaking work, issues 
we do well to acknowledge to the extent that his treatment of emotion, like so much of 
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his work, hinged on his categories and semiotic.190 Three of these criticisms are 
especially pertinent to Peirce’s treatment of emotion, sentiment and instinct.  
     First, Wells points out that Peirce confines his treatment of semiotic almost 
exclusively to human animals and to intellectual activity. As such, Peirce can be called a 
cognitivist, if, in following David Savan’s lead, we “mean by cognitivism in emotion 
theory the denial that emotions are feeling or natural behavior, and the assertion that 
emotions are identical with cognitive or evaluative judgments or with words and concepts 
that figure in cognitive or evaluative judgments.”191  There is no doubt, as we will 
demonstrate in the next section, that Peirce was every bit a cognitivist in this sense, to the 
extent he affirmed that emotions are judgments. However, as Wells contends, there are 
plenty of passages, both published and unpublished, in which Peirce appears to be taking 
the contrary position, “that along side of wanting a cognitivistic semiotics that treats 
judgment as the paradigm of semiosis, he also wants a semiotics which applies in a 
natural way to behavior, brute and human, and to human experiences that are not 
obviously cognitive.”192 
     Peirce’s various treatments of instinct and emotion provide both a glaring 
example of a vexing ambivalence in his psychology and a window into his evolutionism. 
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Elsewhere Wells ascribes to Peirce a peculiar brand of innatism, the view that the human 
mind possesses intrinsic powers, akin to the instincts of brutes, among which is guessing 
ability.193 Herein lay the only original details that Wells credits to Peirce’s 
evolutionism.194 Guessing, usually termed abduction or retroduction, is one of three 
classes of inference, the others being deduction and induction. As will further be explored 
in chapter six, abduction is an instinctive behavior as well as a class of inference. It is a 
capacity for guessing the correct hypothesis, explained by principles of mathematical 
probability, a propensity for successful scientific investigation that arose through natural 
selection, a process generalized by Peirce to, among other things, explain the emergence 
of habit which, in turn, Peirce assimilates into instinct.195  
     Peirce’s evolutionism is, for Wells, yet another source of confusion and a 
symptom of an ultimately fatal Peircean flaw, an incurable schizophrenia apparent in his 
stand on Darwinism.196  Wells explains:  
In relation to Darwinism Peirce shifts in two ways. (1) He switches 
between taking it as a scientific theory and taking it as a philosophy;  
(2) When taking it as a philosophy, he varies between favoring it and 
opposing it. The vacillation cannot be explained away by chronological 
considerations … There are other symptoms of Peirce’s disease, but I 
pick Darwinism for its combination of two properties. It is evolutionary; 
and it is scientific – and Peirce claims to be fundamentally scientific.197 
 
 
 193. Rulon S. Wells, “Distinctively Human Semiotic,” in Essays in Semiotics, eds. Kristeva, Rey-
Debove, and Umiker (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 102. 
 194. Rulon Wells, “Peirce as an American” in Perspectives on Peirce, ed. Richard J. Bernstein 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), 28ff. 
 195. Wells, “Distinctly Human Semiotic,” 104. 
 196. Wells, “The True Nature of Peirce’s Evolutionism,” 304. 
 197. Ibid. 
 
137 
                                           
Peirce’s oscillating position on Darwinism stems from what Wells sees as a tendency to 
over generalize. Philip Wiener traced Peirce’s evolutionism to three sources that are held 
in tension.  
Peirce’s evolutionism was not simply Darwin’s hypothesis of Natural 
Selection, but a certain deliberate generalization of it in Peirce’s own 
speculative form. In the first place, Peirce regarded Darwin’s view as 
indicating only one of three equally operative modes of the evolution of 
organic species: (1) Darwin’s “successively purely fortuitous and 
insensible variations in reproduction”; (2) Lamarck’s mode of 
inheritance of acquired characters, which assumes continuous, very 
minute changes due wholly to strivings or efforts of individuals in 
adapting themselves to the environment; (3) Cuvier’s and Agassiz’ 
defense of the cataclysmal mode of large abrupt changes in 
reproduction. All three of these modes of evolution have been operative, 
according to Peirce.198  
 
It is this very insistence on holding to three incongruent modes of evolution, generalized 
so as to form a single, ultimately untestable hypothesis that, for Wells, degenerates to 
pseudo-science or metaphysical Darwinism. When speculation is extended to the 
question of the origin of triadic relationships, Peirce finds himself at a loss.  
The problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world 
is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life 
first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of 
pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the 
suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that 
case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the 
metaphysical sense.”199  
 
The alternative, not considered here, is: 
that chance is not itself vital, and is a fundamental, irreducible 
phenomenon, in which case the explanation that life arose by chance is 
genuinely an explanation, whether it is the true one or a false one. Now 
in many places Peirce does speak of chance as fundamental, especially 
 
 198. Philip Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1949), 77. 
 199. CP 6.322. 
 
138 
                                           
in his cosmogonic discussions where he describes the successive 
evolution of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Life as thirdness 
ought according to these discussions to be an evolute of chance as 
firstness, with secondness somehow interposed. And one of the reasons 
why Darwinism appealed to Peirce in certain moods is his belief that it 
resembles statistical mechanics in exhibiting the rise of order out of 
chaos. According to this line of thinking, choice is opposed to chance as 
the mental to the non-mental.200  
  
Closely related to this is the question of the evolution of signs. A requirement of 
evolution is that if something x is said to have evolved, it did so from what it is not, i.e., 
from non-x.   
So if judgment is to have evolved, it must have evolved from non-
judgment. A common view of its evolution is that judgment evolved 
from feeling. What is the relevance for semiotics? Here the fundamental 
question is whether signs have evolved from non-signs – so that they are 
not omnipresent in the universe – or whether signs are omnipresent as 
thirdness is omnipresent, so that any evolution of signs must be of one 
kind of sign from another, e.g. thought-signs (signs whose interpretants 
are thoughts) from feeling-signs.201  
 
     This leads us to the third of Wells’ criticisms of Peirce’s sign theory that we will 
mention. The classification of signs into icons, indices, and symbols suffers from two 
basic faults, according to Wells.  
(a) It is not what it purports to be, a classification of signs, but rather a 
classification of aspects of signs. The utility of the trichotomy is greatly 
increased if we think of a sign not as being an icon, or an index, or a 
symbol, but as having iconic, indexical, or symbolic aspects. For then 
we may find more than one aspect in a sign, and we will be free to 
describe a sign as, say, predominantly iconic but with a discernible 
symbolic component. (b) The trichotomy presupposes Peirce’s 
categories; this renders it scientifically unsuitable because of their 
idealism. Peirce attempts, as part of his idealism, to generalize the 
concept of mind so that it applies to phenomena that would ordinarily be 
considered non-mental.202  
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It is this process of generalization, inspired by mathematics, which Wells believes vitiates 
Peirce’s semiotics by being conflated with the process of virtualization, whereby the 
twitching frog leg and the logic machine are said to “reason” virtually, i.e., behave as 
they would if they actually reasoned, a treatment that tempts behaviorism.203 This, for 
Wells, represents a serious philosophical error.  
Generalization and virtualization are incompatible operations, i.e. in any 
instance where we apply one of them, we must not apply the other. We 
must not say both that x is a special case of y [generalization] and that 
every y, other than what is plainly x, is virtually x. If we regard x as a 
special case of y, we can give to some word which originally denoted the 
class x a generalized sense whereby it denotes y. When the two classes 
are furthermore such that the ‘effects’ of any y are the same effects of 
any x, then any word which denotes x will, when qualified by ‘virtually’ 
denote y. Thus any instance of virtualization is also an instance of 
generalization; a y that is virtually an x in the original sense is without 
qualification an x in the generalized sense. Whenever virtualizing is 
possible, generalizing is unnecessary, but virtualizing is not always 
possible.204  
 
Elsewhere Wells shows how Peirce employs the methodological error to assimilate 
choice, as a salient quality of minds, to the process of natural selection.205 He quotes a 
very telling passage from Peirce that makes his point. 
This is the way the mathematician supplements facts in the interest of 
formal rhetoric. …He must take care not to misrepresent the real world; 
but his ideal addition to it may have any properties that simplicity 
dictates. This is an immense engine of thought in mathematics.”206 
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    Methodological errors aside and for the sake of argument allowing virtual thought 
to stand, Wells finds Peirce’s treatment of emotions as interpretants an intriguing 
possibility for a Peircean zoosemiotic.  
With emotions as interpretants, we may give a different account than 
otherwise of brutes, i.e., nonhuman animals. With virtual thought 
admitted … it [becomes] possible to say that brutes think. But according 
to one fairly common view, brutes don’t actually think (have thoughts), 
but they do actually perceive and actually feel. Of course we could 
ascribe virtual perception and virtual feeling to them as well as virtual 
thought, but if emotions (feelings) are not excluded from being 
interpretants, the way is open to accommodating the fairly common view 
in these terms:  Brute semiosis is only virtual semiosis when the 
interpretant is a thought, but may be actual when the interpretant is an 
emotion.207  
 
However, as Thomas L. Short is quick to point out in his new book, Peirce’s distinctive 
explanation of the intentionality of emotions limits the theory of signs to animals.208 
“Outside of purposeful action, which appears to be limited to animals, no mistakes are 
possible, and where no mistakes are possible, there can be no intentionality, hence, no 
interpretation; but all significance is relative to potential interpretation.”209 Thus Short 
denies, in opposition to many of Peirce’s better known interpreters, among them Thomas 
Sebeok, Helmut Pape, and Jasper Hoffmeyer, and certainly Peirce himself, that the 
semiotic can be extended to all of life or to cosmology.210  This limitation would seem to 
jeopardize not only the generality of the sign theory but also Peirce’s synechism. We will 
return to the notion of intentionality in the next section. We turn now to Peirce’s semiotic 
theory of emotion.  
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D. Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion 
 
      While Peirce’s writings on the emotions are dispersed throughout the body of his 
work and lack a systematic explication, they do possess a remarkable consistency 
because he never deviated from the postulate that all mental phenomena resemble 
cognitions in that they are capable of representation. Not only was Peirce explicit on what 
an emotion is, he was clear on what an emotion is for. Using Peirce’s sign theory David 
Savan pieced together the scattered fragments of these writings to form what he believed 
to be a coherent, comprehensive, and provocative emotion theory.211 It is this landmark 
work that will provide the backdrop for our study.  
     To begin, as we have noted, Peirce’s views on emotion place him in opposition to 
the dominant psychological views expressed by James in the 1880s. According to that 
theory, emotions originate as bodily rather than mental states. They are mere feelings of 
bodily response reducible to sensation. As such it is impossible to distinguish emotions 
because as immediate, all feelings are alike. Knowledge requires discrimination and 
discrimination requires the introduction of a mediating concept.  
      For Peirce, emotions cannot be immediately intuited feelings or there would be no 
way to distinguish one emotion from another. Here Peirce makes use of the Kantian 
distinction between ‘immediate’ and ‘mediate.’  
Quality seems at first sight to be given in the impression. Such results of 
introspection are untrustworthy. A proposition asserts the applicability 
of a mediate conception to a more immediate one. Since this is asserted, 
the more mediate conception is clearly regarded independently of this 
circumstance, for otherwise the two conceptions would not be 
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distinguished, but one would be thought through the other, without this 
latter being an object of thought, at all … Take, for example, the 
proposition, “This stove is black.” Here the conception of this stove is 
the more immediate, that of black the more mediate, which latter, to be 
predicated of the former, must be discriminated from it and considered 
in itself, not as applied to the object, but simply as embodying a quality, 
blackness.212  
 
The process of discriminating mediate from immediate conceptions itself was referred to 
by Peirce as precision or prescission and adapted from Dun Scotus.  
The terms “precision” and “abstraction,” which were formerly applied to 
every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental 
separation, but to that which arises from attention to one element and 
neglect of the other … Abstraction or precision ought to be carefully 
distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be 
termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely 
with the senses of the terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. 
Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant 
association, is permitted by the law of association of images. It is the 
consciousness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous 
consciousness of the other. Abstraction or precision, therefore, supposes 
a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than 
dissociation.213 
 
In an interesting footnote to this passage he adds: 
Some writers called every description of abstraction by the name 
precision, dividing precision into the real and the mental, and the latter 
into the negative and the positive; but the better usage named these 
abstraction divided into real and intentional, and the latter into negative 
(in which character from which abstraction is made is imagined to be 
deniable of the subject prescinded) and into precisive abstraction or 
precision, where the subject prescinded is supposed (in some 
hypothetical state of things) without any supposition, whether 
affirmative or negative, in respect to the character abstracted.214 
 
Thus, like his contemporary Franz Brentano, of whose work he seems to have been 
ignorant, Peirce unearthed the Scholastic concept of intentionality and used it to mark off 
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the mental. Anything having intentionality has an object and, as such, is a sign, being 
comprised of a subject, its object, and an interpretant, possesses intentionality. As we will 
see, emotions as signs, like thoughts, also possess intentionality or are about something, a 
subject. We will return to this discussion of intentionality in the next chapter where it 
raises some interesting questions for Peirce’s understanding of the self, for as we have 
seen, Peirce contends all thought is in signs but not all thought is necessarily connected 
with a brain. Thomas L. Short summarizes the challenge facing Peirce: 
Peirce denies both that all interpretants are thoughts and that they are all 
formed by or in persons. Besides, Peirce wished to analyze the human 
mind as a special case of semeiosis, rather than semeioisis as a special 
application of mind. He repeatedly described thoughts as signs (e.g., as 
early as 1868: CP 5.283-309) and even portrayed man as being a sign 
(CP 5.310-317). Therefore, if his philosophy is coherent, Peirce must be 
able to account for the intentionality of signs without presupposing that 
of thought.215 
 
     Here we should pause to offer a few words of explanation on how Peirce 
understood the concepts of ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion.’ As Savan points out, “Peirce 
sometimes slipped and spoke of emotions as feelings … but he never departed from his 
position that such emotion feelings are not immediate intuitions, or ‘first impressions of 
sense.’”216 Early and late, Peirce denied the power of introspection to provide privileged 
information of mental states, and linked feelings, along with emotions, to cognition as the 
fundamental type of mental activity. This is a central theme of the 1868 Cognition Series. 
In 1902, his position had changed very little.  
It is nonsense to call attention to an outward object by the name of 
introspection. Introspection is direct observation of the operations of the 
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mind as mental operations; because, as for feelings, they are always 
referred to some object, and there is no observation of feelings except as 
characters of [external] objects.217 
 
In addressing the doctrine of association in 1893 he again assailed the popular notion of 
introspection. 
Now the truth is that the data of introspection are in these respects 
altogether analogous to those of external observation. Introspection does 
not directly reveal what is immediately present to consciousness, at all; 
but only what seems to have been present from the standpoint of 
subsequent reflection… We cannot directly observe even so much as 
that there is such a thing as present consciousness.218  
 
As such, feelings, like emotions, are derivative; all mental states are signs and all signs 
are cognitions. “Every emotion, every burst of passion, every exercise of will, is like 
cognition.”219 Stanley M. Harrison summarizes this epistemological view. 
The significance and originality of Peirce’s position is seen in his view 
that even sensations and emotions are interpretative or representative 
responses to an object. In short, Peirce developed the position that “a 
sensation is not … [a] first impression of sense” (CP 5.291), but the 
result of a manifold of more complex impressions originating in the 
sense organs. A sensation of a certain color, for example, is for Peirce “a 
simple predicate taken in place of a complex predicate; in other words, it 
fulfills the function of any hypothesis” (CP 5.291). Inasmuch as this 
occurs spontaneously, a sensation is a “natural mental sign …, a 
predicate of something determined logically by the feelings which 
precede it” (CP 5.292-292).220  
 
As we observed, the confounding of first impressions of sense with thought is an error 
that Peirce saw leading James to the error of internalism.221  
 
 217. CP 7.376. 
 218. CP 7.420. 
 219. CP 1.376. 
 220. Stanley M. Harrison, “Peirce on Persons,” in Proceedings of the C.S. Peirce Bicentennial 
Congress, eds. Kenneth L. Ketner, Joseph Ransdell and Carolyn Eisele (Lubbock: Texas Tech University 
Press, 1981), 218. 
 221. CP 8.81. 
 
145 
                                           
     In the essay “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce further 
distinguished sensations from emotions. Observing that for every feeling there seems to 
be a corresponding motion in the body, he goes on to say that: 
In the case of a sensation, the manifold of impressions which precede 
and determine it are not of a kind, the bodily motion corresponding to 
which comes from any large ganglion or from the brain, and probably 
for this reason the sensation produces no great commotion in the bodily 
organism; and the sensation itself is not a thought which has a very 
strong influence upon the current of thought except by virtue of the 
information it may serve to afford. An emotion, on the other hand, 
comes much later in the development of thought – I mean, further from 
the first beginning of the cognition of its object – and the thoughts which 
determine it already have motions corresponding to them in the brain, or 
the chief ganglion: consequently, it produces large movements in the 
body, and independently of its representative value, strongly affects the 
current of thought. The animal motions to which I allude, are, in the first 
place and obviously, blushing, blenching, staring, smiling, scowling, 
pouting, laughing, weeping, sobbing, wriggling, flinching, trembling, 
being petrified, sighing, sniffing, shrugging, groaning, heartsinking, 
trepidation, swelling of the heart, etc., etc. To these may, perhaps, be 
added, in the second place, other more complicated actions, which 
nevertheless spring from a direct impulse and not from deliberation.222 
 
Emotions, therefore, as Thomas L. Short has indicated, serve to connect information to 
action for “’leading to action’ is precisely what is meant by the noun ‘affect.’”223  Finally, 
Peirce discriminated sensations and emotions from the feeling of a thought.  
That which distinguishes both sensations proper and emotions from the 
feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material 
quality is made prominent, because the thought has no relation of reason 
to the thoughts which determine it, which exists in the last case and 
detracts from the attention given to the mere feeling.224  
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Peirce provided a number of examples of sensation ranging from the simple, such as the 
experience of a particular color to the more complex, such as that of beauty.225  
     So emotions and sensations are, for Peirce, signs and he offered three arguments 
for why they are such and not, as James contended, feelings of bodily change or qualities 
of immediately intuited feelings.226  First, they are not qualities of immediate feeling 
because an immediate feeling is, as we have seen, unmediated and, as such, can only be 
considered sui generis. As immediate, nothing can be predicated of feeling; it is a First, 
undistinguished, unanalyzable, inexplicable, and unintellectual.227  If emotions were 
immediate feelings, we could not tell one emotion from another and such is not the case. 
Secondly, emotions, as Thirds, are not feeling events. Feeling events are Seconds, 
existing in a period of time. When that time has ended that particular occurrence of the 
feeling will have passed from existence. On the contrary, David Savan noted: 
[That] emotions do recur. My revulsion at torture is the same today as it 
was yesterday. To compare two temporally distinct occurrences they 
must be brought together, set side by side, and this can happen only if 
the two occurrences are represented. An emotion is, then, a 
representamen, a sign.228  
 
Finally, for Peirce, whatever else an emotion might be, it is a representation, a predicate 
to a subject.  
If a man is angry, he is saying to himself that this or that is vile and 
outrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying “this is delicious.” If he is 
wondering, he is saying “this is strange.” In short, whenever a man feels, 
he is thinking of something. Even those passions which have no definite 
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object – as melancholy – only come to consciousness through tinging the 
objects of thought.229 
 
Elsewhere he noted that the intrinsic connection between emotions and objects is how the 
child learns not only how to identify emotions but also gains a sense of self. 
A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, 
indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is 
hot or cold. But he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to 
suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere.230 
 
The resulting burn incites feelings which are not predicates but which cause the child to 
ascribe the pain to the stove. The stove is bad and she is made furious by the awful thing 
that burned her. The immediate feeling produced by the stove is pain. The emotion of 
anger that arises from the pain is a judgment relating the pain to the stove.  
     In this way, Peirce contended, emotions are analogous to hypotheses. 
The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise, when our attention 
is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances. Fear 
arises when we cannot predict our fate; joy in the case of certain 
indescribable and peculiarly complex sensations. If there are some 
indication that something greatly for my interest, and which I have 
anticipated would happen, may not happen; and if, after weighing 
probabilities, and inventing safeguards, and straining for further 
information, I find myself unable to come to any fixed conclusion in 
reference to the future, in the place of that intellectual hypothetic 
inference which I seek, the feeling of anxiety arises. When something 
happens for which I cannot account, I wonder. When I endeavor to 
realize to myself what I never can do, a pleasure in the future, I hope. “I 
do not understand you,” is the phrase of an angry man. The 
indescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite 
emotion. Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an 
operation of the mind for a highly complicated predicate. Now if we 
consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation by means 
of an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate 
substituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an 
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hypothesis, strictly speaking, is hardly possible – the analogy of the parts 
played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking.231    
 
There is, however, a marked difference between an emotion and an intellectual 
hypothesis.  
[I]n the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic 
predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, 
in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be 
given, but which is determined merely by our emotional constitution. 
But this corresponds precisely to the difference between hypothesis and 
reasoning from definition to definitum ….232 
 
     For all of its novelty the theory as presented thus far has not been without its 
critics. Wells questioned the depiction of emotions as predicates not only as one more 
instance of Peirce’s propensity to over-generalize but a reductionism directly resulting 
from this propensity. 
When someone, A, is angry, Peirce proposes to say that his anger is a 
predicate. A predicate of what? Not of A, but of the universe, or at least 
of the world that A confronts. It is, then, what since Santayana has been 
called an objectified emotion: not ‘A is angry,’ but ‘Things are (or the 
world is) anger-worthy.’ This is Peirce’s preferred treatment, a feature of 
his cognitivistic face, but it is not dictated either by his abstract 
definition of sign or by his phaneroscopy [i.e. phenomenology]. 
Phaneroscopy could justify saying that besides anger there is anger-
worthiness, and perhaps anger-worthiness is the cause of anger, but it 
could not justify saying that ‘A is angry at B’ is nothing but “A judges 
that B is anger-worthy’; it could not justify reductionism in general, nor 
cognitivism in particular.233  
 
G. Lynn Stephens is critical of the analogy of emotion to hypothesis. Having claimed that 
both arise under conditions of perplexity or uncertainty through the substitution of a 
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simple for a complex predicate, Peirce must show how emotions operate both to simplify 
our thinking and assuage our uncertainty.  
The analogy presents certain problems as it stands. Is emotion connected 
with uncertainty in the way Peirce suggests? It would seem that fear, for 
example, often arises when we can predict our fate. I’m afraid of the 
injection because I know it is going to hurt … A more pressing question 
is, How should we take this analogy? Is it only an analogy, or does he 
regard the mental activity involved in emotion as a form of hypothetic 
reasoning. He suggests that both emotion and hypothesis represent a 
simplification of our thinking on some matter. The sorts of 
simplification may be different, however. The hypothesis simplifies by 
explaining: it makes sense of a puzzling situation. When hypothetic 
reasoning is successful, we understand things better than we did before. 
Does Peirce really attribute such an explanatory function in the 
emotions? Do I understand my situation better because I get angry about 
it? Does fear make me better able to predict my fate?234 
 
Pointing to Peirce’s treatment of anxiety in CP 2.592 above, Stephens concludes that:  
[A]nxiety appears not as a hypothesis, but as a substitute for hypothetic 
inference: “in place of the intellectual hypothetic inference which I seek, 
the feeling of anxiety rises.” The simplification achieved by becoming 
anxious seems to be a matter of replacing a state of mind characterized 
by conflicting inclinations and attributes by one in which a single feeling 
predominates. Whatever the similarities between this sort of process and 
hypothetical explanation, anxiety can hardly be regarded as a form of 
explanation.235  
 
The text of CP 5.292 makes it clear that the simplification attained by emotion is non-
explanatory in nature. The feeling of a thought, Peirce argued in CP 5.292, has a logical 
relation to the thoughts which precede it. It is governed by the rules of valid or probable 
inference. Sensations and emotions bear no such marks. For Peirce, they involve thought 
– in fact are thoughts by virtue of being about something – without involving or being 
cognitions. “Cognition is a sequence of thoughts in which the propositions expressed by 
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the successive thoughts are related by the rules of valid inference.”236 The emotions are 
not so ordered. “There is nothing in the content of the [emotional] thought which explains 
why it should arise only on occasion of these determining thoughts.”237  
     Instead, Stephens reminds us that Peirce claimed emotions rise from brute 
connections effected by the “constitution of our nature,” and not through the logical 
connections between thoughts that marking cognition as such, are not reducible to 
cognition.238 By introducing reference to our emotional constitution, Peirce gives up his 
assertion that cognition is the essential form of mental activity and that every mental act 
is an inference derived either from hypothetical or abductive reasoning, on the one hand, 
or by reasoning from definition to definitum, i.e., generalization, on the other hand.239 
Notwithstanding the analogies he draws between these mental processes of cognition and 
those giving rise to emotion, emotion is not on Peirce’s own account, reducible to 
cognition and “thus he abandons, tacitly at least, the project of explaining every mental 
action as an instance of valid inference.”240  In chapter six we will return to Stephens’ 
rather serious charge when we examine in more detail Peirce’s notion of abductive 
reasoning as it relates to his understanding of instinct. It is my contention that his 
synechism and his inferentialist program do afford us a cognitive understanding of 
emotion on Peirce’s own terms.  
      If we accept Peirce’s declaration in CP 1.376 – “every emotion, every burst of 
passion, every exercise of will, is like a cognition” –  as more than simile and grant that 
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all mental states are signs and all signs are cognitions, then we can begin to examine what 
kind of signs emotions might be. If an emotion is a sign, what are its grounds, its objects, 
and its interpretants? Peirce was not at all clear on the matter but David Savan believes it 
is relatively easy to draw conclusions from the mass of his semiotic. As to the ground of 
an emotion, i.e., the nature of the sign or how it picks out its objects, Savan concludes 
that an emotion is a legisign because every emotion has certain law-like features.  
    First, an emotion has a pattern unrolling over a period of time. Joy 
rises and falls, becomes more intense and fades. Fear comes to us in 
waves, moving us to flight but also freezing us into immobility. Anger 
runs a course, taking some time to reach its zenith, growing more intense 
if it is not then discharged, and so on.  
    Second, an emotion is general, and exists only through instances. I 
may be moved to joy by any number of things – a meeting with an old 
friend, good news, Beethoven’s Ninth, and so on. 
    Third is Peirce’s repeated thesis that what can be fitted into a system 
of explanation must have at least some of the characteristics of a law But 
emotions do enter the systematic explanation of behavior. Further, 
emotions can be justified, shown to be inappropriate, disproportionately 
strong or weak, and so it.241 
 
Finally, Savan points out that emotions, like all legisigns, exist through instances or 
replicas, i.e., as tokens to a type.  
      Peirce held that the immediate object of a sign, or the object under a specific 
description, is relative to circumstances of time and place and Savan believes it is easily 
identifiable in expressions of emotion. An approaching friend makes me feel happy. The 
lurking stranger fills me with fear. The dynamic object of an emotion as sign could only 
be known, according to Savan, by the ideal completion of an investigation revealing the 
class of all things giving rise to a particular emotion.  
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     Given the two trichotomies Peirce employed, the interpretant of an emotion is far 
less obvious. Savan’s account of emotions as interpretants is complicated by his 
advocacy of a six-fold classification consisting of both of Peirce’s triads, a position that 
he asserts “emerged obscurely and laconically in some of [Peirce’s] last writings.”242  
According to Savan’s classification, interpretants are, for Peirce, either immediate, 
dynamic, or final (or normal) and dynamic interpretants, as the actual dynamic effect of a 
sign can be emotional, energetic, or logical.  
The information which the sign is capable of transmitting to its 
interpretants, and which it has collected from the prior signs it interprets. 
It is this significance, conveyed by the simple presentation of the sign 
itself, that is the Immediate Interpretant.243 
 
The Dynamic Interpretant is the actual semeiotic effect which the sign in 
fact produces.244 
 
The Final Interpretant is the semeiotic effect which would be produced 
by a sign if it could finally and fully satisfy the norm by which it is 
intended to be judged. Since this purpose provides the norm influencing 
the changes in the succession of Dynamic Interpretants, it may also be 
called the Normal Interpretant.245 
 
First, the emotional dynamic interpretant is the qualitative semeiotic 
effect of that sign … Second, the dynamic interpretant may be an act in 
which some energy is expended, and such an act Peirce called an 
energetic interpretant. The energetic interpretant may be a muscular 
encounter with the external world, or it may be the manipulation and 
exploration of the images of our inner world. … The logical dynamic 
interpretant is the thought, concept, or general understanding actually 
produced by a sign. To think is to make inferences, to draw out the 
consequences of certain premisses, to move in accordance with some 
general rule.246 
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     Brandon Lalor, whose classification of Peirce’s intepretants we are following, 
simplifies this presentation by treating the emotional, energetic, logical triad as a case of 
the particular, concrete, experience or effect that interprets a sign. As such, the emotional 
interpretant is a feeling produced by a sign. The energetic interpretant is an action 
produced by a sign. The logical interpretant is a rule, habit, or law produced by a sign.247 
If, as Peirce seems to indicate at least some of the time that interpretants are signs248 and 
all signs are cognitions, it would seem that emotions viewed as interpretants would at the 
very least be quasi-cognitions and not just a superfluity of unruly thought, simple brute 
connections emanating from our evolved emotional constitution and standing in a merely 
analogous relation to cognition. This is the case Peirce seems to be trying to make in the 
Cognition Series of 1868. Ten years later his position, fundamentally unchanged, would 
be stated in even stronger terms.  
Hypothesis substitutes for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to 
one subject, a single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sensation to 
belonging to the act of thinking that each of these predicates inheres in 
the subject. In hypothetical inference this complicated feeling so 
produced is replaced by a single feeling of greater intensity, that 
belonging to the act of thinking the hypothetic conclusion. Now when 
our nervous system is excited in a complicated way, there being a 
relation between the elements of the excitation, the result is a single 
harmonious disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various 
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sounds made by the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and 
the result is a peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds 
themselves. This emotion is essentially the same thing [emphasis mine] 
as an hypothetic inference, and every hypothetic inference involves the 
formation of such an emotion. We may say, therefore, that hypothesis 
produces the sensuous element of thought.249  
 
Here ‘hypothesis’ is used to refer to both the type of reasoning (later termed abduction or 
retroduction) and the product of that reasoning, the simplifying predicate.  
      Savan noted, however, that if this was the sum of the theory, it would be an 
inadequate account of emotion. A theory in which emotions are understood only in their 
role as simplifying hypotheses or coping mechanisms does not lead us to an 
understanding of emotional affect, or the normative or evaluative function of emotion, 
without which we can never come to a deeper appreciation for the real differences 
between sensation and emotion. In chapters six and seven we will address the normative 
function of what Peirce called the logical sentiments. For the present we will turn our 
attention to the dynamic affect of emotion.  
     Savan wished us to understand ‘affect’ in a specialized way as: 
That variation in intensity of arousal and agitation that is manifested 
both by involuntary physiological changes and by larger movements of 
approach and withdrawal. And emotional person – and this usage of the 
word ‘emotion’ is often passed over by cognitivists – is one who readily 
undergoes sharp changes of affect. He or she is volatile, easily agitated, 
passing quickly from elation to depression, from calm to excitement or 
lassitude. He or she is overwhelmed by emotion, dominated by it, and 
held in its grip. An emotional meeting is one in which we expect tears 
and laughter, passionate gestures, tempestuous movements. It is affect 
which is the criterion of the presence of emotion.250 
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This understanding complements Short’s etymological rendering of the noun as “leading 
to action” noted earlier. It is a definition that honors the Latin motus animae, as the 
apparent root of ‘emotion’ and does justice to nineteenth century psychology by not 
introducing any twentieth-century notions.  
     Savan traced the origin of dynamic affect to the 1878 Popular Science Monthly 
series of six essays, the first two of which –“The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make 
Our Ideas Clear” – are largely regarded as the first formal statement of pragmatism. 
However, Short believes the roots of the affective dimension of emotion are present in 
the papers of 1868, especially in CP 5.293 where Peirce makes it clear that emotions are 
conceived as both simplifying hypotheses and as affective expressions and, as such, serve 
more than as a mere conveyance of information.251 Interestingly, the 1878 series makes 
no use of semiotic. This is no doubt in part due to the fact that this series, collectively 
titled “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” was written for general consumption and 
published in a popular journal. In any case, Peirce presented an affective theory of doubt 
and belief in 1878 that shows him to be more than a pure cognitivist.  
      “Peirce’s theory of doubt is the kernel of a semeiotic theory of emotion as 
affect.”252  The first thing Peirce wants to show is that doubt cannot be willed any more 
than can love or joy or fear. This is at the crux of his critique of Cartesianism.  
Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only 
necessary to utter a question whether orally or by setting it down upon 
paper, and have recommended us to begin our studies with questioning 
everything! But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative 
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form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must 
be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle.253 
 
Why cannot men see that what we do not doubt, we do not doubt, so that 
it is false pretense to pretend to call it into question?254 
 
Pretending to doubt is as irrational as it is mendacious.  
     Real, living, doubt is however, a feeling of irritation that we seek to overcome 
with the “calm and satisfactory state” (CP 5.372) acquired in belief. Belief is “a 
subjective feeling of mastery” (CP 5.389) in which the irritation of doubt is assuaged, 
regardless of whether the belief is mistaken. “Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state 
from which we free ourselves and pass into the state of belief.”255 We find that “the 
action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is 
attained.”256 Doubt, then, is a visceral discomfort by which we are goaded in inquiry 
toward the settlement of belief. Belief, for its part, has but three properties.  
First, it is something we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation 
of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule 
of action, or, say for short, a habit.257 
 
We possess “an instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind, exaggerated into a 
vague dread of doubt” and this causes us “cling spasmodically” to the views we already 
have.258  
     Savan asserts that “doubt is an energetic interpretant of an emotion that has been 
disturbed by a sharp encounter with resistant fact.”259 Peirce described the experience as 
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shocking or percussive,260 something beyond our control.  As with all energetic 
intepretants, as we can see from the language Peirce chose, doubt excites action, irritates, 
moves us, causes us to cling, i.e., involves effort. “The effort may be a muscular one … 
but is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort.”261 The 
effect can, however, be outward and turbulent, uncontrollable and controlling.  
For example, it is the shock of encounter with an outrageous act or 
person that triggers our first violent anger. If the outrageous act persists 
we become more agitated and enraged. The persistence of the 
outrageous act operates as an imperative, demanding our complete and 
absorbed attention. Emotional affect preempts both mind and body, 
imperiously controlling all thought and action. To be overwhelmed by 
an emotion is to become its creature.262 
 
      To further understand the affective dimension of emotion we must turn to the 
feeling subject of this turbulence, the experiencing self. From there we will return to the 
role of affect in inquiry, the process defined by Peirce in the 1878 essays as the struggle 
to attain a state of belief caused by the irritation of doubt. It is this state of belief that, in 
turn, is our guide to action by satisfying our desires.263  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Self as Sign 
 
For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, 
 taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought,  
proves that man is a sign; so that every thought is an external sign, 
proves that man is an external sign. 
That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical in the same sense 
in which the words homo and man are identical.  
Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is thought. 
-- Peirce, Collected Papers 
 
A. The Negated Self 
     Richard Bernstein spoke for generations of interpreters when he wrote that, “The 
nature of human individuality always seemed to be a source of intellectual 
embarrassment for Peirce.”1 William James, on the other hand, had written in his 
Principles of Psychology that, “The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal 
with are found in personal consciousness, minds, selves, concrete particular I’s and 
you’s.2 Writing in 1892, just two years later, Peirce labeled the philosophical theory of 
personal identity, “the metaphysics of wickedness.”3 To be sure, a sampling of what else 
he had to say on the subject reveals that Peirce did not hold the notion of self in high 
regard.  
Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the 
absolute ego of pure apperception.4  
                                            
 Epigraph.  CP 5:314. 
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Now you and I – what are we? Mere cells on the social organism 
…Psychological analysis shows that there is nothing which distinguishes 
my personal identity except my faults and my limitations – or, if you 
please, my blind will, which it is my highest endeavor to annihilate.5  
 
[Y]our neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure 
than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. Really, the 
selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the 
vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men who resemble 
you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, 
though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors are you.6  
 
There is still another direction in which the barbaric conception of 
personal identity must be broadened. A Brahmanical hymn begins as 
follows: “I am that pure and infinite Self, who am bliss, eternal, 
manifest, all-pervading, and who am the substrate of all that owns name 
and form.” This expresses more than humiliation, the utter swallowing 
up of the the poor individual self in the Spirit of prayer. All 
communication from mind to mind is through the continuity of being. A 
man is capable of having assigned to him a role in the drama of creation, 
and so far as he loses himself in that role, no matter how humbly it may 
be, so far he identifies himself with its Author.7 
 
The Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Mladenov recently concluded, more generally, that “after 
a closer look, the strong impression remains that something about the  issue of 
subjectivity constantly irritated Peirce [and] this did not change with the  maturing of his 
view.”8  This chapter will consist of an attempt to account for possible reasons why.  
     In a set of questions on William James’s Principles of Psychology9 that Peirce 
prepared for the writing of a review article in the Nation, there are two that are pertinent 
to the matter of the individual ego. The first, addressing James’ view of the absolute 
 
 5. CP 1:673. 
 6. CP 7.571. 
 7. CP 7.572. 
 8. Ivan Mladenov, Conceptualizing Metaphors (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 104. 
 9. CP 8.72-90. 
 
160 
                                           
insulation of individual minds, was cited in the previous chapter. The second response 
follows a lengthy quote from Principles on the privacy of thoughts. 
Everybody will admit a personal self exists in the same sense in which a 
snark [the imaginary animal of Lewis Carroll’s poem] exists; that is, 
there is a phenomenon to which that name is given. It is an illusory 
phenomenon; but still it is a phenomenon. It is not quite purely illusory, 
but only mainly so. It is true, for instance, that men are selfish, that is, 
that they are really deluded into supposing themselves to have some 
isolated existence; and in so far, they have it. To deny the reality of 
personality is not anti-spiritualistic; it is only anti-nominalistic.10   
 
Peirce’s negative view of the individual has several probable sources.  
     First, as Bernstein reminds us, pragmatism began, in some measure, as a rebellion 
against the excesses of subjectivism common to much modern epistemology.11 The result 
was a failure of the entire movement, as much as of Peirce himself, to produce a coherent 
theory of self.  
     Furthermore, for Peirce pragmatism and realism entailed one another.12 “In 
clarifying the meaning of his pragmaticism [coined circa 1900 to distinguish it from more 
popularized versions, including James’], Peirce is acutely conscious of the categorical 
difference between Thirdness and Secondness.”13 An undue emphasis on Secondness, 
that is, unmediated experience or existence, is the source of nominalism, and in turn, the 
source of most of what he found errant in most modern philosophy,14 including 
sensationalism, phenomenalism, materialism, and especially, individualism.15  For 
Peirce, the overall effect on rationality is insidious. Nominalism’s explanation of 
 
 10. CP 8.82. 
 11. Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971), 197. 
 12. CP 5.453, 5.470, 5.503. 
 13. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, 186.  
 14. CP 1.19. 
 15. CP 8.38. 
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experience blocks the road of inquiry by holding that no amount of evidence from th
past can provide predictability regarding the future. There are no necessary connections 
between phenomena. Laws are mere habits of association and the whole enterprise of 
science is rendered unintelligible. Paul Forster sums up Peirce’s views of the e
nominalism’s materialistic psychology.  
The conception of reasoning as deliberation is threatened by 
determinism. Errors are deemed to be inevitable, beyond the control of 
those who make them. Humans are reduced from autonomous reasoners 
to rational machines … More seriously, Nominalist psychology is 
incapable of establishing its own foundational status. The defense of 
psychology must itself exploit psychological concepts and methods. 
Psychology thus accounts for its own authority only by presupposing it, 
leaving it an edifice that “floats on air” (8.158).16 
 
The latter point accounts for Peirce’s sustained attack on psychologism that will concern 
us in the next chapter.  
    Thirdly, Bernstein suggests there might be “an intimate connection between 
Peirce’s failure to develop a positive theory of the self and his personal difficulties.”17 
Peirce’s personal and professional failings have been well documented and often are 
cited, justly or otherwise, as cause for shortcomings in his philosophy. In a missive to his 
employer, Peirce’s first wife observed, “All his life from babyhood it seems as though 
everything had conspired to spoil him with indulgence.”18 Nearing the end of his life 
Peirce was moved to prolonged periods of remorse and self-loathing. In a reflective 
moment he observed, “For long years I suffered unspeakably … from ignorance of how 
 
 16. Paul D. Forster, “Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 28 (Fall 1992): 696. 
 17. Richard J. Bernstein, “Action, Conduct, and Self-Control,” in Perspectives on Peirce (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 90. 
 18. Quoted in Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 17. 
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to go to work to acquire sovereignty over myself.”19 In a letter to James in the spring of 
1897 he was finally able to acknowledge: 
I have learned a great deal about philosophy in the last few years 
because they have been very miserable and unsuccessful years, – terrible 
beyond anything that the man of ordinary experience can possibly 
understand or conceive … Much have I learned of life and the world, 
throwing strong lights upon philosophy in these years. Undoubtedly its 
tendency is to make one value the spiritual more, but not an abstract 
spirituality … (It has) led me to rate higher than ever the individual deed 
as the only real meaning there is (in) the Concept, and yet at the same 
time to see more sharply than ever that it is not the mere arbitrary force 
in the deed but the life it gives to the idea that is valuable.20 
 
This is the first inkling Peirce gave that he had established a station for the individual as 
inquirer and moral agent apart from the ideal community of scientific investigators in 
which he had always vested the limits of inquiry. He was fifty-six years old.  
    In an attempt to account for the feeling subject, we will summarize in this section 
what Peirce said about the self in a few key points while heeding Thomas L. Short’s 
cautionary note “that sometimes he changed his mind and sometimes he changed his 
language, and that often he stretched terms so as to emphasize continuities.”21 To begin, 
says Peirce:  
You have a sense of resistance and at the same time a sense of effort. 
There can be no resistance without effort; there can be no effort without 
resistance. They are only two ways of describing the same experience. It 
is a double consciousness. We become aware of ourself in becoming 
aware of the not-self … The idea of other, of not becomes the very pivot 
of thought.22 
 
 
 19. MS 905, quoted in Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 341. 
 20. Quoted in Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 340-1. 
21. Thomas L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
311. 
 22. CP 1.324. 
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The two-sidedness of unmediated experience, bonded as effort and resistance, is the 
element of Secondness. Self-consciousness, then, arises in the experience of opposition, 
from the double-barreled nature of brute experience. Recall the trope of consciousness in 
Peirce’s letter to James on the nature of Secondness, how thought moves across the mind 
as a wave moves through the sea, that: 
This is not a conception, nor is it a peculiar quality. It is an experience.  
It comes out most fully in the shock of reaction between ego and non-
ego. It is there the double consciousness of effort and resistance. That is 
something which cannot properly be conceived. For to conceive it is to 
generalize it; and to generalize it is to miss altogether the hereness and 
nowness which is its essence … All the actual character of 
consciousness is merely the sense of shock of the non-ego upon us. Just 
as a calm sea sleeps except where its rollers dash upon the land.23  
 
Nathan Houser explains that, “It is clear from this metaphor that the wave of 
consciousness is distinct from the mind through which it moves, but it is doubtful that we 
would say that either the mind possesses the wave or that the wave possesses the 
mind.”24 So far, all we have referenced is the immediate sense of effort and resistance 
through which we first become aware of self by becoming aware of non
     While self-consciousness arises from brute experience, from the shock between 
ego and non-ego, it develops in the interplay of Secondness and Thirdness, in an 
“interfering process between ‘I’ and the ‘Other,’ or, between the individual mind and the 
community mind.”25 From this process the concept of self is formed negatively:  
Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a 
self in which this ignorance can inhere.26 
 
 
 23. CP 8.266. 
 24. Quoted in Mladenov, Conceptualizing Metaphors, 107. 
 25. Ibid., 106. 
 26. CP 5.233. 
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In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self 
which is fallible.27 
 
The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by 
ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and 
from what he and they are to be, is only a negation.28 
 
Self-awareness, then, arises as a hypothesis to account for error. Here the emphasis is 
upon growth and development.  
It is first to be observed that there is no known self-consciousness to be 
accounted for in extremely young children. It has already been pointed 
out by Kant that the late use of the very common word “I” with children 
indicates an imperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so 
far as it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion in regard to the 
mental state of those who are still younger, it must be against the 
existence of any self-consciousness in them.29 
 
Use of the personal pronoun “I” develops slowly and only after “children manifest 
powers of thought … the complicated trigonometry of vision and the delicate adjustments 
of coordinated movement.”30 The concept of “I” is a much more sophisticated and 
abstract notion than “me.” Short notes that “we use the word ‘I’ ambiguously, sometimes 
denoting oneself as physical (‘I went down to the Peiraeus yesterday’) and sometimes 
denoting an entity distinct from the body (‘I moved my arm’).”31 Before the proper 
understanding and use of “I” the child has, according to Peirce, fixated on his or her own 
body in contact with and relation to the immediate surrounding world and given meaning 
to the feelings generated by what it touches. 
No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, he thinks, not 
of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding. How 
 
 27. CP 5.234. 
 28. CP 5.317. 
 29. CP 5.227. 
 30. CP 5.228. 
 31. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 315. 
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when he wills to move a table? Does he think of himself as desiring, or 
only of the table as fit to be moved? That he has the latter thought is 
beyond question; that he has the former, must, until the existence of an 
intuitive self-consciousness is proved, remain an arbitrary and baseless 
supposition … The child … must soon discover by observation that 
things which are thus fit to be changed are apt actually to undergo this 
change, after a contact with that peculiarly important body called Willy 
or Johnny.32    
 
From this stage of development the child progresses to the mastery of language.  
The child learns to understand the language; that is to say, a connection 
between certain sounds and certain facts becomes established in his 
mind. He has previously noticed the connection between these sounds 
and the motions of the lips of bodies somewhat similar to the central 
one, and has tried the experiment of putting his hand on those lips and 
has found the sound in that case to be smothered. He thus connects that 
language with bodies somewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so 
unenergetic that they should be called rather instinctive, perhaps, than 
tentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins to converse.33 
 
Thus the child acquires a rudimentary knowledge of other beings and learns that he or she 
may trust them in order to gain deeper understanding of the world.  
A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, 
indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is 
hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a 
striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary 
to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives 
the first dawning of self-consciousness.34  
 
Such a trust of testimony, however, is borne of a sophistication of understanding that 
“reveals the child’s grasp of the fact that it is but one of many selves, equivalent in 
selfhood, each of whom refers to itself by the word ‘I.’”35  
 
 32. CP 5.230-1. 
 33. CP 5.232. 
 34. CP 5.233. 
 35. Thomas L. Short, “Hypostatic Abstraction in Self-Consciousness,” in Rule of Reason, eds. 
Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 297. 
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     In this account of child development, overlaying the interplay of Secondness with 
Thirdness, a sense of abstracted personal identity clearly begins to emerge. Yet, apart 
from the acquirement of language, Peirce has not yet posited anything uniquely human 
about the notion of self. In fact, there is very little about a child associating sounds with 
certain facts that cannot be claimed for the behavior of other social animals via habitual 
association of signals with purposeful activity. There certainly is nothing uniquely human 
about the ability to discover error and learn from it. Finally, the capacity to distinguish 
self from non-self is basic to all protoplasm, evident in the simplest one-celled organisms.  
Only the capacity to abstract a self in which error may inhere seems to belong to humans 
alone. Such a view may be in keeping with Peirce’s synechism, that selfhood, like 
consciousness, is a matter of degree. However, Bernstein rightfully objects that there is 
nothing in this view of self that warrants a claim of positive Secondness bearing the 
marks of radical individuality which characterizes the individual. “If my separate 
existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, if I differ from my fellow man only 
by being a negation, then ‘where’ and ‘what’ is the ‘I’ that controls and adopts ultimate 
ideals?”36 In the next section we will begin to uncover just what a self is and how it is 
achieved apart from ignorance and error.  
 
B.  Consciousness, Self and Self-Control 
     In chapter three we explored Peirce’s theory of consciousness in relation to his 
notion of mind and discovered that mind, as Peirce generally presented it, is a much 
                                            
 36. Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971), 198. 
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broader concept, external to but containing anything that might be described as individual 
consciousness. Thomas Short explains that:  
When Peirce wrote of the physical world as having mental 
characteristics or exhibiting the workings of mind, he was not referring 
to an individual mind. His point, rather, was to emphasize the continuity 
of human mentality with nature, and especially that the mind’s way of 
working is a genus not uniquely human nor unique even to individual 
creatures. In the way words have, his usage is as likely to mislead the 
reader as to convey the meaning intended. The same point can be made 
differently; by asserting commonalities between mind narrowly 
construed and the (in that sense) mindless physical world.37  
 
In this case, Peirce’s commitment to continuity moved him to assert, as part of what he 
came to call his doctrine of objective idealism, “that matter is effete mind, inveterate 
habits becoming physical laws.”38  
      Consciousness itself, as we saw, is no less troublesome a term in Peirce’s hands. 
It is, as he pointed out, marked by ambiguity and vagueness. 
What do we mean by consciousness, for it is rather an ambiguous term. 
There is that emotion which accompanies the reflection that we have 
animal life. A consciousness which is dimmed when animal life is at its 
ebb, in age or sleep, but which is not dimmed when spiritual life is at its 
ebb; which is more lively the better animal a man is, but is not so the 
better man he is … In the second place, consciousness is used to mean 
the knowledge which we have of what is in our minds; the fact that our 
thought is an index for itself on the ground of a complete identity with 
itself … Consciousness is, also, used to denote what I call feeling; as by 
Mr. [Alexander] Bain whom I mention in order to say that he recognizes 
the unity of sensation and emotion under this term …39 
 
In another instance Peirce showed that consciousness is sometimes used to signify the 
unity in thought, the I think of apperception.40 Given its wide range of usage it should 
 
 37. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 290. 
 38. CP 6.25, cf. 6.605. 
 39. CP 7.585-6. 
 40. CP 5.313. 
 
168 
                                           
come as no surprise that in stressing synechism, Peirce began around 1900 to describe a 
continuum of consciousness. This continuum is grounded in the three pseudo-scientific 
designations that he varying referred to as the departments of mental action, states of 
mind or parts of mind, commonly accepted in the nineteenth century: Feeling, 
Knowledge, and Will.41 For Peirce there is no sharp delineation between any of the three, 
each being made to represent three different elements common to all consciousness.  
No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between different integral 
states of mind; certainly not between such states as feeling, knowing, 
and willing. It is plain that we are actively knowing in all our waking 
minutes, and actually feeling, too. If we are not always willing, we are, 
at least, at all times consciously reacting against the outer world.42 
 
In 1902 he wrote “Synechism amounts to the principle that … continuity is the absence 
of ultimate parts in that which is divisible; and that the form under which alone anything 
can be understood is the form of generality, which is the same thing as continuity.”43 The 
reference to ultimate parts forms the kernel of Peirce’s attack on nominalism. As Rorty 
once put it, “For Peirce, it is the nominalist and the reductionist who succumb to belief in 
metaphysical figments – namely the belief that beneath all the evident fuzziness, 
vagueness, and generality which we encounter in language (and, therefore in all thought) 
there are non-fuzzy, particular, clearly intuitable reals.”44 It is the nominalists who 
multiply entities by postulating simples, who harbor the belief that language can be 
transcended, in clinging to the “Ockhamistic prejudice … that in thought, in being, and in 
development the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a primary state of perfect 
 
 41. CP 7.39. 
 42. CP 7.541n9. 
 43. CP 6.173. 
 44. Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Categories, and Language,” The Philosophical Review 70 (April 
1961): 209. 
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definiteness … The truth is rather on the side of the scholastic realists that the unsettled is 
the primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness … are, in the large, 
approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and metaphysically.”45 
Consciousness is just such an unsettled, vague and indeterminate notion.  
     Peirce wrote, in 1905, that “to be conscious is nothing else than to feel.”46 As 
early as 1892, in a series of essays for the Monist, Peirce began asserting that even the 
slime-mould has the capacity to feel. 
Consider a gob of protoplasm, say an amoeba or a slime-mould. It does 
not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve cell, though its 
functions may be less specialized. There is no doubt that this slime-
mould, or this amoeba, or at any rate some similar mass of protoplasm 
feels. That is to say, it feels when it is in its excited condition.47 
 
In the same series, in an essay that his former student, Christine Ladd-Franklin,  took as 
evidence he was losing his mind,48 Peirce asserted that even the slime-mould has not only 
a capacity for feeling but also bears marks of consciousness, “feeling, but plainly no 
personality.”49 Peirce’s purpose in this essay was, in part, to explain what he meant by 
continuity and establish why synechism “is of prime importance in philosophy.”50 This 
effort involved his formula that “there is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to 
spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation 
of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting 
others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas.”51 The linking of 
 
 45. CP 6.348. 
 46. CP 1.318. 
 47. CP 6.133. 
 48. Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, 211. 
 49. CP 6.133. 
 50. CP 6.103. 
 51. CP 6.104. 
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consciousness with feeling is an essential ingredient of this philosophical doctrine. “The 
synechist will not believe that some things are conscious and some unconscious unless by 
consciousness be meant a certain grade of feeling.”52  
     Peirce was intent on showing that there is a continuum of feelings, consciousness 
and ideas. In an attempt at clarification, he considered continuity from the standpoint of 
Cantor’s mathematics and from the standpoint of both Aristotle and Kant, concluding 
that:  
The precise definition is still in doubt; but Kant’s definition, that a 
continuum is that of which every part has itself parts of the same kind, 
seems to be correct. This must not be confounded (as Kant himself 
confounded it) with infinite divisibility, but implies that a line, for 
example, contains no points until the continuity is broken by marking 
the points. In accordance with this it seems necessary to say that a 
continuum, where it is continuous and unbroken, contains no definite 
parts, contains no points until the continuity is broken by marking the 
points … In the calculus and theory of functions it is assumed that 
between any two rational points (or points at distances along the line 
expressed by rational fractions) there are rational points and that further 
for every convergent series of such fractions (such as 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, 
3.1415, 3.14159, etc.) there is just one limiting point; and such a 
collection of points is called continuous. But this does not seem to be the 
common sense idea of continuity. It is only a collection of independent 
points. Breaking grains of sand more and more will only make the sand 
more broken. It will not weld the grains into unbroken continuity.53 
 
His analysis concluded that feeling, and thus consciousness involves time,54 and has 
spatial extension,55 and that this continuum in space and time is, accordingly, the medium 
through which ideas are generated and pass from one person to another. Summarizing his 
thoughts he argued that “without this … it would have been impossible for minds 
 
 52. CP 6.173. 
 53. CP 6.168. 
 54. CP 6.164. 
 55. Ibid. 
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external to one another ever to become coordinated, and equally impossible for any 
coordination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of one brain.”56 Along 
this continuum the general idea emerges as a “living feeling” whose duration is 
infinitesimal, still embracing innumerable parts, and entirely unlimited but, nevertheless, 
immediatel
     Later in the same essay, Peirce turned his attention “to the consideration of a 
particular phenomenon which is remarkably prominent in our own consciousnesses, that 
of personality.”58 So close are our ideas of personality and self that they appear to be 
nearly identical, to the extent that they can be apprehended in a given moment.59 
Personality, in its fullness, is to be understood as “some kind of cöordination or 
connection of ideas,” and “a connection between ideas is itself a general idea,” and “a 
general idea is a living feeling.”60 Notwithstanding the sense of self-consciousness that is 
present in any given moment:  
Personality, like any other general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended 
in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it 
in all its fullness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and 
living, though specially colored by the immediate feeling of that 
moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is 
immediate self-consciousness. But the word coördination implies 
somewhat more than this; it implies a teleological harmony in ideas, and 
in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive 
pursuit of a predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. This is 
personal character. A general idea, living and conscious now, it is 
already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not 
now conscious.61 
 
 56. CP 6.134. 
 57. CP 6.138. 
 58. CP 6.155. 
 59. Short, “Hypostatic Abstraction in Self-Consciousness,” 304. 
 60. CP 6.155. 
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Clearly, what Peirce has in mind is not a static end toward which we strive according to 
nature but a dynamic cluster of ends that we elect for ourselves and which we retain, alter 
or reject according to our needs at different stages in the process of maturation. “Were the 
ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, 
for life; and consequently there would be no personality.”62 Rather, what Peirce had in 
mind was a notion of the self that was future oriented, experienced in any given moment 
but comprehended only in the fullness of time. It is the idea that personality is a process 
of self-discovery, “the consequences of choices made within this ambit of partial 
understanding and partial ignorance.”63 Not only is the self constantly evolving and 
emerging it is not absolutely an individual. Conversely, as we will closely examine in 
chapter seven, the communities to which a self belongs themselves bear some of the 
stripes of an individual. In the 1905 Monist series, Peirce put it is way: 
Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. 
The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are 
what he is “saying to himself,” that is, is saying to the other self that is 
just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that 
critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a 
sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to 
remember is that a man’s circle of society (however widely or narrowly 
this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in 
some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual 
organism.64  
  
 It is in this context that Peirce began in 1907 to link consciousness qua feeling to self-
control.65  
 
 62. CP 6.157. 
 63. Short, “Hypostatic Abstraction in Self-Consciousness,” 304. 
 64. CP 5.421. 
 65. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 311. 
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      Peirce’s theory of self-control was slow and meandering in its development over a 
span of fifty years. Edward S. Petry, Jr. outlined four very distinct, largely incompatible, 
stages of development.66 Among the sundry and disparate influences that Petry believes 
tinge this history in its various stages are works of Friedrich Schiller, Emmanuel 
Swedenborg and Henry James, Sr.; Peirce’s student, the psychologist, Joseph Jastrow; the 
British Moralists, Johann Friedrich Herbart and William James. The fourth stage was, 
according to Petry, an attempt at integration of the fully developed concept of self-control 
with the rest of Peirce’s philosophy, a process commencing with preparation of the 1903 
Harvard Lectures on pragmatism and continuing with the development of his doctrine of 
critical common-sensism around 1905 and culminating in the unpublished writings of 
1907. Evident in the works of this latter period are trace elements of his thinking from the 
earlier stages. It is in this fourth stage that we find self-control and self-consciousness 
inseparably linked. For this reason, we will focus on this stage in the development of the 
concept.  
     To understand Peirce’s fully developed notion of self-control and the role it plays 
in understanding the developing self, we must start with his understanding of the use of 
language. We recall that Peirce believed that learning a language preceded the 
acquirement of self-consciousness which, itself, follows from consciousness of other 
selves. Thomas Short says that, “the acquired capacity to signal our needs or 
 
 66. Edward S. Petry, Jr., “The Origin and Development of Peirce’s Concept of Self-Control,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28 (Fall 1992): 667-690. 
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circumstances to others becomes, as well, a capacity to represent them to ourselves.”67 In 
1905, Peirce had written: 
All thinking is by signs; and the brutes use signs. But they perhaps rarely 
think of them as signs … Brutes use language and they seem to exercise 
some little control over it. But they certainly do not carry this control to 
anything like the same grade that we do. … One extremely important 
grade of thinking about thought … is performed when something, that 
one has thought about any subject, is itself made a subject of thought.68 
  
This process of making what one has thought about a subject into a subject of thought is 
an adaptation of the mathematical process of hypostatic abstraction, which Peirce 
remarked “may be called the principal engine of mathematical thought.”69  
Number is [a] product of abstraction; and how useful number is in 
demonstration, I need not say. That which abstraction does is take a 
circumstance and regard it as a subject acting, suffering, and being … A 
particle is somewhere quite definitely. It is by abstraction that the 
mathematician conceives the particle as occupying a point. The mere 
place is now made a subject of thought. The particle moves; and it is by 
abstraction that the geometer conceives it as describing a line. This line 
… is merely a fact turned into a substantive, is regarded as so substantial 
that we talk of the line as moving, and as generating a surface, which is 
a new abstraction; and even the surface is made to move.70 
 
Hypostatic abstraction is to be differentiated from the process of precision, which we 
explored in the last chapter.  
Abstraction names two wholly different operations. One of them 
consists in supposing some feature of the fact to be absent, or at least 
leaving it out of account. I call that precissive abstraction. The other 
changes ‘This man is shy’ to ‘This man is affected with shyness.’ It may 
be called clipping the wings of words provided we call those words in a 
sentence which show us upon what our attention is to rest because 
something is about to [be] said of that, the επεα απτεροεντα and those 
words which say something of those subjects the επεα πτεροεντα. In 
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more prosaic language it changes a predicate into a subject (extending 
the term subject beyond the subject nominative to the subject accusative 
and subject dative, in short, to what are called the direct and indirect 
objects of the verb.) “The rose smells very sweetly” is by hypostatic 
abstraction converted into “The rose possesses a delightful perfume.” So 
“Cain killed Abel” is changed to “Cain caused the death of Abel.” 
Perfume and death are hypostatic abstractions. They denote entia 
rationis, whatever that may mean.71 
 
      In the Monist series of 1906 Peirce explained how “that wonderful operation of 
hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, 
sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we 
think or think through, into being subjects thought of.72  The resulting entia rationis are 
direct inferences whose conclusions refer to a subject not referred to by the premisses. 
Working on his system of existential graphs in 1903, Peirce returned to his favorite 
example to illustrate such immediate inferences.  
  Opium causes people to sleep;  
  [Ergo,] Opium possesses a power of causing sleep.73  
 
Here a dormative power, not referred to in the premises, is inferred by hypostatic 
abstraction. Such is the way thought progresses. “We think of the thought-sign itself, 
making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of 
hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions.”74  
     We are not yet at the point of inferring self-consciousness. “In this case, the 
entities introduced by hypostatic abstraction are not selves but, rather, thoughts, whether 
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attributed to selves or not.”75 Here enters the notion of self-control. It should come as no 
surprise that as there are grades of consciousness there are corresponding grades of self-
control. Nor should it be seen as coincidental that the manuscript in which Peirce details 
the grades of self-control contains a long passage on hypostatic abstraction.76 The reason 
for this linkage was repeatedly stated by Peirce. 
Inference is essentially deliberate and self-controlled … Reasoning 
essentially involves self-control …77 
 
In my opinion, it is self-control which makes any other than the normal 
course of thought possible, just as nothing else makes any other than the 
normal course of action possible; and just as it is precisely what that that 
gives room for an ought-to-be of conduct, I mean Morality, so it equally 
gives room for an ought-to-be of thought, which is Right Reason; and 
where there is no self-control, nothing but the normal is possible.78     
 
Reasoning is thought subjected to self-control, and that the whole 
operation of logical self-control takes precisely the same quite 
complicated course which everybody ought to acknowledge is that of 
effective ethical self-control.79  
 
Thought, for Peirce, is, simply stated, a species of behavior and, as such, is controllable.  
     The complicated scale of self-control is one that he outlined later in the same 
manuscript.  
Of course there are inhibitions and coördinations that entirely escape 
consciousness. There are, in the next place, modes of self-control which 
seem quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of self-control which results 
from training. Next, a man can be his own training-master and thus 
control his self-control. When this point is reached much or all of the 
training may be conducted in imagination. When a man controls himself, 
thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule in view, however 
special and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve 
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this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do 
this he must have something higher than an irrational rule. He must have 
some sort of moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by 
reference to an esthetic ideal of what is fine. There are certainly more 
grades than I have enumerated. Perhaps their number is indefinite. The 
brutes are certainly capable of more than one grade of control; but it 
seems to me that our superiority over them is more due to our greater 
number of grades of self-control than it is to our versatility.80 
The inhibitions and coördinations that escape consciousness are assumed to be automatic 
reflexes and responses of the body such as respiration, heartbeat, and the complex 
mechanism and processes of sight.81 Instinctive self-control, as we will detail in chapter 
six, is tied to Peirce’s notion of hypothesis or abduction, itself an instinctive mode of 
behavior that is evidenced in a propensity for right reasoning.82 Peirce closely linked 
instinct, a general tendency to act in a certain manner, i.e., a habit or disposition,83 that 
may or may not be hereditary,84 to sentiment, which he viewed as acquired habit.85  He 
viewed instinct as a “half conscious inference”86 and viewed reason and instinct as 
continuous,87 shading into one another by imperceptible degrees88 with reason, 
particularly abductive reasoning, being a species of instinct.89 It is at the higher grades of 
self-control that the faculty of abstraction is in evidence. Short explains: 
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At the highest levels of self-control, however, it becomes necessary to 
bring diverse thoughts, sensations, emotions, decisions, resolutions, 
actions, and bodily parts into an integrated whole, spanning past and 
future, connecting decision to decision in a single plan, and making 
many plans into a single life. This is achieved by attributing these 
various entities to a single underlying entity – the self that is introduced 
by hypostatic abstraction as that which thinks those thoughts, suffers 
those emotions, makes those decisions, commits those actions, forms 
and breaks those habits, and possesses that body and its parts. The 
diagram through which we explore alternative courses of action and 
their predictable consequences (see 1.529), and thereby gain control 
over the principles of our conduct, include, conspicuously, a sign – often 
the word ‘I’ – designating this supposed entity. The highest grades of 
self-control and consciousness therefore entail self-consciousness.90 
  
Thus, for Peirce, self-control paradoxically precedes self-awareness.  
     At the highest level of self-control the individual becomes his or her own training-
master.91 This, as we have seen, involves commitment to a moral rule which, in turn, may 
be refined by a moral principle which, in turn, may be guided by an aesthetic notion of 
the fine or the beautiful. This grounding of ethics in aesthetics had, after 1903, far 
reaching implications for inquiry as well as action, resulting in the reformulation of his 
pragmatism. It is, however, as one’s own training master, that one carries out in 
imagination the representation of actions and their possible consequences. In a 1906 letter 
to F.C.S. Schiller, Peirce suggested that self-control proceeds from the interplay of 
several components.  
The power of self-control is certainly not a power over what one is 
doing at the very instant the operation of self-control is commenced. It 
consists (to mention only the leading constituents) first, in comparing 
one’s past deeds with standards, second, in rational deliberation 
concerning how one will act in the future, in itself a highly complicated 
operation, third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the creation, on 
the basis of the resolve, of a strong determination, or modification of 
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habit. This operation of self-control is a process in which logical 
sequence is converted into mechanical sequences or something of the 
sort. How this happens, we are in my opinion as yet entirely ignorant. 
There is a class of signs in which the logical sequence is at the same 
time a mechanical sequence and very likely this fact enters into the 
explanation.92  
The representation of actions and their possible consequences involves, as Short notes, 
the production of signs and their manipulation.  
Such signs are diagrams and replicas of legisigns. These are the medium, 
as well, of higher levels of self-control, as we trace logical consequences 
of principles and react emotionally to detailed pictures and complex 
narratives of what might be. As felt, such signs are the stuff of 
consciousness in these grades … Representation of one’s possible 
actions includes self-designation: ‘Were I to do this, then what would 
happen?’93 
Thus, it is through sign activity that a positive theory of self is possible. The personality, 
however, as Peirce noted, is “not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be 
lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness. Yet in each 
infinitesimal interval it is present and living, though specially colored by the immediate 
feelings of that moment.”94 “Personality lies in the unity of the I think – which is the 
unity of symbolization – the unity of consistency – and belongs to every symbol.”95 Thus 
understood, personality is a coordination of ideas that is constantly emerging.  
The word coördination implies … a teleological harmony in ideas, and, 
in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive 
pursuit of a predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. This is 
personal character. A general idea living and conscious now, is already 
determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now 
conscious. This reference to the future is an essential element of 
personality.96 
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Peirce’s notion of self, as Colapietro points out, is consistently oriented to the future, and 
is reflected as a living reality, in “a pursuit of purposes in which genuinely novel 
purposes emerge; during any moment of its life, the self is first and foremost a process in 
which some species of meaning is evolving.”97  
    Character unfolds in the process of the personality’s development. “A person is 
not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is, is 
saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time.”98 Those thoughts 
are signs, language itself being a species, through which the individual comes to 
represent herself. “Word” and “sign” are used interchangeably by Peirce in the Monist 
series. 
…the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference. 
What distinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction doubtless. 
The material qualities, the forces which constitute the pure denotative 
application, and the meaning of the human sign, are all exceedingly 
complicated in comparison with those of the word. But these differences 
are only relative. What other is there? ... [I]t is sufficient to say that there 
is no element whatever of a man’s consciousness which has not 
something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It 
is that the word and or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as 
the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact 
that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so that every 
thought is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign 
are identical, in the same sense in which the words homo and man are 
identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is 
the thought.99  
Language, as Short summarizes, thus plays three essential, though separate, roles in self-
consciousness.  
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First, all conception is linguistic in form: the criterion of an individual’s 
having a concept of anything, including himself, is his correct use of 
certain words. Second, the content of the concept of selfhood is derived, 
directly or indirectly, from speech acts: we think of selves as those 
beings that can express themselves in words or as those beings that can 
think, and thinking we think of as that which can be expressed in words. 
But, third, we now discover that certain uses of words actually create 
and sustain the self: there would be no self if it were not for the 
linguistic legerdemain known as hypostatic abstraction. This, by positing 
a self, brings diverse feelings, habits, and actions into a single, organized 
whole, and this unification actually constitutes the self that is posited.100  
It is from confluence of these three functions of language that Peirce is able to assert one 
of his most puzzling and controversial beliefs about both the self and signs, namely, that 
man himself is a sign.101  
C.  Self as a Sign 
     In order to bring coherence to the many seemingly disparate things Peirce had to 
say about the self and, in turn, as a means to understanding his unusual claim that “man is 
a sign,” it is important that we come to terms with his vital distinction between power and 
force. Understanding this distinction will allow us to better see how self-control, the use 
of language, and the developmental teleology of ideas, habits, and feelings converge in a 
reasonably cohesive doctrine of self. Peirce identified the issue as early as 1868. In the 
sentence following his claim that “my language is the sum total of myself; for man is the 
thought,”102 Peirce explains:  
It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying 
himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute 
force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought. But the 
identity of a man consists in the consistency of what he does and thinks, 
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and consistency is the intellectual character of a thing; that is, is its 
expressing something.103 
In 1905, while attempting to refine his understanding of pragmatism and critical 
common-sensism, Peirce wrote, “What he adores, if he is a good pragmaticist, is power; 
not the sham power of brute force, which, even in its own specialty of spoiling things, 
secures such slight results; but the creative power of reasonableness, which subdues all 
other powers, and rules over them with its scepter, knowledge, and its globe, love.”104 
The distinction is between blind will as a species of force and self-control as a species of 
power.105 The consistency of what the individual does and thinks is the measure of her 
character, a teleological harmony, a coordination of feelings, ideas, and possible actions 
directed by self-control toward attractive and away from repulsive ideas.106 In this 
context Colapietro notes: 
Power is unintelligible apart from an ideal that exerts an attraction. 
Indeed, the exertion of an attraction by an ideal is perhaps the best way 
of defining what Peirce meant by ‘power.’ Our capacity to exert control 
over ourselves ultimately rests upon our ability to open ourselves to the 
very real exertions of truly attractive ideals.107  
Whereas, Peirce had written that “there is nothing which distinguishes my personal 
identity except my faults and my limitations – or if you please, my blind will, which it is 
my highest endeavor to annihilate,”108 he now postulated the power of self-control in 
tandem with the purposes of a developmental teleology.  
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     The means through which we open ourselves to the attractive ideals is dialogue, 
both with ourselves and with others.109 Here we recall his words, “that a person is not 
absolutely an individual, [that] his thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is … 
to the other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time [and] that a man’s circle of 
society … is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank that the 
person of an individual organism.”110 Conversation, the intrapersonal dialogue one has 
with himself, and the interpersonal dialogue one carries on with others, is the means 
through which the personality emerges as a coordination of feelings, ideas, and habits. In 
early drafts of the Cognition Series Peirce had observed that thinking is dialogic in form: 
“Thought, says Plato, is a silent speech of the soul with itself.”111 Thus, again, it follows 
that for Peirce all thinking is in signs. Language is the vehicle of thought. As Short noted 
above, “all conception is linguistic in form: the criterion of an individual’s having a 
concept of anything, including himself, is his correct use of certain words.”112  
      Having asserted both that all thought is in signs and that conception is linguistic in 
form, it was, as we have seen, natural for Peirce to use “word” and “sign” 
interchangeably.113 His further claim that the “the word or sign man uses, is the man 
himself,”114 set him off on an analysis to discover what differences between the two 
might exist. In a fascinating argument that we haven’t space to fully investigate, Peirce 
developed the analogy between a man and a word.115 There are, he noted, significant 
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differences but concluded that the differences are offset by the similarities. Some of the 
properties possessed by both are communication, conformity to law (morality in humans 
and grammar in words), procreation (sentences are symbols that produce other symbols 
or thoughts), the power of effort or attention (nothing dissimilar to the denotative power 
of words), and the power to be in two places at one time (just as ‘six’ can be written twice 
a man, as essentially more than his corpus –“the organism is only an instrument of 
thought”116 – can exist in the mind of another man through the communication of his 
feelings, intentions, and thoughts to the other).  
When I communicate my thought and my sentiments to a friend with 
whom I am in full sympathy, so that my feelings pass into him and I am 
conscious of what he feels, do I not live in his brain as well as my own –
most literally? True, my animal life is not there but my soul, my feeling 
[,] thought [,] attention are. If this be not so, a man is not a word, it is 
true, but is something much poorer. There is a miserable material and 
barbarian notion that a man cannot be in two places at once; as though 
he were a thing … Each man has an identity which far transcends the 
mere animal; an essence, a meaning subtile (sic) as it may be.117  
Not only are a man and a word analogous, they affect one another through mutual 
participation at the level of meaning.  
The man-sign acquires information, and comes to mean more than he 
did before. But so do words. Does not electricity mean more now than it 
did in the days of Franklin? Man makes the word, and the word means 
nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some 
man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external 
symbols, these might turn round and say: “You mean nothing which we 
have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as 
the interpretant of your thought.” In fact, therefore, men and words 
reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man’s information 
involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word’s 
information.118  
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As Konstantin Kolenda has observed, “this metaphor might blossom into Heidegger’s 
claim that it is language, not man, that speaks. ‘In its essence, language is neither 
expression nor an activity of man. Language speaks.’”119 Kolenda goes on to note that in 
their respective analyses of meaning, both Heidegger and Peirce emphasized the 
importance of the future. “Heidegger said that meaning ‘gets its structure from a fore-
having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.’”120 Peirce, for his part, emphasized the 
future-oriented nature of meaning vis à vis the idealized community of inquirers.  
As what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known in 
the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the 
ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by 
virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought 
identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of 
thought now depends … on the future thought of the community.121 
     Peirce came to the conclusion that “man is a sign” as early as 1868 and one might 
be tempted to gloss over it as merely incoherent metaphor, a weak analogy or perhaps the 
product of a subconscious indwelling of New England transcendentalism. Peirce 
acknowledged his proximity to Emerson’s far-reaching influence and the bard of 
Concord was, in fact, a frequent visitor in Peirce’s boyhood home.122 While he was not 
aware of any such stimulus in his work, he left open the possibility of its presence as late 
as 1892. 
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I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord – I mean 
Cambridge – at a time when Emerson [F.H., son of Harvard logician 
Levi], Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they 
had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or 
from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of 
the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic 
against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having 
contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some 
cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in 
my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the 
surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in 
physical investigations.123  
Arthur Burks, the editor of volumes seven and eight of the Collected Papers, claimed that 
it is precisely the tincture of Emersonian transcendentalism that renders Peirce’s claim 
that “man is a sign” incoherent. Only when the Emerson-like rhetorical veneer is stripped 
away from this notion and its interpretation will we find “an intelligible and interesting 
doctrine that fits well with the clear parts of Peirce’s semiotic.”124  In doing so, Burks 
discovers three standard rhetorical devices employed by Peirce that, when explained, lend 
clarity to Peirce’s declaration that “man is a sign.”     
     The first of these devices, consisting of a number of steps, is a variety of weak 
analogy termed a “stretched analogy” through which likeness is treated as transitive. 
Burks explains how the device works.  
Suppose A is like B, which is like C, which is like D. A may 
nevertheless be unlike D, because the grounds of each of the likenesses 
may be quite different. Without realizing it, Peirce stretched the analogy 
between man and the word by employing a succession of analogies and 
dropping the middle ones.125 
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Thus, by employing a string of such transitions, Burks claims that Peirce is able to 
conclude that a man and a sign are analogous. There is a problem with this interpretation, 
however. In CP 7.590, Peirce makes it clear that “man is a sign” is metaphoric and no 
mere simile. Commenting on Cuvier’s claim that “metaphysics is nothing but metaphor,” 
Peirce states that:  
If metaphor be taken literally to mean an expression of similitude when 
the sign of predication is employed instead of the sign of likeness – as 
when we say this man is a fox instead of this man is like a fox, I deny 
entirely that metaphysicians are given to metaphor; on the contrary, no 
writers can compare with them for precision of language; but if Cuvier 
was only using metaphor himself, and meant by metaphor broad 
comparison on the ground of characters of a formal and highly abstract 
kind, then, indeed, metaphysics professes to be metaphor – that is just its 
merit – as it was Cuvier’s own merit in Zoölogy.126 
Peirce clearly differentiated a certain kind of metaphor from simile and analogy. While 
he had no formal theory of metaphor and provided few remarks on the subject, some of 
those remarks are highly suggestive of a modern view of metaphor developed by I.A. 
Richards and Max Black known as interactionism that attributes a dimension of creativity 
generally lacking in similes and analogies, which tend to be purely isomorphic and 
static.127 Peirce scholar Carl Hausman summarizes Black’s view of metaphor.  
(1) A metaphor is an expression that links two or more normally 
dissociated subject terms, or, generally, linguistic units, each with its 
own implied complex of meanings. (2) The subject terms interact so that 
their meanings make differences to one another. (3) The outcome of the 
interaction is a creation in that it presents new meaning, or a meaning- 
complex, that may offer insight.128  
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In his “Syllabus” of 1902, Peirce included the following footnote. 
If a logician had to construct a language de novo – which he actually has 
almost to do – he would naturally say, I shall need prepositions to 
express the temporal relations of before, after, and at the same time with, 
I shall need prepositions to express the spatial relations of adjoining, 
containing, touching, of near to, far from, above, below, before, behind, 
and I shall need prepositions to express motions into and out of these 
situations. For the rest, I can manage with metaphors.129  
Prepositions are required to fulfill the Kantian requirement of placing objects in space, 
time, and motion while metaphors are the principle means of semantic innovation.130 
Judging from what he has said about the nature of signs, I do not believe that Peirce’s 
claim that man is a sign is a mere analogy or elliptical simile. Such an interpretation 
would overlook the dynamic nature of signs, an understanding that is vital to Peirce’s 
notion of self as well as signs. Selves and signs have the mode of being Thirds and, as 
such, are general.  
The very being of the general … is such that its being never can have 
been perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. It is 
like the character of man which consists in the ideas that he will 
conceive and in the efforts that he will make, and which only develops 
as the occasions actually arise. Yet, in all his life long no son of Adam 
has fully manifested what there was in him … This development … 
consists in embodiment, that is, in manifestation.131  
As Peirce noted in CP 5.313, humans and words acquire information and come to mean 
more than they did. In the instance of the metaphor, “man is a sign,” two subjects, “man” 
and “sign,” interact to produce something novel to each. The metaphor itself is a sign of 
the creative process that is semiosis.   
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     The second rhetorical device Burks finds in Peirce’s claim that “man is a sign” he 
terms “romanticized descriptions,” by which he means “the use of descriptions with 
positive emotive effect.” “Man is a sign” is, then, a romanticized description of “men use 
signs” or “man is an information processor.”132 Again, however, there is a problem with 
such an interpretation. There is, as we have witnessed, a school of interpretation that has 
sought to account for the incongruent elements in Peirce’s thought by postulating “two 
Peirces,” One Peirce is exemplified by writings of an empirical, naturalistic, and 
mathematical stripe and the other Peirce by a body of work bearing the marks of 
metaphysical, transcendentalist, and idealistic interests. These interpreters have tended to 
place the aphoristic “man is a sign” under the latter heading. While dismissive of the 
theory of the philosophical schizophrenic,133 Burks accuses Peirce with being 
intentionally obscure as a way to amp up the emotional impact of the philosophical 
concept. In fact, Peirce had a well earned reputation as an accomplished lexicographer. 
He was responsible for hundreds of contributions to such publications as Baldwin’s 
Dictionary and The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia. He possessed a translator’s 
knowledge of Greek, Latin, French, and German; demonstrated a genius for etymology 
and famously developed new terms from ancient roots as he indulged his passion for 
classification. His occasional turn of a phrase notwithstanding, Peirce was not given to 
the excessive use of emotive language, particularly at the cost of precision. 
     The third rhetorical device Burks calls “reality labels.” “This is the rhetorical 
attribution of value to a mode of being by calling it “real,” “substance,” or “necessary,” 
 
 132. Burks, “Man: Sign or Algorithm?” 286. 
 133. Ibid., 279-80. 
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and calling less important modes of being by lesser names, such as “fact,” “existence,” 
“actual,” “property,” or “possible.”134  Burks charges Peirce with what we might call 
philosophical gerrymandering in the naming of his three categories.  
Thirdness is the highest, and it is called the “real.” Secondness is second 
best, and it is called “existence” or “actuality.” Firstness is mere 
“possibility.” Signs and meanings are, of course, Thirdness, and semiotic 
is the highest of the sciences.135  
What Burks is overlooking, however, is the way in which the categories originate and 
function.  
     Peirce’s categories are, like Kant’s, universal and necessary. Therefore, as in the 
case of Kant, they originate not only through observation -- for they are conditions by 
which inductive inference is made intelligible – but also through logic. They are, 
however, described phenomenologically by the means of “precision.”136 They serve as 
conditions of intelligibility for the purpose of reducing the manifold of sensuous 
impressions to unity and, in earliest iterations of the theory, are framed by the “it” in 
general, i.e., substance, and by the “is” in general, i.e., being,  the condition for 
predication. The categories are ordered according to function, “for one such conception 
may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception 
and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on.”137 The emerging gradation is thus 
hierarchical, according to function. However, the categories cannot function 
 
 134. Ibid., 287. 
 135. Ibid. 
 136. Carl R. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 95ff. 
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independently of one another. The hierarchy is one of mutual dependence. If genuine, 
categories cannot be reduced to a lower-order category.138 Thus, in the case of Thirdness: 
the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or 
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. 
The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind 
capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing 
the role of Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of 
experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing 
Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the 
idea and gives it body.139  
To claim that “man is a sign” is merely to draw attention to his or her mode of being a 
general or a Third which does not cause the man to cease being an instance or a Second.  
     As we have seen, sensations and emotions, as signs, are representative responses 
to an object for Peirce. So, too, do aesthetic and moral feelings function primarily as 
interpretations of objects. 
Good and bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and therefore 
are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined by the previous 
cognitions (there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective 
elements of consciousness) … That a sensation is not necessarily an 
intuition, or first impression of sense, is very evident in the case of the 
sense of beauty … When the sensation beautiful is determined by 
previous cognitions, it always arises as a predicate; that is, we think that 
something is beautiful. Whenever a sensation thus arises in consequence 
of others, induction shows that those others are more or less 
complicated.140  
In this manner all thinking is in signs.  
Whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, 
image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it 
follows from our own existence … that everything which is present to us 
is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its 
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being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at 
once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain.141 
Thus, it is the case that “as the conscious life of man consists in the flux or rapid 
transition of mental states, each one a sign, Peirce made the appropriate move and 
affirmed that ‘when we think … we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a 
sign.’”142  
     In fact, however, it is as a particular type of sign that man appears; man is a 
symbol.143 As we have learned, a symbol is a sign whose meaning is established by 
convention rather than by nature. Words are symbols whose essential meaning is ever 
changing and growing. The self, as a sign, is general. Man, as a symbol, is a sign whose 
meaning is continuously unfolding in the course of its interaction with others, a sign 
whose true meaning always lies in the future and can never be understood in the present. 
As a symbol, “a general idea, living and conscious now, [the self] is already 
determinative of acts in the future to an extent it is not now conscious.”144 As such, “[an 
individual] cannot know his own essential significance; of his eye it is eyebeam.”145  To 
do so, according to Harrison, would amount to pure self-consciousness which is what 
cannot be achieved. 
This is so because thought “cannot happen in an instant” (CP 5.253) but 
takes time (albeit an infinitesimal amount of time), which is but to say 
 
141. CP 5.283. 
 142. Peirce’s words are from CP 5.283; Stanley M. Harrison, “Peirce on Persons,” in Proceedings 
of the Peirce Bicentennial Congress, eds. Kenneth L. Ketner, Joseph M. Ransdell, Carolyn Eisele, Max H. 
Fisch and Charles S. Hardwick (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1981), 218. 
143. CP 7.583. 
 144. CP 6.156.  
 145. CP 7.591, reference is to lines from Emerson’s “Riddle of the Sphinx”: 
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that all cognition is by means of signs. In the case of pure self-
consciousness, this means that to represent the sign I am at each moment 
as a sign, I must make it the object for a subsequent sign or thought. No 
object can be a sign and, at the same time, represent itself as a sign. Had 
Descartes understood this, there could have been no question about the 
possibility of immediately apprehending himself as substance or as 
anything else.146  
To illustrate this very point, Harrison reminds us that Peirce had employed the analogy of 
a country upon which a map is placed. The map represents the topography of the country 
in every minute detail, down to the location of the map itself. “Thus there will be within 
the map, a map of the map, and within that, a map of the map of the map, and so on ad 
infinitum.”147  At no instant, then, are we able to be a sign and be present to ourselves as 
the sign that we are, anymore than the map can be a map and represent itself as a map. 
Thus are we consigned to ignorance regarding our essential self and remind ourselves, as 
Peirce reminded his readers, of Shakespeare’s words from Measure For Measure:  
  … proud man, 
 Most ignorant of what he’s most assured, 
 His glassy essence.148  
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Chapter Five 
 
Ineluctable Dualisms and the Limits of Synechism 
 
Logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, 
as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion… 
--Peirce, Collected Papers  
 
A. Pragmatisms: Peirce and James 
 
     In the autumn of 1902, while James was actively negotiating with the Harvard 
Corporation for a series of paid lectures for his impoverished and, by that time, suicidal 
friend, Peirce penned a long letter to his benefactor in which he proclaimed a recent 
breakthrough in his thinking on pragmatism. In part, he wrote: 
I seem myself to be the sole depository at present of the completely 
developed system [of pragmatism], which all hangs together and cannot 
receive any proper presentation in fragments. My own view in 1877 [in 
the essay “The Fixation of Belief” for Popular Science Monthly] was 
crude. Even when I gave my Cambridge lectures [in 1898] I had not 
really got to the bottom of it or seen the unity of the whole thing. It was 
not until after that that I obtained the proof that logic must be founded 
on ethics, of which it is a higher development. Even then, I was for some 
time so stupid as not to see that ethics rests in the same manner on a 
foundation of esthetics … These three normative sciences correspond to 
my three categories, which in their psychological aspect, appear as 
Feeling, Reaction, Thought … The true nature of pragmatism cannot be 
understood without them. It does not, as I seem to have thought at first, 
take Reaction as the be-all, but it takes the end-all as the be-all, and the 
End is something that gives its sanction to action. It is of the third 
category. Only one must not take a nominalistic view of Thought as if it 
were something that a man had in his consciousness. Consciousness may  
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mean any one of the three categories. But if it is to mean Thought it is 
more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of 
us … This then leads to synechism, which is the keystone of the arch.1 
 
In the same letter Peirce wrote, “I think I could satisfy you that your view of pragmatism 
requires some modification, that it is the logical basis and proof of it (and it can receive 
no sound support from psychology) and its relation to the categories that have first to be 
made clear before it can be accurately applied except in very simple ways.”2  The 
richness of this letter is evidenced by the inclusion of several important themes from 
Peirce’s later thinking that were then taking shape and that he clearly saw differentiating 
his own brand of pragmatism from that of James’s more popular version of the same 
name. In this way, Peirce was giving an account of his own philosophical development 
that had recently undergone tremendous ferment, in his endeavor to ground logic as a 
science and thereby establish pragmatism as a logical maxim.3 This lead to the notion 
that logic was dependent upon ethics and ethics, in turn, was dependent upon aestheti
During this same period, Peirce had been developing the notion of synechism, first 
suggested in 1892,4 as the synthesis of tychism - the notion that chance is operative in the 
world-- and pragmatism.5 “The word synechism is the English form of the Greek 
 
 1. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley, eds., Correspondence of William James 
(Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2002), 10:157-158. 
 2. Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany: The State University of New York 
Press, 1997), 28. This portion of the letter of November 25, 1902 is not included in Skrupskelis and 
Berkeley. 
 3. Patricia Ann Turrisi, “Commentary,” in Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and 
Method of Right Thinking, 26. 
 4. CP 6.103. 
 5. CP 4.584. 
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συνεχισμός , [synechismos], from συνεχής , [synechés] continuous,” the Greek word 
meaning continuity of parts brought about by surgery.6  
       In the first of a series of five essays written for the Monist during the early 1890s, 
Peirce attempted to explain the propriety of the architectonical approach to philosophical 
systems commended by Kant.  
That systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been 
preached since Kant, but I do not think the full import of the maxim has 
by any means been apprehended. What I would recommend is that every 
person who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems 
should first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge, should 
take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should 
observe in just what respect each has been successful and where it has 
failed, in order that, in the light of the thorough acquaintance so attained 
of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of the nature 
and strength of each, he may proceed to the study of what the problem of 
philosophy consists in, and of the proper way of solving it.7  
 
In 1896, in another essay for the Monist, Peirce exposited the structure formed by the 
sciences and the corollary assumption that there is an order to human knowledge.  
This double assertion, first, that logic ought to draw upon mathematics 
for control of disputed principles, and second that ontological 
philosophy ought in like manner to draw upon logic, is a case under a 
general assertion which was made by Auguste Comte, namely, that the 
sciences may be arranged in a series with reference to the abstractness of 
their objects; and that each science draws regulating principles from 
those superior to it in abstractness, while drawing data for its inductions 
from the sciences inferior to it in abstractness.8   
 
The place of logic was at this time, for Peirce, central. “Logic seeks to show how truth 
might be attained; all other sciences comprise the various divisions of the attempt to 
reach the truth. Peirce thus thought that a systematic study of logic would result from an 
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examination of its relation to these other sciences, of their relations to one another, and of 
the assistance they render to one another.”9 According to Murphey, it was around this 
time, in a lengthy paper entitled the “Logic of Mathematics,”10 that Peirce began to work 
on a more detailed schema of the sciences that resulted in the intricate classification of 
1902 in which, as we can see from the letter to James, pragmatism, the categories and the 
normative sciences are integral to one another.11  
      The problem was that pragmatism, as a maxim of logic, originated as a means of 
escaping the irritation of doubt and obtaining satisfaction through the settlement of belief 
as the clarification of ideas, thus enabling us to establish habit and “predict what sensible 
experiences we will receive from an object as a consequence of actions of our own.”12  
As Peirce expressed in the letter to James and often acknowledged in his later writings, 
the expression of pragmatism in the 1877-78 Illustrations of the Logic of Science series of 
essays for Popular Science Monthly was crude. In the first of the Harvard Lectures of 
1903, he wrote: 
My original article [“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”] carried this back 
to a psychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, 
was developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a 
definite intention. But in the first place, this was not very clearly made 
out, and in the second place, I do not think it satisfactory to reduce such 
fundamental things to facts of psychology. For man could alter his 
nature, or his environment would alter it if he did not voluntarily do so, 
if the impulse were not what was advantageous or fitting. Why has 
evolution made man’s mind to be so constructed? That is the question 
 
 9. Beverly Kent, Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences (Kingston and 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1980), 54-5. 
 10. CP 1.417-520. 
 11. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Pragmatism, 356. 
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we must nowadays ask, and all attempts to ground the fundamentals of 
logic on psychology are seen to be essentially shallow.13 
 
That is to say, the early expression of pragmatism, as one aspect of the doubt-belief 
theory of inquiry, smacked of psychologism, a term that Peirce never used but clearly 
understood as “any attempt to ground philosophical explanation in psychological 
phenomena”14 and, as such, not only shallow but threatening to his attempt to establish 
logic as an autonomous science of inquiry and as the classifying science.   
     Thus, as Murphey and others have demonstrated, there is to be found  within 
Peirce’s work a tension, if not a gulf, between the architectonic attempt to establish logic 
on a non-sensational foundation and the doubt-belief theory of inquiry, a tension that he 
expended considerable effort attempting to resolve during his final years. If pragmatism 
is a regulative principle of logic, it cannot be derived from psychology or physiology.15 
This chapter will examine this incongruity as it is manifested in ostensibly opposed and 
seemingly irreconcilable statements on matters of theory and practice, reason and 
sentiment, and conscious and unconscious inference that are prevalent and often 
contemporaneous in Peirce’s work. Our capacity to understand the proper function of the 
passional within the cognitive process rests, in part, on our ability to reconcile these 
apparent antinomies within Peirce’s writings. 
      Peirce’s ongoing effort to overcome these internal problems brought his 
differences with James into sharper relief, as can be seen in the letter quoted above. Not 
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only does Peirce declare he has “proof” of the dependence of logic upon ethics for 
regulative principles of good and bad and ethics, in turn, upon aesthetics for its notion of 
the summum bonum, he affirms the correspondence of these three “normative sciences” 
to his three categories, without which pragmatism cannot be “truly” understood. It is 
through the normative sciences that Peirce can speak of the ends of reason as regulated 
thought, as thought brought under self-control, while James, having understood 
pragmatism as authorizing action as an end in itself, finds Peirce insisting that only 
thought, as general, can sanction action. Action is Second, thought is Third; he claimed 
we are closer to the truth to say that we are in Thought rather than Thought in us. James’s 
pragmatism had been weighed in the balance by Peirce and found wanting. It was paltry, 
individualistic, psychologistic, and materialistic. Synechism, for Peirce, was the linchpin 
of pragmatism, a doctrine that allowed him to understand reason as self-controlled 
thought and thus as a type of purposive action. Synechism was the path to unity that 
could, to Peirce’s mind, explain the seemingly contrary streams in his thought and 
harmonize the dissonance of the architectonic classification of the sciences and the doubt-
belief theory of inquiry. Whether he succeeded in achieving this has long been debated. 
Murphey believes, as I do, that ultimately the principle of continuity failed him. Peirce, 
for his part, always seemed to understand what was at stake: “[Synechism] is a damned 
easy way of explaining things, my critics will say … Good, I applaud this objection; and 
if I do not answer it satisfactorily set me down as a failure if not a humbug.”16  
 
 16. “Logic of Events. Continuity the Master Key,” MS 949. Quoted in Murphey, The Development 
of Peirce’s Pragmatism, 406. 
 
200 
     The balance of this chapter will examine the means by which Peirce and his 
interpreters have attempted to overcome the incongruence of component themes within 
his philosophy resulting from, as Murphey has argued, the incompatibility of his 
commitment to both the architectonic structure of philosophy and the doubt-belief theory 
of inquiry. It is in some measure, as Murphey has suggested, the story of the refinement 
of one pragmatism (Peirce’s) through the suggestions provided by the formulations of 
another (James’s). This enrichment was aided by the maturing of Peirce’s doctrine of 
self-control, which will be examined in the last section.  
 
B.  The Bane of Pragmatism 
       As has often been recounted, the origin of pragmatism can be traced to Peirce’s 
1877-8 Illustrations of the Logic of Science series of essays for Popular Science Monthly. 
In the second of those articles, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” he issued the first 
iteration of the pragmatic maxim. 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception 
of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.17  
 
In a long footnote to this statement, written in 1903, Peirce drew attention to the fact that 
“in these three lines one finds, ‘conceivably, ‘conceive,’ ‘conception,’ ‘conception,’ 
‘conception,’” and argued that since he was not stylistically inclined to the repetition of 
terms: 
This employment fives times over of derivates of concipere must then 
have had a purpose. In point of fact, it had two. One was to show that I 
was speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of intellectual 
purport. The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as 
                                            
 17. CP 5.402. 
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attempting to explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by 
anything but concepts. I did not, therefore, mean to say that acts, which 
are more strictly singular than anything, could constitute the purport, or 
adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. I compared action to the 
finale of the symphony of thought, belief being a demi-cadence. Nobody 
conceives that the few bars at the end of a musical movement are the 
purpose of the movement. They may be called its upshot. But the figure 
would not bear detailed application. I only mention it to show that the 
suspicion I myself expressed (Baldwin’s Dictionary Article, 
Pragmatism) after a too hasty rereading of the forgotten magazine paper 
[“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”], that it expressed a stoic, that is, a 
nominalistic, materialistic, and utterly philistine state of thought, was 
quite mistaken.18 
 
The point in fact, however, is that Peirce, as we have noted, had sensed that the original 
enouncement of this regulative principle had come very near resting logic upon 
perception and many commentators have detected some evidence of  psychologism in the 
two essays of the Illustrations of the Logic of Science that serve as pragmatism’s “birth 
certificate.” Later iterations of the maxim and subsequent attempts to explain the original 
formulation did not entirely remove the whiff of psychologism.   
       First, there was Peirce’s account of the Metaphysical Club meetings of the early 
1870s and the admission that pragmatism was “scarce more than a corollary”19 to Bain’s 
definition of belief that Nicholas St. John Green had brought to the attention of the group. 
In an unpublished letter to the editor of The Sun Peirce remembered:  
Green was especially impressed with the doctrines of Bain and 
impressed the rest of us with them; and finally the writer of this brought 
forward what we called the principle of pragmatism …The particular 
point that had been made by Bain and that had most struck Green and 
through him the rest of us, was the insistence that what a man really 
believes is what he would be ready to act upon and to risk much upon. 
The writer endeavored to weave that truth in with others which he had 
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made out for himself, so as to make a consistent doctrine of cognition 
[emphasis in Peirce].20   
 
 Secondly, there was Peirce’s linkage of pragmatism with the logic of abduction. In the 
1903 Harvard Lectures, Peirce laid out three cotary propositions of pragmatism.21 The 
first was the Aristotelian doctrine, Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.22  
The second was “that perceptual judgments contain general elements, so that universal 
propositions are deducible from them in the manner in which the logic of relations shows 
that particular propositions usually, not to say invariably, allow universal propositions to 
be necessarily inferred from them.”23  And the third of these propositions was that : 
[A]bductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any 
sharp line of demarcation between them; or, in other words, our first 
premises, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme 
case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely 
beyond criticism. The abductive suggestion comes to us in a flash. It is 
an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that 
different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is 
the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of 
putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our 
contemplation.24  
 
      Complicating the delineation of abductive inference and perceptual  
 
judgment is Peirce’s distinction of perceptual judgment and percepts which are 
considered to be as unlike “as the printed letters in a book, where a Madonna of Murillo 
is described, are unlike the picture itself.”25 There are general elements in perceptual 
 
 20. MS, 325. Quoted in Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Essays by Max H. Fisch,  95. 
 21. In CP 5.180 Peirce wrote: “Cos, cotis, is a whetstone. [Cotary propositions] appear to me to 
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judgments which as “the first premises of all our reasonings,”26 “the first judgment of a 
person as to what is before his senses”27 are unlike the percepts from which they are 
formed. The percept, as the sense-image reacting upon the mind, is singular and 
indexical,28 though in some places, e.g. CP 6.542, Peirce seems to suggest that even the 
percept contains a general element.29 In the final analysis, the only significant difference 
between perceptual judgments and hypotheses are that the former are “not controllable 
[thus beyond criticism] and therefore not fully conscious.”30   
     Later in the 1903 lectures, Peirce proclaimed that “If you carefully consider the 
question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic 
of abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render 
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that 
is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, 
this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is 
confined to logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology.”31  The problem 
for Peirce, as we shall investigate in the next chapter, was that abduction (alternately 
termed retroduction or hypothesis), the third of three types of reasoning employed by 
humans, was sometimes defined by Peirce as guessing and described as an instinct we 
share with animals.32 As Thomas Sebeok points out, Peirce’s “abduction is an instinct 
 
 26. CP 5.116. 
 27. CP 5.115. 
 28. CP 5.151-2, 7.633. 
 29. For a thorough discussion of Peirce’s somewhat convoluted theory of perception see Sandra 
Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic Account of Perception: Issues and Implications,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 193-213. 
 30. CP 5.181. 
 31. CP 5.196. 
 32. Charles Sanders Peirce, “Guessing,” The Hound & Horn 2 (Spring 1929): 267-285. 
 
204 
                                           
which relies on unconscious perception of connections between aspects of the world … 
[or] subliminal communication of messages.”33 Abduction also produces emotion and, 
Peirce asserts, hypothetic inference is essentially an emotion. 
Hypothesis substitutes, for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to 
one subject, a single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sensation 
belonging to the act of thinking that each of these predicates inheres in 
the subject. In hypothetic inference this complicated feeling so produced 
is replaced by a single feeling of greater intensity, that belonging to the 
act of thinking the hypothetic conclusion. Now, when our nervous 
system is excited in a complicated way, there being a relation between 
the elements of the excitation, the result is a single harmonious 
disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various sounds made by 
the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a 
peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves. 
This emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetic inference, 
and every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such an 
emotion. We may say, therefore, that hypothesis produces the sensuous 
element of thought, and induction the habitual element.34  
 
Here the relationship between a hypothesis and an emotion is one of identity rather than 
the one of analogy which we saw in CP 5.292. Both are the substitution of a simple 
predicate for a more complex predicate by an operation of the mind. As we also noted in 
chapter three, music is a sign and often served Peirce as an example of an immediate or 
emotional interpretant. Finally, instinct is sometimes equated with sentiment in Peirce’s 
writings.35 Thus in the logic of abduction we find a blurring of the distinctions Peirce 
makes elsewhere between theory and practice, reason and sentiment, and conscious and 
unconscious inference so that for Peirce even reason and instinct are continuous – they 
 
 33. Thomas Sebeok, The Play of Musement (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 27. 
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“shade into one another by imperceptible graduations.”36   Moreover, he notes, “how fine 
are the gradations between subconscious, or instinctive, mind and our more conscious 
and more controlled reason.”37   
      Pragmatism began life not only as a regulative principle of logic but, as Murphey 
points out, simply a single aspect of a theory of inquiry in which the sole purpose of  
inquiry is the establishment of belief as a means to overcoming doubt. This duality of 
purpose seems to undercut the unity of Peirce’s philosophy and his resistance to the 
“disposition to make psychology the key to philosophy.”38  Moreover, in retrospect, 
Peirce felt the whole premise of “The Fixation of Belief” seemed precariously close to a 
petitio principii.  
My original essay, having been written for a popular monthly, assumes, 
for no better reason than that real inquiry cannot begin until a state of 
real doubt arises and ends as soon as Belief is attained, that “a settlement 
of Belief,” or, in other words, a state of satisfaction, is all that Truth, or 
the aim of inquiry, consists in. The reason I gave for this was so flimsy, 
while the inference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that I must 
confess the argument of that essay might with some justice be said to 
beg the question.39  
 
As a corrective, Peirce was moved to establish a place within the sciences wherein logic 
would not be subsumed under any other science, especially psychology, and thus be 
treated, as had Aristotle, as an organon.40  Before examining the contrary positions 
created by the dual purpose of pragmatism, we should briefly examine Peirce’s 
 
 36. MS 1101:2, quoted by Maryann Ayim in “Theory, Practice and Peircean Pragmatism” in 
Proceedings of the C.S. Peirce Bicentennial International Congress, eds. Kenneth L. Ketner, Joseph M. 
Ransdell, Carolyn Eisele, Max H. Fisch and Charles S. Hardwick (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 
1981), 51. 
 37. MS 831:2, quoted by Maryann Ayim in “Theory, Practice and Peircean Pragmatism.” 
 38. CN 3:128. 
 39. CP 6.485. 
 40. CP 2.547.  
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opposition to psychologism as the impetus for development of his classification of the 
sciences as well as refinement of his theory of signs.   
     As clearly as any of his critics, Peirce saw the doubt-belief theory of inquiry, with 
its unavoidable reference to mental states, as jeopardizing logic. Having publicly declared 
in 1903 that pragmatism is “scarce more than a corollary to Bain’s definition of belief”41 
and that “belief consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula 
believed in as a guide to action,42 Peirce was serving notice that the passage of thirty 
years since the Popular Science Monthly series had done little to alter the core of his 
original formulation as a means to ending the irritation of doubt by obtaining a state of 
belief,43 the essence of which is the establishment of a habit.44  In 1906, he wrote: 
It is ... no doubt true that men act, especially in the action of inquiry, as 
if their sole purpose were to produce a certain kind of feeling, in the 
sense that when that state of feeling is attained, there is no further effort. 
It was upon that proposition that I originally based pragmaticism, laying 
it down in the article that in November 1877 [The Fixation of Belief] 
prepared the ground for my argument for the pragmaticistic doctrine 
(Pop. Sci. Monthly for January, 1878) [How to Make Our Ideas Clear]. 
In the case of inquiry, I called that state of feeling “firm belief,” and 
said, “As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, 
whether the belief be true or false,” and went on to show how the action 
of experience consequently was to create the conception of real truth… 
My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the 
agitation of a question ceases when satisfaction is attained with the 
settlement of belief, and then only, goes on to consider how the 
conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the 
action of experience; beginning with willful belief or self-mendacity … 
thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized 
society, then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a 
fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of truth as 
 
 41. CP 5.12. 
 42. CP 5.27. 
 43. CP 5.374. 
 44. CP 5.398. 
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overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an 
independent reality.45 
 
In the original essays of 1877-8, Peirce had defined inquiry in terms of a struggle, 
declaring “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term 
this struggle Inquiry.”46  This struggle, as he labored to explain, was quite visceral in 
nature.  
Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition 
that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt 
has not the least effect of this sort, but stimulates us to action until it is 
destroyed. This reminds us of a nerve and the reflex action produced 
thereby; while for the analogue of belief, in the nervous system, we must 
look to what are called nervous associations – for example, to that habit 
of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach will make 
the mouth water.47   
 
Repeatedly, he established the settlement of belief as the sole end of inquiry and the sole 
means of overcoming the irritation of an undecided state of mind. Only then do we obtain 
the satisfaction of established habits of action. Peirce’s doubt-belief theory of inquiry can 
be roughly summed up in a few short passages. In each instance, the date of publication is 
given to further show that the doubt-belief theory was a position he held throughout his 
long career. 
The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to 
attain belief … With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with 
the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the 
settlement of opinion.48  
 
 
 45. CP 5.563-564. 
 46. CP 5.374. 
 47. CP 5.373. 
 48. CP 5.375 (1877). 
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than playing a tune in different keys is playing different 
tunes.51   
 
a habit; and a deliberate, or self-controlled, 
abit is precisely a belief.52   
 
n of a 
atic 
activity that in some way must get superseded by a habit.53   
Of course, as David Savan reminds us, “some beliefs are unsettling, and some doubts 
relax. Think, for example, of the belief that danger or pain lie ahead, and the calming 
effect of doubt upon that belief.”54 The point Peirce is making, however, is that both 
                                           
… the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases 
when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole 
function of thought.49  
 
And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical 
phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has 
just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, 
it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the 
establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a 
50
The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beli
are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give
rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same 
doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in
the manner of consciousness of them can make them different belie
any more 
[Readiness] to act in a certain way under given circumstances and when 
actuated by a given motive is 
h
 
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind 
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; 
and like other habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins 
its dissolution) perfectly self-satisfied. Doubt is of an altogether contrary
genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. Now a privatio
habit, in order to be anything at all, must be a condition of err
 
 
 49. CP 5.394 (1878). 
 50. CP 5.398 (1878).  
 51. Ibid.  
 52. CP 5.480 (1907). 
 53. CP 5.417 (1905). 
 54. David Savan, “Decision and Knowledge in Peirce,” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 1 (1965): 37-8. 
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belief and doubt are sensational in nature and that they constitute modes of action and 
actions that tend toward regularity under prescribed conditions are habits.  
     What had changed for Peirce was that James’ address “Philosophical Conceptions 
and Practical Results,” delivered to the Philosophical Union at Berkeley in during the 
summer of 1898, had introduced the world to the term ‘pragmatism’ and to Peirce, as its 
inventor, though he had never used the word in print, even in 1878. “For Peirce, 
‘pragmatism’ was simply one aspect of the doubt-belief theory of inquiry, and it was not 
a sufficiently important aspect to justify the use of a separate name.”55 But James gave 
him the credit and now Peirce was in a bind. 
He was in desperate financial straits. The ever loyal James had once 
again come to the rescue in an hour of dire need, and had given him a 
chance not just for fame but for money which that fame could bring 
through articles and lectures. For personal and financial reasons, 
therefore, Peirce could not disown the doctrine; nor could he honestly 
embrace it without qualification. And as controversy – and therefore 
interest – gathered about the doctrine, and as James, and subsequently 
Dewey and Schiller, made their interpretation of it more explicit, Peirce 
was more and more compelled to dissociate himself from the school, to 
stress the differences between his doctrines and theirs – even going so 
far as to invent a new name, “pragmaticism,” for his own doctrine – and 
yet to use the notoriety which he had acquired as the inventor of 
pragmatism to publicize the aspects of his work which he considered 
important and to try to make enough money to keep the wolf a little 
longer from the door.56  
 
The subsequent and dramatic reformulation of Peirce’s thoughts, especially in regard to 
the classification of the sciences, the theory of signs and the deliberate subsuming of 
logic under semeiotic was, in no small part, due to his strong distaste for what he felt to 
be the narrow, popular doctrines of James, Schiller and Dewey that he believed himself to 
 
 55. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Pragmatism, 358. 
 56. Ibid., 358-9. 
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have unintentionally inspired. The apostasy common to all three was, for Pierce, rooted in 
psychologism.  
     James’ 1907 collection of popular lectures entitled Pragmatism was dedicated  
TO THE MEMORY OF JOHN STUART MILL 
FROM WHOM I FIRST LEARNED THE 
PRAGMATIC OPENNESS OF MIND 
AND WHOM MY FANCY LIKES TO PICTURE AS 
OUR LEADER 
WERE HE ALIVE TO-DAY 
 
For Peirce, Mill’s work was the culmination of a movement with a long history, namely  
[T]he disposition to make psychology the key to philosophy – 
categories, aesthetics, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Something of it has 
existed since Descartes; but since about 1863 every student of 
philosophy, even though he be one of those who consider the present 
psychological tendency excessive, has placed a new and higher estimate 
than before upon the scientific value of psychology. Here was seen one 
science, than which no branch of philosophy, in the days when men 
disputed about the primum cognitum, was more enveloped in 
metaphysical fog, which yet suddenly, that mist lifting, had come out 
bright and clear as a June forenoon. How could that but happen, as it 
certainly did, that men should think that the best way to resolve any 
problem of philosophy would be to reduce it to a question of 
psychology?57  
 
Mill’s polemical Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy appeared in 1865.58 
There Mill had written that:  
Logic is not a science distinct from and coordinate with, Psychology. So 
far as it is a science at all, it is a part, or branch of Psychology; differing 
from it, on the one hand as a part differs from the whole, and on the 
other, as an Art differs from a Science. Its theoretical grounds are wholly 
borrowed from Psychology, and include as much of that science as is 
required to justify the rules of the art. Logic has no need to know more 
than of the Science of Thinking, than the difference between good 
thinking and bad. A consequence of this is, that the Necessary Laws of 
 
 57. CP 8.167. 
 58. J.S. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green, & 
Company, 1865). 
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Thought … are precisely those with which Logic has least to do, and 
which belong the most exclusively to Psychology.59 
 
For Peirce, no less than for his contemporaries Frege and Husserl, Mill was seen as “part 
of a tradition and, in crucial respects, as the distillation of the principal methodological 
commitments of the British empiricist tradition and, closely allied with this, British 
associationist psychology (e.g., David Hartley, Thomas Brown, and of course James Mill 
as well as his son John Stuart).”60 Peirce’s antipathy toward this treatment of logic as 
psychology ran deep. Such treatments “draw no line between an association of ideas 
which leads to truth, from some recondite cause, and that which does so upon a principle 
which we are aware of.”61   
       It is arguable that Peirce’s anti-psychologism is traceable to his earliest published 
writings of the mid-1860s62 and, thus, that the psychologism of the Illustrations is 
apparent only, the result of writing for an audience of philosophical laity represented by 
the readership of Popular Science Monthly, and the attempt to root inquiry in the 
psychological states of belief and doubt.63 The theory of signs, as well as the system of 
categories, so central to the discussion of psychological states in the 1868-9 Cognition 
Series in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, is entirely missing from the six essays of 
the Illustrations of the Logic of Science. An obvious explanation might be that Peirce 
viewed his semiotic as beyond the grasp of such an audience. In a revealing letter to Lady 
 
 59. J.S. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Company., 1889), 461-2. 
 60. Vincent Colapietro, “C.S. Peirce’s Critique of Psychologism,” in Philosophy, Psychology and 
Psychologism, ed. Dale Jacquette (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 161. 
 61. W 1:410. 
 62. See Jeff Kasser, “Peirce’s Supposed Psychologism,” see Arisbe website:  
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm (accessed August 2008). 
 63. Max H. Fisch, “An Unpsychological View of Logic,” Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce, 
eds. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 1:305-322.  
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Welby in 1908, Peirce owned that his definition of a sign had lately and necessarily been 
popularized but only at the risk of introducing psychological factors. 
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, 
called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which 
effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately 
determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to 
Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception 
understood.64 
 
Being abstruse to the masses, however, was only a measure of Peirce’s discouragement; 
he despaired of ever being comprehensible to his peers. There was, as Max Fisch 
suggests, another possible motive. “If we recall that the original motive of subsuming 
logic under semeiotic in 1865 was to avoid basing it on psychology, we can give a 
tentative and at least partial answer: The sop to Cerberus was lapsing from sign-talk into 
psych-talk – from semeiotic into psychology.”65 Thus, it may be suggested, the notion of 
an “effect upon a person” in this definition of a sign is the analogue to the practical 
effects of the original pragmatic formula.  
     As we’ve noted, James, like J.S. Mill and Alexander Bain before him, was 
profoundly influenced by Thomas Brown. The effect of Brown’s thoroughgoing 
naturalism can be clearly seen not only in James’ psychology but in his pragmatism with 
its emphasis on the individual’s flow of experience and its activity. “Self-identity [for 
Brown] becomes essentially a set of my memories having coherence in change, in just the 
 
 64. Charles S. Hardwick, ed., Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. 
Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 80-1 (italics mine). 
 65. Max H. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, eds. Kenneth 
Laine Ketner and Christian J.W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 343. 
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way objects have a kind of permanence even when they are altering through time.”66 For 
Peirce, such individualism cannot help but be psychologistic from the standpoint that 
according to this view, generality is merely the regularity of experience that extends over 
feelings as well as cognitions of experiencing individuals. Any meaningful notion of law 
as governing thought is hostage not only to possible differences in how two or more 
individuals experience the same phenomenon but how a single individual experiences a 
given phenomenon at different times. The laws of logic, therefore, can be nothing more 
than regularities in experience ascertained in contiguity, cause and effect, and 
resemblance, and thereby contrived and contingent.  
      Peirce’s assertion that apart from whatever else anything may be, it is also a sign 
and that ‘sign’ is the ultimate and irreducible category presages his gradual movement 
away from the language of psychology and physiology and increasing focus on the 
classification of sciences that began around 1880.67 He came at last to a clearly 
articulated position that logic and psychology have little common interest. In his 1902 
grant application to the Carnegie Institution he wrote:  
If the logician is to talk of the operations of the mind at all … he must 
mean by “mind” something quite different from the object of study of 
the psychologist … Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A 
definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought 
than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, 
part by part, during a lapse of time.68  
 
 
 66. Elizabeth Flower, “Some Interesting Connections between the Common Sense Realists and the 
Pragmatists, especially James,” in Two Centuries of Philosophy in America, ed. Peter Caws (Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), 102. 
 67. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism: Essays of Max H. Fisch, 369. 
 68. NEM 4:20. 
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Yet, little of real essence had changed for Peirce since 1865 when he had declared “Logic 
has nothing at all to do with operations of the understanding, acts of the mind, or facts of 
the intellect.”69  What Peirce was actually attempting to discriminate in both of these 
instances is thinking from thought, a distinction he made elsewhere where thinking is the 
domain of psychology and thought that of logic, i.e., semiotic. In a later manuscript 
Peirce elaborated on the distinction. 
‘Thinking’ is a fabled ‘operation of the mind’ by which an imaginary 
object is brought before one’s gaze. If that object is a Sign upon which 
an argument may turn, we call it a Thought. All that we know of the 
‘Thinking’ is that we afterwards remember that our attention was 
actively on the stretch, and that we seemed to be creating Objects of 
Transformations of Objects which noting their analogy to something 
supposed to be real, we choose to call an ‘operation of the mind’; and we 
are, of course, quite justified in doing so … The ‘operation of the mind’ 
is an ens rationalis. This is my insufficient excuse for speaking of it as 
‘fabled.’70   
 
We do not directly observe ourselves thinking. Peirce was adamant; we have no power of 
introspection. All we know of the mental processes of thinking is what we remember of 
the objects of its production. “It is a guess,” says Colapietro, “put forth as a way of 
explaining the conjuring and transformation of objects in our imaginations.”71 Thought, 
conceived in general terms, applies to the treatment of the imaginary objects produced by 
our thinking, i.e. semiosis. This basic distinction gave rise to the thesis that semiotic is 
normative while psychology is descriptive, a notion found at the heart of the taxonomy of 
sciences.  
 
 
 69. W 1:165. 
 70. MS 293, 5-6, circa 1906. Quoted in Colapietro, “C.S. Peirce’s Critique of Psychologism,” 166. 
 71. Colapietro, “Peirce’s Critique of Psychologism,” 166. 
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C.  Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences 
      As a working scientist, Peirce had a long standing interest in classification. As 
early as his first series of Lowell lectures, delivered in 1866, Peirce had produced an 
inchoate classification of the sciences.72  At least one other attempt followed in 1878.73  
Beginning in 1892, Peirce produced a succession of classifications over the next eleven 
years, continuing to refine the perennial version of 1903 until his death.74 As Beverly 
Kent indicates, there were several motivations for this work evidenced in his writings.  
      First, “philosophy ought to be deliberate and planned out.”75  Peirce believed this 
was inherent in the architectonic approach commended by Kant76 which he 
acknowledged as an inspiration to his own musings.77  Another reason for classifying the 
sciences was Peirce’s desire to provide an architectonic within which he could test his 
categories and vindicate them against critics who found them too speculative.78 By far, 
however, the overarching concern in the classification of the sciences was logic. As Kent 
points out, Peirce affirmed classification to be the business of science, especially the 
science of logic, that science closest to his heart.79 Related to this, Peirce exhibited, 
especially during the last decade of his life, a desire to situate logic within other 
theoretical pursuits and thus make clearer what exactly he meant by it and how his views 
on the subject differed from popular notions.  
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Peirce thought that recognition of the relation [logic] holds to other 
sciences would rescue it from attenuation of, worse, from absorption 
into some other discipline. He was particularly anxious to quash 
prevalent tendencies to collapse logic into mathematics, or to found it on 
psychology or on metaphysics or on one of the other disciplines that he 
identified as underlying the logical studies of his contemporaries. The 
classification would guard against the hazards of attempting to resolve 
problems of metaphysics and special sciences without thoroughly 
considering the nature of the reasoning to be used and the basis of its 
validity.80  
 
Peirce believed that a plausible classification, in which logic was thus rescued, would 
ultimately serve to clarify his pragmatism “[By permitting him] to display a given science 
in relation to other sciences in order to exhibit its conceivable effects.”81  
     Since the classification of the sciences was yet one more unfinished piece of the 
Peircean corpus, our task in this section will be limited to a few general observations 
concerning the arrangement of the most definitive version, the classification of 1903. 
Greater attention will be paid to the identification of logic as a normative science within 
this schema, and its relation, especially, to psychology.  
     Peirce’s mature classification, like many earlier versions, recognized two 
branches of science: theoretical and practical.82  Theoretical sciences, “whose purpose is 
simply and solely to recognize God’s truth,”83 were subdivided into two subbranches 
which, with the practical sciences, predictably formed a triadic schema. Under theoretical 
sciences, heuretic, or sciences of discovery, are those sciences concerned with discovery 
for its own sake, irrespective of anything else. Sciences of discovery, corresponding to 
the category of Firstness, include mathematics, philosophy, and what Peirce referred to as 
 
 80. Ibid. 
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the special sciences. Each of these sciences of discovery is, likewise, subdivided into 
groups of three. Mathematics is separated into finite collections, infinite collections, and 
continua. The three species of philosophy, alternately termed cenoscopy, are 
phenomenology, normative sciences, and metaphysics. The special sciences, often called 
idioscopy, are bifurcated into physical sciences (chemistry, physiology, anatomy, 
astronomy, geology, etc.) and psychical sciences (psychology, anthropology, linguistics, 
history, etc.). Hierarchically arranged, the class of special sciences is a subaltern of 
philosophy, i.e., idioscopy is subordinate to cenoscopy.  
     By utilizing his classification of the sciences, postulating two distinct spheres of 
observation and according philosophy a precise position in the hierarchy of sciences, 
Peirce buttressed his argument against psychologism. In so doing he distinguished 
psychical truths from psychological truths.  
We must distinguish between results which depend upon the validity of 
the scientific method of psychology – scientific discoveries – and those 
rough [psychical] facts about the mind which are open to everybody’s 
observation, and which no sane man dreams of calling into question. As 
a matter of fact, it is upon these latter facts, and upon a series of similar 
facts about the outer world, that every man actually really bases, first, 
his general metaphysics, and then his metaphysics of the soul.84  
 
Psychical observation regarding mind in general antecedes scientific inquiry into the 
mind as uniquely human. An example of such an observation is that there is such a state 
of mind as doubt.85  Psychology, under the pretense of scientific method, is inevitably 
 
 84. CN 3:49. 
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tied to “clandestine” metaphysics “lying in ambush” that skew its findings.86  One of 
Peirce’s issues with James’ Principles of Psychology involved this very point.  
Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to 
challenge the elements between which its own ‘laws’ obtain, and from 
which its deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite 
individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a 
physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) 
they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the 
discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics.87 
 
Commenting on James’ fallacy in 1901, Peirce remarked that “nobody would now 
propose, as James then did, to write a psychology altogether uninfluenced by any 
metaphysics. The point is that it has been made manifest that positive psychology cannot 
escape taking for granted a metaphysics of one kind or another in no inconsiderable 
measure.”88  Thus, the special science of psychology is subordinate to the science of 
(physical) metaphysics which, in turn, relies upon the normative science of logic for a set 
of rules concerning our experience of the physical world. By 1904, Peirce would 
conclude that “Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of the 
logician.”89  In 1906, he wrote: 
Logic, to be sure is a positive, not a mathematical science; but it makes 
no special observations, contenting itself with the ordinary experience of 
just about everybody. By psychology is meant the special science so-
called, the fruit of psychological research. Logic studies the laws under 
which signs function as such. Since all cognition consists of signs, 
psychology is in part a special application of logic [i.e. of semiotics], 
supplemented by additional facts.”90   
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     The second branch of theoretical science was comprised of the sciences of review, 
of which little is ever said,91 but by which Peirce “meant the business of those who 
occupy themselves with arranging the results of discovery, beginning with digests, and 
going on to form a philosophy of science.”92   
It is a department perfectly well recognized. It belongs by virtue of its 
purpose to the branch of Theory; yet varies enough in its purpose from 
the active science to be erected into a subbranch [sic] … Its design is to 
sum up the results of all the theoretical sciences and to study them as 
forming one system.93   
 
Kent points that “Peirce appeared to be ambivalent as to whether the process of 
classifying the sciences is the business of logic or the sciences of review.”94 
Nevertheless, it is the science of review that “systematizes conclusions arrived at by th
sciences of discovery, supplements these with its own investigations, and uses them ‘f
its own purpose’ [MS 693a.78].”95 Beyond these few statements, Peirce did not elaborate
on the sciences of review and never enumerated or further specified them by nam
apparently saw them roughly corresponding to the category of Thirdness in mediating 
somehow between theory and practice.96  
     The other general division of the sciences in 1903 was the practical sciences, 
comprising a third major grouping. Where the theoretical sciences were, in fact, viewed 
 
 91. CP 1.202, 1.243. 
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as pure science, the practical sciences were often viewed as synonymous with the arts.97  
Where the purpose of theoretical science was understood as discovery of God’s truth, the 
practical sciences are for the “uses of life”98 or to satisfy our desires. Peirce claimed to 
have identified over three hundred of these99 and included such examples as pedagogy, 
etiquette, horology, surveying, navigation, telegraphy, printing, engraving and 
deciphering.100   Productive in nature, this class of sciences (arts) relates to action and, 
thus, to Secondness.  
      What was novel in the 1903 classification and what is of special interest here, was 
the tripartition of philosophy. 
Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which 
simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its 
ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together 
perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is 
Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws 
of the relation of Phenomena to ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, 
and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to 
comprehend the Reality of the Phenomena.101   
 
The second grand division, normative science, was comprised of aesthetics, ethics, and 
logic. Together treating phenomena as seconds, each normative science relates, in turn, to 
one of the categories.  
Supposing … that normative science divides into esthetics, ethics, and 
logic, then it is easily perceived, from my standpoint, that this division is 
governed by the three categories. For Normative Science in general 
being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics 
considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feelings, 
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ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things 
whose end is to represent something.102   
 
As he noted in the letter to James, Peirce’s belief that logic was dependent upon ethics for 
the regulative principle governing right reasoning was a long time coming and yet 
fundamental to any comprehensive understanding of pragmatism. Likewise, he had come 
to understand the dependence of ethics upon aesthetics for the regulative principle of the 
good. Aesthetics provided ethics with the regulative principle of the summum bonum or 
the beautiful. This move marked a fundamental change in Peirce’s view of ethics and, as 
we shall see, his understanding of self-control. 
      Until this time Peirce’s interest in ethics had been negligible and his views rather 
dismissive. Negotiating with James for the series of lectures that were to be delivered in 
Cambridge in 1898 under the proposed title “On the Logic of Events,” Peirce was 
strongly advised by his dear friend to put aside his penchant for logic and speak on 
“matters of vital importance.” James wrote: 
I am sorry you are sticking to formal logic. I know our graduate school 
here, and so does Royce, and we both agree that there are only 3 men 
who could possibly follow your [existential] graphs and [logic of] 
relatives. Now be a good boy and think a more popular plan out. I don’t 
want the audience to dwindle to 3 or 4 …You are teaming with ideas – 
and the lectures need not by any means form a continuous whole. 
Separate topics of a vitally important character would do perfectly 
well.103  
 
Peirce responded with more than a hint of sarcasm when he wrote, “It is against my deep 
principles to represent that [tychism and synechism] or any philosophy as a matter of 
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‘vital importance,’”104 and in the fourth lecture of the series that had come to be called 
“Reasoning and the Logic of Things,” he planned to deliver the following revealing 
disclaimer.   
Since I myself am in no sense a teacher, but only a learner, and at the 
very foot of my class at that, for the reproach made against me is a just 
one that I am all the time modifying my doctrines, it is only to please 
you and not by any means myself that I have elected to address you on 
topics of vital importance. To me no subject could possibly be more 
distasteful. For I know nothing about matters of vital importance. All I 
think I know concerns things which I hope may prove of subsidiary 
importance. As to topics of vital importance I have nothing to inculcate 
but sentiments. True, I am a sentimentalist in theory. I believe sentiment 
is far more deeply important than science. But by my training I am 
nothing [but] a scientific man myself and am quite out of my element in 
talking about things vitally important. My only excuse for attempting it 
is my desire to conform to your wishes. But I find that struggle as I may 
and do, I cannot keep dry details altogether out of my lectures. For if I 
did I should have nothing to say.105 
 
Matters of vital importance, paradoxically of a very low order of importance in the total 
scheme of things,106 included ethics, a topic Peirce associated with practical matters. 
Ethical concerns seemed to Peirce most private.  
Among vitally important truths there is one which I verily believe – and 
which men of infinitely deeper insight than mine have believed – to be 
solely important. It is that vitally important facts are of all truths the 
veriest trifles. For the only vitally important matter is my concern, 
business – or yours. Now you and I – what are we? Mere cells of the 
social organism. Our deepest sentiment pronounces the verdict of our 
own insignificance.107  
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In this arena, reason is of little use. Sentiment and instinct are all we have to guide us. 
The inner conflict of moral issues often arise as crises that must be resolved in an instant 
and do not afford one the luxury of reasoned deliberation.  
     Moreover, Peirce was inclined to think that moral reasoning is dogmatic, 
impeding investigation, thus violating his great maxim: “Do not block the way of 
inquiry.”108  
It may very easily happen that the over-development of a man’s moral 
conception should interfere with his progress in philosophy. The 
protoplasm of philosophy has to be in a liquid state in order that the 
operations of metabolism may go on. Now morality is a hardening agent. 
It is astonishing how many abominable scoundrels there are among 
sincerely moral people. The difficulty is that morality chokes its own 
stream. … morality, doctrinaire conservatist that it is, destroys its own 
vitality by resisting change, and positively insisting, This is eternally 
right: That is eternally wrong. The tendency of philosophers has always 
been to make their assertions too absolute. Nothing stands more in the 
way of a comprehension of the universe and of the mind. But in morals 
this tendency acquires triple strength.109  
 
Murphey suggests that it may have been Peirce’s study of James’ pragmatism and the 
suggestion he found there that the truth is a species of the good, that provided  the 
impetus for Peirce’s reevaluation of the science of ethics and the further development of 
his theory of self-control.110  
      Whether this is so, it is clear that Peirce’s view of ethics began to change after 
1898, ethics eventually being shifted from the realm of applied or practical sciences to 
the realm of theoretical science.111 Ironically, it was James’ indifference to the reasons 
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for classifying the sciences that Peirce found especially irksome. In a 1904 letter to his 
friend he wrote: 
I know that you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing one 
science from another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to 
any progress. The standards of certainty must be different in different 
sciences, the principles to which one science appeals altogether different 
from those of the other. From the point of view of logic and methodical 
development the distinctions are of the greatest concern.”112  
 
Even more ironic, however, is the fact that Peirce’s expressed purposes in classifying the 
sciences, namely the ordering of his philosophical system and establishing the 
independence of logic from psychology within that system, also resulted in a number of 
mutually incompatible positions that impeded his progress. In the next section we will 
examine several examples that arise from Peirce’s concurrent commitment to both the 
doubt-belief theory of inquiry and his architectonic construction while exploring the 
limits of continuity in overcoming these seeming contradictions.   
 
D. Intractable Dichotomies   
       The first instance of a contradictory position arising from Peirce’s commitment to 
both the doubt-belief theory of inquiry and the architectonic attempt to establish the 
independence of logic from psychological phenomena that we will look at involves the 
distinction between and relationship of theory and practice. In the later taxonomy of the 
sciences, the normative sciences – esthetics, ethics, and logic – are classified under the 
theoretical sciences, forming the heart of coenoscopy.113  Notwithstanding Peirce’s 
evolutionary view of the sciences as having produced one another and the sciences as 
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having grown out of the useful arts,114 elsewhere he drew a sharp distinction between the 
theoretical and the practical sciences. Maryann Ayim articulates the problem as follows. 
Two mutually incompatible positions regarding the relationship between 
theoretical and practical sciences emerge from Peirce’s writing: (i) 
Theory and practice are mutually hostile and irreconcilably distinct; (ii) 
they are mutually dependent and associated in an important respect. 
Position (i) implies that the ends of theoretical as well as practical 
science are better served if a clear distinction is made between them. 
Position (ii) suggests that the ends of theoretical and practical sciences 
may sometimes be best served through an affiliation between the two 
realms.115   
 
Supporting position (i) we find such statements as the following. In each case the date of 
authorship is given in order to demonstrate that this was a view Peirce held 
contemporaneous to position (ii).  
The two masters, theory and practice, you cannot serve.116  
 
Unfortunately practice generally precedes theory, and it is the usual fate 
of mankind to get things done in some boggling way first, and find out 
afterward how they could have been done much more easily and 
perfectly.117 
 
I stand before you an Aristotelian and a scientific man, condemning with 
the whole strength of conviction the Hellenistic tendency to mingle 
Philosophy and Practice.118   
 
Pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say 
concerning practical matters.119   
 
Reason blunders so very frequently that in practical matters we must rely 
on instinct and subconscious operations of the mind, as much as 
possible, in order to succeed. Thus, in my logic there is a great gulf 
between the methods proper to practical and to theoretical questions, in 
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which latter I will not allow instinct, “natural” reason, etc. to have any 
voice at all.120  
 
Drawing such a rigid distinction, as here between theory and practice, goes very much 
against the grain of the rest of Peirce’s philosophy in which synechism is chief among the 
leading principles. Certainly this stands in stark contrast to any number of statements we 
might quote supporting position (ii) where theory and practice are essentially compatible, 
if not continuous.  
The phenomena of reasoning are, in their general features, parallel to 
those of moral conduct. For reasoning is essentially thought that is under 
self-control, just as moral conduct is conduct under self-control. Indeed, 
reasoning is a species of controlled conduct and as such necessarily 
partakes of the essential features of controlled conduct.121   
 
… the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action.122 
 
By its very nature pragmatism inexorably links theory and practice.  
All pragmatists … agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings 
of words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by 
which all the successful sciences (in which number nobody in his senses 
would include metaphysics) have reached the degrees of certainty that 
are severally proper to them today; this experimental method being itself 
nothing but a particular application of an older logical rule, “By their 
fruits ye shall know them.”123   
 
The method of science, i.e. inquiry, within which the pragmatic maxim was operative, 
was, for Peirce, a “mode of life.”124  As a means of establishing belief both as a settled 
mental state and as a disposition to act, pragmatism is, in effect, a denial of the 
dichotomy between theory and practice. However, in what Christopher Hookway calls 
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the “no belief thesis,” Peirce declares in 1898 that “there is … no proposition at all in 
science which answers to the conception of belief.”125  Peirce’s post-1900 writings on the 
normative sciences clearly indicate a connection between right feeling (aesthetics), right 
conduct (ethics) and right thinking (logic).126  Yet in the selected passages, some of them 
from the same period, we find Peirce establishing the “great gulf” between theory and 
practice.  
    In an attempt at explanation, Rulon Wells observed: 
 
To admit [this gulf], as to admit any gulf, is to go against the maxim of 
synechism. But sometimes this must be done. And if we look for the 
reasons for admitting this gulf, we will find one which is ineluctable. 
Theory is concerned with the long run; practice, with the short run. The 
gulf between them rests on the gulf between the long run and the short 
run, that is, between the whole infinite future and what will happen some 
finite time from now. But no gulf is more unbridgeable than the gulf 
between the infinite and the finite.127  
 
The difference between the short and long term is reflected in the distinction between 
“matters of vital importance” and “useless things.” As we have noted, the former is 
associated with the critical and the immediate where sentiment and instinct are surer 
guides than reason. “True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the 
useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific Men.”128  Truth, as the end of 
science, is, for Peirce, idealized and, thus, associated with both the long run and, as we 
will see in chapter seven, the community of inquirers. In 1911, Peirce declared “I call 
‘truth’ the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which would 
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ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular 
direction.”129  This merely echoed his proclamation of 1878 that “The opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth.”130   
      The mutually opposed statements within Peirce’s work that arise from 
contradictory commitments to the doubt/belief theory of inquiry and the architectonic 
treatment of the sciences are not easily overcome. Locating a mediating principle 
between theory and practice within the architectonic is more easily achieved. We will 
briefly examine four that have been suggested. 
     Maryann Ayim finds herself incredulous, noting that “All the underlying tenets of 
Peirce’s philosophy cry out against the type of rigid distinction [Peirce] tried to draw 
between theory and practice.”131 Chief among those underlying tenets is continuity, “the 
leading conception of science”132 and “the master key which … unlocks the arcana of 
philosophy.”133  As we noted above, it is Ayim’s conjecture that Peirce viewed the 
sciences of review as an intermediary classification that would interrelate the conclusions 
of the theoretical and practical sciences, and provide what she calls a “buffer zone” 
between theory and practice. “This threefold division of sciences into purely theoretical, 
purely practical, and intermediate is perfectly accommodated by Peirce’s broad 
classification of the sciences; it is in fact perfectly consistent with every other major 
theme of Peirce’s philosophy, such as his pragmatism, his evolutionary metaphysics, and 
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his categories.”134 The problem, as we have seen, is that Peirce did not elaborate on the 
sciences of review, never enumerated them and remained ambivalent as to what he 
wished them to do; he called for, but predictably never finished, a complete appraisal of 
the sciences of review.135   
     David Savan locates the mediating principle in sentiment. He reminds us that, for 
Peirce, scientific method evolved from a context of instinct, feeling, belief and action, 
that theoretical inquiry developed from our basic needs and feelings associated with 
feeding, breeding and security and that its hypotheses can be, and often are, drawn from 
sentiment and instinct.136 Scientific findings, while removed from matters of vital 
importance, must be justified by sentiments which embody moral and social objectives 
that transcend independent private feeling and personal practical imperatives.137 For 
Peirce, scientific inquiry is communal in nature, guided and measured by sentiments, 
which are social as well as logical. Peirce proclaimed in 1868, “He who would not 
sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his 
inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle.”138  Thus the guiding 
principles of the scientist are three logical sentiments Peirce loosely associates with 
Christian principles, and which are used, as we will see in the last chapter, to fix emotion.  
It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, 
interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this 
interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of 
intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet, when 
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we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, 
which, as it terminates in action, must begin in emotion, and that 
furthermore, the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that 
other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse, 
why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in 
reasoning? As for the other two sentiments which I find necessary, they 
are so only as supports and accessories of that. It interests me to notice 
that these three sentiments seem pretty much the same as that famous 
trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, which, in the estimation of St. Paul, are 
the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts.139   
 
Savan accepts that Peirce clearly opposed theory and practice. However, he holds that 
“theory and practice may be interdependent and inseparable, like two close friends, 
without being intrinsically connected.”140  While “theoretical thinking requires the 
subordination of short-term personal and social goals to a succession which is potentially 
infinite,”141 theory is subordinated, at least in the short run, to emotional signs that are 
viewed as distinct from the objectives of vital personal importance associated with 
practice.  Thus, for Savan, theory, practice and emotion form a triadic relationship in 
Peirce’s writings. We will return to this notion in chapter seven. 
      Larry Hickman sees Peirce (and, especially, Dewey) subordinating both theory 
and practice to the idea of production.142 “Habits are associated with control and control 
is linked with products and production.”143  “The whole function of thought is to produce 
habits of action.”144  Viewed on the spectrum of what Hickman terms the cognitivist-
praxicalist struggle where, on the one hand, theory is dominant and on the other hand, 
practice is dominant, Peirce and Dewey argued that both positions are defective because 
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both are incomplete. Hickman traces their respective (though by no means congruent) 
positions to an understanding of production or making derived from the Greek poietike. 
He links this notion in Peirce to the continuum grades of self-control145 and the 
associated acquirement of habit,146 whether it be at the lower ends of the spectr
unconscious behavior of a crystal’s formation or, at higher levels, in the instinctive social 
behavior of bees and ants, the trained behavior and elementary sign usage of certain 
mammals, or at the level of human animals where control becomes truly self-control and 
habits are the products of sign manipulation, i.e., control over signs in their role as signs, 
as in the case of language.147  The problem with Hickman’s thesis is that Peirce, unlike 
Dewey, doesn’t seem to have made much of a distinction between production and action 
and there are only three references to poietai in the Collected Papers, one in reference to 
category production, another to the production of mathematical hypotheses, and the third 
to hallucinations.  
      The notion of self-control that both Savan and Hickman incorporate into their 
arguments provides another synechistic strategy.  Bernstein affirms that “The concept of 
self-controlled conduct provides the mediating link between the traditional dichotomies 
of theory and practice, thought and action.”148  We might add that Peirce’s development 
of the theory of self-control suggests a role in mediating other dichotomies that we will 
shortly explore.  
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      The next instance of a contradictory position arising from Peirce’s competing 
allegiances to the doubt/belief theory of inquiry and the architectonic structure of his 
classification of the sciences is that which we find between reason and sentiment. Savan 
briefly touched on this dichotomy in reference to the logical sentiments and the genesis of 
the scientific method. Much of this matter will be treated in depth in the next chapter. It 
is, however, important to remember that Peirce often used the terms ‘sentiment’ and 
‘instinct’ interchangeably, especially when making reference to the social instincts of 
humans. Ayim notes, “Peirce divided instincts into two major types (CP 7.378): (a) social 
– which have evolved into reason and have been instrumental in the development of the 
theoretical sciences (CP 7.384); and (b) selfish – which have retained the characteristics 
popularly associated with instinct and have been instrumental in the development of the 
practical sciences (CP 7.383, 1.75).”149 This synonymy will be explored in the next 
chapter. Peirce was also inclined to equate habit and instinct.  
If I may be allowed to use the word “habit” without any implication as 
to the time or manner in which it took birth, so as to be equivalent to the 
corrected phrase “habit or disposition,” that is, as some general principle 
working in a man’s nature to determine how he will act, then an instinct, 
in the proper sense of the word, is an inherited habit, or in more accurate 
language, an inherited disposition. But since it is difficult to make sure 
whether a habit is inherited or is due to infantile training and tradition, I 
shall ask leave to employ the word “instinct” to cover both cases.150   
 
     Peirce often saw sentiment and reason as continuous, his fairly consistent 
association of reason with theory and instinct with practice, notwithstanding. Just six 
months before his death, Peirce expressed his views. 
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I use the word instinct in the precise sense of an animal’s faculty of 
acting (whether physically or psychically) in a reasonable (or better “an 
adaptive”) manner when the animal (human or other) would be unable 
by reasoning to reach the requisite conclusion. It follows that, adopting 
this definition, I must admit that all reasoning ultimately reposes on 
“instinct.” That is to say, it rests on a rule of logic which could not be 
reached by reasoning without a petitio principii, or its equivalent.151  
 
This professed continuity is, however, complicated by Peirce’s insistence that reason and 
sentiment are quite distinct faculties with vastly different purposes. 
I would not allow to sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in 
theoretical matters, not the slightest. Right sentiment does not demand 
any such weight; and right reason would emphatically repudiate the 
claim if it were made. True, we are driven oftentimes in science to try 
the suggestions of instinct; but we only try them, we compare them with 
experience, we hold ourselves ready to throw them overboard at a 
moment’s notice from experience. If I allow the supremacy of sentiment 
in human affairs, I do so at the dictation of reason itself; and equally at 
the dictation of sentiment, in theoretical matters I refuse to allow 
sentiment any weight whatever.152  
 
When it comes to practical affairs, however, we find that “instinct seldom errs, while 
reason goes wrong nearly half the time, if not more frequently.”153 He used the example 
of incest to demonstrate our heavier reliance on instinct in matters of morality. 
Biology will doubtless testify that the practice [of incest] is inadvisable; 
but surely nothing that it has to say could warrant the intensity of our 
sentiment about it. When, however, we consider the thrill of horror 
which the idea excites in us, we find reason in that to consider it to be an 
instinct; and from that we may infer that if some rationalistic brother and 
sister were to marry, they would find that the conviction of horrible guilt 
could not be shaken off.154  
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In the end, instinct is viewed as essential to both theory and practice. In a collection of 
manuscript pages from 1902-05, Peirce concluded that “we cannot even reason except at 
the suggestion of instinct.”155   
      The segregation of theory and practice might be enough to explain, at least in part, 
the distinct purposes of reason and sentiment were it not for the fact that by 1903 Peirce 
had come to firmly ensconce the normative sciences within the realm of theoretical 
science and to recognize the dependence of right thinking upon right conduct and right 
conduct upon right feeling. 
If we judge our norm of right reason to be satisfied, we get a feeling of 
approval, and the inference now not only appears as irresistible as it did 
before, but it will prove far more unshakable by any doubt. You see at 
once that we have here all the main elements of moral conduct; the 
general standard mentally conceived beforehand, the efficient agency in 
the inward nature, the act, the subsequent comparison of the act with the 
standard. Examining the phenomena more closely we shall find that not 
a single element of moral conduct is unrepresented in reasoning.156  
 
     Further abetting the ambiguity is the introduction of what Peirce termed il lume 
naturale, the faculty that makes possible abductive inference,157 is akin to common 
sense,158 and is instinctive in nature.159  According to this notion, “science is nothing but 
a development of our natural instincts.”160  The idea of lumen naturale – or, to adopt 
Peirce’s usage, il lume naturale – is premised on the assumed reasonableness of nature 
and that mind, as both part and product of nature, enjoys an affinity with the logic of the 
natural order. “Unless man have [sic] a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he has 
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no chance of understanding nature at all.”161  This natural insight is observable in the 
propensity of the scientist to arrive at the correct hypothesis from the nearly infinite realm 
of possibilities.  
Thus it is that, our minds having been formed under the influence of 
phenomena governed by the laws of mechanics, certain conceptions 
entering into those laws become implanted in our minds, so that we 
readily guess at what the laws are. Without such a natural prompting, 
having to search blindfold [sic] for a law which would suit the 
phenomena, our chance of finding it would be as one to infinity.162  
 
Finally, this capacity to guess correctly is not only observable but testable. This is  
 
because il lume naturale is a rational instinct, as distinguished from both animal instincts 
such as the migration of birds or the hive building of bees and vegetative instincts such as 
the habit of plants to grow toward sunlight.163   “Abductive inference is an act of insight” 
[i.e. il lume naturale].164  “[It] is the provisional adoption of a hypothesis, because every 
possible consequence of it is capable of experimental verification, so that the persevering 
application of the same method may be expected to reveal its disagreement with facts, if 
it does so disagree.”165  Clearly, Peirce has not abandoned the scientific method by 
referencing the capacity humans have for guessing correctly. “The tendency to guess 
nearly right is itself the result of a similar experimental procedure.”166  There is a rational 
aspect of il lume naturale. Reason and sentiment complement each other however this 
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may conflict with Peirce’s position that sentiment and instinct have no weight in 
theoretical matters.167   
        Peirce continually reminded us that “instinct and sentiment are formed by 
unconscious mental processes which parallel their more voluntary and disciplined 
counterparts.”168 Thus we come to the third of the dichotomies we will examine in this 
section, that which stands between conscious and unconscious inference. Two claims, 
both from after 1902, illustrate the conflict. 
So the synechist will not believe that some things are conscious and 
some unconscious, unless by consciousness be meant a certain grade of 
feeling.169  
 
The term “reasoning” ought to be confined to such fixation of one belief 
by another as is reasonable, deliberate, self-controlled. A reasoning must 
be conscious; and this consciousness is not mere “immediate 
consciousness,” which (as I argued in 1868) is simple Feeling viewed 
from another side, but is in its ultimate nature (meaning in that 
characteristic element of it that is not reducible to anything simpler), a 
taking of a habit, or disposition to respond to a given stimulus in a given 
kind of way.”170   
  
     As we’ve seen, Peirce sometimes spoke of instinct as “half-conscious 
inference”171 and of “a natural instinct for right reasoning,”172 an innate theory of logic 
that he sometimes referred to as logica utens.173  Peirce also spoke of uncontrolled 
inference. 
All inferences are really performed under the influence of the law of 
association. But all psychical actions divide into two great classes, those 
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and Phenomenological Research 42 (Sept. 1981): 88. 
 169. CP 1.173. 
 170. CP 5.440. 
 171. CP 6.570. 
 172. CP 2.3. 
 173. CP 2.186. 
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which are performed under the uncontrolled governance of association 
and those in which by the “agency” of consciousness, whatever that may 
mean, the actions come under self-criticism and self-control. The latter 
class of actions may be pronounced good or bad; the former could not be 
otherwise than they were. Uncontrolled inference from contiguity, or 
experiential connection, is the most rudimentary of all reasoning.174  
 
As in the case of the dichotomous distinction between theory and practice, Peirce appears 
in the second passage to be establishing an unbridgeable gap between controlled and 
uncontrolled inferences that again, like any gulf, stands in opposition to the principle of 
synechism. As we’ve also seen, there is considerable vagueness in Peirce’s understanding 
of consciousness as linked to a certain grade of feeling.175  As he indicated in CP 6.133, 
all protoplasm, even an amoeba or slime-mould, is capable of feeling and can thus be 
spoken of as possessing consciousness, if not personality. Yet there are passages where 
Peirce claims that there are “inhibitions and coördinations that entirely escape 
consciousness.176   
     Peirce is guilty of having set up yet one more dualism in opposition to his 
synechism. If, as Peirce claims, reasoning is a species of deliberate, controlled action, 
then it follows that any conduct, including mental action that is not distinctly conscious, 
such as instincts and percepts, is beyond control. If it is beyond control, then it is beyond 
criticism.  
Reasoning is deliberate, voluntary, critical, controlled, all of which it can 
only be if it is done consciously. An unconscious act is involuntary: an 
involuntary act is not deliberate nor subject to criticism in the sense of 
approval or blame. A performance which cannot be called good or bad 
differs most essentially from reasoning.177 
 
 174. CP 7.444-445. 
 175. CP 6.173. 
 176. CP 5.533. 
 177. CP 2.182. 
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As Wells observed, “Behavior that is unconscious, and largely innate [i.e. instinct], thus 
falls outside the scope of normative science.”178 As such, it would fall outside the bounds 
of pragmatism. Before declaring Peirce hopelessly self-conflicted, we will briefly return 
to his theory of self-controlled conduct as a possible strategy for mediating these 
dichotomies.  
 
E. Self-Control as a Synechistic Strategy 
    Given the gulf that Peirce allows to stand between theory and practice and 
between the conscious and the unconscious in opposition to the theory of continuity, one 
is naturally directed to seek out a seamless, mediating principle. Self-control presents 
itself as a candidate, inasmuch as it is, for Peirce, the woof and warp of pragmatism. 
Now the theory of Pragmaticism was originally based, as anybody will 
see who examines the papers of November 1877 and January 1878, upon 
a study of that experience of the phenomena of self-control which is 
common to all grown men and women; and it seems evident that to some 
extent, at least, it must always be so based. For it is to conceptions of 
deliberate conduct that Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport 
of symbols; and deliberate conduct is self-controlled conduct. Now 
control may itself be controlled, criticism itself subjected to criticism; 
and ideally there is no obvious definite limit to the sequence. But if one 
seriously inquires whether it is possible that a completed series of actual 
efforts should have been endless or beginningless … I think he can only 
conclude that … this must be impossible. It will be found to follow that 
there are, besides perceptual judgments, original (i.e. indubitable 
because uncriticized) beliefs of a general and recurrent kind, as well as 
indubitable acritical inferences.179  
 
     At one end of the spectrum of self-control stands the fully developed human 
being. 
                                            
 178. Rulon S. Wells, “Thirdness and Linguistics,” in The Signifying Animal, eds. Imenegard 
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 179. CP 5.442. 
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Man comes from the womb in actuality an animal little higher than a 
fish; by no means as high as a serpent. His humanity consists in his 
destination. He becomes not actual man until he acquires self-control 
and then he is so in the measure of his self-control … Man’s existence 
qua man … consists solely in his growing to act from rational self-
control.180   
 
Besides defining human existence, the assumption of rational self-control is what 
explains the continuity between our thoughts and our actions. Pragmatism rests on a 
series of hypothetical propositions, what Peirce referred to as “would-bes,” which as 
Petry explains rest upon another assumption.  
On the antecedent side [of the conditional proposition] there are rules for 
behavior including rules pertaining to our thoughts and conduct in 
relation to an object. On the consequent side there are hypotheses about 
the laws governing the behavior of objects under the conditions resulting 
from our behavior. This method suggests that reasoning is subject to 
self-control. It only makes sense to propose conditional propositions if it 
is in our power to either make changes or to hold to a course of thought 
and action which will bear fruit in the future. Some habit of personal 
development and continuity is necessary if future thoughts and conduct 
are to be either similar to those of the present or, more importantly for 
Peirce, the product of a deliberate, conscious and teleological growth.181   
 
At the other end of the scale we begin, as Peirce suggested, fish-like, with “the inhibitions 
and coördinations that entirely escape consciousness.”182       
      While at Johns Hopkins in the early 1880s, Peirce joined his student, the 
psychologist Joseph Jastrow, in a series of experiments in which they hoped to show that 
very slight, imperceptible differences in sensation might influence judgment. Peirce 
recorded their results in a paper for the National Academy of Sciences entitled, “Small 
 
 180. MS 330. Quoted by Larry Holmes, “Peirce on Self-control, Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society 2 (Fall 1966): 113. 
 181. Edward S. Petry, Jr., “Peirce’s Concept of Self-Control,” Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society 28 (Fall 1992): 683. 
 182. CP 5.533. 
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Differences in Sensations.”183  The experiments were deemed successful and one result 
was that Peirce ever after was convinced of the importance of unconscious mental 
processes.184  This conclusion was supported in Peirce’s review of James’ Principles of 
Psychology, written for The Nation.185  Murphey summarizes the lengthy argument of 
that article.  
 In 1891 Peirce wrote a review of James’ work in which he considered 
particularly the question, “Is Perception Unconscious Inference?,” and 
vigorously defended the thesis that it is. The distinction between  
“conscious” and “unconscious” inference, Peirce argues, is that between 
inferences recognized as being inferences and inferences not so 
recognized. He then seeks to show how perception, and association in 
general, are inferential and do conform to the forms of valid ampliative 
reasoning. Thus Peirce holds that all unconscious mental processes 
conform to the patterns of logic.186   
 
While such inferences are beyond control and thus criticism, it was Peirce’s firm belief 
that they do, in fact, affect our judgments.  
     We haven’t time to closely examine Peirce’s views of perception. His views of 
perception are, to say the least, obscure. Bernstein acknowledged that “If we collected all 
of Peirce’s statements concerning percepts, we would find not only conflicting 
approaches but explicit contradictions.”187 He then goes on juxtapose two sets of remarks 
Peirce made on the subject during the years 1902-05 that are contradictory, some of 
which are included below.  Sandra Rosenthal concurs with Bernstein, that “a cursory 
reading of Peirce seems to indicate that what he says about perception is both incomplete 
 
 183. CP 7.21-35. 
 184. Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 360. 
 185. CP 8.64f. 
 186. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy, 360 
 187. Richard J. Bernstein, “Peirce’s Theory of Perception,” in Studies of the Philosophy of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, 2nd Series, eds. Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin (Amherst: The University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 174. 
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and inconsistent.”188  What are of interest to us, however, are a few remarks that Peirce 
made that indicate, as Murphey suggests, that percepts and perceptual judgments have, 
like other unconscious mental processes, some common features.  
     While there is a record of Peirce maintaining the position that “a percept contains 
only two kinds of elements, those of firstness and those of secondness,”189 and that “the 
percept is a single event happening hic et nunc [that] it cannot be generalized without 
losing its essential character,”190 there are also indications that he saw percepts and, more 
precisely, perceptual judgments as not only the products of mental processes but 
containing elements of generality.  
Notwithstanding its apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product 
of mental processes, or at all events of processes for all intents and 
purposes mental.191   
 
The science of psychology assures me that the very percepts were 
mental constructions, not the first impressions of sense.192   
 
No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept.193  
  
While percepts or perceptual judgments – all we know of the percept apart from the blow 
of it, the first judgment of a person as to what is before his senses194 – are not, strictly 
speaking, part of the controlled, cognitive process, they are, more broadly, involved in 
 
 188. Sandra Rosenthal, “Peirce’s Pragmatic Account of Perception,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Peirce, ed. Cheryl Misak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 193. 
 189. CP 7.630. 
 190. CP 2.146. 
191. CP 7.624. 
 192. CP 2.141. 
 193. CP 4.542. 
 194. CP 7.643, 5.115. 
 
242 
                                           
mental processes and nevertheless contribute to the process of rational, self-controlled 
thought.195  
     Peirce made much of the distinction between uncontrolled mental processes and 
inferences that come under self-criticism and self-control, the distinction resting on the 
question of consciousness.  
Such [unconscious] inferences are beyond the jurisdiction of criticism. It 
is the part of psychology to explain as it can, as long as they are out of 
the focal plane of consciousness, they are out of our control; and to call 
them good or bad were idle. The ordinary business of life is, however, 
best conducted without too much self-criticism.      
 Quite otherwise is it with the actions which carry out our grander 
purposes. Here all must be voluntary, thoroughly conscious, based on 
critical reflection. Logic is wanted here, to pull inferences to pieces, to 
show whether they be sound or not, to advise how they may be 
strengthened, to consider by what methods they ought to proceed.196   
 
While perception is itself unconscious, beyond criticism, and thus does not fall under the 
scrutiny of normative behavior, nevertheless inquiry begins when percepts are forced 
upon us and is continuous with perceptual judgment through minutely incremental grades 
of increasing self-control.197  Percepts or perceptual judgment is the data of all 
knowledge.198  
     As we’ve seen, Peirce believed the general elements of perceptual judgments to 
be the second cotary proposition of pragmatism. To demonstrate, Peirce pointed to a 
drawing that he borrowed from his father.199  It can be experienced as a serpentine line or 
 
 195. For Peirce’s understanding of the complex relationship between the percept, the perceptual 
judgment and what he terms the “percipuum”, i.e., that which the percept and the perceptual judgment form 
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a wall but not as a dog or a seascape.200  This drawing demonstrates the phenomenon of 
similar well known figures. Larry Hickman agrees with Peirce’s interpretation. 
Looking at a “duck-rabbit” or “face-vase,” it is as if the perceiver gets 
“tired” or “bored” with seeing it one way, then switches ground and 
figure or sees the figure as rotated. Once this is done, such switching 
may be a matter of control … We can literally choose one percept over 
another.201  
 
Peirce concluded that  
In all such visual illusions of which two or three dozen are well known, 
the most striking thing is that a certain theory of interpretation of the 
figure has all the appearance of being given in perception. The first time 
it is shown to us, it seems as completely beyond the control of rational 
criticism as any percept is; but after many repetitions of the now familiar 
experiment, the illusion wears off, becoming first less decided, and 
ultimately ceasing completely. This shows that these phenomena are 
connecting links between abductions and perceptions. If the percept or 
perceptual judgment were of a nature entirely unrelated to abduction, 
one would expect that the percept would be entirely free from any 
characters that are proper to interpretations.202  
 
 In fact, “unless generality is given in perception it can never be known at all.”203 
Without the continuity of perception and conception, uncontrolled mental processes a
self-regulated inferences, Peirce cannot argue, as he does, that Generality, Thirdness, 
pours in upon us in our very perceptual judgments, and that all reasoning … turns u
 
 200. Patricia Ann Turrisi, “Commentary,” in Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle 
and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (Albany, SUNY Press, 1997), 
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the perception of generality and continuity at every step204  He cannot hold to his claim 
that there is Thirdness in experience,205 and that the universe is perfused with signs.
       Peirce’s line between operations of the mind that can be controlled and those that 
cannot is not, as Bernstein points out, particularly sharp, no sharper for instance than the 
line marking off the conscious from the unconscious. Peirce, for instance, contended that 
stimulating the nerves in the hind leg of a decapitated frog produces something very close 
to, if not in fact actual, reasoning.  
A decapitated frog almost reasons. The habit that is in his cerebellum 
serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a drop of acid is his minor 
premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping it away. All that is of 
any value in the operation of ratiocination is there, except only one 
thing. What he lacks is the power of preparatory mediation.207   
 
Nevertheless, those mental operations that do not rise to the level of consciousness 
(including percepts and perceptual judgments) and are generally beyond control and 
criticism, lie outside the bounds of normativity and that, for Peirce, is the critical 
distinction. 
Man … cannot really infer without having a notion of a class of possible 
inferences, all of which are logically good. That distinction of good and 
bad he always has in mind when he infers. Logic proper is the critic of 
arguments, the pronouncing them to be good or bad. There are, as I am 
prepared to maintain, operations of the mind which are logically exactly 
analogous to inferences excepting only that they are unconscious and 
therefore uncontrollable and therefore not subject to criticism. But that 
makes all the difference in the world; for inference is essentially 
deliberate, and self-controlled.208 
 
 
 204. CP 5.160. 
 205. Ibid. 
 206. CP 4.539. 
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This leads back to Wells’ concern regarding behavior outside the bounds of normative 
science. Self-controlled thought is a species of purposive action that is directed toward 
ends provided by the normative sciences. If, as Peirce claimed in 1903, the original 
wording of the pragmatic maxim, while admittedly awkward, was carefully crafted to 
show that he was “speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of intellectual 
purport” and to “avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to explain a concept 
by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but concepts,”209  then we are forced to 
conclude that the notion of unconscious inference is without real meaning. What follows 
is the serious question of whether Peirce’s theory of signs can be considered truly 
general. One is reminded of Peirce’s ongoing struggle to establish the reality of 
Thirdness. “Among the linguistic devices used by Peirce to carry his readers with him to 
the higher reaches of generality, and perhaps to assist his own ascent, were ‘almost,’ ‘all 
but,’ ‘virtual,’ and above all, ‘quasi-,’ as in ‘quasi-sign’ [CP 5.473], ‘quasi-mind’ [CP 
7.669], ‘quasi-utterer’ [CP 4.551], ‘quasi-interpreter’ [CP 4.551],” and we might add, 
‘quasi-inference’ from percepts [CP 8.149].”210  
     Wells suggests that Peirce’s system might easily be emended in a way that would 
remove the restriction of inference to deliberate self-controlled conduct and “enlarge its 
scope, but that would hardly support claims of adequacy and fruitfulness.”211 Such an 
emendation would, however, put aside the question Peirce struggled to answer: “Where 
… in the process of cognition does the possibility of controlling it begin?”212  It is this 
 
 209. CP 5.402n3. 
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 211. Wells, “Thirdness and Linguistics,” 197. 
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broader notion of cognition that Colapietro holds is key and extends self-control beyond 
the strictures of consciousness and deliberation.  
Reasoning in the strict sense is the essential, though not exclusive 
operation of the rational mind. Now, the rational mind is a species of the 
cognitive mind, its specific difference being … the capacity to exert self-
control over some of its inferences … We might say that the decapitated 
frog that responds to external stimuli thereby manifests a cognitive, but 
not a rational, mind. Recall that, for Peirce, inference is essentially an 
interpretation of signs. Any agent capable of engaging in acts of 
interpretation (be these instinctual or learned, automatic or autonomous) 
possesses by virtue of this capacity, a cognitive mind. As we have seen, 
a rational mind is simply a cognitive mind that is capable of controlling 
some of its acts of inference and, as a result of this capacity, capable of 
controlling the formation of some of its habits.213    
 
Certainly such a view is hinted at by Peirce’s grades of self-control that range from those 
that “entirely escape consciousness” to the controlling of control by human agents, a 
capacity requiring the disposition toward moral rule that alone is provided by normative 
science.214  After declaring categorically that “reasoning must be conscious,” Peirce 
concluded that “the secret of rational consciousness is not so much to be sought in the 
study of this one peculiar nucleolus, as in the review of the process of self-control in its 
entirety.”215  Unfortunately, as in so many other instances, he never completed this 
review.  
 
213. Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self, 110. 
 214. CP 5.533. 
 215. CP 5.440. 
 
247 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Instinct, Emotion and Sentiment as Indispensable to Reason 
 
All human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, 
is but the development of our inborn animal instincts.  
--Peirce, Collected Papers 
 
A. The Evolution of a Philosophical Role for Instinct 
       The effect of Darwinism on the development of American philosophy in the 
second half of the nineteenth century was, to state the obvious, revolutionary. Charles 
Darwin’s theory suggested that the mind and its contents, no less than the living things it 
perceived, was integral to nature and a product of the process of natural selection. This 
idea profoundly affected Peirce and the pragmatists, as Max Fisch points out.   
The crux of the theory of biological evolution was of course man, and 
the difficulty was not so much that of finding the links between the 
human organism and those of lower animals, as it was that of finding the 
links between animal instinct and human reason. Darwin made a 
beginning in those chapters of his Descent of Man devoted to 
comparison of the mental powers of man with those of lower animals, 
and to the development of the intellectual and moral faculties during 
primeval and civilized times. The naturalization of the human mind there 
begun was continued by the pragmatists.1  
 
      Writing in 1873, following a trip to England, where he had visited Darwin, 
Chauncey Wright, an original member of the Metaphysical Club, suggested that 
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evolutionary theory was buttressed because it demonstrated that the historical distinction 
between instinct and intelligence was vague and artificial.  
For the distinction of instinct and intelligence, though not less real and 
important in the classification of actions in psycho-zoology, and as 
important even as that of animal and vegetable is in general zoölogy, or 
the distinctions of organic and inorganic, living and dead, in the general 
science of life, is yet, like these, in its applications a vague and ill-
defined distinction … Under the naturalist’s point of view, the contrasts 
of dead and living matters, inorganic and organic products, vegetable 
and animal forms and functions, automatic and sentient movements, 
instinctive and intelligent motives and actions, are severally rough 
divisions of series, which are clearly enough contrasted in their 
extremities, but ill defined at their points of division.2  
 
Peirce was among the first to affirm this vagueness in appropriating a philosophical role 
for instinct in his account of the development of mind and its continuity with nature. As 
he was fond of reminding his readers, the capacity of reason in humans reflects the 
mind’s affinity with nature and its continuity with the instincts of so-called lower 
animals.   
you cannot seriously think that every little chicken, that is hatched, has 
to rummage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good 
idea of picking up something and eating it. On the contrary, you think 
the chicken has an innate idea of doing this … The chicken you say 
pecks by instinct. But if you are going to think every poor chicken 
endowed with an innate tendency toward a positive truth, why should 
you think that to man alone this gift is denied? … It is somehow more 
than a mere figure of speech to say that nature fecundates the mind of 
man with ideas which, when those ideas grow up, will resemble their 
father, Nature.3  
 
Peirce often distinguished reasoning from instinct by claiming that reasoning differs from 
instinct only in being less reliable. 
 
 2. Charles Eliot Norton, Philosophical Discussions by Chauncey Wright with a Biographical 
Sketch of the Author (1877, repr., New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), 219-220. 
 3. CP 5.591. 
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Every race of animals is provided with instincts well adapted to its 
needs, and especially to strengthening the stock. It is wonderful how 
unerring these instincts are. Man is no exception in this respect; but man 
is so continually getting himself into novel situations that he needs, and 
is supplied with, a subsidiary faculty of reasoning for bringing instinct 
to bear upon situations to which it does not directly apply. This faculty is 
a very imperfect one in respect to fallibility.4  
 
     Wright and Peirce were in agreement that the use of signs and symbols  
constitutes thought and explained the continuity of human intellectual evolution.5 Peirce 
wrote in the late autumn of 1913, just months before his death, that “[t]he word instinct 
itself is but a generalization of abstractions, one of the brood of language or of thought: 
there is no great difference between the two …”6  As we have seen, Peirce was convinced 
that the so-called lower animals were also capable of sign usage and believed that they 
use language and exercise some minimal level of control over it.7  Evolution provided a 
framework for developing the continuity between instinct and intelligence. For Peirce, it 
is a force governing the machinations of mind, no less than organic species.8  Natural 
selection extends to the habits of mind, the good or useful being approved and retained, 
the bad or errant being eliminated.9  Thus the species adapts, becoming more reasonable. 
     Peirce, however, took this all even one step further like so many of his generation, 
extending it far beyond the scope of biological organisms, to which Darwin  
 
 4. CP 6.497. 
 5. Philip Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1949), 89. 
 6. MS 682, EP 2:473. 
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had confined it, and thus transmuting Darwinism into philosophy.10 To Peirce’s mind, 
evolution also provided a means for solving the riddle of the universe, of bringing science 
and cosmology together. His entry for “Pragmatic and Pragmatism” in Baldwin’s 
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology provided a snapshot of his vision.  
Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the 
evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions 
in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism 
is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, 
the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general 
ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of 
reasonableness. This is first shown to be true with mathematical 
exactitude in the field of logic, and is thence inferred to hold good 
metaphysically. It is not opposed to pragmatism in the manner in which 
C.S. Peirce applied it, but includes that procedure as a step.11 
 
The idea dazzled and consumed him and Peirce spent most of the balance of his life 
employing it in an ultimately unfulfilled endeavor to erect a system of philosophy as 
comprehensive as that of Aristotle.12  
     Darwin provided a muse. In 1884, in a lecture on how the laws of nature might 
have evolved from pure chance, delivered to the Metaphysical Club at Johns Hopkins, he 
proclaimed “Indeed, my opinion is only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, and brought 
into the realm of Ontology.”13 He believed that he was able to statistically generalize 
chance variation occurring in natural selection and account for the phenomenon of pure 
chance throughout the universe.  
 
 10. See Rulon S. Wells, “The True Nature of Peirce’s Evolutionism,” in Studies in the Philosophy 
of Charles S. Peirce, 2nd series (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 304-322, where Wells 
charges Peirce with a methodological schizophrenia, in which he oscillates between the treatment of 
Darwinism as a testable scientific theory and as a philosophy. 
 11. CP 5.4. 
 12. CP 1.1. 
 13. EP 1:222. 
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Explicability has no determinate & absolute limit. Everything being 
explicable, everything has been brought about; and consequently 
everything is subject to change and subject to chance. Now everything 
that can happen by chance, sometime or other will happen by chance. 
Chance will sometime bring about a change in every condition … 
Chance is indeterminancy, is freedom. But the action of freedom issues 
in the strictest rule of law.14 
 
Changes wrought by the operations of chance were, for Peirce, “founded upon the 
mathematical view of probabilities and the theory of the adaptation of the mind to the 
universe.”15 He often pointed to the example of the operations of chance at the gaming 
table.  
Thus, if a million players sit down to bet at an even game, since one 
after another will get ruined, the average wealth of those who remain 
will perpetually increase. Here is indubitably a genuine formula of 
possible evolution, whether its operation accounts for much or little in 
the development of animal and vegetable species.16  
 
Peirce saw three elements – chance, law and the tendency toward habit formation – as 
isomorphic with his three categories.17 He enlarged Darwin’s theory that the law of 
heredity is subject to chance variation to include the metaphysical assertion that it is the 
interplay of chance and law that produces habit-taking.  
conformity to law exists only within a limited range of events and even 
there is not perfect, for an element of pure spontaneity or lawless 
originality mingles, or at least, must be supposed to mingle, with law 
everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a fact requiring to be 
explained; and since Law in general cannot be explained by any law in 
particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is 
developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminancy …Tell us 
how the laws of nature came about, and we may distinguish in some 
 
 14. W 4:549, 552. 
 15. Charles Sanders Peirce, Johns Hopkins Circulars 1 (May 1881), 150, quoted by Wiener in 
Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, 82. 
 16. CP 6.15; see also CP 1.396 where Peirce provides the actual calculations for this game of 
chance.  
 17. CP 1.409. See also Nathan Houser, The Essential Peirce, eds .Nathan Houser and Christian 
Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1:245. 
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measure between laws that might and laws that could not have resulted 
from such a process of development. To find that out is our task. I will 
begin with this guess. Uniformities in the modes of action of things have 
come about by their taking habits. At present, the course of events is 
approximately determined by law. In the past that approximation was 
less perfect. The tendency to obey laws has always been and always will 
be growing.18  
 
     Spontaneity was a word Peirce used as a synonym for chance, particularly as it 
pertained to actuality rather than possibility.19 For Peirce, spontaneity is life and it 
permeates the universe, manifesting itself in the evolutionary process. He claimed, “By 
… admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and 
everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal 
departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for 
all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really sui 
generis and new can be said to be accounted for.”20  
      Peircean evolution emerged in the instant of the universe’s genesis. In his 
cosmogony, the laws of physics, the rules of logic, even Time, are antedated by the 
operation of pure chance “with its consequent thorough-going evolutionism.”21 
“Tychism, the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor in the universe,”22 was joined to 
his objective idealism, the “theory of the universe … that matter is effete mind, inveterate 
habits becoming physical laws,”23 to forge his Synechism, “that tendency of 
philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in 
 
 18. CP 1.407-8. 
 19. Douglas R. Anderson, Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 103. 
 20. CP 6.59. 
 21. CP 6.163. 
22. CP 6.201. 
 23. CP 6.25. 
 
253 
Franklin, 
                                           
philosophy and, in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true 
continuity.”24 In this way, Peirce believed he was able to demonstrate how the universe is 
evolving toward concrete reasonableness, spawning orderliness out of chaos, and, at the 
same time, attaining a higher grade of complexity. 
… all the evolution we know of proceeds from the vague to the definite. 
The indeterminate future becomes the irrevocable past. In Spencer’s 
phrase the undifferentiated differentiates itself. The homogeneous puts 
on heterogeneity. However it may be in special cases, then, we must 
suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a more 
general continuum, a continuum of higher generality … If this be 
correct, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than before logic, we 
cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than in the utter vagueness of 
completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. The 
evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing 
universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms 
themselves have become or are becoming developed.25 
 
Wells indicates that one of the reasons Darwin appealed to Peirce was his belief that the 
operation of chance in natural selection resembles statistical mechanics in the growth of 
order from chaos.26  As we saw earlier, this process of becoming ordered, this tendency 
to become continuous, to become governed by laws is the summum bonum. 
“Generalization, the spilling out of continuous systems, in thought, in sentiment, in deed, 
is the true end of life.”27 In an 1891 letter to his former student, Christine Ladd-
Peirce summarized his evolutionary cosmology. 
I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to 
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, 
 
 24. CP 6.169. 
25. Charles Sanders Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 258. 
 26. Rulon S. Wells, “The True Nature of Peirce’s Evolutionism,” Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 316. See CP 5.364 where Peirce writes, “The Darwinian controversy is, 
in large part, a question of logic. Mr. Darwin proposed to apply the statistical method to biology. 
 27. NEM 4:346. 
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to a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of things in 
the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in 
the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is 
death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law 
and absence of spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state 
of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, 
and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the 
increase owing to the growth of habit.28 
 
    The wild cosmogonical speculation engaged in by Peirce notwithstanding, the 
only thing, he supposed, that we can ever hope to know of the universe and its 
development via the tendency toward habit-taking is by applying scientific method to an 
artifact of its creation, the human mind. 
In doing this I am not much afraid of specializing too much and of 
assuming that the universe has characters which belong only to nervous 
protoplasm in a complicated organism. For we must remember that the 
organism has not made the mind, but is only adapted to it. It has become 
adapted to it by an evolutionary process so that it is not far from correct 
to say that the mind has made the organism.29   
 
Another way Peirce had of stating this was his claim that the only thing we can know of 
the outer world is what is found in the inner world. In this, however, Peirce differentiated 
himself from his contemporaries. “I do not mean by the inner world that human 
consciousness which [James Mark] Baldwin and Royce have lately so forcibly reminded 
us is a social development and therefore very recent, only now in fact in process of taking 
a shape which has not yet been attained,” he declared.30  For him, the structure of the 
mind and the structure of the universe were continuous.  
There are three categories of being; ideas of feelings, acts of reaction, 
and habits. Habits are either habits about ideas of feelings or habits 
about acts of reaction. The ensemble of all habits about ideas of feeling 
 
 28. CP 8.317. 
 29. NEM 4:141. 
 30. Ibid. 
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constitutes one great habit which is a world; and the ensemble of all 
habits about acts of reaction constitutes a second great habit, which is 
another world. The former is the Inner World, the world of Plato’s 
forms. The other is the Outer World, or universe of existence. The mind 
of man is adapted to the reality of being.31   
 
“That is why,” he declared, “I make strong to go to the human mind to learn the nature of 
a great cosmical element.”32  There, in a time before Time, lay the origin of the 
distinction between the inner and outer worlds.  
The accidental reaction awoke [the inner world] into a consciousness of 
duality, of struggle and therefore of antagonism between an inner and an 
outer. Thus, the inner world was first, and its unity comes from that 
firstness. The outer world was second. The social world was logically 
developed out of those two and the physiological structure of man was 
brought to forms adapted to that development.33 
 
Beyond such conjecture there is, however, little to be learned when it comes to the origin 
of habit.  
Even from the human mind we can only collect external information 
about habit. Our knowledge of its inner nature must come to us from 
logic. For habit is generalization.34   
 
Whether there was “a tendency to take habits in the chaotic, original nothingness,”35 or 
whether it evolved in the antagonism of the two worlds, Peirce is, admittedly, at a loss.36 
He does, however, propose to understand the phenomenon in very human terms, in a 
passage written in 1902.   
 
 31. CP 4.157. 
 32. NEM 4:141. 
 33. Ibid. 
 34. NEM 4:142. 
 35. Anderson, Creativity and the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, 216.  
 36. Ibid., 102. W.B. Gallie rightly notes that such a conjecture, that the universe of pure chance 
was the source of the actual and of the tendency to take habits or the tendency toward generalization is fatal 
to his doctrine of the categories, each of which is universal. See W.B. Gaillie, Peirce and Pragmatism 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 226ff. 
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If I may be allowed to use the word “habit,” without any implication as 
to the time or manner in which it took birth, so as to be equivalent to the 
corrected phrase “habit or disposition,” that is, as some general principle 
working in a man’s nature to determine how he will act, then an instinct, 
in the proper sense of the word, is an inherited habit, or in more accurate 
language, an inherited disposition. But since it is difficult to make sure 
whether a habit is inherited or is due to infantile training and tradition, I 
shall ask leave to employ the word “instinct” to cover both cases.37   
 
This definition gives rise to a very interesting theory of instinct that, as much as anything 
else, can be considered the heart of Peirce’s philosophy, for it encompasses the sum of 
his thought on many of the wide range of topics we have been exploring.  
     Having thus assimilated instinct to habit, Peirce’s theory owes much to his heavy 
reliance on Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s belief in the capacity for the genetic transmission of 
acquired characteristics.38 “The Lamarckian theory … supposes that the development of 
species has taken place by a long series of insensible changes, but it supposes that those 
changes have taken place during the lives of the individuals, in consequence of effort and 
exercise, and that reproduction plays no part in the process except in preserving these 
modifications.”39 Even so, Peirce left open the question of whether habits are sexually 
transmitted from generation to generation.  
Nothing so characterizes instincts as their persistence when all the lights 
of reason are against them, and this whether they are true inherited 
instincts or merely traditional. Well-bred people, for example, are full of 
traditional habits – prejudices, we call them – about manners. They may 
be in situations in which reason warns them that these habits are 
distinctly injurious to them; and still they have a difficulty in 
overcoming them even with a serious effort.40   
 
 
 37. CP 2.170. 
 38. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, translation of Philosophie zoologique, trans. 
Hugh Elliott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), part 1, chapter 7, 106-127. 
 39. CP 6.16. 
 40. CP 2.160. 
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At other times he distinguished non-inherited from inherited instincts by referring to the 
former as sentiments.41  Sentiments were generally viewed by Peirce as being social in 
nature.42 This is clearly reflected in his postulation of three logical sentiments in his 1878 
Illustration of the Logic of Science series:  “It may seem strange that I should put forth 
three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the 
possibility of this interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of 
intellectual activity, as indispensable requirements of logic.”43  Nevertheless, the lack of 
a reliable nomenclature is the source of considerable difficulty for the interpreter, as
Maryann Ayim is forced to admit. 
In some passages, Peirce limits the term “instinct” to inherited habits, 
and uses the term “sentiment” to refer to non-inherited habits. Often, 
however, Peirce neglects to distinguish between inherited and non-
inherited habits, in which case the term “instinct” and “sentiment” are 
used interchangeably. Peirce’s failure to consistently retain this 
distinction leads to some confusion in his writing.44 
 
In the next section we will do our best to address this confusion and come to a clearer 
understanding of Peirce’s theory of instinct and its role in inquiry and action, a theory 
that for William H. Davis binds together many of the doctrines we have been exploring. 
“The continuity of signs, of all mental life, as it flows and tends to organize itself under 
more general heads, the evolution of physical laws, biological laws, and the life of the 
mind – all this is tied together in a very provocative package.”45  
 
 
 41. CP 1.661. 
 42. Maryann Ayim, Peirce’s View of the Roles of Reason and Instinct in Scientific Inquiry 
(Meerut, India: Anu Prakashan, 1982), 19. 
 43. CP 2.655. 
 44. Ayim, Peirce’s View of the Roles of Reason and Instinct in Scientific Inquiry, 19. 
 45. William H. Davis, Peirce’s Epistemology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 122. 
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B. Instinct, Habit and Inquiry 
 
       While instinct is more or less subsumed in habit in CP 2.170, such is not entirely 
the case in every instance. While Peirce was generally unwilling to distinguish inherited 
from acquired instinct, he occasionally did so. 
‘Instinctive’ does not simply mean ‘very much a matter of habit.’ Other 
reasonings, although not exactly instinctive, have become so habitual as 
to resemble instinctive actions. In many cases, the habits have come to 
us from tradition.46  
 
Peirce recalled an incident from his childhood by way of illustration. 
 
I well remember when I was a boy, and my brother Herbert, now our 
minister at Christiana, was scarce more than a child, one day, as the 
whole family were at table, some spirit from a “blazer,” or “chafing-
dish,” dropped on the muslin dress of one of the ladies and was kindled; 
and how instantaneously he jumped up, and did the right thing, and how 
skillfully each motion was adapted to the purpose. I asked him afterward 
about it; and he told me that since Mrs. Longfellow’s death [in 1861, in 
a similar accident], it was that he had often run over in imagination all 
the details of what ought to be done in such an emergency. It was a 
striking example of a real habit produced by exercises in the 
imagination.47 
 
In this section we will briefly examine to what degree Peirce intended the identity of 
instinct and habit. We will also investigate the relation of habit and belief and how both 
relate to inquiry. This will entail some understanding of Peirce’s theory of inquiry, some 
of which we have studied in previous chapters but other parts of which are yet uncharted. 
We will conclude with a fuller investigation of Peirce’s classification of instincts in 
which he demonstrates the evolution of instinct and its development into reason.  
                                            
 46. MS 693a, 20, undated. Quoted in Ayim, Peirce’s View of the Roles of Reason and Instinct in 
Scientific Inquiry, 109. 
 47. CP 5.487n1. 
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       Very near the end of his life, Peirce identified the reasoning power of human 
beings with the instinctive nature of ants and wasps.48  So far from being dissociated 
from instinct and sentiment, human reasoning is essentially the exercise of unconsc
instinct.  
Reason is of its very essence egotistical. In many matters it acts the fly 
on the wheel. Do not doubt that the bee thinks it has a good reason for 
making the end of its cell as it does. But I should be very much surprised 
to learn that its reason had solved that problem of isoperimetry that its 
instinct has solved. Men many times fancy that they act from reason 
when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute to themselves are 
nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the 
teasing “whys” of the ego. The extent of this self-delusion is such as to 
render philosophical rationalism a farce. Reason, then, appeals to 
sentiment in the last resort.49 
  
As we have noted, Peirce held a strong belief in the mind’s inherent insight into the ways 
of nature by virtue of its evolved structure.  
…Man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than 
wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong 
than right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. An 
Insight, I call it, because it is to be referred to the same general class of 
operations to which Perceptive Judgments belong. This Faculty is at the 
same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the instincts of 
the animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and 
for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely 
beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small 
liability to error; for though it goes wrong oftener than right, yet the 
relative frequency with which it is right is on the whole the most 
wonderful thing in our constitution.50  
 
Even the description of a theory or an idea as reasonable often seems to have less to do 
with the ratiocination involved in arriving at it than it does with the feeling or intuition of 
reasonableness that accompanies it.  
 
 48. EP 2:464. 
 49. CP 1.631-2. 
 50. CP 5.173. 
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If you ask an investigator why he does not try this or that wild theory, he 
will say, “It does not seem reasonable.” It is curious that we seldom use 
this word where the strict logic of our procedure is clearly seen. We do 
[not] say that a mathematical error is not reasonable. We call that 
opinion reasonable whose only support is instinct….51  
 
We shall return to this interesting aspect of instinct in our treatment of abduction.  
 Instinct is acquired in the development of the human species.52 It originates in the 
work of the categories.  
…the categories suggest our looking for a synthetizing law; and this we 
find in the power of assimilation, incident to which is the habit-taking 
faculty. This is all the categories pretend to do. They suggest a way of 
thinking; and the possibility of science depends upon the fact that human 
thought necessarily partakes of whatever character is diffused through 
the whole universe, and that its natural modes have some tendency to be 
the modes of action of the universe.53  
 
Like the rest of the universe, including its governing laws, “Instinct is capable of 
development and growth,” though the process is quite slow.54 “Our instinctive ways of 
thinking have become adapted to ordinary practical life, just as the rest of our physiology 
has become adapted to our environment.”55  As we have already seen, instinct and reason 
are continuous with reason being an evolutionary outgrowth of instinct, as much as the 
contrary could be argued from observation.56  
     Peirce associated instinct with pure feelings of sensation without identifying the 
two. Despite sometimes speaking of “instinctive feelings” (CP 1.107, 2.170), “instinctive 
desires” (CP 1.584), and “instinctive attraction” (CP 5.64), it is clear from the rest of his 
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 52. Davis, Peirce’s Epistemology, 120. 
 53. CP 1.351. 
 54. CP 1.648. 
 55. CP 7.606. 
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writings that Peirce’s preferred view was that instincts, like emotion, perception, 
sensation, attention, action, habit and inquiry, are semiotic processes, that is, they are 
representational.57 In other instances instinct is to be understood in terms of original, 
indubitable or natural beliefs (CP 5.445, 5.498, 5.603, respectively). David Savan 
identifies the occurrence of the indubitable in Peirce’s writings as a class of things 
belonging to a paradisiacal, simple, naïve, pre-critical universe.58 He lists three species of 
indubitable, the second of which consists of those things which are entirely too vague to 
be doubted. Here he includes instincts, moral sentiments, and common sense judgments. 
Peirce demonstrated the indeterminacy of instinct by defining it “in that broad sense in 
which it will include all habits of which we are not prepared to render an account, or in 
one word, all that goes by the name of the rule of thumb.”59  As such, he says, instincts 
are “habits of unknown parentage”60 that are accepted uncritically. This fact, however, 
should not deter us in our investigation. Because of the vagueness he attached to his 
understanding of instinct and his apparent reticence to carve at the joint of instinct and 
habit, following his lead in CP 2.170, we shall treat instinct as habit, without regard to its 
origin, save where Peirce has made a distinction. As a rule of thumb, i.e., a practical rule, 
based on neither science nor precision, and belonging to a pre-critical world, instinct is, 
nevertheless, inferential, if not something of which we are even half-conscious.61  At 
 
 57. David Savan, “Peirce and Idealism,” in Kenneth Laine Ketner, ed., Peirce and Contemporary 
Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 322; and “Abduction and Semiotics,” in The 
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 58. David Savan, “Decision and Knowledge in Peirce,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 1 (1965): 31-35. 
 59. CP 2.175. 
 60. Ibid. 
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times, particularly in regard to abductive inference, Peirce appears to have come close to 
blurring the line between logic and psychology. He referred to the instinct of abduction in 
psychological language as an “insight” (CP 5.173, 5.604), a feeling (CP 5.643) and as a 
“flash” (CP 5.181), and explained that it belongs to the same general class as perceptual 
judgments (CP 5.173), that, in fact, abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment 
without any line of sharp demarcation (CP 5.181). But as we have seen, perceptual 
judgments contain general elements that allow universal propositions to be inferred from 
them (CP 5.181) providing the means by which we divine the ways of nature (CP 5.173). 
In 1902, he offered the following apology for the psychological content of his 
descriptions. 
After the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be 
no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule excluding 
psychological matter, observations of how we think and the like … But 
while the justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be borne in mind 
that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take place 
… In addition to this, there may be a psychological account of the 
matter, of the utmost importance and ever so extensive … I may here 
and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my doctrine.62  
 
We shall explore this distinction further in the next section dealing with abduction. 
     As we have noted, Peirce linked human instinct to the flight and migration of 
birds, the hive building of bees and the colonizing of social insects. In addition to animal 
and human instinct, Peirce indicated a third variety that he called vegetable instinct but 
said very little about.63 Presumably, vegetable instinct indicates the habit of green plants 
to grow toward sunlight and the adaptation of “carnivorous” plants such as the Venus 
flytrap. Peirce commented parenthetically that “both [animal and vegetable instinct], 
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especially the latter, throw much light on man’s nature,”64 but he never explicitly said 
how. In an obscure passage from around 1902 entitled “Of the Practical Sciences,” Peirce 
wrote. 
An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of the 
individual’s Nature (his ‘nature’ being that within him which causes his 
behaviour to be such as it is), manifested by a certain unity of quasi-
purpose in his behaviour. In man, at least, this behaviour is always 
conscious, and not purely spasmodic. More than that, unless he is under 
some extraordinary stress, the behaviour is always partially controlled 
by the deliberate exercise of imagination and refexion; so much so that 
to the man himself his action appears to be entirely rational, so far is it 
from being merely sensori-motor. General analogy and many special 
phenomena warrant the presumption that the same thing is true of the 
lower animals, though they are undoubtedly far less reflective than men. 
Yet the adaptation of the behaviour to its quasi-purpose in some definite 
part overleaps all control … So then the three essential characters of 
instinctive conduct are that it is conscious, is determined to a quasi-
purpose, and that in definite respects it escapes all control.65  
 
He was convinced that animals do reason, though perhaps, very little.66 In an undated 
manuscript from around 1911, Peirce asserted, once again, that a false dichotomy exists 
between reason and instinct, that animals do reason and presented illustrations with little 
elaboration.67 As we saw in chapter four, reasoning is related to the higher levels of self-
control and thus to self-consciousness. Animal instinct, as such, is in some manner 
uncontrolled inference.  
Uncontrolled inference from contiguity, or experiential connection, is 
the most rudimentary of all reasoning. The lower animals so reason. A 
dog, when he hears his master’s voice, runs expecting to see him; and if 
he does not find him, will manifest surprise, or, at any rate, perplexity.68  
 
 64. Ibid. 
 65. CP 7.381n19. 
 66. CP 1.626. 
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And yet, on other occasions, Peirce made it appear that there was much more to the 
reason of “those whom we are so fond of referring to as the ‘lower animals’”69 than what 
we might think of as conditioned response. Writing in 1902, Peirce noted that his dog 
was capable of a level of reasoning as complex as to consist of a triplicity of relations. 
I tell my dog to go upstairs and fetch me my book, which he does. Here 
is a fact about three things, myself, the dog, and the book, which is no 
mere sum of facts relating to pairs, nor even a pairing of such pairs. I 
speak to the dog. I mention the book. I do those things together. The dog 
fetches the book. He does it in consequence of what I did. That is not the 
whole story. I not only simultaneously spoke to the dog and mentioned 
the book, but I mentioned the book to the dog; that is, I caused him to 
think of the book and to bring it. My relation to the book was that I 
uttered certain sounds which were understood by the dog to have 
reference to the book. What I did to the dog, beyond exciting his 
auditory nerve, was merely to induce him to fetch the book. The dog’s 
relation to the book was more prominently dualistic; yet the whole 
significance and intention of his fetching it was to obey me. In all action 
governed by reason such genuine triplicity will be found.70 
 
What appears to us as the occult nature of animal instinct seems to have more to do with 
the differences in our modes of perception than with the kinds of feelings produced, 
which, in the final analysis are communicable not only between members of the same 
species but at times between human and non-human animals.  
As for the senses of my dog, I must confess that they seem very unlike 
my own, but when I reflect on how small a degree he thinks of visual 
images, and of how smells play a part in his thoughts and imaginations 
analogous to the part played by sights in mine, I cease to be surprised 
that the perfume of roses or of orange flowers does not attract his 
attention at all and that the effluvia that interest him so much, when at all 
perceptible to me, are simply unpleasant. He does not think of smells as 
sources of pleasure and disgust but as sources of information … I know 
very well that my dog’s musical feelings are quite similar to mine 
though they agitate him more than they do me. He has the same 
 
 69. CP 1.626. 
 70. CP 2.86. 
 
265 
                                           
emotions of affection as I, though they are far more moving in his case. 
You would never persuade me that my horse and I do not sympathize, or 
that the canary bird that takes such delight in joking with me does not 
feel with me and I with him; and this instinctive confidence of mine that 
it is so, is to my mind evidence that it really is so.71  
 
     This brings us to the question of the role of instinct. In one of the last of his 
writings on the subject, Peirce further refined his thinking about instinct. 
I should define what I mean by an “instinct” as a way of voluntary 
acting prevalent almost universally among otherwise normal individuals 
of at least one sex or other unmistakable natural part of a race … which 
action conduces to the probable perpetuation of that race, and which, in 
the present state of science, is not at once satisfactorily and fully 
explicable as a result of any more general way of mental action.72 
 
Peirce contended that there are essentially two kinds of instincts. One he referred to as 
selfish (CP 7.383) and the other as social (CP 7.378). Both types include inherited and 
non-inherited instincts. Both are aimed at preservation of the species whether “through 
preserving the individual in whom the instinct acts,” on the one hand, or by preserving 
“some other individual or individuals than the agent,” on the other hand.73 While selfish 
instincts are geared to the interests and survival of the individual, “in many cases, the 
social instincts are expensive to the individual, even dangerous, sometimes fatal.”74 The 
useful arts (e.g., food gathering, tool-making, agriculture, and medicine) have developed 
from the selfish instincts.75 The social instincts led to the development of reason.76 We 
will return to this distinction later in the chapter. At all events, all instinct is acquired in 
the development of the race as an adaptation to nature and conditions in the environment. 
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To the end of preserving the species, instincts, whether of the selfish or social variety, 
guide and assist the reasoning process. As Davis points out, “It is a cornerstone of 
Peirce’s philosophy that human instincts, so far as they bear on judgment as well as on 
action are far from pernicious in their influence, but positively helpful.”77 In our 
treatment of abduction, we will see how instinct is applied to the reasoning process and 
promotes the preservation and well-being of the human species.   
     To the extent that instinct is a mode of voluntary mental action aimed at the 
perpetuation of the species (EP 2:464 above), it is purposive action and thus very closely 
tied to pragmatism and the fixation of belief. In 1905, he wrote: 
[The pragmatist’s] doctrine essentially insists upon the close affinity 
between thinking in particular and endeavour in general. Since, 
therefore, action in general is largely a matter of instinct, he will be 
pretty sure to ask himself whether it be not the same with belief.78  
 
Three years later, in a piece entitled “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of  
 
God” for the Hibbert Journal,79 Peirce underscored his point in the context of his critical 
common-sensism. 
…man, like any other animal, is gifted with power of understanding 
sufficient for the conduct of life. This brings him, for testing the 
hypothesis, to taking his stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies faith 
in common sense and in instinct, though only as they issue from the 
cupel-furnace of measured criticism.80 
 
      While Peirce often asserted that instinct is prone to error in theoretical matters 
(CP 1.404, 1.634, 5.592), and made it clear that in practical affairs instinct was nearly 
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habit.  
Again, Peirce’s retrospective essay on pragmatism traced the biological, as well as the 
psychological aspects of inquiry. 
 as 
. 
arly in 
lly directed toward the removal of stimulation.83
    In that same issue of the American Journal of Mathematics he had written: 
                                           
infallible (CP 1.633, 1.661), the conduct of life is more than the sum of that which he 
termed practical in nature. The production of belief, the amplification of meaning, and the 
establishment of a habit which, for Peirce, are the essence of pragmatism, are as rooted in 
theory as in practical effects. Beliefs are of the nature of habits (CP 2.643) that is, habits 
of which we are conscious (CP 4.53) and, as such, are dispositions to certain kinds of 
conduct.81 The production of belief clearly has a psychological aspect. We have noted 
that in his Popular Science series of 1877-8, Peirce articulated the position that he refined 
over the years but from which he never essentially wavered.  
And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical 
phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has 
just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, 
it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the 
establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a 
82
 
It is … no doubt true that men act, especially in the action of inquiry,
if their sole purpose were to produce a certain state of feeling, in the 
sense that when that state of feeling is attained, there is no further effort
It was upon that proposition that I originally based pragmaticism … In 
the case of inquiry, I called that state of feeling “firm belief” … E
1880, in the opening paragraphs of my memoir in Vol. III of the 
American Journal of Mathematics, § I referred the matter to the 
fundamental properties of protoplasm, showing that purposive action 
must be action virtua
  
 
 81. Peirce appears to have changed his mind on this point. In CP 5.417 he says:  “Belief is not a 
momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at 
least) unconscious” [1905]. 
 82. CP 5.397. 
 83. CP 5.563. 
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Thinking, as cerebration, is no doubt subject to the general laws of 
nervous action. When a group of nerves are stimulated, the ganglions 
with which the group is most intimately connected on the whole are 
thrown into an active state, which in turn usually occasions movements 
of the body. The stimulation continuing, the irritation spreads from 
ganglion to ganglion (usually increasing meantime). When the stimulus 
is withdrawn, the excitement quickly subsides. Now, all vital processes 
tend to become easier on repetition. Along whatever path a nervous 
discharge has once taken place, in that path a new discharge is more 
likely to take place … Hence, a strong habit of responding to the given 
irritation in this particular way must quickly be established.84 
 
Habits thus established are dispositions to action. 
 
Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition 
that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. 
Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry 
until it is destroyed.85 
 
Thus purpose of inquiry is, then, to settle doubt by replacing it with belief which is 
conscious (or semi-conscious) habit. Carl Hausman correctly points out that with the 
understanding that belief is of the nature of habit, that for Peirce: 
[t]he term belief can be understood in at least two senses: psychological 
and logical or ontological. According to the first sense, a belief is a 
subjective or behavioral process. According to the second, it is, or is 
interpretable as, a proposition, or as an ontological referent. In this latter 
sense, it is a regularity in thinking, a disposition to envisage regularities 
in consequences that follow from the thought and that are objective in 
relation to psychological acts. Thus, in this logical-ontological sense, 
belief is a type of process that is not reduced to actual mental states or 
events, but is an objective condition that mental, habitual acts 
exemplify.86  
 
When we turn our attention to abduction we will see how the two senses of belief in 
Peirce have been a sticking point for his interpreters.  
 
 84. CP 3.155-7. 
 85. CP 5.373.  
 86. Carl R. Hausman, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 25. 
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     Generally speaking, inquiry is the methodology of the natural sciences and, as 
such, is a process that involves each of the three types of inference. Before inquiry can 
commence, however, three conceptions are necessary. “The first is a reference to a 
quality, the second to a subject, and the third to a mediator interpreting predicate quality 
and subject correlate to one another.”87 These, of course, are the three categories. 
According to Savan, three conditions (components really) are also necessary for inquiry.  
The first condition for inquiry is a precritical and unexamined world, 
environment or neighborhood. Second, some hard fact enters this 
innocent and artless world, raises a real doubt concerning some 
determinate part of it, and sets investigation in motion. Third, the 
movement of investigation is terminated by a critically evaluated and 
permanently affirmed belief.88 
 
The actual process of inquiry unfolds in stages that parallel the three categories which, in 
turn, are for Peirce, omnipresent in the universe. Thus empirical logic mirrors the 
operation of the mind which, as a product of evolution, mirrors the operation of nature. 
 As K.T. Fann describes the actual process of inquiry, “The three types of 
inference now become three stages in a scientific inquiry. They are intimately connected 
as a method.”89 Peirce begins his account of this method by stating that every inquiry 
takes place in one of the three universes of experience (CP 6.469), by which he means 
any one of the three states of being: Potentiality, Brute Actuality, or Representation (CP 
6.455)  
 
 87. David Savan, “Decision and Knowledge in Peirce,” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 1 (1965): 36-7. 
 88. Ibid., 37. 
 89. K.T. Fann, Peirce’s Theory of Abduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 32. 
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     The first stage of inquiry is conjecture or hypothesis. 
Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation … of some 
surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an 
expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the 
inquisiturus … The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in 
all their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder 
shall be resolved … At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a 
possible Explanation … On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is 
led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he 
provisionally holds it to be “Plausible” … Plausibility, I reckon as 
composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its characteristic formula of 
reasoning I term Retroduction, i.e., reasoning from consequent to 
antecedent.90 
 
The second stage of inquiry consists in testing the hypothesis. 
 
This testing, to be logically valid, must honestly start, not as 
Retroduction starts, with scrutiny of the phenomena, but with 
examination of the hypothesis … This constitutes the Second Stage of 
Inquiry. For its characteristic form of reasoning our language has, for 
two centuries, been happily provided with the name Deduction … The 
purpose of Deduction [is] that of collecting consequents of the 
hypothesis …91  
 
Having gathered the consequents, they too must be tested.  
 
The inquiry enters upon its Third Stage, that of ascertaining how far 
those consequents accord with Experience, and of judging accordingly 
whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct or requires some inessential 
medication, or must be entirely rejected. Its characteristic way of 
reasoning is Induction.92 
 
This stage of inquiry is itself trifurcated.  
 
For it must begin with Classification, which is an Inductive Non-
argumentational kind of Argument, by which general Ideas are attached 
to objects of Experience; or rather by which the latter are subordinated 
to the former. Following this will come the testing-argumentations, the 
Probations; and the whole inquiry will be wound up with the Sentential 
part of the Third Stage, which, by Inductive reasonings, appraises the 
 
 90. CP 6.469. 
 91. CP 6.470, 472. 
 92. CP 6.472. 
 
271 
                                           
different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-
appraisal of these very appraisals themselves, and passes final judgment 
on the whole result.93  
 
Peirce wished us to observe that “neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the 
smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry.”94  Peirce, at the apex of his 
eloquence, continued by claiming:  
Deduction explicates; Induction evaluates: that is all. Over the chasm 
that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man’s 
environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the 
forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he managed 
to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of 
induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank of 
its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by 
spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason and neither Deduction nor 
Induction contributes a single new concept to the structure.95 
 
It is to retroduction (abduction) as the intersection of insight and inference to which we 
shall turn later in this chapter.  
    As we noted in our study of the classification of the sciences, one reason Peirce 
had for classifying anything was his view that classification is the very business of 
science, especially logic, the science dearest to his heart. This motivation led him to 
attempt a classification of the instincts as a way of treating psychology in its proper 
relationship to the other sciences and to demonstrate that in addition to the psychological 
aspects of human instinct, there is a logical dimension as well. There was, however, 
another motivation at work, one that even antedated pragmatism. In 1905, he wrote,  
Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential 
consequence of it, but which the writer defended before [1871] he had 
formulated, even in his own mind, the principle of pragmaticism, is the 
 
 93. Ibid. 
 94. CP 6.475. 
 95. Ibid. 
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scholastic doctrine of realism. This is usually defined as the opinion that 
there are real objects that are general, among the number being the 
modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed, these be not the 
only such objects. But the belief in this can hardly escape being 
accompanied by the acknowledgement that there are, besides, real 
vagues, and especially real possibilities.96  
 
Peirce continued by explaining that his 1878 formulation of pragmatism came very close 
to denying what for him was this essential realism.  
The article of January 1878 [How to Make Our Ideas Clear] endeavored 
to gloze over this point as unsuited to the exoteric public addressed; or 
perhaps the writer wavered in his own mind. He said that if a diamond 
were to be formed in a bed of cotton-wool, and were to be consumed 
there without ever having been pressed upon by any hard edge or point, 
it would be merely a question of nomenclature whether that diamond 
should be said to be have been hard or not.  No doubt this is true, except 
for the abominable falsehood in the word MERELY, implying that 
symbols are unreal. Nomenclature involves classification; and 
classification is true or false, and the generals to which it refers are 
either reals in the one case, or figments in the other.97  
 
Thus, in 1902, Peirce turned his attention to what he called a classificatory psychonosy or 
psychotaxy within which he located the instincts, the latter admittedly “not a very good 
name for classificatory psychognosy or the study of kinds of mental manifestation,”98 and 
used only for the sake of brevity.99  
    Psychotaxy was comprised of two Suborders (I) Kinds of Performance [or 
perhaps Faculties], broadly construed to include actions that are simple and involuntary, 
and (II) Kinds of Individuals. Under the former there are two genera (A) Elements of 
Performance and (B) Systems of Performance, the former being subdivided into (A1) 
kinds of sensations and their relations and (A2) kinds of emotions and their relations. 
 
 96. CP 5.453. 
 97. Ibid. 
 98. CP 1.271. 
 99. CP 7.378. 
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Under (B) Systems of Performance, Peirce included two subgenera (B1) those that are at 
the instinctive stage of development and generally associated with brutes and lower 
animals, being comprised of “inborn performance determined in almost every detail.” 
These instincts are thus divided, as we have seen, between those that are associated (a) 
with the preservation of the stock, or an individual or individuals other than the agent, 
and those that are associated (b) with the preservation of the individual agent. The first 
species he terms “social,” and the second he terms “selfish.”  
     Under the preservation of the stock he listed several orders of instinct as being 
reproduction, communication (the cries and songs of mammals and birds and the facial 
expressions of mammals), and architectural instinct, related to shelter, e.g., the 
construction of cobwebs. Peirce also mentioned instincts for locomotion and migration, 
instincts for games and instincts for adornment and decoration (sometimes, but not 
always related to reproduction, e.g., the delight of a horse with a handsome harness or the 
pride of the freshly trimmed poodle).  
      A second subfamily (B2) under Systems of Performance is related to “systems in 
minds that are too highly developed for much wealth of Instinct” (CP 7.380). As Peirce 
explained in a lengthy section on the rational mind, it was his opinion that the instinctive 
mind could probably not have developed into the rational mind because the rational 
mind’s capacity for growth seems to make it appear more undeveloped than the 
instinctive mind.100 It is its immaturity and capacity for growth, and thus for error, that 
distinguishes the rational mind from the instinctive mind. Animals rarely make mistakes 
while humans often err. Peirce surmised that rational mind might well be a case of an 
 
 100. CP 7.380. 
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arrested development of instinctive mind. However, only through the resilience and 
flexibility that is manifest in immaturity could the rational mind be suited for the 
tremendous development of which it is capable.  
The conception of the Rational Mind as an Unmatured Instinctive Mind 
which takes another development precisely because of its childlike 
character is confirmed, not only by the prolonged childhood of men, but 
also by the fact that all systems of rational performances have had 
instinct for their first germ. Not only has instinct been the first germ, but 
every step in the development of those systems of performance comes 
from instinct. It is precisely because this Instinct is a weak, uncertain 
Instinct that it becomes infinitely plastic, and never reaches an ultimate 
state beyond which it cannot progress. Uncertain tendencies, unstable 
states of equilibrium are conditions sine qua non for the manifestations 
of Mind.101 
 
Instinctive mind is governed by automatic rather than reasoned response; it is by nature 
decidedly unreflective and inert. But, according to Peirce, this is the seed of progress. As 
we will see, instinct serves to guide the mind by putting it on the right scent.102  
      Before setting aside the business of psychotaxy, the work of Maryann Ayim, who 
compiled an exhaustive list of instincts from the published and unpublished writings of 
Peirce, should be mentioned.103 She has catalogued the instincts of animals and humans 
under ten separate categories and included any examples provided by Peirce. This 
remarkable work appears as Appendix C.   
 
C. Reason and Instinct 
      Peirce’s classification of the instincts reveals the separate development of reason 
from the germ of instinct. In addition to what he said in the psychotaxy regarding rational 
                                            
 101. CP 7.381. 
 102. Davis, Peirce’s Epistemology, 120. 
 103. Ayim, Peirce’s View of the Roles of Reason and Instinct in Scientific Inquiry, 23-25. 
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mind as a case of the arrested development of instinctive mind, Peirce held a variety of 
other positions on the relationship between reason and instinct, opinions that appear on 
the surface to be contradictory. Briefly, as Ayim showed, those positions can be 
summarized as follows. 
      Instinct evolves, albeit more slowly than reason, and its development is toward 
reason as it moves toward infinite plasticity and increasing fallibility. As Ayim observes, 
“reason is an evolutionary development of instinct in that man, as a rational animal, has 
gradually evolved from non-rational forms of life.”104 She points out that within this 
context, instinct and reason are continuous. However, as we noted in chapter three, it is 
Wells’ observation that “If something, x, has evolved, it must have evolved from what it 
is not; from non-x, in other words.”105   A common view is that judgment evolved from 
feeling just as reason evolved from instinct.  
Peirce sometimes uses the evolutionary term ‘rudimentary’ … The more 
or less synonymous term ‘low-grade’ is not distinctively evolutionary, 
but if evolution is upward ascent, then labeling of x as low-grade y 
would suggest that the relation between x and y, if conceived 
evolutionarily, is to be conceived as the evolution of x into y (= 
evolution of y from x). To decide, however, that in that situation y is the 
paradigm to which x is to be assimilated is to take a further step. Peirce 
takes this step but it is one of my aims … to argue that the step is 
arbitrary, i.e., that one might as reasonably have taken some other 
step.106 
 
We’ve noted that one of Wells’ chief criticisms of Peirce centers on what he takes to be a 
tendency to over-generalize. Peirce’s ambitious attempt to demonstrate the continuity of 
reason and instinct is perhaps another example even though, as we saw in CP 5.533, he 
 
 104. Ibid., 17. 
 105. Rulon S. Wells, “Peirce’s Notion of the Symbol,” Semiotica 19 (1977), 200. 
 106. Ibid., 201. 
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subsumes both under the mediating principle of self-control, the varying degrees of 
which provide the biggest difference between species.  
     As we saw in the classification of instincts, Peirce viewed reason as one of the 
types or subdivisions of instinct. While closely related to the view of reason as an 
evolutionary development of instinct, he expressed the opinion that reason might be a 
case of inchoate instinct, suggesting that reason might actually be an instance of the 
arrested development in the evolution of instinct. This represents a second position of the 
relationship of instinct and reason.  
    A third view that Peirce expressed was that reason and instinct are completely 
distinct faculties. In some of his writings he asserted that instinct had little or nothing to 
do with theoretical matters and was only reliable and useful in practical matters. This 
opinion is largely confined to the first of his Cambridge lectures of 1898. As we saw in 
the last chapter, the correspondence between William James and Peirce leading up to this 
lecture series provides a clue for the title of that first lecture, “Vitally Important Topics.”  
After reading the lecture which Peirce first proposed, James was 
apprehensive over the emphasis Peirce had given to formal logic. James 
told Peirce that he and Royce both agree there were only three men at 
Harvard “who could possibly follow your graphs and relatives.” James, 
who as a close friend of Peirce had obtained the lectureship for him, 
counseled Peirce to “be a good boy and think a more popular plan out,” 
suggesting that he might consider dealing with “separate topics of a 
vitally important character.”107 
 
Peirce’s response was grudgingly compliant, condescending and dripping with sarcasm.  
I have no doubt you gauge the capacity of your students rightly … 
People who cannot reason exactly (which alone is reasoning), simply 
cannot understand my philosophy, neither the process, methods, nor 
 
 107. Richard L. Trammell, “Religion, Instinct and Reason in the Thought of Charles S. Peirce,” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 8 (1972): 7. 
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results. The neglect of logic in Cambridge is plainly absolute … I will 
begin again, and will endeavor to write out some of the “ideas” with 
which I am supposed to be “teaming” on “separate topics of vital 
importance.” I feel I shall not do it well, because in spite of myself I 
shall betray my sentiments about such “ideas”; but being paid to do it, I 
will do it as well as I possibly can … I wish I had to sing comic songs 
and dance, though I should do it badly … The audience had better go 
home and say their prayers, I am thinking.108  
 
In a draft of the first lecture Peirce addressed his audience, comprised largely of 
Harvard’s “élite youths … living softly cultured lives” and beseeched them to “be guided 
by their instincts into almost every detail of life” after the example of “our humble 
cousins whom it pleases us to refer to as ‘the lower animals.’”109 Throughout this lecture 
he repeated the theme that instinct is infallible in practical matters but prone to failure 
and of little value in “useless” matters of theory and scientific discovery.110  At every 
turn, he expressed thinly masked contempt for “matters of vital importance,” i.e., the 
practical concerns of morality, religion, “high and holy desires,” “the greatest affairs of 
life,” and “matters which are, and out to be, sacred to us,” including earning comfortable 
incomes and obtaining worldly success, and reassured his hearers that “on vitally 
important topics reasoning is out of place.”111  
     At least once in these lectures Peirce made reference to the medieval term logica 
utens.112 He explained elsewhere that logica utens is “the set of opinions which you bring 
 
 108. Letter of Peirce to James, 12/26/1897, in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of 
William James, 2 vols., (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), 2:419-20. 
 109. CP 1.649, 1.650. 
 110. CP 1.633, 1.634, 1.661. 
 111. CP 1.619, 1.620, 1.623, 1.633, 1.635, 1.642, 1.652 1.653. 
 112. Charles Sanders Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences 
Lectures of 1898, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 109 (hereinafter 
cited as RLT). 
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to the study of logic,”113 a common and general method for acquiring truth that is in our 
possession and operative in our daily decision making even when we are not aware of it. 
That is to say, logica utens is “the instinctive logic-in-use [that] is more or less adequate 
to a very primitive and simple type of life,” and hence for resolving the “vitally important 
issues” that everyone faces.114 Peirce illustrated the operation of logica utens in the 
following passage.  
Perhaps it may sound like a contradiction to talk of “instinctive logic.” It 
may possibly be thought that instinct is precisely that which is not logic 
or reason. But think of a man whose business it is to lend out money. 
The accuracy of his cool reason is what he relies upon; and yet he is not 
guided by a theory of reasoning, but much rather upon an intense love of 
money which stimulates his faculties of reasoning. That is what I call his 
logica utens. There are many fields in which few will maintain that any 
theoretical way of reaching conclusions can ever be so sure as the 
natural instinctive of an experienced man. Yet let instinct tread beyond 
its proper borders but by ever so little, and it becomes the most helpless 
thing in the world, a veritable fish out of water.115  
 
Logica utens is contrasted with logica docens “or the legitimate doctrine that is to 
 
be learned by study,” the discipline or science of logic that can be developed and  
 
refined by erudition.116  
     The fourth opinion held by Peirce and noted by Ayim was one that views instinct 
and reason as complementary powers in the attainment of knowledge. In this view 
abduction, as the first step in the process of inquiry, is requisite to both induction and 
 
 113. CP 2.186. 
 114. Joseph Ransdell, “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce’s Semiotic,” see Arisbe website 
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deduction and necessary for any progress in science.117 It is Ayim’s position that not only 
did Peirce hold each of these four positions on abduction but that he held them 
contemporaneously and that they are in not, upon examination, mutually exclusive, rather 
that they each simply emphasize a different aspect of the analysis of reason and 
instinct.118  
      In any event, abduction is variously viewed by Peirce as bearing traits of both an 
instinct and a form of inference. To the extent that it is originative (CP 2.96), 
presumptive (CP 2.776), irresistible (CP 5.582) and experienced as an insight (CP 
5.181), a feeling (CP 7.218), a hope (CP 7.219, 1.121), a surmise (CP 7.36) a guess (CP 
6.526), a conjecture (CP 7.36), an attraction, an aversion, or an urge, abduction is clearly 
instinctual and psychological. On the other hand, to the degree that abduction is 
experimental (CP 5.581), deliberate (CP 5.581), colligating (CP 5.581), voluntary, 
critical (CP 2.102), and controlled, it is inferential and, hence, normative. Peirce 
summarized his position by stating “It must be remembered that abduction, although it is 
very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference, asserting its 
conclusion only problematically, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite 
logical form.119  It is this very position that has drawn the ire of his critics. Harry 
Frankfurt spoke for many of them when he wrote: 
…it is this very insistence by Peirce on the originative character of 
abduction, together with his claim that abduction is indeed a form of 
logical inference, that presents the first problem in the understanding of 
his doctrine [of abduction]. For Peirce also holds the view that 
hypotheses are the result of insight, and there is a prima facie 
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contradiction between this opinion and what he says about abduction … 
We are, then, faced with the seeming paradox that Peirce holds both that 
hypotheses are the products of a wonderful imaginative faculty in man 
and that they are products of a certain sort of logical inference.120  
 
For Frankfurt, abductions may be insights or inferences, but not both to the extent that 
inferences are conclusions drawn from premises based on prior experience and known 
facts, which are themselves conclusions. The late Arthur Burks also expressed dismay at 
the apparent contradiction in Peirce’s treatment of abduction as the logic of discovery.   
One might expect Peirce’s view to flow out of a confusion of logic and 
psychology, or out of a theory which held them to be inseparable. But he 
clearly separates logic from psychology: psychology, he frequently says, 
is a study of how we do think and is irrelevant to logic, which is a study 
of how we ought to think. It is true that in his discussions of abduction 
Peirce often speaks of a man’s “insight into the laws of nature,” his 
“guessing instinct,” his natural tendency to guess right; “… all human 
knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development 
of our inborn animal instincts” (2.754). Thus he says that abduction “is 
really an appeal to instinct” (1.630), and that the “simpler” hypothesis is 
the one that instinct suggests (6.416). Of course if these statements were 
taken literally, one could not speak meaningfully of the logic of 
abduction, for unless the process of abduction has a rationale of some 
sort it cannot have a logic.121  
 
      Another of Peirce’s critics, K.T. Fann, agrees with Burks that the apparent 
contradiction is attributable to a transition in Peirce’s thought on abduction from the view 
of it as an “evidencing process” to seeing it as a stage of scientific inquiry that produces 
hypotheses.122 This shift marked a movement from the syllogistic iteration of abduction 
that Peirce used to explain abduction in 1878.  Peirce’s early work on abduction was 
rooted in his study of Aristotelian logic. Anderson traces the summation of Peirce’s 
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syllogistic understanding of abduction to a 1901 paper entitled “The Logic of Drawing 
History from Ancient Documents.”123 There Peirce argued for his translation of 
Aristotle’s apagogue as abduction. 
… having remarked that induction, epagogue, is the inference of a 
syllogism in Barbara or Celarent from its other two propositions as data, 
[Aristotle] would have asked himself whether the minor premiss of such 
a syllogism is not sometimes inferred from its other two propositions as 
data. Certainly, he would not be Aristotle, to have overlooked that 
question; and it would no sooner be asked than he would perceive that 
such inferences are very common. Accordingly, when he opens the next 
chapter [of Prior Analytics, II, 25] with the word apagogue a word 
evidently chosen to form a pendant to epogogue, we feel sure that this is 
what he is coming to.124  
 
     Anderson’s claim is that “[Peirce] sees [apagogue] as the acceptance or creation 
of a minor premiss as a hypothetical solution to a syllogism whose major premiss is 
known and whose conclusion we ‘find to be a fact.’”125 Because the minor premiss is not 
immediately known, Anderson says abductive arguments are merely possible, maybe 
probable, but can only be accepted provisionally. However, from “his interpretation of 
Aristotle, Peirce arrived at an initial view of abduction which held it to be a type of 
reasoning whose form was that of obtaining a minor premiss from a major premiss and a 
conclusion.”126  
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     In the final installment of the 1878 Popular Science series, Peirce had turned his 
attention to explaining the subtle differences that stand between induction and abduction 
as forms of synthetic inference.127   
Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which 
something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class. 
Or, we find a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of cases and 
infer that it is true of the same proportion of the whole class. Hypothesis 
[or Abduction] is where we find some very curious circumstance, which 
would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain 
general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition. Or, where we find 
that in certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance, and infer 
that they resemble one another strongly in other respects.128  
 
Peirce admitted that abduction is grounded in a common logical error: “There is no 
greater nor more frequent mistake in practical logic than to suppose that things which 
resemble one another strongly in some respects are any the more likely for that to be alike 
in others.”129 Therefore, he proposed a set of rules for this admittedly weak form of 
inference that would protect honesty and guard against bias in scientific results, i.e., not 
block the road of inquiry.130  The application of these rules would require that abductive 
inferences be replaced by stronger inductive arguments as inquiry progressed.131  
     In distinguishing induction from abduction Peirce noted the greatest difference as 
being “that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed in 
cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes something of a  different kind from 
what we have directly observed, and frequently something which it would be impossible 
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for us to observe directly.132  Be that as it may, “when we stretch an induction quite 
beyond the limits of our observation, the inference partakes of the nature of 
hypothesis.”133 Thus Peirce was admitting that the real differences between induction and 
abduction are more a matter of degree than of kind, inasmuch as  
it would be absurd to say that we have no inductive warrant for a 
generalization extending a little beyond the limits of experience, and 
there is no line to be drawn beyond which we cannot push our inference; 
only that it becomes weaker the further it is pushed. Yet, if an induction 
be pushed very far, we cannot give it much credence unless we find that 
such an extension explains some fact which we can and do observe.134  
 
Peirce goes on to note that distinction between induction and abduction is “that it is 
associated with an important psychological or rather physiological difference in the mode 
of apprehending facts.”135 This becomes critical to whatever response that can be made to 
Stephens’ serious criticism of Peirce’s analogy of emotion to hypothesis that we made 
reference to in chapter three. That distinction was that 
Induction infers a rule. Now, a belief of a rule is a habit. That a habit is a 
rule active in us, is evident. That every belief is of the nature of a habit, 
in so far as it is of a general character, has been shown in the earlier 
papers of this series. Induction, therefore, is the logical formula which 
expresses the physiological process of formation of a habit. Hypothesis 
substitutes, for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to one 
subject, a single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sensation 
belonging to the act of thinking that each of these predicates inheres in 
the subject. In hypothetic inference this complicated feeling so produced 
is replaced by a single feeling of greater intensity, that belonging to the 
act of thinking the hypothetic conclusion. Now, when our nervous 
system is excited in a complicated way, there being a relation between 
the elements of the excitation, the result is a single harmonious 
disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus the various sounds made by 
the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a 
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peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves. The 
emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetic inference, and 
every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such an emotion. 
We may say, therefore, that hypothesis produces the sensuous element 
of thought, and induction the habitual element.136  
 
We will again address the Stephens criticism in the final section of this chapter and 
speculate what kind of response Peirce might have made.  
     Even though the form of abductive inference ranges outside the commonly 
accepted bounds of formal logic, it is by virtue of its loose resemblance to syllogism and 
its continuity with induction that Peirce was able to later argue that it is both an 
originative method and a logical form.137 It is, however, in a work simply entitled 
“Guessing” from 1907 that Peirce provided the clearest picture of his mature thinking on 
abduction and indicates his growing interest in the instinct. This essay was only partially 
included in the Collected Papers,138 omitting a detailed and disturbing account of an 
instance of racial profiling Peirce used to illustrate how he had once used abductive 
reasoning to recover a stolen gold watch by “guessing” the identity of a “colored” waiter 
he suspected. The complete essay appeared in Harvard’s literary quarterly, The Hound & 
Horn, in 1929.139  In it he claimed that even though abduction operates as surmise, 
conjecture, or guess: 
We may be aided by previous knowledge in forming our hypotheses. In 
that case they will not be pure guesses but will be compounds of 
deductions from general rules we already know, applied to the facts 
under observation, for one ingredient, and pure guess for the other 
ingredient.140 
 
 136. Ibid. 
 137. Anderson, “The Evolution of Peirce’s Concept of Abduction,” 146. 
 138. CP 7.36-48. 
 139. Charles S. Peirce, “Guessing,” The Hound & Horn 2 (Spring 1929): 267-282. 
 140. Ibid., 268. 
 
285 
                                           
 
He went on to explain how such compounds might be formed. 
 
… suppose the surprising facts which puzzle us are the actions of a 
certain man on a certain occasion; and our conjecture relates to the state 
of belief that caused such conduct. If we have no previous knowledge of 
the man, any one state of belief that would account for his conduct might 
be as good a guess as any other; but if we know that he is particularly 
inclined, or particularly disinclined, to extravagant beliefs or any other 
special kind of belief, we still have to guess; only we shall select our 
guess from a small number of possible hypotheses.141 
 
He then tied the whole business of guessing to Darwinian evolution. 
In the evolution of science, guessing plays the same part that variations 
in reproduction take in the evolution of biological forms, according to 
the Darwinian theory. For just as, according to that theory, the whole 
tremendous gulf, or ocean rather, between the moner and the man has 
been spanned by a succession of infinitesimal fortuitous variations at 
birth, so the whole noble organism of science has been built up out of 
propositions which were originally simple guesses.142 
 
It is here that Peirce presents his strongest argument for abduction, namely, that for any 
given phenomenon under investigation there might be “trillions and trillions” of 
hypotheses that could account for it. Notwithstanding the fact that in the mind of the 
investigator this phenomenon might be a special determination by a million other 
phenomena, each of which might, in turn, be shown to be determined by each of the 
others, by the laws of probability it would be nearly impossible for any mind to correctly 
guess the cause of any phenomenon. The chronicles of science are, however, filled with 
one account after another of an investigator beating these odds.   
There are, indeed, puzzles, and one might well say mysteries, connected 
with the mental operation of guessing … There can, I think, be no 
reasonable doubt that man’s mind having been developed under the 
influence of the laws of nature, for that reason naturally thinks 
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somewhat after nature’s pattern. This vague explanation is but a surmise; 
but there is no room to believe that it was merely by luck that Galileo 
and the other masters of science reached the true theories after so few 
wrong guesses as they did. This power of divining the truths of physics –
for such it is, although it is somewhat imperfect – is certainly an aid to 
the instinct for obtaining food, an instinct whose wonders throughout the 
animal kingdom are exceeded only by that of producing and rearing 
offspring.143 
 
Yet it is just this kind of incredible luck that Rorty credits to Galileo in having hit upon a 
vocabulary that enabled him to frame his hypotheses and achieve scientific success.  
Galileo’s terminology was the only “secret” he had – he didn’t pick that 
terminology because it was “clear” or “natural,” or “simple,” or in line 
with the categories of pure understanding. He just lucked out.144   
 
Whether it is, as Rorty suggests, a matter of finding the right jargon with which to frame 
one’s hypotheses and pose the right questions or a capacity for guessing the hypotheses 
that turn out to be the truest representation of nature which accounts for scientific 
breakthroughs, the odds of doing either are, as Peirce indicated, astronomical.  
     William Davis uses a familiar puzzle to illustrate just how long the odds would 
be. To find the correct answer to the next letters in an infinite sequence beginning OTTFF 
…, one would have to pick the ordering principle out of literally an infinite number of 
possibilities.  
For example, here is one wrong solution to the problem: “O” is the 
fifteenth letter in the alphabet; “T” is the twentieth; “F” is the sixth. 
Perhaps the series is constructed by dropping back one letter, and the 
next group is NSSEE, and so on indefinitely, going back to “Z” after 
“A.” This certainly brings a unity to the problem and is a possible 
solution. But perhaps the rule is more complex. Here is another wrong 
solution: Perhaps these letters are the initial letters to the first words in 
the first book in the upper, right-hand corner of the bookcase in my 
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study, and the next letters are the initial letters to the succeeding words 
in that book, and so on through that book and all the other books in the 
bookcase, and then repeat the series … There is no end to wrong 
theories, and to wrong ways to impose a unity on the series.145 
 
Davis’ contention is that to arrive at the correct answer, i.e., the solution that the puzzle’s 
inventor had in mind, would, because of the puzzle’s vagueness, literally take a stroke of 
luck. Even the series OTTFF… repeated infinitely would meet the condition of a possible 
solution and would be, undoubtedly, offered by a computer that was programmed to run 
through all possibilities. According to Peirce’s theory there is not only an appropriate 
answer to the puzzle that abduction suggests to the mind of the investigator, there is a 
sense of knowing that it is the right answer that is instinctive.  
The only way to express Peirce’s theory is to say that the person who 
solves the problem has enough insight into human psychology to know 
or to sense or feel that the correct answer is the kind of answer that 
makes the puzzle significantly interesting to other people. The 
subconscious hones in [sic] on “interesting” solutions, and ignores the 
vast quantity of possible and ad hoc solutions. How a machine could 
answer this puzzle other than by going blindly through every 
conceivable possibility – and whether it could do it even this way in 
anything less than a short eternity, I do not know. And how it could 
recognize the significant answer when it found it, is the second 
problem.146 
 
Such is the reason why Peirce did not believe that machines could be made to reason in 
any but the most superficial sense of the word.147 True reason involves more than endless 
deductions upon infinite hypotheses; it employs insight, an instinct or sense of “knowing” 
what is significant to other minds and, as we will see in the final chapter, such a capacity 
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requires the notion that minds share a common nature, that the content of other minds are 
accessible to us. 
     Peirce credited the human instinct for correct guessing to a natural adaptation. 
Survival of the species is due in large measure to its having acquired certain instincts or 
natural beliefs that relate “in part to forces, in part to the action of minds.”148 Science 
itself “is nothing but a development of our natural instincts.”149 “In fact, the two great 
branches of human science, physics and psychics, are but developments of that guessing-
instinct under the corrective action of induction.”150 As we have noted, Peirce employed 
a term he credited to Galileo for the rational instinct of understanding nature and 
correctly guessing the laws that govern it il lume naturale and likened its operation to the 
instincts of lower animals. Il lume naturale as an instinctive capacity works not only to
help us identify the set of best hypotheses from the trillions of possible solutions but by 
revealing the right hypothesis as the simplest from the standpoint of nature rather t
la Ockham, logic
That truly inspired prophet [Galileo] had said that, of two hypotheses, 
the simpler is to be preferred; but I was formerly one of those who, in 
our dull self-conceit fancying ourselves more sly than he, twisted the 
maxim to mean the logically simpler, the one that adds the least to what 
has been observed … It was not until long experience forced me to 
realize that subsequent discoveries were every time showing I had been 
wrong, while those who understood the maxim as Galileo had done, 
early unlocked the secret, that the scales fell from my eyes and my mind 
awoke to the broad and flaming daylight that it is the simpler Hypothesis 
in the sense of the more facile and naturale, the one that instinct 
suggests, that must be preferred.151 
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Such a caveat, it might be argued, by bifurcating logical and natural simplicity makes 
identification of the best hypothesis, i.e., the naturally simpler, largely a matter of 
question begging. That hypothesis will always be the one that instinct, not logic, 
suggested. But the instinct we are talking about is the logic of abduction or it is merely a 
hunch or pure guess. As if anticipating this criticism, Peirce provided his response in the 
closing paragraphs of the “Guessing” essay.  
      It is not without real significance that Peirce concluded “Guessing” by recounting 
the series of experiments on perception that he and Jastrow had conducted at the Johns 
Hopkins University, experiments that demonstrated “a discrimination below the surface 
of consciousness, and not recognized as a real judgment …”152 The success of abduction 
is “a chapter of the art of inquiry,” according to Peirce, a mystery grounded in two 
leading principles. “I infer in the first place,” he said, “that man divines something of the 
secret principles of the universe because his mind has developed as a part of the universe 
and under the influence of these same secret principles; and secondly, that we often 
derive from observation strong intimations of truth, without being able to specify what 
were the circumstances we had observed which conveyed those intimations.”153 In the 
end, “our faculty of guessing corresponds to a bird’s musical and aeronautic powers; that 
is, it is to us, as those are to them, the loftiest of our merely instinctive powers.”154 
Taking this statement at face value it is nothing short of astonishing to consider that in 
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1903 Peirce had written “If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will 
see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.”155 
 
D.  Reason, Emotion and Sentiment 
     In chapter three we presented Lynn Stephens’ criticism of the analogy that Peirce 
drew between emotion and hypothesis. We will now address it in more detail and 
conclude with an examination of the normative aspect of emotion. This latter study will 
take us to Peirce’s understanding of community, the subject of the final chapter. In this 
section we return to the semiotic aspect of emotion.  
     Stephens’ problem with Peirce centers on Peirce’s alleged cognitivist treatment of 
emotion which should demonstrate how emotion is reducible to cognition. Peirce’s 
attempt to draw a strong analogy between the operations of emotion and hypothesis fails, 
by Stephens’ estimation, to indicate that such a reduction is possible on Peirce’s own 
terms in the essay “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” from the 1868 Cognition 
Series (CP 5.264-317).  
     Peirce’s position, as we have seen, was that “every mental operation consists in a 
succession of thought which proceeds according to and is explainable by reference to the 
rules of valid inference.”156 The emotions as mental processes, hence, should be 
reducible to cognition. Peirce pointed to the evidence. 
                                           
Now every emotion has a subject. If a man is angry, he is saying to 
himself that this or that is vile and outrageous. If he is in joy, he is 
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saying “this is delicious.” If he is wondering, he is saying, “this is 
strange.” In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of something.157 
 
He then claimed that there is a similarity between the mental processes involved in 
emotion and those found in hypothesis or abductive reasoning158 that consists of the 
explanatory nature of emotion in which an emotion substitutes a simple predicate for a 
complicated set of sensations, i.e., for a highly complex predicate. He concluded by 
saying, “if we consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation by means of 
an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate substituted for that 
complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly speaking, is 
hardly possible – the analogy of the parts played by emotion and hypothesis is very 
striking.”159 As Peirce later noted, “hypothesis substitutes, for a complicated tangle of 
predicates attached to one subject, a single conception,”160 thus arguing that there is a 
very strong similarity in these mental operations. Stephens wonders just how far Peirce 
wished to take this analogy and says that from the text, it is hard to tell whether he 
intended it as merely an analogy or was suggesting that emotion is a kind of abduction. 
He goes on to conclude that the balance of Peirce’s remarks in this essay make it clear 
that he did not regard emotions as a type of hypothesis.  
     “There is, it is true,” said Peirce, “this difference between an emotion and an 
intellectual hypothesis.” 
We have reason to say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the 
simple hypothetic predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate 
is true; whereas, in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which 
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no reason can be given, but which is determined merely by our 
emotional constitution.161  
 
In the case of hypothesis we have an argument form  
which proceeds upon the assumption that a character which is known 
necessarily to involve a certain number of others, may be probably 
predicated of any object which has all the characters which this character 
is known to involve. Just as induction may be regarded as the inference 
of the major premiss of a syllogism, so hypothesis may be regarded as 
the inference of the minor premiss, from the other two propositions.162 
  
Stephens explains that hypothetical reasoning commences  
When we observe that some object or state of affairs, S, exhibits a 
puzzling complex of properties, CP. Casting about for an explanation it 
occurs to us that if S were M, where ‘M’ denotes a predicate simpler 
than ‘CP,’ it would not be puzzling that S should be CP. We therefore 
advance the hypothesis that S is M.163 
 
Peirce formally stated the rule of inference in CP 5.276 and ten years later in CP  
2.623 as: 
Whatever is M is CP  
   S is M   
   ∴ S is CP   
 
Stephens reminds us that the argument depicts the logical form but not the temporal 
succession of the thoughts represented. The conclusion ‘S is CP’ is actually what occurs 
first, though it appears last as the thing to be explained by the hypothesis. The (unknown) 
hypothesis is the minor premise but occurs last in the sequence as the thing to be shown. 
The major premiss is only known to us empirically from prior cognitions and, says 
Stephens, may not occur explicitly in our thinking, but must occur implicitly.164  
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      Peirce claimed that in the case of emotion “no reason can be given” for holding 
“that to whatever the hypothetic predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is 
true.”165 Stephens illustrates the point. 
My anger, i.e., my thought that something is vile, arises on the occasion 
of my thinking that something is CP. But, I have no reason to believe 
that there is any connection, empirical or conceptual, between being vile 
and being CP. Hence, the fact that S is vile isn’t a hypothesis and the 
transition from thinking that S is CP and that S is vile isn’t a 
hypothetical argument.166 
 
Emotion, according to the iteration of 1868, follows more closely along the lines of 
sensation than hypothesis.  
The general principle that everything to which such and such sensation 
belongs, has such and such a complicated series of predicates, is not one 
determined by reason (as we have seen, but is of an arbitrary nature. 
Hence, the class of hypothetic inferences which the arising of a 
sensation resembles, is that of reasoning from definition to definitum, in 
which the major premise is of an arbitrary nature. Only in this mode of 
reasoning, this premiss is determined by the conventions of language, 
and expresses the occasion upon which a word is to be used; and in the 
formation of sensation, it is formed by the constitution of our nature, and 
expresses the occasions upon which sensation, or a natural mental sign, 
arises.167 
 
The appeal to the constitution of our nature as whatever cause there is for the transition 
from the thought that S is CP to the emotion – the notion that S is vile, to use his example 
– is, for Stephens, an assertion that refutes Peirce’s own theory of cognition.  
That which distinguishes both sensations proper and emotions from the 
feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material 
quality is made prominent, because the thought has no relation of reason 
to the thoughts which determine it … By there being no relation of 
reason I mean that there is nothing in the content of the thought which 
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explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determining 
thoughts.168  
 
The material quality is a reference to the mere feeling of the emotion or Sensation,169 i.e., 
an “incomplex” thought.170  Cognition is, however, dependent upon the relations of 
reason. “Cognition is a sequence of thoughts in which the propositions expressed by the 
successive thoughts are related by the rules of valid inference. Peirce denies that any such 
relations hold between emotions and the thoughts which precede them.”171 In so doing, 
Peirce has refuted his own cognitivist project.  
       Peirce’s response to Stephens would, I believe, follow a path converging from 
other things he had to say regarding the nature and function of emotion elsewhere in 
“Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” and ten years later in the Illustrations of the 
Logic of Science series for Popular Science Monthly. First, he might remind the reader 
that “we have … seen that every sort of modification of consciousness – Attention, 
Sensation and Understanding – is an inference.172 That would also include emotion, 
instinct and perception, which like sensation and attention, are semiotic, i.e., logical, 
processes. Michael Hoffman acknowledges the “central feature of Peirce’s epistemology 
is that all cognition – from perception to logical and mathematical reasoning – is 
mediated by ‘signs’ or ‘elements of generality.’”173 We noted in the previous chapter, 
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that for Peirce there is clearly evidence of generality in perception and, as it turns out, 
there is even evidence of it in sensa
I am not quite prepared to say what precisely is in my consciousness; but 
of this I am sure, that every memory of a sensation is more or less vague, 
that is, general. Every memory! Why, the sensation itself, when present 
for a few moments, is so …174 
 
To the extent that something is general, it is predicable. Thus there is no mental activity 
which is not, in some manner of speaking, reasonable.  
     Secondly, the conclusion in CP 5.292 that “in the case of an emotion this is a 
proposition for which no reason can be given, but which is determined merely by our 
emotional constitution,” should be interpreted in light of what follows in the next 
paragraph, a passage we examined in chapter three, where in distinguishing sensation and 
emotion, Peirce wrote: 
An emotion … comes much later in the development of thought [than a 
sensation] – I mean, further from the beginning of the cognition of its 
object – and the thoughts which determine it already have motions 
corresponding to them in the brain or the chief ganglion; consequently, it 
produces large movements in the body, and independently of its 
representative value, strongly affects the current of thought.175 
 
And a few paragraphs later he declared that: 
 
Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its own 
peculiar emotion, however slight this might be. This emotion is a sign 
and a predicate of the thing.”176 
 
It is clear that even in 1868 Peirce was moving toward an understanding of emotion as 
part of the reasonable sequence of thought, determined, in part, by the thoughts which 
precede it, as a sign to its object. As we will reiterate in the next section, emotions as 
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signs have interpretants and are interpretants to other signs. The important thing to bear 
in mind is that, as Short notes, “the concept of the interpretant is broader than that of 
consciousness, and applies to many kinds of responses to stimuli in the animal and even 
in the vegetable world that certainly do not involve consciousness.”177 As interpretants, 
our emotions do participate in the rational process of thought, or semiosis, without 
necessarily being cognized as such.  
     In a long section in CP 5.294, Peirce addressed the differences between sensations 
and emotions, on the one hand, and the feeling of a thought, on the other hand. “What 
distinguishes sensations and emotions from thoughts is not the structure of the mental 
processes but the relative prominence of the material quality of the mental action.”178 We 
might say that the physiological manifestation associated with the feeling of sensation 
and emotion eclipses the more subtle feeling of thought. In chapter three we observed 
that one of the difficulties with the theory of 1868 is that it does not provide a means of 
differentiating sensation from emotion, one of the serious problems with James’ theory of 
emotion. It says nothing about emotional affect which, as Savan understood it, has to do 
with variations in the intensity of arousal and agitation and its manifestations in 
involuntary physiological change as well as larger movements of approach and 
withdrawal, the impulse to “fight or flight.”179  
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     What does it mean to be an emotional person as well as a rational being? The 
answer Peirce gave is to be found in the 1877-8 papers of the Popular Science Monthly 
series. There, in the essay entitled “Deduction, Induction Hypothesis,” Peirce stated: 
Now, when our nervous system is excited in a complicated way, there 
being a relation between the elements of the excitation, the result is a 
single disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various sounds 
made by the various instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and 
the result is a peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds 
themselves. This emotion is essentially the same thing as a hypothetic 
inference, and every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such 
an emotion. We may say, therefore, that hypothesis produces the 
sensuous element of thought, and induction the habitual element.180  
 
It is clear from this passage that Peirce believed emotion not only to be a simple predicate 
substituting for a complex predicate, but a hypothetical inference related to the preceding 
thoughts, aiding in the explanation and justification of the actions that follow. Thus, in 
answer to Stephens, we might argue that Peirce did, indeed, clearly indicate how emotion 
is reducible to reason.  
      Peirce’s view of emotions was that they are not value-neutral, as Savan has 
indicated.181  Emotions are evaluated, in a broad sense, as being good or bad. Joy, hope 
and love are deemed to be good, perhaps simply because they accompany sensations of 
pleasure or perhaps because they are regarded by others as honorable or desirable. 
Sorrow, fear, and shame are bad, again, possibly because they occur on occasions of 
experienced pain or discomfort, or for the reason that they are not valued by others. 
Emotions are also judged to be appropriate or inappropriate, justified or unjustified. 
“Sometimes anger is called for and not to be angry is a weakness, but other times anger is 
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a mistake; and so on for sadness, joy, and the rest.”182 We’ve seen how Peirce viewed the 
teleological growth of inquiry, ideas, habits, feelings, the notion of self, literally every 
mode of a sign, and, in chapter three, how this aspect of signs is recognized in and by the 
final interpretant. Savan reminds us that “It is … [Peirce’s] recognition of the importance 
of critical standards for moral action and for logical argumentation that leads him to call 
the final interpretant, alternatively, the normal interpretant.”183 In the case of emotion it 
has, predictably, three aspects.  
It is considered first, as in itself a norm for a sign. Second, it is in a 
dyadic relation to the sign it interprets. And third, it is in a triadic 
relation of assurance to its object through the sign that it interprets.184 
 
     Peirce introduced his theory of logical sentiments in the 1878 Illustrations of the 
Logic of Science series. There he made it clear that they were associated with the business 
of fixing belief, specifically with the rational method of science. 
It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments … as 
indispensable requirements of logic. Yet when we consider that logic 
depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in 
action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of 
our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt 
fail on account of the social impulse, why should we wonder to find 
social sentiment presupposed in reasoning?185  
 
Savan suggests that Peirce had intentionally associated each of the methods of fixing 
belief that he treated in the first essay of this series with one of the three relations derived 
via hypostatic abstraction from the categories. 
In … “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce discussed two other methods of 
dealing with doubt, a method of Firstness that he called the ap priori 
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 183. Savan, “Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion,” 329. 
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method, and a method of Secondness, divided into the two forms of 
tenacity and authority. The three logical sentiments are basic to the 
method of Thirdness, the rational method of science. The first method is 
closely linked with instinctive emotions … the second method is 
associated with the emotions regulated by the church and the state. The 
[three] logical sentiments are fundamental to the all inclusive 
community of those whose actions and emotions are controlled through 
constantly renewed, rational criticism.186 
 
This, according to Savan, gives rise to Peirce’s three-fold classification of emotions.  
     The first category of emotions is comprised of the natural emotions, those that are 
innate, instinctive in the narrowest sense, and have to do with breeding and feeding.187 
These include natural fears, rages, revulsions, joy in warm bodily contact, and grief over 
loss and are observable in human infants and other animals.188 Instinctive emotions find 
their objects of expression without a learning process. Savan raises the question of what 
the final aim of natural emotions might consist in. 
What is their ultimate interpretant, considered in itself, as a monad? 
What is the bad condition that anger, fear, and revulsion tend to remove? 
What is the good state that gives rise to joy? It is not enough answer that 
frustration is the unlearned stimulus for anger, and that warm body 
contact is the unlearned stimulus for joy. We are asking about the final 
interpretant, the end toward which the dynamic interpretants tend.189 
 
Peirce did not reduce the ultimate aim simply to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance 
of pain. He said that we have “an instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind, 
exaggerated into a vague dread of doubt.”190  Admittedly, it might be argued that this is 
nothing more than the motivation of pain avoidance to the extent that Peirce associated 
doubt with a feeling of irritation (CP 5.373), struggle (CP 5.374), and uneasiness (CP 
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5.510). The complement to this unpleasant feeling is not so much pleasure per se but an 
absence of irritation, a homeostatic sense of rest, equilibrium and peace of mind which 
doubt disrupts. However, Peirce does speak of this state as one that is naturally happy and 
self-satisfied.191 This is a state to which one, disturbed by doubt, seeks to return. Pleasure 
is not, in the final analysis, the object that is pursued by the natural emotions, but the 
thing that is associated with joy, i.e., the full stomach and the warmth that the infant 
receives in bodily contact with its mother. In the end, the natural emotion identifies its 
object through the quality of the emotion experienced. “The sign that is interpreted by its 
final interpretant as identifying its objects primarily through the quality of the sign was 
called by Peirce a rhematic sign.”192  
     Besides natural emotions there is a second category of emotions which are 
acquired through experience and moral training. To illustrate the difference between 
natural and moral emotions, Savan asks us to compare the following pairs: anger and 
indignation, annoyance and resentment, affection and benevolence, disgust and contempt, 
fear and guilt, joy and pride. 
In each of these pairs the second member includes a moral norm. I may 
be angry at my car for breaking down on an important trip, but I can be 
indignant only with someone I can blame – say, the garage mechanic. I 
may be annoyed at trivia but I cannot resent them unless I think I have a 
right to be free of interruption. I may be disgusted by a foul meal but I 
reserve my contempt for the cook. The norm is moral. When a sign is 
referred to its moral final interpretant, Peirce called it practical, leaning 
on Kant’s use of that term.193 
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Savan rightly points out that moral emotions, being learned in specific social and 
historical contexts, can never be universal and necessary. External social authorities, 
perhaps religious or political, differ according to place and time, and exert various kinds 
of emotional influence on the authority of an individual’s conscience. “There are 
folkways of right emotion as well as of right conduct.”194 For this reason the final 
intrepretant of a moral emotion is a dicent or dicisign, an indexical representation of its 
object.    
A Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to something as having a real 
being independently of the representation of it as such … Or we may say 
… that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in 
respect to actual existence.195  
 
Indignation, resentment, benevolence, contempt, and guilt can only be represented in 
relation to an actual other by whom or by which one can be truly affected.196 In other 
words, it is unlike a natural emotion which is represented simply by the quality of feeling 
as simply anger, annoyance or fear.  
      Finally, there are the sentiments. “Sentiments are enduring and ordered systems of 
emotions, attached either to a person, an institution, or, in Peirce’s case, a method.”197 By 
way of example, Savan points out that one who loves will experience a full complement 
of emotions that include, but are not limited to, anger, joy, jealousy, sorrow, euphoria, 
embarrassment, disappointment, and contentment. The three logical sentiments198 
provide another example. These sentiments are (1) an interest in an indefinite commun
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(2) recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme, and (3) hope in t
unlimited continuance of intellectual activity and are indispensable requirements of  
logic.199 “To be logical, men must not be selfish,”200 and these sentiments are premised 
upon the possibility of the very kind of self-sacrifice and sympathy with the thoughts of 
others that Peirce deemed essential to scientific progress. “So the social principle is 
rooted intrinsically in logic.”201 He likened the logical sentiments to those of which Paul 
of Tarsus wrote in the Christian Bible, “the famous trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, 
which … are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts.”202  Savan paraphrased the 
relationship of the logical sentiments to the business of scientific inquiry as follows: 
It is a matter of faith or trust that there is a real world which is 
independent of what any man or group of men may think it to be. It is a 
matter of hope that this independent reality can be known eventually 
through the long painstaking process of formulating, clarifying, and 
sifting our theoretical beliefs about it. Beyond the two sentiments of 
faith and hope, the scientist must be moved by the love of truth, that is to 
say, by a willing sacrifice of personal short-term achievement for the 
long-run approximation to an ideally ultimate and stable truth, agreed 
upon by the scientific community.203  
 
We will take a closer look at Peirce’s notion of the sentiment of selfless love or agape in 
the next chapter.     
     Just as Peirce spoke of methods for fixing belief, we have in the logical 
sentiments, according to Savan, a means for fixing emotion.204  The aim of these 
sentiments is “true stability in our beliefs and in our daily lives. Indeed, they convert the 
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goal of stability into a norm for criticizing, rationalizing, and controlling our 
emotions.”205 That stability, Savan suggests, is the final interpretant of the logical 
sentiments, “the secure peace of a contingent, finite, and mortal person.”206  
     The vicissitudes of life promise despair and unrest. The doctrine of chances 
guarantees ruination. 
If [the gambler] plays long enough he will be sure to have such a run 
against him that as to exhaust his entire fortune. The same thing is true 
of an insurance company. Let the directors take utmost pains to be 
independent of great conflagrations and pestilences, their actuaries can 
tell them that, according to the doctrine of chances, the time will come, 
at last, when their losses will bring them to a stop. They may tide over 
such a crisis by extraordinary means, but then they will start again in a 
weakened state, and the same thing will happen again all the sooner.207 
 
Whatever can happen, will happen in the long run. It is, as we will examine more closely 
in the final chapter, our identification with an indefinite community of investigators and 
the hope that that this community, bound together by the altruistic logical sentiments, will 
endure long enough to profit from the business of drawing inferences from 
probabilities.208 
All human affairs rest upon probabilities, and the same thing is true 
everywhere. If man were immortal he could be perfectly sure of seeing 
the day when everything in which he had trusted should betray his trust, 
and, in short, of coming eventually to hopeless misery. He would break 
down, at last, as every great fortune, as every dynasty, as every 
civilization does. In place of this we have death.  
      But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death 
must happen to some man. At the same time, death makes the number of 
our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result 
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uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the 
assumption that this number is indefinitely great. We are thus landed in 
the same difficulty as before, and I can see but one solution of it. It 
seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires 
that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own 
fate, but must embrace the whole community.209  
 
     Elsewhere, sentiment is identified with instinct210 and is linked to the doctrine 
Peirce termed ‘sentimentalism’ or ‘conservatism’ which stresses that “great respect 
should be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible heart.”211 Peirce believed reason 
to be essentially egotistical,212 appealing to sentiment in the last resort.213 It is instinctive 
or sentimental induction that summarizes the collective experience of the human race.214 
“That it is abstractly and absolutely infallible we do not pretend,” Peirce conceded, “but 
that it is practically infallible for the individual … in that he ought to obey it and not his 
individual reason, that we do maintain.”215 In the next chapter we will explore several 
themes stemming from this concurrence of sentiment and the whole experience of the 
unlimited community.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Community: The Social Instinct 
 
No general description of the mode of knowledge 
can be just which leaves out account of the 
social aspect of knowledge. 
This is its very essence. What a thing society is! 
-- Peirce, MS 
  
A.  Inquiry and Community: The Social Theory of Logic 
 
      In this chapter we will examine the fundamental status of the general notion of 
community in Peirce’s work. This will entail a look at how Peirce understood the nature 
of community, his view of the individual human as “a community of cells” and his 
understanding of society as a “greater person.” From there we will study his idea of the 
“community of inquirers,” the ideal “community without definite limits,” through which 
reality is defined and truth is pursued. This will necessitate some understanding of his 
doctrine of agapism, the antithesis of the arrogant individualism, errant subjectivism and 
greed that he viewed as the fruits of the vulgar nominalism permeating nineteenth century 
American culture. It will also require some understanding of the role of community in 
what Helmut Pape has called the normativity of assertion.1 The juxtaposition of logic and 
community is a relatively unexplored area of Peirce’s thought, as James Hoopes 
observes. “Those intellectual historians such as Murray Murphey and Bruce Kuklick who 
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have paid the most attention to Peirce’s actual writings rather than merely the social 
circumstances of his life have recognized the centrality of logic to his thought but have 
not related it to his emphasis on community.”2 This unfortunate fact is, I believe, one 
reason that Peirce’s work has not been as valued as it might otherwise have been.  
     Peirce held that the attainment of knowledge is, as John E. Smith put it, “an 
organic process that is dialectical in the sense that it involves a gradual criticism of what 
is merely private or subjective, and the preservation of the objective and universal.”3 In 
1868 Peirce’s claim was that the act of “thinking is a dialogue that originates between 
different phases of the ego.”4 Forty years later he reiterated that “All thinking is dialogic 
in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, 
all thinking is conducted in signs….”5 From his belief that all thought is in signs, and its 
corollary that all thinking is dialogic in nature, followed what Peirce called his social 
theory of logic. “In time,” says Fisch, “it led him to return to the etymological meaning of 
the adjective ‘scientific’; that is, knowledge-making, or conducive to knowledge … [and] 
to abandon the notion of science as a body of organized knowledge, once-and-for-all and 
infallibly concluded, and to adopt instead the notion that science is what scientists do –
the way of life of the scientific community.”6  
     This view of science turned on two assumptions. First, science can only succeed 
to the extent its practitioners are governed by habits of self-effacement and humility. 
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Peirce variously defended the following values as necessary preconditions of inquiry: the 
passion and joy of learning, fair-mindedness and impartiality, devotion, honesty, probity, 
industry, and cognitive flexibility.7  These attitudes can only be cultivated within the 
scientific community and are embodied in the logical sentiments, consisting of, as we 
have seen, interest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this 
interest being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual 
activity.8 
  
B.  The Nature of Community 
     In chapter four we examined Peirce’s negative view of the self and observed that 
Peirce viewed the individual as the source of ignorance and error, that human beings 
were, to Peirce’s mind, “mere cells on the social organism.”9 In the Lowell Lectures of 
1866 he stated his belief that the individual human being, like any singular term, is in 
actuality a composite.  
Do you say Daniel Webster is an individual? He is so in common 
parlance, but in logical strictness he is not. We think of certain images in 
our memory – a platform and a noble form uttering convincing and 
patriotic words – a statue-certain printed matter – and we say that which 
that speaker and the man whom that statue was taken for and the writer 
of this speech – that which these are in common is Daniel Webster. 
Thus, even the proper name of a man is a general term or the name of a 
class, for it names a class of sensations and thoughts. The true individual 
term [,] the absolutely singular this and that cannot be reached. 
Whatever has comprehension must be general.10 
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Further reflection, however, indicates that Peirce did not so much intend to denigrate the 
individual as he sought to establish the community as an empirically grounded, 
metaphysical entity through which the self as actualized reality is understood and 
knowledge is obtained.  
     His understanding of the communal nature of all life bears some similarity to the 
basic tenets of twentieth century sociobiologists and communitarians. Like a 
sociobiologist, Peirce had an expressed interest in the complex social structures and 
behaviors of various species. Like any communitarian, Peirce held that “society … has 
some of the same reality as does the individual.”11 However, as we have noted above, 
Peirce’s interest in the phenomenon of community went much deeper, down to the 
cellular level. His claim that, “…consciousness is a sort of public spirit among the nerve-
cells,”12 provided a protoplasmic metaphor for his understanding of human community. 
As he remarked on another occasion, “by us, we mean our neighbors, all that are 
embraced in the community, or society, very indefinite to our apprehension of which you 
and I are, as it were, histological cells.”13  
     In this sense, i.e., in terms of the social nature of personal identity, Peirce bears 
some resemblance to the ideal of humanity expressed by Bradley’s “My Station and Its 
Duties.”14 In this model self is realized as it is merged with the whole, as it accepts its 
role and becomes immersed in the performance of its function within the community 
which is, as it is for Peirce, the analog to a biological organism. Bradley himself seems to 
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have sensed the limitations of this analogy. “With a fine disregard for the question of how 
far the comparison of community to organism can be taken, he reminds us that the 
members of the social organism are self-conscious whereas the organs of an animal … 
are not.”15 Given Peirce’s view of self-consciousness as something which the individual 
becomes aware of by becoming aware of the non-self, and his view of matter as effete 
mind, the analogy seems stronger in Peirce’s case than in Bradley’s. However, 
community was, for Peirce no less than for Bradley, something greater than the sum of its 
parts, more than the collection of individuals comprising it. At a practical level there was 
something very important at stake: “…Whether men really have anything in common, so 
that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if so, what the relative 
value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental practical question in regard to every 
public institution the constitution of which we have it in our power to influence.”16  
      As we saw in chapter four, Peirce’s 1892 essay for The Monist, “Man’s Glassy 
Essence,”17 included a discussion of the constitution and behavior of the simplest forms 
of protoplasm. The properties of liquefaction, food assimilation, waste expulsion, growth, 
and reproduction were examined as habits of conduct, wherein one molecule affects 
another, and that, for Peirce, evoked the properties of mind. To the extent that the 
molecules of a slime-mould exhibit reaction to stimuli, a propensity for patterns of 
behavior under controlled conditions, and the occasional departure from regularity under 
unusual conditions, they suggested the elements of mental action. Questions of 
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anthropomorphism aside, Peirce continued by arguing that “all mind is directly or 
indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so that all 
mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter.”18 Mind, no less than matter, is 
governed by habit and the consciousness of habit is a general idea. Furthermore:  
the consciousness of a general idea has a “certain unity of the ego” in it, 
which is identical when it passes from one mind to another. It is, 
therefore, quite analogous to a person, and, indeed, a person is only a 
particular kind of general idea. Long ago … I pointed out that a person is 
nothing but a symbol involving a general idea; but my views were, then, 
too nominalistic to enable me to see that every general idea has the 
unified living feeling of a person.19 
 
     Two things are clearly in evidence here. First, the continuity of matter with mind, 
in which the physical properties of protoplasm exhibit the traits of mental action, presents 
us with a view of the universe as organic in every sense of the word. Secondly, as he 
went on to conclude in this essay, the personification of the world extends to the social 
structures that are comprised of individual persons.  
It is true that when the generalization of feeling has been carried so far 
as to include all within a person, a stopping-place, in a certain sense, has 
been attained; and further generalization will have a less lively character. 
But we must not think it will cease. Esprit de corps, national sentiment, 
sympathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us can fully realize what the 
minds of corporations are, any more than one of my brain-cells can 
know what the whole brain is thinking.20  
 
This allows Peirce to view human communities not only as the analog to colonies of 
social insects and the flocks, herds, and packs of higher animals, within which individual 
behavior can be studied, but also as fundamental and egocentric entities with their own 
habits, exerting forces upon their constituents, forces which the members may not 
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individually cognize, any more than a single affected brain-cell cognizes the thought of 
the whole brain. This view of community becomes paradigmatic for Peirce’s 
understanding of the social nature of logic, reality and truth.  
     This brings us to Peirce’s view of society as a “greater person.” Following his 
assertion that esprit de corps, national sentiment, and sympathy are no mere metaphors, 
he says that “the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities, and 
there are many ordinary observations which, if they were critically examined and 
supplemented by special experiments, might, as first appearances promise, give evidence 
of the influence of such greater persons upon individuals.”21 He follows this with several 
examples, both secular and non-secular in nature, where all the individual members of a 
given group were moved, sometimes without mutual knowledge, acting in unison in some 
capacity as a corporate personality.  
       We should be reminded that Peirce attached the notion of corporate personality to 
the social instincts. Social instincts were those that Peirce saw as adapted to the 
preservation of the species. Sometimes, as he noted, “social instincts are expensive to the 
individual, even dangerous, sometimes fatal.”22 Peirce understood “something that 
Darwin saw straight through to the bottom, that to explain altruistic behavior the unit of 
selection cannot be the individual, since moral acts usually offer him no advantage. The 
unit of selection must be the whole tribe or community.”23  Selfish instincts “are adapted 
to the preservation of the stock, if at all through preserving the individual in whom the 
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instinct acts”; social instincts are “adaptive primarily to the advantage of some other 
individual or individuals than the agent.”24 Thus, the phenomenon of altruism, evidenced 
in many species throughout the animal kingdom, is clearly a social instinct.25 For Peirce, 
altruism was not only noble, but logical, and thus the moral duty of every investigator.   
That logic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate fact, 
nothing which can happen to a man’s self, should be of more 
consequence to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his 
own soul to save the world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. 
So the social principle is rooted intrinsically  in logic.26 
 
This understanding of altruism, as we will see, became central to his understanding of 
inquiry.  
     One final point on Peirce’s view of the nature of community is that it clearly owes 
something to the Greek notion of polis. Though he did not make reference to the idea of 
the polis in his publications, it seems reasonable that his idealized community of minds 
has Hellenistic roots.  Wells acknowledges that for Peirce “the pseudo-terminus [or end] 
of the world is a community of minds; recalling that the best translation of the Greek 
word polis into present-day English is not ‘city,’ ‘state,’ or ‘city-state,’ but ‘community,’ 
we may compare Peirce’s ideal of a world community with the ancient ideal of a 
cosmopolis.”27 Wells draws this conclusion despite, as is well known, Peirce’s having 
paid virtually no mind to political philosophy. The Peircean ‘community of minds’ is the 
aim, or as he put it on one occasion, the “great hope” of human evolution.28 Through the 
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use of one of his favorite metaphors Peirce described this community as the place where 
individual minds and their wills, their ideas, their views and their feelings are “welded” 
together.29  
 
C. Community, Reality, and Probability 
      As we have seen, Peirce postulated three logical or social sentiments which are 
necessary for the grounding or founding of logic and thus presupposed in correct 
reasoning. These social sentiments clearly established the foundational connection 
between virtuous emotions and correct reasoning.30 Bernstein points out that the social 
sentiments also established the elementary status of community. “Peirce saw clearly that 
the notion of community is not like a superstructure resting on a more fundamental 
epistemological and metaphysical foundation, but is intimately bound up with our very 
conceptions of reality, knowledge and semiosis.”31 The idea of the social nature of reality 
was first heralded in the Cognition Series where Peirce had written: “the very origin of 
the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a 
COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of 
knowledge.”32  “The concept of reality implies community, not vice versa.”33 This 
remained a vital tenet of his philosophy for the next forty-five years. Peirce’s work 
during the first decade of the twentieth century especially served to underscore the view 
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first expressed in 1868, that the “ideal perfection of knowledge by which we have seen 
that reality is constituted must thus belong to a community in which this identification is 
complete.”34 
      The social theory of reality begins with the activity of inquiry. “The real is what is 
disclosed through the application of empirical method; it is also called the stable belief 
expressed in that ultimate opinion resulting, in the long run, from the persistent following 
of the method of science.”35 Inquiry, in turn, rests upon the logical sentiments. In 1902 
Peirce had written “all that logic warrants is a hope, and not a belief.”36 Earlier he had 
claimed  that “… when we busy ourselves to find the answer to a question, we are going 
upon the hope that there is an answer, which can be called the answer, that is, the final 
answer … which sufficient inquiry will compel us to accept.”37 Similarly, “when we 
discuss a vexed question, we hope that there is some ascertainable truth about it, and that 
the discussion is not to go on forever and to no purpose.”38 The answer, the ascertainable 
truth, paradoxically, entails hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity 
which implicitly entails the existence of an indefinite community of investigators. As 
Peirce viewed it, reality is bound up in the definition of truth: “The opinion which is fated 
to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the 
object represented in this opinion is the real.”39 Reality, in turn, is the product of an 
idealized intersubjectivity: “The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles 
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 35. Smith, “Community and Reality,” 104. 
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down.”40 As fated or destined, this opinion is one that rests not only on faith in the 
activity of an indefinite community with which one can identify his or her own interests, 
but hope in its continued existence. 
[A]ll this requires a conceived identification of one’s interests with those 
of an unlimited community. Now, there exist no reasons … for thinking 
that the human race, or any intellectual race, will exist forever. On the 
other hand, there can be no reason against it; and, fortunately, as the 
whole requirement is that we should have certain sentiments, there is 
nothing in the facts to forbid our having a hope, or calm and cheerful 
wish, that the community may last beyond any assignable date.41  
 
Such hope is grounded in a theory of probabilistic reasoning, as Christopher Hookway 
explains: 
Inquiry and deliberation rest upon a framework of assumptions and 
standards which function as hopes; and inquirers incur the obligation 
eventually to explain why those hopes were, in fact, warranted. One task 
of (properly scientific) metaphysics is to provide an account of reality 
which explains why those hopes were in fact correct. Although these 
themes became prominent in Peirce’s thought only after the mid-1890s, 
they were implicit in the early discussions of probabilistic reasoning: 
one of the logical sentiments was hope that the scientific community 
would endure for long enough to benefit from the policy of drawing 
inferences on the basis of probabilities.42  
 
The early work in which this explanation was first attempted is entitled “The Doctrine of 
Chances,” the third paper of the six “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” that appeared 
in Popular Science Monthly, an essay which contains the important insight that Hilary 
Putnam calls “Peirce’s Puzzle.”43 
 
 40. CP 6.610. 
 41. CP 2.654. 
 42. Christopher Hookway, “Sentiment and Self-Control,” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy 
of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds. Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997), 211. 
 43. Popular Science Monthly 12 (March 1878): 604-615; also published in CP 2.645-60. See 
Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1987), 80ff. 
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      Peirce’s Puzzle is a way of questioning the propriety of acting according to the 
precepts of logical probability, which is rooted in a kind of hope. As Peirce correctly 
noted: 
the idea of probability essentially belongs to a kind of inference which is 
repeated indefinitely. An individual inference must either be true or 
false, and can show no effect on probability; and, therefore, in reference 
to a single case considered in itself, probability can have no meaning.44  
 
In vital matters of choice based on an inference that cannot be repeated, such as Peirce’s 
hypothetical decision involving personal immortality or Putnam’s suggested substitute of 
a choice between an easy death and a hard death, one would reasonably opt for whatever 
strategy that would increase his or her odds of gaining the desirable outcome.45  
[I]f a man had to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing 
twenty-five red cards and a black one, or from a pack containing twenty-
five black cards and a red one, and if the drawing of a red card were 
destined to transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to 
consign him to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought 
to prefer the pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although, 
from the nature of the risk, it could not be repeated. It is not easy to 
reconcile this with our analysis of the conception of chance.46  
 
The question for Peirce is why should he or she choose from the pack of predominately 
red cards? Probable inference is based on repeated and repeatable outcomes, employing 
the method of success frequencies found, for instance, in actuarial calculations. In 
situations that are not repeatable, that are by definition limited to a single situation, we 
are confronted with Peirce’s Puzzle.  
 
 44. CP 2.652. 
 45. Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, 81. 
 46. CP 2.652. 
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      Citing Reichenbach’s position that probability statements concerning 
unrepeatable cases are simply a fictitious transfer of our knowledge of relative 
frequencies over time, Putnam notes that: 
the very statement that Jones will have only one chance in twenty-five 
[sic] of eternal felicity this one time … is a ‘projection.’ There is no fact 
about the single unrepeatable situation which is the fact that [the choice 
of a card from the pack of predominantly red cards] gives Jones twenty-
four chances out of twenty-five [sic] of eternal felicity. Peirce’s problem 
comes out very clearly if we take the view that probability just is relative 
frequency in the long run. The person in the situation knows a fact 
which is utterly irrelevant to what he should do. He knows that if there 
were a series of situations like this one, then he would have eternal 
felicity twenty-four times out of every twenty-five if he were to choose 
[from the pack of predominantly red cards] each time. But a person can 
have eternal felicity or everlasting woe only once! His problem is not 
how to achieve eternal felicity twenty-four times out of every twenty-
five; his problem is to obtain eternal felicity this time.47  
 
Why, therefore, should one pick from the pack of predominately red cards? Peirce’s 
answer is an appeal to altruism and community. By identifying my interests with those of 
the indefinite community, Peirce asserted that I am able to infer the reasonableness of 
selecting a card from the pack of predominantly red ones. I would be acting on a rule that 
would, if employed by the fellow members of my community, produce eternal felicity 
twenty-five times out of twenty-six. This is a logical fact and no mere individualistic 
projection.  
     Putnam believes this reasoning is akin to the ethical reasoning of Rule 
Utilitarianism: “in choosing this arrangement I am supporting, and helping to perpetuate, 
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a rule which will benefit mankind (or the community of rational investigators) in the long 
run.”48  For Peirce:  
this makes logicality attainable enough. Sometimes we can personally 
attain to heroism. The soldier who runs to scale a wall knows that he 
probably will be shot, but that is not all he cares for. He also knows that 
if all the regiment, with whom he identifies himself, rush forward at 
once, the fort will be taken. In other cases we can only imitate the virtue. 
The man whom we have supposed as having to draw from the two 
packs, who if he is not a logician will draw from the red pack from mere 
habit, will see, if he is logician enough, that he cannot be logical so long 
as he is concerned only with his own fate, but that man who should care 
equally for what was to happen in all possible cases of the sort could act 
logically, and would draw from the pack with the most red cards, and 
thus, though incapable himself of such sublimity, our logician would 
imitate the effect of that man’s courage in order to share his logicality.49 
 
Putnam, however, sees this response as highly unlikely. The identity of one’s own 
interests with those benefiting members of the community is out of place in just such a 
case.  
Can it really be that the reason I would choose [to select a card from the 
pack of predominantly red cards] is that I am altruistic? Maybe I am, but 
isn’t it obvious that I would choose [this] arrangement first and foremost 
because it would avoid everlasting woe in my own case? … If my only 
reason for believing that I should be reasonable were my beliefs about 
what will happen in the long run if I act or believe reasonably, then I 
would have absolutely no reason (apart from the implausible reason of 
altruism) to think it better to be reasonable in an unrepeatable single case 
like the one described.50  
 
     So far as it goes, Putnam’s dismissal of Peirce’s solution of “a conceived 
identification of one’s interests with those of an unlimited community”51 as incredible, is 
compelling. Hookway concedes there is ample evidence that the appeal to altruism in a 
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case of vital concern, i.e., the question of one’s eternal happiness or woe, is probably the 
product of Peirce’s own confusion regarding the differing demands of rationality in 
matters of theory and practice during the 1870s.52 As Peirce came to believe, matters of 
vital concern must be settled without recourse to probabilistic calculation, to scientific 
reflection about the long run and the good of the community. Thus it would appear that 
appeals to altruism and the long-run benefit to the community are out of place in such 
fateful decisions and matters of vital concern.  
 
D. Agapism  
     As we observed in chapter four, Peirce harbored a lifelong suspicion toward all 
forms of individualism. The process of inquiry is clearly no individual affair. Reality, no 
less than truth, is tied to the opinion of the community. “The real, then, is that which, 
sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore 
independent of the vagaries of me and you.”53 This assertion, as we’ve seen, rests upon 
the logical sentiments which embody the notion of a community. The notion of 
community is made possible because the law of love is operative as a creative force in the 
universe.  Peirce developed what he termed his agapism54 in the final essay of the five 
part series for The Monist. In this last essay, a highly romanticized piece he called 
“Evolutionary Love,”55 he attempted to spell out his belief that agape operates as one of 
three discernible types of evolution. Evolutionary love entails sentimentalism which, as 
                                            
 52. Hookway, “Sentiment and Self-Control,” 218. 
 53. CP 5.311. 
 54. Of this doctrine, Wiener observed that “for sheer speculative audacity [it] was a worthy rival 
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we noted in the last chapter, is “the doctrine that great respect should be paid to the 
natural judgments of the sensible heart.”56 It is the force that makes possible the 
communicability of feeling and the sympathy of ideas.57  
       Agapism is contrasted with evolution by natural selection or fortuitous variation 
and evolution by mechanical necessity. Evolution by fortuitous variation is associated 
with the theory of Darwin and is termed tychasm.58 Interestingly, this essay betrays 
Peirce’s ambivalence toward Darwinian evolution. Evolution by mechanical necessity is 
associated with the thought of Karl Nägeli, Albert von Kölliker and August Weismann 
and is termed anacasm.59  Juxtaposed with tychasm and anacasm is the theory that Peirce 
associated with Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck’s theory. 
Evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity are 
conceptions warring against one another. A third method, which 
supersedes their strife, lies enwrapped in the theory of Lamarck. 
According to his view, all that distinguishes the highest organic forms 
from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little 
hypertrophies or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their 
lives, and have been transmitted to their offspring. Such a transmission 
of acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking … Its 
action is essentially dissimilar to that of a physical force; and that is the 
secret of the repugnance of such necessitarians as Weismann to 
admitting its existence.60 
 
Habit, which is merely inertia, acts upon the novel forms generated by Lamarckian 
evolution by codifying changes.  
Habit … forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the 
structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, 
gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, 
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habit plays a double part; it serves to establish the new features, and also 
to bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of 
the animals and plants to which they belong. … [T]he reader … will see 
that this account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general 
description of the action of love …61 
 
     As its name suggests, the theory of agapism (alternately “agapasm” or 
“agapasticism”) has theological roots, and, as far as providing a context for what is 
purported to be a scientific explanation of the universe’s functioning, this is unfortunate. 
Peirce’s description of evolutionary love is certainly laced with religious idiom, and as 
was the case with his depiction of the logical sentiments, the notion of agape clearly 
owed something to the Pauline missives of the Christian Bible. However, as Hausman is 
quick to point out, “the conceptual advantages it has as a hypothesis for interpreting 
evolution can be offered without reference to Christianity.”62   
        Peirce required several things from agapism. In language oddly reminiscent of 
Whitehead’s metaphysical writings, he suggested that there “probably in nature is some 
agency by which complexity and diversity is increased.”63 Later, in “Evolutionary Love,” 
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this agency through which “new elements of form are first created,” is tied to Lamarck’s 
theory and labeled in a distinctly Peircean term as “energetic projaculation.”64 Secondly, 
agape supplies the need for a source of uniformity in nature.65 As we saw in the last 
chapter, the interaction of spontaneity and mechanical necessity produces “another kind 
of causation, such as seems to be operative in the mind of the formation of associations, 
and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature could have been brought 
about.”66 This view of nature, Hausman points out, allowed Peirce to establish a 
continuum between chance and necessity, “the idea of lawfulness as inseparable from 
spontaneity, which is one of the conditions under which agape functions.”67 As we noted, 
Peirce claimed elsewhere in the Monist series, that “mind, no less than matter, is 
governed by habit.”68 Thirdly, Peirce needed agapism to establish the objectivity of mind 
as an agent in the universe, apart from the mere feeling or “inward aspect” of the 
individual self.  
… by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how 
little – be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount – we gain room to 
insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is 
needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is 
entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing we 
resolve to problem of the connection of soul and body.69  
 
 
issue of the extent of Peirce’s unrecognized influence is a genuine one.” [From Joseph Brent, “The Singular 
Experience of the Peirce Biographer,” see Arisbe website: http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/ 
library/aboutcsp/brent/singular.htm (accessed September 2008)]. 
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Finally, agapism provided Peirce with the mechanism of what he termed “developmental 
teleology,” the means by which the universe becomes self-intelligible and self-actualized, 
without the operation of either rigid necessity or pure chance.  
      Agape, the third form of evolution, incorporates elements of both tychism and  
 
anacasm. “Agapasm is evolution that includes chance and necessity and something else: 
it is the synthesis of chance and necessity, which is not reducible to either or to both 
simply added together.”70 Agapism provides the dynamic, self-determining, and 
ultimately purposive element of the universe. Through creative love Peirce was able to 
impose the principle of continuity on the workings of the universe.  
     Endowment of the universe with the element of harmonious, self-determining 
continuity implied, for Peirce, a moral principle. Progress toward an end could be 
possible only to the degree that individual will was superseded by selfless love. It is at 
this point that his hypothesis for interpreting evolution took on a decidedly Manichean 
flavor and his religious bias was revealed.  
Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes 
from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his 
neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is 
that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for 
himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot 
whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the 
Gospel of Greed.71   
 
The evangelist of this Gospel of Greed was clearly Darwin.  
 
The Origin of Species of Darwin merely extends politico-economical 
views of progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable life. The 
vast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold the opinion that the 
true cause of those exquisite and marvelous adaptations of nature for 
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which, when I was a boy, men used to extol the divine wisdom, is that 
creatures are so crowded together that those of them that happen to have 
the slightest advantage force those less pushing into situations 
unfavorable to multiplication or even kill them before they reach the age 
of reproduction. Among animals, the mere mechanical individualism is 
vastly reënforced as a power making for good by the animal’s ruthless 
greed. As Darwin puts it on his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; 
and he should have added for his motto: Every individual for himself, 
and the Devil take the hindmost!72  
 
Peirce was certainly not alone in seeing Darwin as having extended to the human animal 
a materialist view of nature, with its cold-blooded will-to-survive-at-all-costs imbued in 
the heart of every individual creature. Richards argues that by the close of the nineteenth 
century, this was a common view that fueled much of the conflagration over evolution. 
Such a view was, however, at variance with the facts. “Darwin, perhaps more forcefully 
than any of his disciples, attempted to infuse human nature with an authentic moral sense: 
altruistic behavior did not disguise a more fundamental utilitarian selfishness but instead 
revealed a divine spark lighting the rest of nature.”73 The moral sense of human beings, 
understood as a motivating feeling to act on behalf of others or suffer the pangs of guilt 
for resisting it was, for Darwin, a species of social instinct, and was to be understood as 
the capacity of the individual to see him or herself in relation to others, bonded to social 
wholes, the preservation of which was in the ultimate interest of each member.   
Social instincts comprised behaviors that nurtured offspring, secured 
their welfare, produced cooperation among kin, and organized the group 
into a functional unit. The principal mechanism of their evolution, in 
Darwin’s view, was community selection: that kind of natural selection 
operating at levels of organization higher than the individual. The degree 
to which social instincts welded together a society out of its striving 
members depended on the species and its special conditions. Community 
selection worked most effectively among the social insects, but Darwin 
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thought its power was in evidence among all socially dependent animals, 
including that most socially advanced creature, man.74  
 
We have already noted Peirce’s understanding and description of the social instincts and 
the considerable influence of Darwin on his thinking. This characterization of Darwin as 
the purveyor of the gospel of greed in biology can thus best be viewed as a straw man. 
Darwin’s understanding of community selection certainly has parallels to Peirce’s general 
understanding of community and his theory of moral sense as a capacity for altruistic 
action has much common ground with Peirce’s own views.  
  
E. Community and Normativity 
 
       Peirce’s interest in the normative sciences was a relatively late development. It 
was largely an outgrowth of his attempts to refine and redefine his pragmatism in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. His interest was focused primarily on logic as a 
regulative principle; only in this way did it extend to ethics and aesthetics, and then only 
in the most general way. By this time, he had shifted his thinking to the view that logic 
was part of semiotic. In a 1908 letter to the British mathematician and philosopher, 
P.E.B. Jourdain, he wrote:   
We think in signs; and indeed meditation takes the form of a dialogue in 
which one makes constant appeal to his self of a subsequent moment for 
ratification of his meaning in respect to his thought = signs really 
representing the objects they profess to represent. Logic therefore is 
almost a branch of ethics, being the theory of the control of signs in 
respect to their relation to their objects.75 
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Brent contends that Peirce’s newly found interest in ethics also resulted from Peirce’s 
finally coming to see the connection between his professional and economic failings and 
his moral turpitude.  
[Peirce] said of himself, “For long years I suffered unspeakably … from 
ignorance of how to go to work to acquire sovereignty over myself.” His 
despair and self-loathing finally drove him to change his ways, and in 
1905, he was reconstructing the pragmatism of the “Illustrations” of 
twenty-seven years before so that it would show not only its origin in the 
doctrine of signs, but its dependence on ethics, the requirement for self-
control.76  
 
Helmut Pape sees both of these sources of Peirce’s reconstructed pragmatism as 
intertwined and inseparable. This conclusion is traceable to Peirce’s own restatement of 
the pragmatic maxim in 1905: 
I will restate [the pragmatic maxim of 1878] in other words, since 
ofttimes one can thus eliminate some unsuspected source of perplexity 
to the reader. This time it shall be in the indicative mood, as follows: 
The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all 
general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the 
possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the 
acceptance of the symbol.77 
 
Four paragraphs later, Peirce added, “For it is to conceptions of deliberate conduct that 
Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport of symbols; and deliberate conduct is 
self-controlled conduct.”78  The use and control of signs to express beliefs and to direct 
action is an ethical concern and, of course, what has ethical implication also has social 
and political implication.  
      In 1903, Peirce described what he meant by the ethics of assertion. 
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wrote:  
                                           
… an act of assertion supposes that, a proposition being formulated, a 
person performs an act which renders him liable to the penalties of the 
social (or, at any rate, those of the moral law) in case it should not be 
true, unless he has a definite and sufficient excuse; and an act of assent 
is an act of the mind by which one endeavors to impress the meanings of 
the proposition upon his disposition, so that it shall govern his conduct, 
including thought under conduct, this habit being ready to be broken in 
case reasons should appear for breaking it.79  
 
Pape’s interpretation of Peirce’s pragmatism seems to be that assenting to a proposition 
(i.e., believing it to be true) and asserting a belief (i.e., publicly pronouncing it to be true) 
involves normativity in two distinct, but related senses.  
     In the first sense, “the proposition is an inner habit of thought or ‘thought-sign’ 
that structures the behavior of the thinker of this proposition.”80 The second sense 
follows from the act of public assertion of a belief and results in accountability for the 
truth of what is asserted under threat of public sanction or consequence.81 Peirce did not 
make it entirely clear just what such penalties might entail, though his biography woul
have undoubtedly provided a fair sampling. He does, however, give us a hint in a later 
passage on assertion. In a 1905 letter to James he 
Now an assertion belongs to the class of phenomena like going before a 
notary and making an affidavit, executing a deed, signing a note, of 
which the essence is that one voluntarily puts oneself into a situation in 
which penalties will be incurred unless some proposition is true. One 
may maintain that every proposition involves an assertion. Very likely 
that may be true as a psychological truth; but if so the element of 
assertion is frequently altogether or in great degree inhibited and 
disavowed. I have nothing further to say about assertion.82 
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In other passages, Peirce likened the notion of assertion to a promise of future payment, 
and to swearing an oath in court.83 Presumably, social sanctions include, but likely are 
not exhausted by, legal penalty. Certainly one who asserts, promises, or swears falsely 
also runs the risk of social stigma and ostracism for having violated the moral law. In a 
lengthy letter to Welby on signs and the categories, he expressed himself on the subject 
three months before the missive to James just quoted.   
According to my present view (I may see more light in future) the act of 
assertion is not a pure act of signification. It is an exhibition of the fact 
that one subjects oneself to the penalties visited on a liar if the 
proposition is not true. An act of judgment is the self-recognition of a 
belief; and a belief consists in the deliberate acceptance of a proposition 
as a basis of conduct.84   
 
In any event, within the first few years of the twentieth century, Peirce had come to see 
assertion as involving something more than the mere utterance of thought-signs. It is, “as 
Peirce put it elsewhere, ‘an action that is related to our thought’ (MS 599, 1902, & in MS 
499/499s, 1906) by which we take responsibility for the truth of a proposition.”85 Tom 
Short claims that, at least in this sense, Peirce’s position presaged Austin’s famous 
dictum that saying “’I know that …’ is a sort of ‘performative’ utterance, akin to saying 
‘I promise,’ making one vulnerable to censure if what is said turns out not to be true.”86  
      The act of public assertion, by which the declarer becomes liable for social and 
moral sanctions, refers us back to the social status of normativity for the belief that is 
asserted. Pape explains that “what determines the validity of an assertion as well as the 
validity of the rules I am using is … independent of my conduct as an individual: there 
 
 83. CP 5.546. 
 84. CP 8.337. 
 85. Pape, “Pragmatism and the Normativity of Assertion, 525. 
 86. T.L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 243.  
 
329 
s 
                                           
can be no inferential or semiotical rules which are valid for me alone.”87 A social theory 
of logic, or logic viewed “almost as a branch of ethics,” implies that my interests and the 
interests of the community are one in the use of signs. This identification, or as Peirce 
called it ‘personification,’ becomes instinctive through enculturation.   
Cannot a man act under the influence of a vague personification of the 
community and yet according to a general rule of conduct? Certainly: he 
so acts when he conforms to custom … Conformity to a norm may take 
place by an immediate impulse. It then becomes instinctive imitation. 
But here the man does not vaguely personify the community, but puts 
himself in the shoes of another person, as we say. I call this putting of 
oneself in another’s place, retroconsciousness.88  
 
      As we learned in chapter three, such norms are symbols. “A Symbol is a sign 
which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of 
general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that 
Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, a legisign.”89 Symbols represent their 
objects by incorporating a habit or habits of interpretation.90 “Such is any utterance of 
speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that 
signification.”91 Finally, “every symbol is an ens rationis, because it consists in a habit, 
in a regularity; now every regularity consists in the future conditional occurrence of fact
not themselves that regularity.”92  Or, in the slightly different way Peirce stated it earlier 
in the same essay,  
The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something surely will 
be experienced if certain conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will 
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 92. CP 4.464 (1903). 
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influence the thought and conduct of its interpreter. Every word is a 
symbol. Every sentence is a symbol. Every book is a symbol. Every 
representamen depending upon conventions is a symbol.93 
 
    Thus, Pape concludes   
The reason why the normativity of belief depends on its social status and 
the reason why we have to accept the sanctions of social obligations, if 
the belief does not fulfill the required standards, is the role the belief 
plays in the communicative and inferential use for us or in a community 
of interpreters. If other people trust my assertion, they will use what I 
say as a premise for their inferences and interpretations – as I do with 
theirs. For this reason, the meaning of my beliefs depends on what, in 
the long run, the community of investigators will accept as valid logical 
inferences and interpretations. It is the inferential and communicative 
context of a community of reasoners/interpreters for which the meaning 
and seriousness of assertions is important.94 
 
      Pape goes on to explore the social status of the logical rules themselves in 
Peirce’s writings, a study beyond the scope of the present work, but integral to the grand 
work that Peirce proposed in his grant application to the newly formed Carnegie 
Institution in 1902. There, in answer to his own question “What am I prepared 
deliberately to accept as the statement of what I want to do, what am I to aim at, what am 
I after?”, he would demonstrate, in the span of a planned three dozen “Memoirs on 
Minute Logic,” that “logic is a means of attaining the end of thought,” that “life can have 
but one end” [and] “it is Ethics which defines that end.”95 The irony was that, the esteem 
with which the Peirce family was held by Harvard community (his grandfather had been 
the University’s first historian, his father Benjamin, a highly revered professor and 
founding member of the National Academy of Sciences, his brother James, dean of the 
 
 93. CP 4.447. Dates have been inserted to indicate Peirce’s focus on this subject during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. 
 94. Pape, “Pragmatism and the Normativity of Assertion,” 535. 
 95. CP 2.198. 
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Mathematics department, and his other brother Herbert, an under-Secretary of State), the 
social and political connections he enjoyed and the favors he could cull in support of his 
Carnegie application (those who wrote letters to the grant committee in support included 
his first cousin, Henry Cabot Lodge; the astronomer and aeronautics pioneer, Samuel P. 
Langley; the bridge-builder and engineer, George S. Morison; the mathematician, 
William Pepperell Montague; the psychologists J. McKeen Cattell and William James; 
and even President Theodore Roosevelt, “whom Peirce’s cousin Senator Lodge had 
fascinated with the tale of Peirce’s life”) was not enough to overcome his reputation for 
personal and professional failure.96  The grant application was denied, in part the residual 
outcome of his banishment from the academy and twenty years of self-imposed exile in 
the wilds of northeastern Pennsylvania. He remained a pariah to the community of 
investigators he lauded as so vital to the pursuit of truth.  
 
 
 
 96. Brent, Peirce: A Life, 278ff. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A:  The 1903 Classification of the Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 1903 Classification of the Sciences.  Reproduced with 
permission of the author and publisher from Kelly A. Parker, The 
Continuity of Peirce’s Thought (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1998), 37.
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Appendix B:  Peirce’s Drawing of the Serpentine Wall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Peirce’s Drawing of the Serpentine Wall. Reprinted by permission of the 
publishers from the COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE; 
VOLUMES 1-6, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; VOLUMES 7-8, edited 
by Arthur Burks, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Copyright © 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1958, 1960, 1961 by the President and 
Fellows of Harvard College.  
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Appendix C: 
Ayim’s Catalog of the Instincts from the Writings of Charles S. Peirce 
 
I. Instincts Related to the Physical Sciences: 
(1) Theoretical instinct – the example Peirce gives is that man 
instinctively places phenomena and their causes in close spatial 
proximity (CP 8.223); 
(2) The gnostic instinct – curiosity (CP 7.58). (2) is closely related to (1); 
(3) The power of the human mind to divine the truth, or the method of 
hypothesis (MS 652, p.14, CP 1.630, 5.591, 6.491); 
(4) Instincts which assist the investigator in giving certain hypotheses 
priority over others for initial testing (CP 8.223) – (4) is closely related 
to (3); 
(5) The belief that there is an element of order in the universe (CP 6.496) 
(6) Respect for the physical sciences (MS 668, pp. 10-11); 
(7) Most reflection – Peirce claims that this instinctive reflection, which 
consists essentially in reconsidering ideas and asking whether they 
appear reasonable, is quite different from the operation of reason (CP 
7.606) 
(8) The bulk of simple reasonings (CP 2.181) 
(9) The instinct for obtaining food (CP 1.118, 7.39) 
 
II. Instincts Related to Psychology: 
(10) Man’s natural psychology, or mass of opinions about the mind -Peirce 
notes that this body of beliefs, contributing much towards our welfare, 
is at least partly instinctive, for it is shared by the lower animals (CP 
2.753, 7.421) 
(11) Sexuality (MS 668, p.11) 
(12) Reproductive instincts (CP 7.379), closely related to (11) and under        
which (13) and (14) are subsumed; 
(13) The instinct for producing offspring (CP 1.118, 7.39) 
(14) The instinct for rearing offspring (CP 7.39); (See also Category I, (7) 
and (8); 
 
III. Instincts Related to Basic Human Attributes: 
(15) Speech, to which Peirce refers as “man’s instinctive vehicle of 
thought” (MS 654, First Copy, p.4) 
(16) Instinct for communication (CP 7.379), closely related to (15), and 
under which (17) and (18) are subsumed; 
(17) Instinct for cries and songs (CP 7.379); 
(18) Instinct for facial expressions (CP 7.379); 
(19) The gust instinct or pleasure principle (CP 7.58); 
(20) Walking (MS 693a, pp. 16-18); 
(21) Instinct for locomotion and migration (CP 7.379); 
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IV. Instincts Related to less Basic Human Attributes: 
(22) Instinct for games (CP 7.379) 
(23) Instincts for medicine – e.g., dogs eating grass (CP 7.378); 
(24) Ferocity (MS 668, p.11) 
(25) Instincts for war (CP 7.378); 
(26) Instincts for self-concealment (CP 7.378); 
(See also Category III, (19)); 
 
V. Instincts Related to Religion 
(27) The belief that there is a God (CP 6.501) – religion itself is a 
generalization of sentiment or instinct (CP 1.676); 
(See also Category I, (5)); 
 
VI. Instincts Related to Moral Beliefs: 
(28) Aversion to incest (CP 5.445, 6.570); (See also Category X, (36), and 
(37)); 
 
VII. Instinct Related to Art and Literature: 
(29) Poetry, which is a generalization of sentiment or instinct (CP 1.676); 
(See also Category III, (16), (17) and (18)); 
 
VIII. Instincts Related to Indubitable Beliefs: 
(30) The belief that fire burns (CP 5.498) 
 
IX. Instincts Related to Shelter: 
(31) Architectural instincts – e.g., construction of cobwebs (CP 7.379); 
(32) Instincts of working materials – e.g., tree falling instinct of beavers, 
instinct of woodpeckers, and all instinctive mechanical skills (CP 
7.378) 
(33) Instinct for clothing (CP 7.379); 
(34) Instinct for adornment and decoration (CP 7.379); 
(35) Instinct for collecting and hoarding useless things – e.g., rats magpies 
(CP 7.378); (See also Category IV, (26)); 
 
X. Instincts Related to Etiquette 
(36) Instinct for manners – e.g., the conviction that nudity among adults in 
public places is socially unacceptable (CP 2.160) 
(37) Instinct for personal cleanliness (CP 7.378); (See also Category IX, 
(33) and (35)).  
 
Figure 3. Ayim’s Catalog of the Instincts from the Writings of Charles S. Peirce. 
Reproduced by permission of author from Maryann Ayim, Peirce’s View of the Roles of 
Reason and Instinct in Scientific Inquiry (Meerut, India: Anu Prakashan, 1982), 23-25.
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